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Abstract 
This thesis analyses Russia's military, economic and diplomatic policies towards the newly 
independent states, particularly towards the members of the CIS, during Boris Yeltsin's first 
term as President of an independent Russia (December 1991 to July 1996). The objective is to 
determine whether after the collapse of the Soviet Union the new Russian state tried to restore 
a sphere of influence or informal empire over the former Soviet republics - as the French did 
in sub-Saharan Africa after decolonisation - or whether instead Russia's policies reflected a 
genuine desire to establish normal state-to-state relations with the new states. 
Chapter one analyses the underlying principles of Russia's foreign policy towards the former 
Soviet states and examines the debate on Russian foreign policy priorities which took place 
during the first years of Russia's independence. This section also overviews Russia's policies 
towards the Russian minorities that inhabit the Baltic states, in order to determine whether 
Russia attempted to use this diplomatic tool to further its own interests in the area. Chapter 
two analyses the peculiar structure of the Commonwealth of Independent States and the 
extent to which Russia used this political framework to achieve hegemony over the former 
Soviet republics. Chapter three looks at Russia's participation in the wars in Transdniestria, 
Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabagh, and Tajikistan, and Chapter four analyses Russia's energy 
trade with Ukraine, Belarus, and the Caspian states. 
The thesis reaches the conclusion that during 1992- mid 1996 Russia's policies only partially 
reflected an attempt to reassert the country's influence over the republics of the former Soviet 
Union and create an informal empire in the post-Soviet space. Russia's behaviour was 
particularly assertive in the military field as well as in its attempts to build a Russian- 
dominated CIS military infrastructure. However, Russia's policies were less aggressive in the 
economic sphere, except probably as far as energy policy is concerned, and regarding the fate 
of Russians living beyond the new borders. More often than not, though, Russia's policies 
followed an ambivalent and incoherent pattern, a result of the weak and fragmented character 
of the Russian state. 
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Note on Transliteration 
The current thesis has used the Library of Congress transliteration system. However the 
letter q has been translated by 'ya' instead of `ia'. In the text, the usual forms Boris 
Yeltsin, Evgeny Primakov, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, Gennady Zyuganov, Arkady Volsky, 
Evgenv Shaposhnikov, Vladimir Semyonov, Yegor Gaidar and Boris Fyodorov have been 
used, instead of Boris El'tsin, Evgenii Primakov, Vladimir Zhirinovskii, Gennadii 
Ziuganov, Arkadii Volskii, Evgenii Shaposhnikov, Vladimir Semenov, Egor Gaidar and 
Boris Fedorov. In the footnotes and bibliography, names of Russian authors, whose works 
are in English or French, have been left as originally transliterated by the publishers. 
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Introduction 
The break up of the Soviet Union in 1991 entailed a profound transformation of the 
geopolitical landscape in the Eurasian land mass. A truncated Russian state, surrounded 
by a series of politically and economically fragile newly independent states, emerged in 
the territory of the former USSR. This created a fundamental problem, namely whether 
Russia, having lost vast amounts of land and over 25 million ethnic nationals would be 
able to discard its imperial legacy and consider the new states as independent and entirely 
sovereign entities of international law, or whether instead, its leaders would attempt to 
restore Russia's hegemony over the post-Soviet space. The current thesis analyses in 
detail Russia's military, economic and diplomatic policies towards the newly 
independent states, particularly towards the members of the CIS, during Boris Yeltsin's 
first term as President of an independent Russia (December 1991 to July 1996). The 
objective is to determine whether after the collapse of the Soviet Union the new Russian 
state tried to restore a sphere of influence or informal empire over the former Soviet 
republics - as the French did in sub-Saharan Africa after decolonisation - or whether 
instead Russia's policies reflected a genuine desire to establish normal state-to-state 
relations with the new states. In other words, whether bilateral and multilateral co- 
operation between Russia and the former Soviet states (FSS) tended to approach the 
model of -symmetric' relations, which Hendrik Spruyt defined as a situation in which 
privileged ties are established with the former Soviet states, but the new states are not 
penalised for choosing policies that do not correspond entirely to Russia's interests, and 
relations are based on voluntary contracting. 1 The weak and fragmented character of the 
new Russian state, however, also allowed for some incoherent and ambivalent policy, not 
really following a clear pattern of behaviour. In order to assess properly Russia's policies 
towards the FSS, the thesis will determine whether Russia's pro-active policies in the 
area responded to legitimate state interests or whether instead they were motivated by an 
`imperial design' and a desire to restore an `informal empire' or `neo-empire' over the 
former Soviet states. 2 The work will focus particularly on the CIS states, given that 
Russia's policies towards those states were particularly assertive, especially after 1992. 
During 1992-1996, the Baltic states remained of great significance to Russia, primarily 
Hendrik Spruyt, `The Prospects for Neo-Imperial and Non-Imperial Outcomes in the Former 
Soviet Space', in The End of Empire? The Transformation of the USSR in Comparative 
Perspective, (hereafter, The End of Empire? ), eds. Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott, London and 
New York, 1997, pp. 3 16-317). 
2 Throughout this work, the concept of informal empire and neo-empire will be used 
interchangeably. 
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because of the presence of a large Russian-speaking community, and the existence of 
important military installations, such as the Skrunda early-warning radar station. 
Moreover, the Baltic states hosted port facilities and transit routes which allowed Russia 
to access the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad, and Western markets. However, there 
seemed to be an acknowledgement, broadly shared among members of the Russian elite, 
that Russia 'had lost' this traditionally significant region, as indicated by the readiness to 
withdraw all Russian troops, and the lack of pressure exercised over these countries so 
that they join the CIS and its military, political and economic institutions. 3 Russia's 
policies towards the Baltic states will therefore be addressed in a less extensive manner. 
Legitimate state interests will be defined as those interests pursued by a country's 
leadership for the sake of preserving the state's territory and protecting its own people, 
such as preventing conflict and instability along the country's external borders, 
preserving regional stability, preventing the spread of crime, weapons, drugs and illegal 
immigrants into the country, maintaining and developing economic links with major 
trading partners, preserving open trade routes, protecting citizens or co-ethnics living 
beyond the borders. In order for these interests to be legitimate, their pursuit must not 
contradict the agreed principles of international law governing inter-state relations. The 
Helsinki Final Act, to which all former Soviet states abided when signing the CSCE Paris 
Charter for a New Europe, defines the following ten principles of inter-state relations: 
respect for sovereignty and sovereign equality, non-resort to the threat or use of force, 
inviolability of frontiers, territorial integrity, peaceful settlement of disputes, non- 
intervention in internal affairs, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, equal 
rights and self-determination of peoples, co-operation among states, and fulfilment of 
international obligations. ' However, it might well be possible that state interests are 
pursued not in accordance with international law, but they are still not aimed at 
establishing a neo-empire. 
As far as the concept of informal empire or neo-empire is concerned, Miles Kahler 
defines it as a `looser and more geographically circumscribed system of influence [than 
the previous empire] over militarily weak and economically dependent societies. '5 Bruce 
' Vasilii Lipitskii, `Kogda zhe budet pereotsenka tsennostei', Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 26 June 1992. 
Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), Final Act, Helsinki, 1975, US 
Department of State, Publication 8826; Charter of Paris for a New Europe, CSCE, Paris, 19-21 
November, 1990, (www. osceprag. cz). These principles are in agreement with, and complement, 
those upheld by UN member states in the UN Charter (art. 2 and art. 51). 
5 Miles Kahler, `Empires, Neo-empires, and Political Change: The French and British Experience' 
(hereafter, `Empires, Neo-empires, and Political Change'), in The End of Empire?, p. 289. 
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Parrott, in turn, argues that an informal empire entails the domination by the metropolitan 
state of the external and internal affairs of other nominally independent states. 6 Hendrik 
Spruyt adds another important element. He notes that hegemonic relations develop when 
the symmetry of benefits diminishes, and the contracting process becomes less 
voluntary. ' Informal empire will therefore be defined as an area, usually composed of 
former colonies, over which the dominant power - or former mother country - has a 
substantial capacity to influence the external and internal developments, and over which 
other countries are denied a hegemonic presence. This capacity to influence events is 
usually obtained as a result of an important military, economic and diplomatic presence, 
and/or the development of close military, political and economic ties. It does not 
however, involve an effort to wrest formal sovereignty from the other countries, which is 
a trait specific of imperialist policies. 8 Informal empire, however, does entail the partial 
surrender of sovereignty by the former colonies to the former metropolis - for example, 
by ceding control over external borders, over the economy or the currency, or over 
foreign policy. This crucial aspect of informal empire is highlighted by David A. Lake, 
who argues that informal empires differ from their more formal counterparts only in the 
breadth of residual rights of control transferred from the subordinate state. ' 9 Whereas in 
formal empires, the metropolis' control over the rights belonging to the subordinate 
partner is nearly total, in informal empires, the control is substantial but less than 
complete. Finally, a clear motivation to create systemic dependency must be present, for 
policies to be classified as neo-imperial ist. 1° Informal-empire building will therefore be 
defined as the process whereby the former metropolis establishes an informal empire 
over its former colonies. 
I. The Imperialist Argument 
So far we have assumed that the Soviet Union was an empire. However, if we are to 
discuss whether Russia is able to discard its `imperial legacy', and if we are to compare 
its post-Soviet behaviour with the French experiences in post-colonial Africa, we must 
6 Bruce Parrott, `Analysing the Transformation of the Soviet Union in Comparative Perspective', 
The End of Empire?, p. 14. 
Hendrik Spruyt, `The Prospects of Neo-Imperial and Non-Imperial Outcomes in the Former 
Soviet Space', p. 317. 
8 Karen Dawisha, `Conclusion', in The Making of Foreign Policy in Russia and the New States of 
Eurasia, eds. Adeed and Karen Dawisha, The International Politics of Eurasia, 4, New York and 
London, 1995, p. 341. 
9 David A. Lake `The Rise and Fall of the Russian Empire: A Theoretical Interpretation', in The 
End of Empire?, p. 22. 
10 Karen Dawisha, `Conclusion', p. 341. 
10 
explain first why we consider the Soviet Union to be an empire. Michael W. Doyle 
defines empire as a `relationship, formal or informal, in which one state controls the 
effective political sovereignty of another political society. "' Miles Kahler, in turn, refers 
to two fundamental dimensions which distinguish imperial rule from other forms of 
international relations: hierarchy of power, as opposed to devolution of decision-making; 
and monopoly of external ties, as opposed to diversification of external relations. 12 
Hierarchy means that one society - the metropolis or centre - assumes supreme decision- 
making authority over internal and external polices. ' 13 On the basis of these definitions, 
we may conclude that an empire entails tight centralised control over the external and 
internal relations of distinct political communities. In the Soviet Union, Moscow 
exercised a monopoly of control through the Communist Party, the military and the 
security structures over the external and internal polices of very distinct political 
societies, such as the developed and westernised Baltic regions, the more primitive 
Muslim societies of Central Asia, the various ethnic groups inhabiting the Caucasian 
mountains and Transcaucasian regions, and the Slav republics of Belorussia and Ukraine. 
These distinctions were deepened by the creation of ethnically defined territorial- 
administrative units - the union republics, autonomous republics and autonomous oblasts 
- which were usually based on historical ethnic homelands, and helped to sustain or 
deepen distinct national identities among the principal ethnic minorities. These 
considerations therefore argue in favour of classifying the USSR as an empire. 
Ghita Ionescu, in turn, refers to three basic elements, which characterise empires, all of 
which were present in the Soviet Union: first, a strong political centre, animated by a 
historical mission of expansion; second, religious or ideological coercion; and third, a 
`sense of final purpose' in its elite. 14 Marxist-Leninist ideology, embedded with a sense 
of mission, provided a powerful instrument of external expansion and a very effective 
instrument of coercion. According to Dominic Lieven, empire implies possession of 
wide-spread territories inhabited by peoples varying widely in their history, ethnicity, 
religion and culture, as well as a considerable degree of direct administrative supervision. 
An empire, in his view, must be a great power, play a major role in shaping not just the 
international relations but also the values and culture of an historical epoch. 15 In this, 
sense, then, the Soviet Union can also be considered an empire. Mark R. Beissinger adds 
" Michael W. Doyle, Empires, Ithaca and London, 1986, p. 45. 
12 Miles Kahler, `Empires, Neo-empires and Political Change', p. 287. 
13 ibid. 
14 Ghita lonescu, The Break-up of the Soviet Empire in Eastern Europe, Baltimore, MD, 1965, p. 7 
a very valuable element to the various definitions of empire listed above - the `subjective' 
dimension. 16 Beissinger emphasises that the most important aspect of any imperial 
situation is perception; in other words, whether politics and policies are accepted as 
ours' or rejected as 'theirs. ' The latter case implies both a well-developed sense of 
separate group identity and a recognition of the illegitimacy of the existing polity's 
authority. ' In his view, empire should be understood not as a thing, but as a set of 
practices that give rise to perceptions and claims that the polity represents a 
fundamentally alien rule, an `other. "' Although it is correct to assume that in many areas 
of the Soviet Union the perception of being ruled by an `alien', illegitimate authority was 
very weak, as for example in Central Asia or Belarus, in other areas of the Soviet Union, 
in particular the Baltic States, Georgia, and to a certain extent in Moldova and 
Azerbaijan, the sense of belonging to a different political and ethnic polity, and of being 
ruled by `alien' Russians was very strong. In this sense, therefore, we can also argue that 
the Soviet Union was, to all intents and purposes, an empire - although a very peculiar 
one, given the physical proximity of its `colonies' and the efforts of its leaders to develop 
a high sense of equality among all ethnic groups, by fostering the emergence of a Homo 
Sovieticus, which tended to blur the imperial character of the political entity. 
Was the Soviet Union a Russian Empire? Russian dissident Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn 
rejected the idea that it was, arguing instead that the Soviet Union was a Communist 
empire. " John Dunlop and Alan Besancon also refused to consider the USSR a Russian 
empire. 19 Besancon argued that the Russian people did not enjoy any special privileges, 
as the French and the British had in their own empires. The `advantages' enjoyed by 
Russians, according to Besancon, derived from their support of communism and not from 
their being Russian. In other words, although Russians were seen as the surest allies of 
communism, they enjoyed a privileged position mainly because of their loyalty to the 
regime. A similar position was adopted by Paul Kolstoe, who argued that `the most 
important dividing line in Soviet society, namely that between the haves and the have- 
15 Dominic Lieven, `The Russian Empire and the Soviet Union as Imperial Polities', Journal of 
Contemporary History, 30,1995, pp. 608-609. 
16 Mark R. Beissinger, `The Persisting Ambiguity of Empire', Post-Soviet Affairs, 11,1995,2, 
pp. 149-184. 
" ibid., p. 155. 
18 Aleksander Solzhenitsyn, `Misconceptions about Russia are a Threat to America', Foreign 
Affairs, 58, Spring 1980,4, pp. 797-834. 
19 John Dunlop, `Russia: Confronting the Loss of Empire', in Nations and Politics in the Soviet 
Successor States, eds. Ian Bremner and Ray Taras, Cambridge, 1993, pp. 45-46; Alain Besancon, 
`Nationalism and Bolshevism in the USSR', in The Last Empire: Nationality and the Soviet 
Future, ed. Robert Conquest, Stanford, 1986, pp. 10-11. 
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nots, was not related to ethnic criteria but determined by membership or non-membership 
of the ruling elite. '20 In other words, the privileged came from distinct ethnic origins and 
belonged to the nornenklatura. It can well be argued that in some respects there was total 
equality among ethnic groups, given that Soviet citizenship was extended to Russians and 
non-Russians alike, and Russians, like other nationalities, very much suffered at the 
hands of communist leaders, especially, although not only, when they displayed too overt 
a support for Russian nationalism. Moreover, individual Russians did not enjoy any 
special privileges when living in the non-Russian republics, and the Russian Soviet 
Federal Socialist Republic (RSFSR) was deprived of such essential symbols of official 
Soviet recognition as a separate Russian Communist Party, Academy of Sciences and 
Central Committee. However, as Bruce Parrott correctly pointed out, many other 
considerations do argue in favour of classifying the USSR as a Russian empire. 
Moscow's policies towards mass education and senior political appointments were based 
on the assumption that the Russian culture and language were superior to those of other 
nationalities. -' The official status of the Russian language, the dominant position of 
Russians in republican and national governing structures, as well as in the army and the 
police, secured the dominant status of the Russian people and ensured the absence of 
threats to their own ethnicity. " On the basis of these assumptions, therefore, it can well 
be argued that the Soviet Union was, to a great extent, a Russian empire. However, it 
should be recalled that the status of Russians fluctuated significantly over time. Under 
Stalin, for example, the Russians were clearly more favoured than they had been both 
before and after. But during the post-Stalinist period, the Russian diasporas were still 
culturally and linguistically privileged in relation to other non-titular ethnic groups. 23 
The `imperial character' of the Soviet Union allows us to make some interesting 
comparisons with the French experience, given that France devised and successfully 
implemented a system of influence over its former colonies in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Although France had an overseas empire, as opposed to the Soviet Union which was a 
contiguous empire, the French still considered the empire to be part of France - they 
named it `France d'outre-mer' - and consequently, experienced a major national 
identity 
crisis during the stages of decolonisation, similar, although probably not as acute, as the 
20 Paul Kolstoe, Russians in the Former Soviet Republics, London, 1995, p. 103. 
2' Bruce Parrott, `Analysing the Transformation of the Soviet Union in Comparative Perspective', 
pp. l 1-12. 
22 Michael Rywkin, `The Russia-Wide Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR): Privileged or 
Underprivileged? ', in Ethnic Russia in the USSR: The Dilemma of Dominance, ed. Edward 
Allworth, New York and Oxford, 1980, pp. 180-187. 
23 Paul Kolstoe, Russians in the Former Soviet Republics, p. 103. 
13 
crisis experienced by Russia after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Moreover, as 
was the case with Russia when the Soviet Union collapsed, France had to deal with the 
legacies of empire in its colonies - i. e. a vast number of military garrisons, important 
economic interests, substantial cultural penetration, as well as the presence of a 
significant number of French immigrants who had settled in the African continent. This 
makes the comparison between the disintegration of the Soviet Union and French 
decolonisation all the more valuable, and certainly more appropriate than, for example, a 
comparison with American policies in Central America or Soviet policies in Finland. In 
the latter examples, we are not dealing with the setting up of spheres of influence over 
territories that belonged to the great power, but with contiguous areas that fall under the 
influence of a major neighbouring power. 
The French state managed to establish a `neo empire' in sub-Saharan Africa. A network 
of bases and a system of bilateral defence agreements allowed France to keep an 
important military presence in the area - about four thousand troops were stationed in 
Djibouti, and smaller numbers in Senegal, Gabon, Chad, and the Central African 
Republic. Almost two thousand African officers were trained in France each year, and 
France sent one thousand military advisers to twenty-three African states. 24 In the 
economic field, France established control over the currencies, central banks, fiscal 
policies, and treasuries of all but two of its former colonies through the Franc Zone, thus 
tying the colonies' economies very closely to the former mother country. 25 France also 
negotiated preferential trade agreements with its former colonies and paid higher than 
world prices for African raw materials. French investment and targeted financial aid 
flowed, as well as large resources devoted to the propagation of French language and 
culture - key elements in retaining elite loyalties to France. 
26 Intelligence co-operation 
became the norm between France and its former colonies in Africa, and on several 
occasions French troops intervened to preserve friendly governments against internal 
threats, such as in the Central African Republic, the Congo, Gabon, Niger, Mauritania, 
and most recently in Chad. In the diplomatic sphere, France succeeded in establishing co- 
24 John Chipman, French Power in Africa, Oxford, 1989, pp. 109-111. 
25 Gerard Destanne de Bereis, `Some Aspects of the Economic Relationship between France and its 
Ex-colonies', in Decolonisation and After: the British and French Experience, eds. W. H. Morris- 
Jones and Dennis Austin, London, 1980, pp. 107-127. The common currency, the CFA franc, was 
pegged to the French franc at a rate of 50: 1. Members of the franc zone enjoyed a number of 
advantages, such as a freely convertible currency guaranteed by France, access to pooled reserves 
to deal with external shocks, and low inflation rates, since monetary policy was effectively 
removed from national control. 
26 Hendrik Spruyt, `The Prospects for Neo-Imperial and Non-imperial Outcomes in the Former 
Soviet Space', p. 301. 
14 
operation with its former African colonies at the United Nations and regular Franco- 
African summits reinforced the ties between France and the leaders of francophone 
Africa. -' This system of tight military, economic and diplomatic co-operation allowed 
France to maintain a `neo-imperial' system in its former African colonies for over thirty 
years. 
2. The Imperialist Argument and the Current Literature 
Most of the early literature examining Russia's relations with the former Soviet states 
argued that Russia was conducting an assertive neo-imperialist policy aimed at restoring 
an empire of a new kind in the former Soviet space, and disregarded the element of 
restraint which was also present in Russian behaviour. This thesis will disagree, to a 
great extent, with these `imperialist' views, which are to be found, for example, in the 
work of Fiona Hill and Pamela Jewett. 28 By examining Russia's involvement in the 
conflicts that erupted in the former Soviet states, as well as the general lines of Russia's 
policy towards the former Soviet republics, Hill and Jewett concluded that after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia tried to recreate the former economic and military 
union it once dominated. Following a similar line of interpretation, Thomas Goltz argued 
that Russian leaders conducted a conscious policy of stirring up conflicts in the 
Transcaucasus in order to preserve Russia's influence in the area. 29 After analysing the 
wars in Nagorno-Karabagh and Abkhazia, and the fall of the Azerbaijani President 
Abulfaz Elchibey in the Spring of 1993, Goltz reached the conclusion that `Russian 
policy appears to be based on the tacit threat of dismemberment of those states that wish 
to leave Moscow's orbit. 31 
Likewise, the various essays in the book edited by Uri Ra'anan and Kate Martin, Russia: 
A Return to Imperialism?, argued that Russia's doctrines and operations reflected 
imperialist behaviour. 31 Sergei Grigoriev, for example, claimed that `the war in Tajikistan 
27 ibid. 
28 Fiona Hill and Pamela Jewett, `Back to the USSR': Russia's Intervention in the Internal Affairs 
of the Former Soviet Republics and the Implications for the United States Policy towards Russia, 
Ethnic Conflict Project, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge 
Ma., January 1994. Other short articles that refer to Russia's neo-imperialist behaviour: Richard 
Pipes, `Imperial Russian Foreign Policy', Times Literary Supplement, May 20,1994, pp. 3-5; Peter 
Reddaway, `The Role of Popular Discontent', The National Interest, 31, Spring 1993. 
29 Thomas Goltz, `Letter from Eurasia: The Hidden Russian Hand', Foreign Policy, 92, Autumn 
1993, pp. 92-116. 
30 ibid., p. 92. 
31 Russia: A Return to Imperialism, eds. Uri Ra'anan and Kate Martin, Institute for the Study of 
Conflict, Ideology and Policy, Boston University, Basingstoke and London, 1995. 
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reached such a large scale because Russia decided to support the most reactionary 
communist-Islamic fundamentalist regime [in the country, thus] obstructing the growth of 
democracy. ' 32 He also argued that in November 1993, the Russian government pushed 
Central Asia away from the ruble zone, thus placing the reformist regimes in Kyrgyzstan 
and Kazakhstan on the verge of bankruptcy. 33 Uri Ra'anan in turn, expressed the view 
that Russia's assertion of dominance over the former Soviet states, which was being 
conducted with the use or threat of force, was a manifestation of post-Soviet Imperialism. 
He also argued that the war in Chechnya [had demonstrated], that `after largely 
successful efforts to extend Russia's de facto borders by reabsorbing [the] former Soviet 
republics', Moscow recognised no limits on the means that [it could] use to consolidate 
its empire, whether within the Russian Federation or beyond. ' 34 Similarly, Ariel Cohen 
argued that the Russian military and security services, the former Gosplan and the 
various Russian branch ministries had started in early 1992 a struggle for the re- 
establishment of the empire through military covert action, as well as diplomatic and 
economic measures. 35 
Similar views regarding Russia's assertive behaviour were expressed by Bruce D. Porter 
and Carol R. Saivetz. 36 According to these authors, after the end of the Soviet Union, 
Russia attempted to reassert its influence over the former Soviet states through a wide 
range of political, military and economic pressures and inducements, such as the 
revitalisation of the CIS, manipulation of oil and gas deliveries, diplomatic support for 
Russians living in the CIS, fiscal inducements, and outright military blackmail. Porter 
and Saivetz claimed that `whether originating from domestic political pressure or an 
objective reassessment of Russia's own interests, the concrete political result was a 
partial reincarnation of a Russian empire, or at least a well-defined sphere of influence, 
throughout the territory of the former Soviet Union. '37 Following a similar line of 
argument, William E. Odom and Robert Dujarric maintained that Russian leaders used 
the CIS as an instrument for the restoration of Russia's economic and military power 
32 Sergei Grigoriev, `Neo Imperialism: The Underlying Factors', in Russia: A Return to 
Imperialism, p. 4. 
33 ibid., p. 6. 
34 Uri Ra'anan, `Imperial Elements in Russia's Doctrines and Operations', in Russia: A Return to 
Imperialism, p. 28. 
35 Ariel Cohen, `Revisiting Russia's Turbulent Rim: Caucasus, Central Asia, and Moldova', 
Russia: A Return to Imperialism, pp. 87-103. 
36 Bruce D. Porter and Carol R. Saivetz, `The Once and Future Empire: Russia and the `Near 
Abroad', The Washington Quarterly, 17,1994,3, pp. 75-90. 
37 ibid., p. 77 
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over the states of Central Asia and Transcaucasia. 38 Peter Truscott also claimed that 
Russia was trying to dominate its former Soviet neighbours by flexing its economic, 
political and military muscle. 39 Likewise, Mark Smith suggested that, despite its manifold 
weaknesses, Russia was powerful enough to attempt to establish a `Pax Russica' 
throughout the near abroad. 4° Stephen E. Miller also considered that Russia's policies 
towards the near abroad in the fields of peacekeeping, military and economic integration, 
and bilateral trade, tended increasingly to approach the model of `domination. ' 41 
Domination implied a strategy whereby Russia treated the former Soviet Union as its 
sphere of influence and emphasised its unilateral interests and prerogatives. 
Taking a similar view, Mark Beissinger also claimed that Russia was trying to restore a 
sphere of influence over the new states of the former Soviet Union. In his view, Russia 
for the most part, denies the legitimacy of the collapse of its past state-building projects, 
seeks to extend its influence over the new system of states, and even openly seeks to 
reintegrate these new states under its lead. ' 42 According to Beissinger, this resulted from 
the difficulties that Russian elites were experiencing in coming to terms with the loss of 
empire. Renee de Nevers also raised a similar point when she wrote that `Russia no 
longer appears willing to accept the independence of the rest of the former Soviet Union 
as a given. Instead, it is increasingly open to negotiation - or blackmail. ' 
43 Gerhard 
Simon also held the view that the neo-imperial rhetoric was increasingly becoming part 
of the policies of the Russian government. This explained, according to Simon, why 
Russia was having difficulty in treating the former Soviet states as truly independent, 
38 William E. Odom and Robert Dujarric, Commonwealth or Empire? Russia, Central Asia and the 
Transcaucasus, Hudson Institute, Indianapolis, 1995. 
39 Peter Truscott, Russia First: Breaking with the West, London and New York, 1997. 
40 Mark Smith, Pax Russica: Russia's Monroe Doctrine, Whitehall Paper Series, The Royal United 
Services Institute for Defence Studies, London, 1993. John Lough also argued that a widespread 
suspicion of a Russian neo-imperial design had developed among the newly independent states, to 
a great extent due to the instability and indeterminacy of Russia's behaviour. (John Lough, Russia's 
Influence in the Near Abroad: Problems and Prospects, Conflict Studies Research Centre, The 
Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, Camberley, August 1993). 
'H Stephen E. Miller, `Russian National Interests' in Damage Limitation or Crisis?: Russia and the 
Outside World, eds. Robert D. Blackwill and Sergei Karaganov, CSIA Studies in International 
Security, 5, Washington and London, 1994, pp. 77-106. 
42 Mark Beissinger, `State Building in the Shadow of an Empire-State: The Soviet Legacy in Post- 
Soviet politics', in The End of Empire?, p. 161. Ilya Prizel takes a similar view. (Ilya Prizel, 
National Identity and Foreign Policy, Cambridge, 1998. ) 
43 Renee de Nevers, Russia's Strategic Renovation - Russian Security Strategies and Foreign 
Policy in the Post-Imperial Era, Adelphi Paper, 289, July 1994, p. 72. 
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although it recognised them as such in December 1991, and was conducting an 
increasingly expansionist policy in the area. " 
Another line of interpretation, with which this thesis tends to coincide, sees Russia's 
behaviour towards the former Soviet states as assertive, but driven above all by pragmatic 
state concerns, which derived from its dominant position within the former Soviet space. 
Karen Dawisha argued that, as the largest and strongest country of the former Soviet 
Union, Russia found itself in a position of enormous comparative advantage after the 
Soviet Union collapsed. 45 According to her, Russian leaders often, but not always, 
exercised this advantage to the detriment of the other new states . 
46 Although Russia's 
policies were not aimed at re-establishing an empire, Dawisha argued that the area 
surrounding Russia's borders was bound to remain critical to its well-being and security, 
and was to develop into what Michael MccGwire called a `national security zone. '47 A 
similar view was taken by Hannes Adomeit, who argued that, from the second half of 
1992 to early 1994, Moscow did indeed in several instances act unilaterally, applying 
military-political pressures and intervening as if it had a droit de regard in the former 
Soviet Union. 48 However, Adomeit claimed that even during that period, the overall 
character of Russian external policies was not one of restoration of empire and 
abandonment of co-operation with the West. 49 Similar views are expressed by Neil 
44 Gerhard Simon, `La Russie: une hegemonie eurasienne? ', Politique Etrangere, 59, Spring 1994, 
1, pp. 29-48. 
Karen Dawisha, `Constructing and Deconstructing Empire in the Post-Soviet Space', in The End 
of Empire?, p. 356-357. 
46 Similarly Rajan Menon argued that despite the lack of support among the Russian population to 
risk war or spend large sums of money to re-create the Soviet Union, the Russian government 
would probably conduct a policy of pre-eminence in the post-Soviet space. This was determined by 
Russia's historical legacy of colonial control over Transcaucasia and Central Asia, the 
overwhelming superiority of its power, and geographic proximity. Russia would not attempt to 
restore the Soviet Union, but would simply remain the dominant power in the region. (Rajan 
Menon, 'After Empire: Russia and the Southern "Near Abroad", in The New Russian Foreign 
Policy, ed. Michael Mandelbaum, Council on Foreign Relations, New York, 1998, pp. 100-166. ) 
`" According to MccGwire, the conceptual distinction between an empire and a national security 
zone is more than a difference of degree. The former has no basis in current international norms or 
laws, the latter allows one to focus on the natural interplay of relations between great powers and 
smaller states, an interplay in which great powers are infinitely more constrained than imperial 
powers and in which small states have significantly more leeway than colonies. (Michael 
MccGwire, Perestroika and Soviet National Security, Washington DC, Brooking's Institution, 
1991, cited by Dawisha, `Constructing and Deconstructing Empire in the Post-Soviet Space', 
p. 356). 
`' Hannes Adomeit, `Russia as a `Great Power' in World Affairs: Images and Reality', 
International Affairs, 71,1995,1, pp. 35-68. 
49 ibid., p. 58. This view is also held by Hendrik Spruyt, who asserted that Russia had not sought to 
re-establish an empire over the former Soviet states, although in certain areas it had pursued an 
assertive policy. (Hendrik Spruyt, `The Prospects of Neo-Imperial and Non-imperial Outcomes in 
the Former Soviet space', pp. 323,330). 
18 
Malcolm and Alex Pravda, according to whom, economic, military and political 
pressures were applied in 1993 to forward Russia's interests and to bring the CIS 
governments into line. 50 However, Pravda and Malcolm argue that Russia's policies were 
not as assertive as they initially seemed. There was a strong reluctance in Moscow to 
make material sacrifices for the sake of CIS partners. Moreover, by 1994, domestic 
political weakness contributed to a lack of clarity in policy, and thus to the absence of a 
coherent and effective policy. 51 These views coincide to a great extent with the 
conclusions reached by the current thesis, which argues that Russia's policies only 
partially fitted into a neo-imperialist pattern. ' 
3. Testing the Imperialist Argument 
In order to properly assess the nature of Russia's relations to the FSS, particularly to the 
CIS states, and in order to determine correctly whether it was aimed at building an 
informal empire in the post-Soviet space, the thesis first analyses the underlying 
principles of Russia's foreign policy towards the FSS and examines the overall debate on 
Russian foreign policy priorities which characterised the first years of Russia's 
50 Neil Malcolm and Alex Pravda, `Introduction', in Neil Malcolm, Alex Pravda, Roy Allison and 
Margot Light, Internal factors in Russian Foreign Policy, The Royal Institute of International 
Affairs, Oxford, 1996, pp. 7-10. 
5'Ibid. Mark Webber also makes reference to the existing limits of Russia's great power revival and 
its attempts to create a sphere of influence, a result of its weak economic performance and reduced 
military means. (Mark Webber, The International Politics of Russia and the Successor States, 
Manchester and New York, 1996, pp. 348-350). Similar views are expressed by Leon Aron, `The 
Foreign Policy Doctrine of Post-Communist Russia and its Domestic Context', in The New Russian 
Foreign Policy, pp. 33-42. 
52 Besides the above-mentioned works, there is a whole body of literature that does not address the 
neo-imperialist question directly. However, a great deal of the material, both explicitly and 
implicitly contained in it, is relevant to the argument of the current thesis, such as the work edited 
by Celeste A. Wallander, The Sources of Russian Foreign Policy After the Cold War, which deals 
with the domestic factors that influenced Russian foreign policy (Celeste A. Wallander, The 
Sources of Russian Foreign Policy After the Cold War, The Harvard University Russian Research 
Center, Harvard, 1996), and the work edited by Adeed and Karen Dawisha, The Making of Foreign 
Policy in Russia and the New States of Eurasia, which analyses Russia's foreign policy from a 
domestic perspective by examining the mechanisms and institutions involved in foreign-policy 
formulation. (The Making of Foreign Policy in Russia and the New States of Eurasia, eds. Adeed 
and Karen Dawisha, New York and London, 1995). Also relevant to the current thesis is the 
following work: The Emergence of Russia's Foreign Policy, eds. Leon Aron and Kenneth M. 
Jensen, The United States Institute for Peace, Washington DC, 1994; Karen Dawisha and Bruce 
Parrott, Russia and the New States of Eurasia: The Politics of Upheaval, Cambridge, 1994; 
Alexander Rahr and Joachim Krause, Russia's New Foreign Policy, Arbeitspapiere zur 
internationalen Politik, 91, Bonn, 1995; Mette Skak, From Empire to Anarchy: Post-Communist 
Foreign Policy and International Relations, Hurst, 1996; Russia and Europe: The Emerging 
Security Agenda, ed. Vladimir Baranovsky, SIPRI, Oxford, 1997; Barnett R. Rubin and Jack 
Snyder, Post-Soviet Political Order, London and New York, 1998; Wynne Russell, `Russian 
Relations with the "Near Abroad"', in Russian Foreign Policy Since 1990, ed. Peter Shearman, 
Boulder, Co., San Francisco, Oxford, 1995. 
19 
independence. A close look is taken at the official policy concepts and ideas of Russian 
decision- makers regarding Russia's national interests in the post-Soviet space. 53 What 
did Russian leaders consider to be the boundaries of the Russian state? What area did 
Russia regard as its strategic space? Did Russia feel entitled to defend the sovereignty 
and territorial integrity not only of Russia but of the other CIS countries as well? What 
populations did Russian leaders consider as Russian and therefore entitled to protection? 
What were Russia's national interests and how did they differ from Russia's former 
imperial interests? What were the threats to the territorial integrity and survivability of 
Russia? Having clarified Russia's leaders' views on the configuration of the Russian 
state and its national interests, the research then examines Russia's military, economic 
and diplomatic policies towards the republics of the former Soviet Union in order to 
determine to what extent and how Russia was attempting to restore its previous influence 
in the area. This chapter also overviews Russia's policies towards the Russian minorities 
that inhabited the FSS. '' By looking at the Baltic case, it analyses whether Russia 
attempted to use this diplomatic tool to further its own interests in the area. 
The research then analyses the peculiar structure of the Commonwealth of Independent 
States and the extent to which Russia used this political framework to achieve hegemony 
over the former Soviet republics, during 1992-mid 1996. It then examines the processes 
of military and economic integration within the CIS in order to determine whether Russia 
conducted an assertive policy aimed at restoring some sort ofrenewed union. 55 In the 
economic field, the thesis examines Russia's trade and monetary policies within the CIS 
53 Relevant literature on foreign policy thinking: Margot Light, `Foreign Policy Thinking', in Neil 
Malcolm, Alex Pravda, Roy Allison, and Margot Light, Internal factors in Russian Foreign Policy, 
The Royal Institute of International Affairs, Oxford, 1996, pp. 33-100; Rethinking Russia's 
National Interests, ed. Stephen Sestanovich, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 
Washington DC, 1993; Marie Mendras, `Towards a Post-Imperial Identity', and Aleksei Arbatov, 
'Russian Foreign Policy Thinking in Transition', in Russia and Europe: The Emerging Security 
Agenda, pp. 90-103 and 135-159. 
54 Relevant literature on Russian minorities living beyond Russia's borders: Neil Melvin, Forging 
the New Russian Nation, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1994; Neil Melvin, 
Russians beyond Russia, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1995; Paul Kolstoe, 
Russians in the Former Soviet Republics, London, 1995; Igor Zevelev, `Russia and the Russian 
Diasporas', Post-Soviet Affairs, 12,1996,3; Jeff Chinn and Robert Kaiser, Russians as a New 
Minority: Ethnicity and Nationalism in the Soviet Successor States, Colorado, 1996. 
ss Literature particularly relevant to the CIS: Mark Webber, CIS Integration Trends: Russia and 
the former Soviet South, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1997; Sherman W. 
Garnett, `The Integrationist Temptation' The Washington Quarterly, 18,1995,2, pp. 35-44: 
Richard Sakwa and Mark Webber, `The Commonwealth of Independent States, 1991-1998: 
Stagnation and Survival', Europe-Asia Studies, 51,1999,3, pp. 379-415; Yuri Shishkov and 
Vladimir Yevstigneyev, Economic Relations Within the CIS: How Relevant is the Experience of 
Cooperation and Integration in Western Europe?, Federal Trust for Education and Research, 
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space and the Belarussian-Russian negotiations on monetary integration. In the military 
field, the thesis looks at multilateral and bilateral forms of CIS military co-operation and 
examines the development of joint border protection and joint air defence arrangements. 
The objective is to determine whether these last policies were aimed at establishing a 
military sphere of influence over the CIS states, besides enhancing Russia's own 
securitv. 56 The research also looks at Russia's participation in four the major military 
conflicts that erupted in the post Soviet space - the wars in Transdniestria, Abkhazia, 
Naýorno-Karabagh, and Tajikistan - in order to examine whether Russia's involvement 
followed legitimate state concerns or whether, instead, it represented an attempt to 
destabilise these states in order to bring them back into Russia's orbit. The thesis then 
analyses the energy trade, by looking first at Russia's policies towards those states that 
depended on its resources, such as Ukraine and Belarus, in order to determine whether 
Russia used the energy dependence to exercise control over political and economic 
developments. The thesis then looks at Russia's policies towards the energy-rich Caspian 
states, to determine whether Russia's attempts to obtain shares in the lucrative Caspian 
oil deals and to control the flow of Caspian oil were aimed at bringing the Caspian states 
under Russia's sway. '' 
London, 1994; Andrei Zagorskii, SNG: Ot desintegratsii k reintegratsii?, Issledovanie Tsentra 
Mezhdunarodnykh Issledovanii MGIMO, Moscow, March 1994,2. 
56 Relevant literature on CIS military integration, peacekeeping and conflict resolution: Roy 
Allison and Christopher Bluth, Security Dilemmas in Russia and Eurasia, The Royal Institute of 
International Affairs, London, 1998; Teresa Pelton Johnson and Stephen E. Miller, Russian 
Security After the Cold War: Seven views from Moscow, CSIA Studies in International Security, 3, 
Washington, 1994; Valery Tishkov, Ethnicity, Nationalism and Conflict in and after the Soviet 
Union, PRIO, London, 1997; Crisis Management in the CIS: Whither Russia?, eds. Hans-Georg 
Ehrhart, Anna Kreikemeyer, and Andrei Zagorski, Baden-Baden, 1995; Roy Allison, Peacekeeping 
in the Soviet Successor States, Chaillot Paper, 18, Institute for Security Studies, Western European 
Union, Paris, 1994; Challenges from the Former Soviet South, ed. Roy Allison, Brookings, 1996; 
Pavel Baev, The Russian Army in a Time of Troubles, PRIO, London, 1996; Pavel Baev, Russia's 
policies in the Caucasus, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1997; State- 
building and Military Power in Russia and the New States of Eurasia, ed. Bruce Parrot, New York 
and London, 1995; John Wright, Suzanne Goldenberg and Richard Schonfeld, Transcaucasian 
Boundaries, London, 1996; Edgar O'Ballance, Wars in the Caucasus, 1990-1995, London, 1997; 
Contested Borders in the Caucasus, ed. Bruno Coppieters, Brussels, 1996; Regional Rivalries in 
the New Eurasia, eds. Alvin Z. Rubinstein and Oles M. Smolansky, London and New York, 1995; 
Irina Zviagelskaya, The Russian Policy Debate on Central Asia, The Royal Institute of 
International Affairs, London, 1995; Central Asia and the World, ed. Michael Mandelbaum, 
Council on Foreign Relations, New York, 1994; Edmund Herzig, Iran and the Former Soviet 
South, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1995; Edmund Herzig, The New 
Caucasus: Armenia, Azerbayan, Georgia, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 
1999. 
S' Relevant literature on the energy trade: John Roberts, Caspian Pipelines, The Royal Institute of 
International Affairs, London, 1996; Rosemarie Forsythe, The Politics of Oil in the Caucasus and 
Central Asia, Adelphi Paper, 300, London, 1996; Gavan McDonnell, The Euro-Asian Corridor: 
Transport and Communications for Central Asia and the Caspian Region, The Royal Institute of 
International Affairs, London, 1995; Vladimir Razuvaev, Russian Interests in the Caspian Region: 
The Energy Dimension, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Ebenhausen, May 1996; Josef C. Brada 
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The thesis reaches the conclusion that after the collapse of the Soviet Union and during 
1992- raid 1996 Russia's policies only partially reflected an attempt by Russia to reassert 
its influence over the states of the former Soviet Union and to create an informal empire 
in the post-Soviet space. Russia's behaviour was particularly assertive in the military 
field as well as in its attempts to build a Russian-dominated CIS military infrastructure. 
However, Russia's policies were less aggressive in the economic sphere, except probably 
as far as energy policy is concerned, and regarding the fate of Russians in the near 
abroad. Russia's assertive behaviour in the former Soviet space was largely due to the 
difficulties Russia was experiencing in discarding its imperial legacy. Russian leaders 
found it difficult to come to terms with the fact that the former Soviet states no longer 
belonged to the Russian state and were to be treated as third countries. The lack of a clear 
idea among the Russian elites regarding what Russia was, where its boundaries ought to 
lie, and therefore, what its national interests were, seems largely to account for Russia's 
actions of an imperialist nature. However, motives that could be interpreted as legitimate 
state concerns - legitimate in that they were derived from Russian leaders perceptions of 
the basic requirements of security, and economic and social well-being of the Russian 
state - also played an important part in determining Russia's actions. The pursuit of what 
were perceived as legitimate state interests demanded that Russia either conduct an active 
policy in the near abroad for the sake of its own stability and survival, or conversely, that 
it limit its actions when imperial over-extension was perceived as detrimental to Russia's 
domestic economic development. In other words, both the dimension of national interests 
and of imperial legacies combined to shape Russia's policies towards the former Soviet 
states, and this explains why policies were sometimes more restrained than is usually 
assumed. However, more often than not, Russia's policies followed an ambivalent and 
incoherent pattern, a result of the weak and fragmented character of the Russian state. 
Conflicting bureaucratic agendas, strongly divergent views among the various Russian 
ministries involved in relations with the FSS, and the struggle for power between the 
executive and the legislature, accounted for highly contradictory and counter-productive 
policies towards the CIS and the Baltic states. The absence of a clear foreign policy 
project determined that policies were most often reactive, rather than proactive, to events 
in the post-Soviet space. These three elements of imperial legacy, national interest, and 
and Gregory V. Krasonov, `Implicit Subsidies in Russian-Ukrainian Energy Trade', Europe-Asia 
Studies, 49,1997,5, pp. 825-843; Margarita Mercedes Balmaceda, `Gas, Oil and the Linkages 
between Domestic and Foreign Policies: The Case of Ukraine', Europe-Asia Studies, 50,1998,2, 
pp. 257-286; Oles M. Smolansky, `Ukraine's Quest for Independence: The Fuel Factor', Europe- 
Asia Studies, 47,1995,1, pp. 67-90. 
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incoherence, which were always present in Russia's policies towards . the near abroad, 
elucidate to a great extent the complexities of Russia's behaviour in the former Soviet 
space, and explain why Russia's policies resulted in what may be called `restrained 
assertiveness'- an assertive behaviour which rarely went beyond what Russia's leaders 
considered to be the country's interests. 
When analysing Russia's policies towards the FSS two important points will be taken 
into consideration. First, there is the impact of the legacies of empire, which compelled 
Russia and the former Soviet states to interact amongst each other long after the collapse 
of the Soviet Union. Tight economic, military and political ties, which bound all the 
republics in a single whole, remained in place well after the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
Moreover, the disintegration of the Soviet Union left about 25 million ethnic Russians 
living beyond the borders of the Russian Federation. The main question to be asked in 
this respect therefore is whether Russia, as the dominant military, demographic, 
geographic and economic power in the region, faced a realistic alternative of 
disengagement or whether instead, it was bound to seek regional integration given that, at 
least geographically, `Russia continued to reside in their midst. '58 Karen Dawisha raised 
an important point in this respect. According to her, Russia's continuing pre-eminence in 
Eurasia as the dominant geographic colossus and economic power gave it an enormous 
advantage. However to conclude from this alone, that Russia would `naturally' exercise 
imperial ambitions over the other new states was, according to Dawisha, to be too 
geographically deterministic, a position actually sustained by this thesis. 59 A second point 
to be taken into account is the fact that the distinction between the legitimate pursuit of 
state interests and informal empire-building is usually, although not always, entirely 
nebulous. There is probably no other region in the world where empire-building and 
state-building have been subject to such ambivalence. As Mark Beissinger correctly 
pointed out, whereas Russian elites seemed incapable of recognising the essential 
ambiguity that surrounded state-building and empire-building in the Eurasian context and 
the dilemmas that this presented, nationalising elites among the non-Russians were 
obsessed with this ambiguity, reading imperial intent into actions that, in other contexts, 
would be unlikely to be understood in that fashion. 60 The new Russian state that emerged 
from the disintegration of the Soviet Union, was as weak and fragmented as most of the 
other newly independent states. Like them, Russia also went through a transitional phase 
58 Karen Dawisha, `Constructing and Deconstructing Empire in the Post-Soviet Space', p. 358. 
59 ibid., p. 342. 
60 Mark Beissinger, `The Persisting Ambiguity of Empire', p. 180. 
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of state-building, resulting in policies often being incoherent and ambivalent, thus 
making the distinction between informal empire-building and state-building all the more 
difficult. 
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Chapter 1: The Underlying Principles of Russia's Policy 
Towards the Former Soviet States 
The current chapter will examine the main underlying principles of Russia's foreign policy 
towards the former Soviet states, in an attempt to determine whether Russian leaders were 
able to discard Russia's imperial legacy and envisage the conduct of relations with the new 
states on the basis of total equality and complete recognition of the new states' 
independence and sovereignty; or whether instead Russian leaders tended to view the 
former Soviet space as a natural sphere of Russian influence. In order to comprehend the 
true nature of Russia's relations with the former Soviet states, the current work will first 
analyse the views of key decision makers and influential foreign policy elites on "what is 
Russia? ", on Russia's vital interests, and its role in the post-Soviet space. 
I. What is "Russia"? 
The break up of the Soviet Union in December 1991 entailed a profound transformation of 
the geopolitical landscape in the Eurasian land mass. A truncated Russian state, successor 
to the Soviet Union and surrounded by fourteen politically and economically fragile newly 
independent countries, emerged in the territory of the former USSR. This new geopolitical 
configuration not only put into question the "great power" status of the Russian state, it 
also created a whole series of new dilemmas in Russia's relations with the former Soviet 
republics. Above all, it produced a serious national identity crisis among the Russian elite 
and the Russian population at large, magnified by the demise of the Communist ideology, 
which had been for decades the source of legitimacy of both the Communist system and of 
the Soviet state. The RSFSR , re-baptised as 
"the Russian Federation", was in fact a 
Bolshevik invention. Its external borders and internal divisions did not correspond to any 
pre-existing geographical, political or ethnic reality. The borders of the Russian empire at 
the times of the last tsar, Nicholas II, almost totally coincided with the frontiers of the old 
USSR, if Poland and Finland are excluded, and not with the actual shape of the RSFSR. 
Before the collapse of the Soviet Union, when the process of disintegration was well under 
way, members of the Russian intelligentsia and the political elite began questioning the 
legitimacy of the RSFSR as an independent country. Prominent thinkers refused to admit 
the possibility of a Russian state within the frame of the RSFSR and stressed the artificial 
nature of its existing borders. Political Scientist Aleksandr Tsipko argued that the RSFSR 
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had neither historical nor ethnic legitimacy. it is essentially a vestige of the division of old 
Russia into separate Soviet socialist republics, ' Tsipko noted and added, this division was 
done in an off-hand way. No one, neither Lenin nor Stalin took a serious attitude towards 
the borders of these semi-state formations. As a result, the borders of the RSFSR are 
purely random in nature. '61 Consequently, he pointed out, some age-old Russian areas 
which were colonised by people originally from Central Russia ended up as parts of 
Ukraine and Kazakhstan. At the same time, many purely imperial conquests carried out by 
Tsarist Russia, for example in the Northern Caucasus, remained within the RSFSR, as part 
of what Tsipko called `lesser Russia. '62 Moreover, Tsipko feared that the breakdown of 
the USSR would lead to the disintegration of RSFSR along similar lines. `If all the 
republics become sovereign states, Tsipko argued, the Centre will die, and along with it, 
the state that for centuries has been called Russia. '63 
Throughout history, Russia's national identity had been based on an imperial idea of the 
Russian state. Unlike other overseas empires, the Russian empire and the Russian state had 
developed simultaneously, on the basis of the acquisition and colonisation of contiguous 
territory. 64 Consequently, the distinction between the Russian metropolis and the colonies 
remained blurred. As a result, Russians tended to associate the idea of Russian statehood 
with the existence of the Russian empire. As Vladimir Balakhonov, pointed out `among 
Russians- the imperial instinct is tremendously strong, and we cannot as yet imagine any 
form of existence other than our current empire, stretching from Brest to Vladivostok. '65 
The vast extent of the Russian territory and above all, the constant expansion of the 
Russian state throughout the centuries, was seen by many political scientists and historians 
as the determining feature of Russia's historical development. 66 
This close identification with the vast expanses of Russian land explains the disarray felt 
by most Russians after the collapse of the Soviet Union, when the Russian state lost such 
large amounts of territory. As journalist Dmitrii Kosyrev noted, The point is not just that 
61 Aleksandr Tsipko, `Crisis of Russian Statehood', Rossiia, 6-12 July 1991 p. 6 in Current 
Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, (CDPSP), XLIII, 1991,28, p. 7. 
62 ibid. 
63 Aleksandr Tsipko, `Drama rossiiskogo vybora', Izvestiya, 1 October 1991, p. 5. 
64 V. O. Kluchevsky, A History of Russia, tr. C. J. Hogarth, London 1931, p. 209. 
65 Vladimir Balakhonov, `Sokhranenie imperii ili samosokhranenie na puti natsional'nogo 
suvereniteta - glavnaya natsional'naya problema russkogo naroda segodnia' Russkaya mysl', 23 
June 1989 p. 7. 
66 Yuri Polyakov, `Rossiiskie prostory: blago ili proklyatie? ' Svobodnaya mysi', 12,1992, pp. 17- 
22. 
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we are still living in a state that feels uncomfortable within its new borders... More than 
that, the psychological adaptation to the fact that Belarus, Ukraine and [other former 
Soviet republics] are foreign states and that relations with them are, in fact, the realm of 
foreign policy, has not been easy. If it has occurred at all. '67 The end of the USSR led to 
new proposals which envisaged different models of reintegration of the former Soviet 
lands. Russian dissident Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn in his renowned article 'Rebuilding 
Russia' advocated in 1990 that Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Northern Kazakhstan remain 
united in what he called a `Russian [Rossiiskii] Union. '63 Konstantin Zatulin, chairman of 
the Russian Duma CIS Committee (1993-1995), also expressed support for a union 
between Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan, eventually to be joined by Tajikistan 
and Georgia. 69 Aleksandr Tsipko, instead, proposed turning the existing Commonwealth of 
Independent States into an asymmetrical confederation including those countries most 
eager to keep close ties with Russia, namely Belarus, Georgia, Armenia, Moldova, 
Tajikistan and Kazakhstan. 7° Academician Aleksei Arbatov, however, held the view that 
only an economic union with a selected group of states, particularly Ukraine and Belarus, 
because of their similar socio-economic developments, was desirable. " 
Russians also expressed great concern over the fate of the 25 million ethnic Russians who 
found themselves living outside the current borders of the Russian Federation after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. These Russians suddenly became "foreigners" in their own 
country, and suffered from a severing of ties with family and friends living in Russia. 72 
Consequently, after the collapse of the USSR, the Russian government not only found itself 
confronted with the costly and painful problem of resettling an increasingly high number of 
refugees, it also felt responsible for the protection of the rights of Russians living in the 
near abroad. Presidential advisor Sergei Stankevich believed Russia had both the moral 
obligation and the political responsibility to protect the fate of Russians living in the newly 
independent republics, while Academician Andranik Migranyan stressed Russia's special 
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role as protector of Russians inhabiting the newly independent republics. `Russia cannot be 
indifferent to the fate of Russians in Kazakhstan and Ukraine, or to the fate of the 
minorities in the autonomous entities of the seceding republics in general, ' Migranyan 
wrote. 73 More radical voices expressed the view that the Russian people had become a 
"divided nation" as the Germans, the Jews and the Armenians had been divided in the past. 
Reintegration of the former Soviet republics, in one sort or another, was considered the 
best way to overcome such a tragedy. 74 
The end of the Soviet Union also put into question Russia's "great power" status in the 
world arena - an important source of pride among the Russian people -, and this resulted 
in a deep sense of national humiliation. Although the Russian Federation became, to all 
intents and purposes, the legal successor of the USSR - it retained the Soviet Union's 
permanent seat at the UN Security Council, inherited its nuclear arsenal, and took charge 
of its debts and treaty obligations - Russians soon realised that the possession of nuclear 
weapons and the holding of a permanent seat at the UN Security Council were not enough 
to compensate for Russia's loss of global influence and for its reduced economic and 
military capabilities. '5 Although Russian politicians and intellectuals tended to insist that 
Russia still remained a great power, regular proclamations by Russian officials that Russia 
was a great power indicated the existence of reasonable doubt as to whether these 
assertions accurately reflected the reality. 76 Whether or not Russia was in fact a great 
power, its politicians and intellectuals tended to agree on the point that Russia should strive 
to become one, and should be respected as such by the world community. However, 
divergencies emerged as to which elements were to determine Russia's great power status. 
Among Liberal Westernizers, the idea that economic development, stability, and the 
people's well being would lead to great power status, gained ground. " According to 
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Foreign Minister Kozyrev, `Russia remains a great power, if we are talking about nuclear 
weapons. However, [great power status] is a question of economic potential, a capacity to 
solve regional conflicts. ''' Moderate Nationalists, such as political analyst Vsevolod 
Rybakov, instead, believed that an important presence in the world arena rather than global 
influence, would make Russia a great power again. 79 Still, it was clear to most politicians 
that Russia remained a great power simply because of the vast extent of its territory, the 
large size of its population and the possession of nuclear weapons. Moreover, by 1993, a 
consensus emerged over the notion that Russia's great power status stemmed primarily 
from its influence over the former Soviet republics. In other words, Russia would be a 
great power as long as it remained the dominant power in the former-Soviet space. 
The idea of "Russia" was also closely linked to the place Russia should occupy in the 
international system as well as its foreign policy orientation. Should it become part of the 
West, should it remain part of an "Eurasian" civilisation, or instead should it concentrate 
on its own internal development and remain isolated from the world arena? A heated debate 
among political scientists took place in 1992 which had a significant impact on the 
developments of Russian foreign policy. This debate on the overall orientation of Russian 
foreign policy was closely intertwined with a similar debate on the various models of 
domestic transformation. It began well before the collapse of the USSR and was, to some 
extent, the result of a revival of Russian national sentiments. During the years of 
perestroika, nationalism in the RSFSR had developed into two contrasting ideologies which 
envisioned two radically different developments of the Russian nation. On the one hand, 
patriotic nationalists insisted on the distinctiveness of Russian development and the specific 
mission of the Russian people, whereas liberal nationalists emphasised the unifying 
features of world civilisation and preferred to see Russians as `normal people living in a 
normal country. '80 As Viktor Zaslavsky explained, an early clash between the liberal- 
democratic, Europe-oriented anti-Communist nationalism and the xenophobic, 
authoritarian and anti-Western nationalism had already occurred in the Soviet Union in the 
late 1960s, in the form of an ideological struggle between Russian intellectuals connected 
with the more liberal journal Novy mir, and those grouped around the journals Nlolodaya 
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gvardiva and Nash sovremennik, who took up the banner of Russian patriotism. 8 The 
latter combined a genuine concern for the destruction of Russian culture and peasantry, the 
Russian Orthodox Church and Russian traditions, with a defence of Stalinism as the 
legitimate continuation of Russian imperial traditions. This movement suffered from an 
internal contradiction, since its supporters could never decide between a `Russian revival' 
or the preservation of the empire. ', ' 
During the late 1980s, the imperial idea slowly lost ground, in view of the growing 
influence of liberal nationalists and the dissemination of nationalist ideas among the 
Russian liberal-democratic intelligentsia. General perceptions about the economic costs of 
the empire on the Russian population increased the desire of "seceding" from the rest of the 
Soviet republics. For the first time, an anti-imperial Russian nationalism that aspired 
toward the creation of a `national' Russian state, emerged. Liberal nationalists called on 
the Russian people to cast off the backward, non-European, non-Christian component of 
the Soviet Union and to return to the home of European culture. They supported the 
opening of Russia to the influences of the industrially developed countries, Russia's 
transition to a market economy and its integration into the world market system. On the 
opposite side, as imperialist nationalism lost ground, Russian national patriots increasingly 
adopted a `Russia first' posture, understood not only as a separation from all non-Slavic or 
even non-Russian republics, but even more crucially as a repudiation of the West and a 
search for a specifically Russian way of life and Russian spiritual values. 
83 
The failed August 1991 coup dealt a major blow to the Russian imperial nationalist idea. 
The Autumn of 1991 saw the progressive implementation of liberal nationalist ideas, which 
resulted in the disintegration of the Soviet Union in December 1991 and the emergence of a 
new Russian state. The new geopolitical reality confronted liberal nationalists with a series 
of new problems. On the one hand, many Soviet republics, usually the most economically 
dependent on Russia, proved reluctant to secede from Russia. On the other hand, Russia 
was forced to handle a series of delicate issues, such as the presence of large Russian 
minorities in the newly independent states, various border disputes, and the existence of 
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several dozen nationalities and ethno-territorial units within the Russian Federation, which 
were expected to press their claims for independence from Russia. In view of these 
difficulties, imperialist nationalist ideas in support of the restoration of the Soviet Union in 
a new form again made themselves heard. Among the Russian population deep nostalgia 
for the Soviet Union gained ground as people found it hard to come to terms with the 
existence of Russia within its new boundaries and the development of the former Soviet 
republics, particularly Ukraine and Belarus, as independent states. However, the longing 
for empire did not actually translate into an active and consistent strategy aimed either at 
the restoration of the USSR or at the creation of an informal empire, despite the fact that 
certain aspects of Russian foreign policy towards the FSS, particularly towards the CIS 
states, did acquire a neo-imperialist character, as will be shown in the next chapters. 
H. The Foreign Policy of the New Russian State 
1. Russia's Pro-Western Orientation 
The collapse of the USSR opened up a new era in the foreign policy of the Russian 
Federation, no longer a republic of the defunct Soviet Union but an independent sovereign 
state. Following on the lines of the Russian national liberal programme, Russia's Foreign 
Minister Andrei Kozyrev adopted a distinctly pro-Western orientation and a clearly anti- 
imperialist approach, based on the recognition of the former Soviet republics as sovereign 
and independent states, and on the rejection of any forcible change of borders among the 
FSS. 84 We simply have to learn to live as independent states and to view each other as 
equal partners, ' Kozyrev wrote in an article on Izvestiya in January 1992.85 The newly 
independent states were allowed freely to join a new non-coercive organisation with Russia, 
the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), which was seen by Russian leaders as a 
way of preserving a common economic and politico-military space in the former Soviet 
space and as a means of further deepening integration, albeit on a voluntary basis. Kozyrev 
84 Although in late August 1991, President Yeltsin questioned the legitimacy of the new 
republic's borders, the CIS agreements adopted in December 1991, which put an end to the Soviet 
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sustained that only natural, voluntary ties among the CIS, and not forceful integration, 
would create a viable and solid institution. 36 He called for the creation of `belt of good- 
neighbourliness' along the entire perimeter of the Russian Federation, and the withdrawal 
of Russia's military presence from abroad. " Similar views were shared by Galina 
Starovoitova, Yeltsin's advisor on nationality issues, who supported Andrei Sakharov's 
Union Treaty project, which was based on a flexible structure, and on total equality among 
all member states. " Starovoitova claimed that Russians had to discard their imperial 
legacy and abandon a significant part of responsibility for developments in the former 
colonies of the empire. 'S9 She believed that the Soviet Union was the last disintegrating 
empire and saw decolonisation as the basic meaning of [Russia's] present history. '9° She 
also supported a Western-oriented foreign policy because, according to her, `the Russian 
people, by their mentality, are oriented to European values' and stressed that Russia could 
not be divided by the Ural mountains between Europe and Asia, East and West. 91 
These views were shared by leading democrat Yurii Afanasev, who argued that Russians 
had to repudiate their pretence `to originality, uniqueness, and a special predestination. ' 
Russia, in Afanasev's view, represented an exhausted form of 'Eurasian civilisation which 
combined Buddhist and Byzantine Christian elements, and which had to be rejected in 
favour of the contemporary Western model. ' This Western model, which was adopted by 
the new Russian leadership in early 1992, envisioned the opening of Russia to the 
influences of developed industrialised countries, Russia's transition to the market economy 
and its integration into the world economic system. Russia's foreign policy, under the 
leadership of the Foreign Ministry, was aimed above all at creating a favourable domestic 
and international environment which would facilitate the economic and political 
transformation of Russia. 92 Kozyrev repeatedly stressed the need to join the club of the 
more dynamically democratic states, and Russia's desire to transform its old enemies in the 
West into partners and eventually allies. In an interview with Izvestiya in June 1992, 
President Yeltsin also expressed Russia's intentions to co-operate with the United States 
and to bring the era of confrontation to an end. 'We will no longer consider ourselves 
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potential opponents, but allies, ' he said. 93 In an earlier speech at the UN Security Council 
in Februarv 1992, Yelts'in-had gotle-as -far as proposing the creation of a global defence 
s\ stem based on the establishment of a global anti-missile project in co-operation with the 
United States. 94 The Russian Foreign Ministry foresaw the fulfilment of the country's 
national interests through Russia's participation in various global and regional security 
systems, such as the UN, the CSCE and NATO, and the development of multilateral 
agreements and international co-operation. 95 
2. The Foreign Policy Debate 
This pro-Western stance immediately provoked a heated debate among the Russian 
academic and political community on Russia's national identity and the orientation of its 
foreign policy. The old nineteenth-century debate between Slavophiles and Westerners 
seemed to resurface, although with some noticeable differences due to the new domestic 
circumstances and the changed international environment. Liberal Westernizers, following 
directly on Gorbachev's New Political Thinking, stressed the link between Russia's 
domestic structure and its foreign policy orientation. Scholar Nikolai Kosopalov insisted 
that the primary concern of Russia's foreign policy had to be the establishment and the 
consolidation of a democratic and liberal domestic political system. Only by transforming 
its internal structure, Kosopalov argued, would Russia be able to discard its old imperial 
legacy and assertive foreign policy traditions. 96 Kosopalov supported Russia's 
participation in the construction of a democratic international system, based on the United 
Nations and other regional organisations, arguing that such a system would help Russia 
compensate for the country's deficit in effective traditional foreign policy instruments and 
levers. 97 Liberal Western thinking discarded the pre-Gorbachev Soviet foreign policy 
tradition which tended to perceive the world as a struggle for power among states. Liberal 
Westernizers, instead, supported the development of an international system based on the 
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primacy of international law and co-operation through international organisations. These 
views, which were adopted by the Russian Foreign Ministry, received very harsh criticisms 
from Russian Imperial Nationalists, who could not resign themselves to the loss of the 
Soviet Empire, and from their new variant, the Neo-Eurasianists. 
Russian Imperial Nationalists, such as the writers Aleksandr Prokhanov and Eduard 
Limonov, and the leader of the Russian nationalist opposition in the Supreme Soviet, 
Sergei Baburin, regretted the collapse of the Soviet Union, and refused to consider such 
developments as irreversible. They believed that the Russian empire had to be recreated in 
one form or another. Eduard Limonov advocated the re-creation of a single powerful state 
`within the limits of Russian civilisation. '98 Russian borders should, as a minimum, include 
those areas inhabited by Russians, and as maximum cover those regions resided by people 
who regarded themselves as belonging to the Russian civilisation. 99 Baburin questioned the 
new borders of Russia, arguing that the Russian Federation was `an offspring of Bolshevik 
experiments..., an unnatural formation. '10° Similar views were shared by high-ranking 
officials in the Russian government, such as Vice-President Aleksandr Rutskoi, who 
refused to equate the Russian Federation with the true borders of Russia, and saw the CIS 
as `a transitional form between the former Soviet Union and a new unitary state to be 
created by the former Union republics. i101 Rutskoi called for the restoration of a single 
democratic state in the territory of the Eurasian landmass. If the Union could not be 
revived, Russia had to become a strong power and discontinue its economic assistance to 
other CIS states. 102 Imperialist Nationalists were endowed with strong anti-Western 
sentiments, and as such they rejected Russia's membership of the IMF and other Western- 
dominated organisations. In sharp contrast to Liberal-Western thinking, they tended to 
interpret the world as a an arena of perennial struggle between two global forces, one 
maritime - or Atlanticist -, and the other continental - or Eurasianist -, which had only one 
predetermined outcome. `The future belongs to the East not to the West', Yurii Borodai 
wrote. ' 03 
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These views very much coincided with the ideas of Neo-Eurasianists, like Konstantin 
Pleshakov and Brontoi Bediurov. Digging in the sources of the Eurasian movement of the 
1920s and 1930s, Eurasianists stressed the unique cultural and geopolitical character of the 
Eurasian space, going as far as bestowing Russia with a special mission in Eurasia. 
Living together within common borders for decades or centuries has formed a common 
space of civilisation, ' Konstantin Pleshakov argued, and added, 
in a sense, Russia does not end on the border of the Baltic states or on the 
foothills of the Great Caucasian Range, any more than it does on the steppe-lands 
of northern Kazakhstan. The empire is gone. But its geopolitical, political, 
military, economic, cultural and intellectual space is not. Russia is closely 
integrated in the affairs of all the new independent regions of the former Soviet 
Union. ' 104 
Pleshakov foresaw total chaos in continental Eurasia, and a redrawing of frontiers and war, 
unless Russia dominated the region militarily, and deterred conflicts and potential 
aggressors. 105 In a similar tone, Brontoi Bediurov repeated the earlier Eurasian view that 
Eurasia constituted a unique continent. We are indeed an integral state-political and 
cultural-historical continent, a distinctive Eurasian cosmos. We are neither Europe nor 
Asia; we are both of them together' he wrote, and stressed the need for all the FSS to live 
together. 106 Although Eurasianists advocated a restoration of the Soviet Union, their views 
remained at a theoretical level, given that they neither put forward clear foreign policy 
proposals on how to achieve the desired goals, nor did they examine more practical issues 
such as the resolution of ethnic conflicts or the protection of Russian minorities in the near 
abroad. 
More moderate Eurasianists, such as Sergei Goncharov and Professor Aleksei Vasilev 
limited themselves to stressing Russia's links with the Islamic world and emphasised the 
need to develop close relations with former Soviet Islamic states. 107 `The Eurasian space 
that used to be occupied by the Soviet Union and the largest part of which is now occupied 
by Russia, has traditionally been a zone of cohabitation, interpretation and interaction 
between the Slavic (primarily Russian) and Turkic ethnic groups, between Orthodox and 
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Moslems, ' Vasilev wrote. "' Therefore, he added `it is in the interests [of both Islam and 
Russia] to use all conceivable means to convert inevitable conflicts between them into a 
non violent form and work to resolve them. ' 1°9 Sergei Stankevich, in his renowned article 
published in Nezavisimava gazeta on 28 March 1992, also emphasised the need to 
strengthen Russia's positions in the East, and to reach `mutual understanding and co- 
operation with the Turkic and Muslim components, which have performed a tremendous 
role in Russia's history. ' 110 Russia's geographical location between East and West placed it 
in a unique position to conduct its specific `mission', which entailed support for the 
multilateral dialogue of cultures, civilisations and states. "` 
Kozyrev's pro-Western, `anti-imperialist' foreign policy approach received also more 
moderate, though certainly more influential critics from Russian scholars and from other 
members of the political elite during the course of 1992 and 1993. Moderate Liberals such 
as Vladimir Lukin, Russian Ambassador and later head of the Duma International Affairs 
Committee, and Aleksei Arbatov, Academician and member of the Duma Defence 
Committee, neither questioned the collapse of the Soviet Union nor the independence of the 
other former Soviet republics. They argued instead that the Helsinki principle of the 
inviolability of borders should form the basis of relations among the former Soviet 
republics. "' Although their views were not significantly different from those of the Liberal 
Westernizers, they emphasised the need for a distinctly Russian foreign and security policy 
based on the specifics of Russia's geopolitical reality. Consequently they placed highest 
priority on Russia's relations with the newly independent states. 1' `Relations with its 
closer neighbours have always been a priority for Russia', Lukin wrote in the Autumn of 
1992, `but the break-up of the Soviet Union, having turned Russia's former territories into 
new and independent neighbours, has transformed traditional interests into something much 
more complex and vital. '' 14 Lukin believed that Russia had a special role to play in the 
Eurasian heartland, `Russia cannot just passively observe threatening developments taking 
place within the zone of its vital interests, especially in areas inhabited by millions of 
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Russians, ' he wrote. 1' Arbatov instead argued that Russia had to be extremely cautious as 
far as intervention in the internal affairs of other republics was concerned, even when 
invited by local governments. Peacekeeping or peace enforcement operations should be 
conducted on the basis of multilateral decisions and actions. Russia's main role should be 
that of an impartial mediator. Arbatov supported the use of sanctions, including the use of 
military force, only as an instrument of last resort, in order to protect the rights of 
minorities, especially of Russian-speakers living beyond the Russian Federation. 116 As far 
as relations with the FSS are concerned, Arbatov argued in favour of voluntary integration, 
on an economic basis first. 
Similar calls for greater emphasis on developing closest ties with the republics of the 
former Soviet Union were expressed by Academician Sergei Rogov. ' 17 According to 
Rogov, relations with the FSS deserved priority, since Russia's main danger lay in the 
possibility of being dragged into territorial and ethnic conflicts with those states. Russia 
had to establish friendly, preferably allied relations with the new states, in view of the fact 
that so many Russians lived there. Rogov seemed particularly worried that some of the 
former republics might fall under the influence of rival regional powers, such as China or 
Iran. 18 Academician Sergei Blagovolin also agreed that Russia should not totally retreat 
from the former Soviet republics. 'The idea that we must abandon all spheres of influence, 
acquired throughout the -decades, and even centuries, is not only absurd but also as 
dangerous, as is the idea of an overall presence, ' Blagovolin declared. ' 19 However, 
Blagovolin retained the view that Russia belonged to European civilisation and that a 
rapprochement with the West, would best allow Russia to fulfil its interests. Academician 
Sergei Goncharov also stressed the need to develop co-operation with the West, which, 
according to him had rightfully been chosen as the model of socio-economic development. 
But he maintained that, in its partnership with the West, Russia had to retain its 
independence. Russia should pursue its own national interests, and not simply provide 
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unconditional support for human rights, Goncharov argued. 'ý° Moderate Liberals were 
therefore in favour of a pro-active policy in the near abroad, and a more independent policy 
towards the West. However, they were not calling for the restoration of a informal empire 
over the former Soviet states, and therefore displayed a readiness to discard Russia's 
imperial legacy. 
Moderate Nationalists such as Academician Andranik Migranyan, and Evgenii 
Ambartsumov, Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Joint Committee on International Affairs 
and Foreign Economic Relations, on the other hand, could not reconcile themselves to the 
demise of the Soviet Union. Although they did not advocate reunification by military force, 
they adopted a very assertive stance as far as the former Soviet space is concerned, and 
vehemently criticised Russia's pro-Western foreign policy orientation. Ambartsumov and 
Migranyan wanted Russia to play a special role in the entire post-Soviet geopolitical space, 
thus indirectly putting into question the independence and sovereignty of the former Soviet 
republics. According to them, Russia's specific role resulted from the presence of over 30 
million Russian-speakers in the former Soviet states, and the arbitrary character of the 
borders of the former USSR, which had given rise to inter-ethnic conflicts and clashes 
between nationalities. According to Migranyan, `many of these territories, such as South 
Ossetia, Karabagh, the Crimea and Transdniestria, were part of the Russian Empire long 
before they were incorporated into the newly formed independent states, ' and therefore they 
had to be protected by Russia. ''' Ambartsumov was particularly emphatic on the need to 
call the entire geopolitical space of the former USSR a sphere of Russia's vital interests, 
and of having such interests recognised by the world community. In his view, Russian 
leaders had to make sure that the international community recognise Russia's role as `the 
political and military guarantor of stability in the post-Soviet space. ' 12- Ambartsumov 
remained sceptical about the future of the CIS, and called Russia to play a leading role in 
recreating, not the Soviet Union, but a confederation of states. He believed that the 
dismantling of the USSR was a completely irresponsible and not properly considered step. 
Only through co-operation with the former Soviet republics could Russia overcome the 
120 Sergei Goncharov, `Osobye interesy Rossii -v Chem zhe oni zakliuchaiutsya', p. 6. 
121 Andranik Migranyan, `Podlinnye i mnimye orientiry vo vneshnei politike', Rossiiskaya 
gazeta, 4 August 1992, p. 4. 
122 Konstantin Eggert, `Rossiya v roli "Evraziiskogo zhandarma"? ', Izvestiya, 7 August 1992, 
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current crisis. 'The fission of the CIS states is inevitable, ' he thought, `because it is 
impossible to draw geographic and even family borders. 5123 
Similar ideas were expressed by influential formations in the Russian Supreme Soviet. In 
October 1992, the Civic Union, in its document Towards a Strong Unified, Democratic 
and Prosperous Russia called the territory of the former Soviet Union a sphere of Russia's 
vital interests, and argued in favour of deepening economic and political integration among 
the FSS .' V' 
Although Civic Union leaders, such as Arkady Volsky, regretted the current 
configuration of Russia, they considered the re-establishment of the USSR unfeasible at the 
present 125 In August 1992, the Council on Foreign and Defence Policy - an 
independent organisation established to discuss foreign policy issues under the leadership 
of Academician Sergei Karaganov - produced a major document on Russia's foreign policy 
priorities, entitled A Strategy for Russia, which had a major impact on the orientations of 
Russian foreign policy. The document argued in favour of an active policy in the former 
Soviet space, including the use of force, particularly as far as resolving inter-ethnic 
conflicts were concerned, which were seen as a main threat to Russia's own security. 126 
The authors declared their support for a `variable speed' integration among the former 
Soviet states and expressed particular concern for the fate of Russian minorities living in 
the former Soviet space. The document argued in favour of using diplomatic means to 
protect their rights, and called for the thriving of Russian minorities as a Diaspora. 
Although no particular reference was made to restoring an informal empire over the former 
Soviet space, the implementation of the Council's proposals might have led to the conduct 
of neo-imperialist policies in the former Soviet space. 
3. Russian Leaders Adopt a More Assertive Policy 
Faced with harsh criticism from influential academic circles, and under strong pressure 
from the powerful centrist groups in the Supreme Soviet, Yeltsin and Kozyrev began 
progressively to adopt a more assertive stance regarding the post Soviet-space during the 
123 Evgeny Ambartsumov, `Sami sebya sagnali v ugol, samim iz nego i vykhodit' ', Rossiiskaya 
gazeta, 13 April 1992, p. 7. 
124 B. Utekhin, `The Russia which we lost', Komsomol'skaya pravda, 21 October 1992, p. 1, in 
CDPSP, XLIV, 1992,42, p. 9. 
125 Gennadii Yastrevtsov, "Rossiiu spasut liudi bez nenavisti v glazakh", Pravda, 9 September 
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126 `Strategiya dlya Rossii - Tezisy Soveta po Vneshnei i Oboronnoi Politike', (hereafter, 
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39 
autumn of 1992. '2' The first major turn in Russia's foreign policy occurred in September 
1992, when Yeltsin cancelled his trip to Japan, yielding to the nationalist camp. After that, 
Yeltsin's tone hardened. In a speech at the Foreign Ministry Collegium on 27 October 
1992, he stressed the need to take national interests into account when formulating foreign 
policy and criticised the `excessive timidity' with which the Russian Foreign Ministry was 
behaving in the world community, especially in the near abroad. In his view, this resulted 
from what he called an 'inverted imperial syndrome. ' 128 `We are hesitant to speak about 
our Russian national interests, ' Yeltsin said, `we are constantly afraid that we will be 
accused of great-power chauvinism... worst of all is the fact that we are not struggling 
against attempts by some of the former USSR republics to resolve their problems at 
Russia's expense. '12' 
In an attempt to reach broader consensus, Kozyrev presented to parliament a new Draft 
Foreign Policy Outline in December 1992, which gave clear priority to relations with 
Russia's near abroad. Russia's foreign policy would aim at establishing a `belt of good- 
neighbourliness' beyond its borders and would work towards the development of 
multilateral forms of co-operation among the CIS states. Particular attention would be 
devoted to the settlement of conflicts in the CIS, the defence of the CIS external borders, 
and the protection of the rights of Russian minorities. As far as the latter was concerned, 
Kozyrev proposed `to protect the rights, lives and dignity of Russians above all by political 
means and diplomatic methods, using the mechanisms of international organisations. '13o 
However, if these methods failed, `the carefully considered application of economic and 
military force, not in the Yugoslav version, needless to say, but within the framework of 
the law', had to be envisaged. 13' Despite the growing focus on the former Soviet space, the 
document still contained elements of Kozyrev's pro-Western stance and clearly reflected an 
anti-imperialist approach. The promotion of Russian democracy, the creation of favourable 
conditions for the development of a market economy, and the integration of Russia into the 
127 In July 1992, the Supreme Soviet proposed the creation of a separate Ministry for 
Commonwealth affairs, in order to strengthen cooperation with the FSS. (Pavel Golub, `Sozdanie 
otdel'nogo ministerstva po delam Sodruzhestva mozhet stat' politicheskoi oshibkoi', Izvestiya, 24 
July 1992, p. 2. ) In December 1992, the Russian Congress of People's Deputies appealled for the 
creation of a confederation joining together the states of the former USSR. (Moscow Radio Rossii, 
14 December 1992, in FBIS-SOV-92-241-S, 15 December 1992, p. 3. ) 
128 `U nashei vneshnei politiki mozhet byt' tol'ko odna ideologiya - interesy Rossii', Krasnava 
zvezda, 28 October 1992. 
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world community ' in a manner befitting its status as a great power', were considered 
Russia's fundamental national interests. Foreign and domestic policies were strongly 
connected, and priority was given to individual, human and minority rights. In its relations 
with other states, Russia committed itself to use diplomatic methods. Force would be used 
only in carefully considered manner, and strictly within the framework of international law. 
Moreover, Russia would try to transform the previous relations of global confrontation 
with the West into a system of global co-operation, and would aim at partnership and allied 
relations with the West. 132 
Although Russia's policies during 1992 did not reflect a neo-imperialist behaviour, the 
Russian leadership paid growing attention to events in the former Soviet states. Particular 
efforts were devoted by the President and the Foreign Minister to mediate in the military 
conflicts that erupted in the near abroad, and Russian troops became involved in 
peacekeeping operations in Transdniestria and South Ossetia. Despite the disintegration of 
the post-Soviet economic and military spaces, the Russian government attempted to 
preserve a certain degree of military and economic co-operation among CIS states. Russian 
diplomats moreover, conducted various efforts aimed at settling the thorny issue of 
discrimination against Russian minorities in the Baltics. The adoption of a more active 
policy and a more assertive rhetoric were determined by a series of factors. First and 
foremost, the failure of economic reforms led to a deterioration of the economic and social 
situation in Russia and to a growing dissatisfaction among the population at large. As a 
result, the Russian political leadership became more vulnerable to pressure from nationalist 
groups and increasingly powerful and uncompromising factions within the Supreme Soviet, 
and began giving in to their demands. In May 1992, Yeltsin set up the Security Council 
under the leadership of its Secretary, Yurii Skokov, a promoter of Moderate Nationalist 
ideas. The Ministry of Defence in turn, became more directly involved in policy 
formulation and policy making, directly rivalling the Foreign Ministry. 
Second, the economic inter-dependence of all republics and the difficulties of simply `going 
it alone' soon became apparent. The potential collapse of neighbouring economies meant 
that Russia could not simply stand idly by. Deep economic recession in the former Soviet 
states was bound to have direct negative repercussions on Russia's own industrial and 
agricultural production. This explained the leadership's efforts to strengthen economic and 
132 ibid. 
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political co-operation within the CIS. Third, the eruption of ethnic conflicts along Russia's 
borders, which created casualties among the local Russian population and among the 
Russian troops located in the areas of tension, and resulted in widespread instability, 
prompted the Russian government to react. Moreover, Russian minorities became victims 
of discrimination, especially in the Baltic states and in certain Central Asian countries. 
Last but not least, disappointment over Western behaviour led to the partial discard of pro- 
Western views. The rather limited financial support provided by Western governments and 
financial institutions, and the unfulfilled expectations, as far as international co-operation 
with Europe, the US and NATO was concerned, led to a general disenchantment with the 
West and Western ideas. 
During the early Spring of 1993, as pressure from the opposition increased in the domestic 
front, Russia's foreign policy discourse became significantly more assertive. In an effort to 
obtain the support of the Civic Union in the VIII Congress of Peoples' Deputies, Yeltsin 
adopted a very assertive foreign policy stance. Speaking at the Civic Union Forum in late 
February 1993, he stressed the need for closer integration among the CIS states and clearly 
stated Russia's special role on the territory of the former USSR, 
'Stopping all armed conflicts on the territory of the former USSR is Russia's vital 
interest. The world community sees more and more clearly Russia's special 
responsibility in this difficult undertaking. I believe the time has come for 
distinguished international organisations, including the UN, to grant Russia special 
powers as a guarantor of peace and stability in the regions of the former USSR"33 
In mid-March, Yeltsin directly appealed to the leaders of the CIS states, calling for deeper 
military and economic co-operation. Yeltsin expressed Russia's eagerness to co-operate 
with the CIS states, `on the basis of equality, in order to achieve further economic and 
social development, and so as to provide the necessary stability and security in the entire 
CIS space. ' 134 Although these speeches were intended primarily for internal consumption 
and CIS support, they pointed to a new direction in Russia's foreign policy. Above all, they 
indicated Yeltsin's readiness to compromise with the opposition on foreign policy issues, in 
order to preserve the upper hand on the domestic agenda. As a result, during 1993, Russian 
foreign policy became more assertive and the political discourse took a more nationalist 
tone, focusing increasingly on developments in the near abroad, particularly on the need to 
deepen CIS integration and settle military conflicts. 
133 Russian Television, 28 February, 1993, in FBIS-SOV-93-038,1 March 1993, p. 21. 
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The Basic Provisions of the Russian Federation Foreign Policy Concept, approved by 
Yeltsin in April 1993, provided the best indication of this change in course. Primarily the 
work of Skokov, and approved by all the major Russian ministries involved in foreign 
policy, the document significantly diverged from the Foreign Ministry Draft both in terms 
of tone and content, and focused on a more assertive policy towards the West and towards 
the FSS. 135 Top priority was given to relations with the former Soviet republics and to the 
deepening of integration among the states of the former Soviet Union, based however, on 
principles of strictly voluntary participation and reciprocity. Russia was entrusted with the 
responsibility of strengthening stability and security on the territory of the former Soviet 
Union, and this explained the inclusion in the document of provisions on the development 
of CIS co-operation in the political and military sphere, such as the creation of an effective 
collective security system, Russia's protection of the CIS's external borders, and the 
preservation of Russian military infrastructure in the former Soviet states, as part of an 
integral CIS security system. 136 Human rights' violations, armed conflicts along Russia's 
periphery, and any actions intended to weaken or undermine Russia's international 
prestige, as well as the integrity of the Russian Federation and the integration of the CIS, 
were seen as potential threats to Russia's security. 
4. A Broad Consensus is Reached 
The approval of the Concept reflected the emergence of a broad consensus among the 
various sections of the Russian political elite over Russia's role in the world and its 
relations with the FSS. The tenets endowed in the Concept reflected the views of Moderate 
Nationalists and, to a great extent, indicated a desire to build an informal empire, 
especially in military terms, in the former Soviet space. Such views continued to permeate 
Russian foreign policy thinking throughout 1993, despite the victory of President Yeltsin 
over conservative forces in the Russian Supreme Soviet in September-October 1993. In the 
Autumn of 1993, the Russian President, and in particular Foreign Minister Kozyrev 
adopted an increasingly neo-imperialist tone. Between September and November 1993, 
135 Vladislav Chernov, `Natsional'nye interesy Rossii i ugrozy dlya ee bezopasnosti', 
Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 29 April 1993, p. 1,3 (The author provided a summary of the document). 
The document identified Russia's vital interests as follows: The territorial integrity of the Russian 
state and the creation of the right conditions to ensure the consolidation of economic and political 
reforms; and Russia's active participation in the building of a new system of international 
relations, in which Russia would be assured a worthy place. 
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Kozvrev issued a series of statements which not only stressed Russia's unique role as the 
guarantor of stability in the post-Soviet space, but also clearly expressed Russia's 
willingness to remain the dominant power in the region. In an article in Nezavisimaya 
gazeta on 22 September 1993 Kozyrev mentioned Russia's historical duty to provide 
stability to the areas of the former Soviet Union. `This is not a `neo-imperial istic' space, he 
wrote, but a unique geopolitical one in which no one is going to keep the peace for 
Russia. "37 In a subsequent article for Nezavisimaya gazeta on 13 October 1993, 
Kozyrev's words became even more assertive, as he maintained that `no international 
organisation or group of states is able to replace Russia's peacekeeping efforts in the 
specific post-Soviet space' and added, that `either [Russia starts] carrying out military 
actions for the support and restoration of peace in the areas of our traditional geopolitical 
interests, or [it] will lose our influence there, and the vacuum will be filled by others, 
including unfriendly forces or even forces competing against us. 7138 
Interviewed by Nezavisimaya gazeta on 24 November 1993, Kozyrev recognised the 
important role played by the UN and the CSCE in resolution of conflicts, but emphasised 
the leading role of Russia. `It would be a mistake to ignore the role of the UN and the 
CSCE [in this sphere], but the other extreme would be to totally hand in this sphere into the 
hands of these organisations. This is an area of Russian interests... Moreover, the UN and 
the CS CE do not have today, neither the strength, nor the means to carry out these 
operations. ' 139 Russian leaders saw the near abroad as a sphere not only of Russia's vital 
interest, but also of its exclusive influence. The victory of Zhirinovsky's Liberal 
Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) party in the December 1993 elections only 
contributed to harden Kozyrev's views. At a Foreign Ministry's conference on 18 January 
1994, Kozyrev characterised the protection of the rights of Russians in the former Soviet 
state as one of Russia's main strategic aims, and stressed the need to maintain a military 
presence in all former Soviet states, an area where `Russia's vital strategic interests' lay. 
140 
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Kozyrev feared that if Russian troops withdrew, the security vacuum would be filled by 
forces which might be hostile and unfriendly to Russia. 141 
Kozyrev's views on peace-making in the former Soviet space very much resembled the 
positions adopted by the Russian Defence Ministry at the time. The Basic Provisions of 
the Russian Military Doctrine, published in November 1993, considered it Russia's duty 
to maintain stability in regions bordering on the Russian Federation and allied countries, ' 
and foresaw the use of the Russian Armed Forces `to check armed conflicts and violence 
on Russia's border and on the border of other states, in accordance with treaty 
commitments. '''2Moreover, the Doctrine saw the suppression of rights, freedoms and 
legitimate interests of citizens of the Russian Federation in foreign states' as a threat to 
Russia's security. 14' These positions were reaffirmed by Grachev in an article in 
Nezavisimaya gazeta on 19 June 1994, where he noted that `Russia considers the 
maintenance of stability in the regions adjoining its borders and the observance of 
international commitments to be the basic principles for resolving questions of military 
security. ''-" Grachev also stressed the need to reach closer CIS integration. 
The increasingly assertive discourse adopted by the Russian leadership did not entirely 
reflect Russia's practical policy during most of 1993. All FSS, except for the Baltic states, 
were brought into the CIS, and Russia became deeply involved in the conflicts that flared 
up beyond its borders in a way which very much corresponded to a neo-imperialist 
behaviour. It provided military support to certain factions in the conflicts, introduced 
peacekeeping forces, and established military bases. However, in the economic field, 
Russia behaved much less assertively. The CIS economic space underwent further 
disintegration, as Russia seemed increasingly unwilling and incapable of paying the high 
price of integration. Energy prices to CIS states progressively approached world levels, and 
subsidies to CIS states were significantly curtailed. As far as military integration was 
concerned, the year 1993 saw a further disintegration of the common military space. 
However, Russia began progressively to restore parts of the former joint military 
infrastructure on a bilateral basis, and by the end of 1996, many elements of the system 
141 Ibid. 
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were partially restored. Russia defended more assertively the rights of Russian minorities 
in the Baltics, but refrained from adopting radical measures such as the imposition of an 
economic blockade or the prolonged suspension of troops withdrawals. 
Despite this mixed record, the near abroad increasingly became an area of active Russian 
involvement. By the end of 1993, and throughout 1994-1995, Russian foreign policy 
priorities no longer focused on the integration of Russia into the community of civilised 
nations, although efforts at developing co-operation with the West, especially with Western 
financial institutions, continued. '45 Most efforts were aimed at resolving the armed conflicts 
that had developed along the periphery of Russia's borders, and at protecting the rights of 
Russian minorities. 'Conscious of its particular responsibility for maintaining peace, 
Russia has made the peacemaking and the protection of human rights, particularly that of 
national minorities, the priority of its foreign policy, first of all in the territory of the former 
USSR, ' Kozyrev stressed in his speech to the UN General Assembly in September 1993. ` 
In his address to the Federation Council in February 1994, Yeltsin made it clear that in all 
spheres of relations with the CIS and the Baltic states, priority will be given to the fate of 
Russian citizens living beyond Russia's borders.. Wherever they live, our compatriots must 
feel full and equal citizens. ''`' Moreover, Russian foreign policy placed increasing 
attention to the strengthening of CIS economic and military integration. 148 In his message to 
the Federal Assembly on 24 February 1994, Yeltsin gave top priority to Russia's relations 
with the newly independent states and to the development of the CIS. 14' However, emphasis 
was put on the notion that integration had to be cost-effective and not detrimental to 
Russia's interests. 150 Renewed importance was also placed on the idea that that Russia had 
to become a strong economic and political state first, before CIS integration could move 
145 'My gotovy k sotrudnischestvu na ravnopravnoi osnove - Vystuplenie Presidenta Rossii Borisa 
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pp. 1,3-5 (Yeltsin's annual address to the Federal Assembly); Therese Rapahel, Claudia Rosett 
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ahead. It was assumed that a strong and economically successful Russia would act as a 
magnet of deeper integration. 
These views were shared by the Council for Defence and Foreign Policy, which in its 
second document, A Strategy for Russia (2) published in May 1994, argued that the 
deteriorating economic situation of the former Soviet states, as well as Russia's reduced 
economic capabilities, ruled out the creation of a EU-type union, let alone a new federate 
state. Instead, it was suggested that Russia develop tight economic and politico-military 
relations with the CIS states, in exchange of unlimited access to their markets and natural 
resources. This policy, defined as `leadership instead of direct control', was aimed at 
granting Russia economic and security benefits without having to bear direct responsibility 
for the economic well-being of those states populations. 15' The Strategic Course of the 
Russian Federation towards the member-states of the CIS, which was approved by Yeltsin 
in September 1995, and which systematically spelled out the main objectives of Russia's 
foreign policy towards the CIS, followed on similar lines, although in a slightly more 
assertive fashion. Russia's main aim was to create an economic and political integration of 
states, 'capable of occupying a fitting place in the world. 1152 Integration was considered 
essential for the sake of containing centrifugal tendencies inside Russia and for ensuring 
lasting stability within the CIS states. 15' Russia was to become the leading force behind the 
formation of a new system of inter-state political and economic relations in the post-Soviet 
space, but its policies in the area would take strict account of Russia's national interests. '54 
During 1993-1995, therefore, overall agreement had been reached among the government 
and most members of the Russian political elite on Russia's foreign policy priorities. 
Russia's foreign policy was to focus on deepening economic, military and political 
integration, on keeping the peace in the post-Soviet space, and on protecting the rights of 
Russian minorities living beyond Russia's borders. Agreement had also been reached on 
the view that Russia had to strive to remain a great power, and this was to be reflected in 
Russia's hegemonic position in the near abroad. The reaching of an overall consensus on 
foreign policy was mainly due to the change in foreign policy focus conducted by Yeltsin 
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and Kozyrev, and to the fact that Moderate Liberal and Moderate Nationalist views 
managed to reach the higher echelons of power. Liberal Westernizers in turn became 
totally marginalised, as their views lost popularity. They either abandoned the government 
- Gennadii Burbulis, Yegor Gaidar and Boris Fyodorov - or adopted more conservative 
views - Kozyrev and Yeltsin. Moreover, the Defence Ministry, supportive of an active 
involvement in the former Soviet space, played a growing role in foreign policy formulation 
and implementation, given that military issues remained high on the near abroad agenda. In 
addition, the security and defence agencies - the Ministry of Defence, the Foreign 
Intelligence Service, and the Federal Security Service - gained major influence in policy- 
making and Yeltsin increasing relied on his old team of subordinates from his time as 
Secretan- of the Sverdlovsk Communist Party Organisation - Yurii Petrov, Viktor Iliushin 
and Oleg Lobov -, most of whom where characterised by rather authoritarian credentials. 
Furthermore, representatives of Moderate Nationalist thinking became part of Yeltsin's 
team of advisors, such as Academician Andranik Migranyan. Yeltsin's and Kozyrev's 
change in foreign policy approach was the to a great extent the result of their own political 
weakness. Yeltsin's growing dependence on the military and security services for keeping 
his hold on power after the October 1993 storming of parliament, and the gains of 
Zhirinovsky in the 1993 Duma elections, compelled him to adopt more assertive policies, in 
order to satisfy their wishes, and retain their support. But as Neil Malcolm correctly 
pointed out, this mood of national accord was brought at a price. Lack of clarity in policy 
and disarray in decision-making characterised Russian foreign policy, which in general 
tended to reflect attempts to reach broad domestic compromise and satisfy domestic 
constituencies, rather than consistently follow Russia's national interest. '55 
Russia's foreign policy record during 1994-1995 however was not as assertive and neo- 
imperialist as indicated by the rhetoric. Although increased emphasis was placed on CIS 
integration - major economic integration treaties were signed and big steps were taken 
down the road of multilateral military integration - very little implementation followed, to a 
great extent due to the unwillingness of Russia's leaders to cover the costs involved. 
Russia's policies in support of minorities in the Baltics also remained restricted to 
diplomatic initiatives, as Russia withdrew all its troops from the region. Russia's policies 
remained more assertive, however, in the areas of peacekeeping, military basing, 
restoration of control over the former Soviet borders and the air defence system, although 
155 Neil Malcolm, `Foreign Policy Making', in Roy Allison, Margot Light, Neil Malcolm, Alex 
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implementation suffered from lack of funding. In the energy sector, Russia tried to obtain 
control over the Caspian oil transportation routes and to participate in the major oil deals. 
Despite the more assertive behaviour in various aspects of Russia's relations with the FSS, 
and the overall consensus reached in foreign policy, differences of opinion remained and 
the debate over foreign policy continued throughout 1994 and 1995, albeit in a less 
passionate manner. The growing assertiveness of Russian foreign policy throughout 1994 
led to growing criticisms, on the one hand, from Liberal Westernizers and Moderate 
Liberals who became alarmed about the radical shifts in Russian foreign policy, and on the 
other, from Moderate and Imperialist Nationalist who instead believed Kozyrev's new 
policies reflected only cosmetic changes - an indication that Russian foreign policy was not 
really following a coherent strategy of 'neo-empire building. ' Liberals such as Professor 
Vyacheslav Dashichev and Moderates such as Aleksei Arbatov expressed great concern 
over the Russian leadership's apparent efforts to transform the former Soviet Union into a 
sphere of Russia's special influence. Dashichev saw Russia's policies towards the near 
abroad as a return to great power expansionism, and insisted that only a concept of 
interdependence could serve as the basis of CIS integration. Ideally, the CIS should be 
transformed into an association of democratic states. 116 Arbatov recognised that Russia had 
special interests in the near abroad but considered the claiming of `special responsibilities' 
as counter-productive. Russia's policies should be aimed at preventing the domination of 
the near abroad by powers hostile to Russia, but Russia should not strive for such 
domination itself. Russian leaders were to use diplomatic and economic levers to enhance 
influence and refrain from fuelling internal tension in neighbouring states. The main aim of 
Russia's foreign policy in the former Soviet space, according to Arbatov, was to foster the 
emergence of independent, stable, peaceful and neutral states. 
151 Similarly, the Council for 
Foreign and Defence Policy, in its document, Strategy for Russia (2), regretted the 
deterioration of relations with the West, and expressed concern over Russia's increasing 
isolation in the world arena, and the potential revival of the Cold War. Russian 
leadership's great power rhetoric was creating suspicions that Russia was aiming at 
imperial revanche. "" 
156 Vyacheslav Dashichev, `Vykrutasy Rossiiskogo vneshnepoliticheskogo myshleniya', 
Nezavisimaya gazeta, 23 April 1994, p. 4. 
15' Aleksei Arbatov, `Russian National Interests', in Damage Limitation or Crisis, eds. Robert 
Blackwill and Sergei Karaganov, CSIA Studies in International Security, Washington, 1994, 
pp. 60-67. 
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Russian politicians also received criticisms from the conservative wing of the Russian 
political spectrum, which characterised Russia's foreign policy as improvised, incoherent 
and subject to abrupt reversals. Conservative Nationalists expressed great concern over 
Russia's growing isolation, made more evident by NATO's enlargement plans. 1'9 Russia's 
inability to counter NATO's enlargement and to influence Western policy in Bosnia during 
September-December of 1995, made Russia's isolation and loss of great power status all 
the more evident. Liberal Westernizers, such as Izvestiya journalist Konstantin Eggert and 
Segodnya journalist Leonid Velekhov, seriously questioned the advantages of Russia's 
striving to remain a great power. 160 However, the more conservative range of the political 
spectrum insisted that Russia was and remained a great power. 161 Communist Party leader, 
Gennady Zyuganov, made it clear that the party would fight for the restoration of Russia's 
great power and prestige if it won the Presidential elections. Zyuganov argued that once in 
power he would restore Russia's role as the unique guarantor or security and stability in 
Eurasia, and would work towards the restoration of the Soviet Union - thus attesting to a 
clearly neo-imperialist approach. Such restoration was considered a historical necessity, 
dictated by Russia's own security needs. 161 Zyuganov based his arguments on the assertion 
that Russia belonged to a different, 'communal' type of civilisation prevalent in Asia. 
Nationalist leader Vladimir Zhirinovsky instead argued in favour of the creation of a 
powerful new Russian state within the old Soviet Union borders, divided into tsarist-like 
provinces rather than ethnically based republics. 163 He also called for drastic action against 
the discrimination of Russian minorities in the Baltic states, Kazakhstan and Moldova -a 
159 Andranik Migranyan, `Vneshnyaya politika Rossii: katastroficheskie itogi trekh let', 
Nezavisimaya gazeta, 10 December 1994, p. l; Alexander Deikin, `Russia in Geopolitical 
Isolation', New Times, October 1995 p. 42. On Lukin's concern over NATO's expansion see 
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14 March 1995, pp. 1-2. 
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December 1995, p. 9- 
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1996, p. 11. Similiarly, the Party Programme adopted at the Third Congress of the Communist 
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position also adopted by the Communist party and its leader Zyuganov. '64Nationalist 
Conservatives, moreover, saw Western, and in particular American, increasing 
involvement in the FSS with great concern. 165 Although criticism of the Foreign Ministry's 
policies on 'near' and `far abroad' issues continued to be voiced during 1994-1995, the 
Duma took a less hostile stance than the Supreme Soviet had in the past and proved more 
ready to negotiation and persuasion. 166 
5. Primakov at the Foreign Ministry 
The arrival of Primakov at the Foreign Ministry in January 1996, did not significantly alter 
Russia's foreign policy orientations, although foreign policy in general became more 
coherent, better organised and increasingly focused on top priority issues, such as 
responding to NATO's enlargement, and deepening CIS integration. Primakov's views 
resembled, to a great extent, those of Moderate Conservatives, although in his behaviour 
Primakov showed great moderation, thus not entirely embracing the neo-imperialist project. 
Foreign policy was to be focused on protecting Russia's interests and creating the best 
conditions for the strengthening of the Russian state. 16' Efforts were to be devoted to 
stabilising the situation in the former Soviet states, and developing fruitful international 
relations in order to prevent the emergence of new hotbeds of tension. Top priority was 
given to accelerating the process of CIS integration, albeit on a voluntary basis, and above 
all in the economic field. Primakov envisaged the creation of a varied-speed organisation, 
with a group of leading states, probably Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, moving faster 
along the path of integration, joining their economies and creating supranational 
structures. 168 Primakov did not intend to restore the Soviet Union, the independence of the 
former Soviet republics was in fact considered irreversible. 169 It can therefore be argued 
that although under Primakov, the FSS remained an area of top priority, Russia's foreign 
policy did not follow a clearly defined neo-imperialist path. "o 
164 Gennadii Ziuganov, `My - russkoe soprotivlenie', Den, 27 September -3October, 1992, p. 1. 
165 Andranik Migranyan, `Vneshnyaya politika Rossii: katastroficheskie itogi trekh let', p. 1. 
166 Anna Ostapchuk, `Prezidentskie lobbisty gotovy deistvovat", Nezavisimaya gazeta, 3 August 
1994, p. 1; Alex Pravda, `The Public Politics of Foreign Policy', in Neil Malcolm, Alex Pravda, 
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167 'Primakov nachinaet s SNG', Nloskovskie novosti, 14-21 January 1996, p. 13. 
168 Maksim Yusin, `Deputatam obeshchana velikaya derzhava', Izvestiya, 10 February 1996, p. 3; 
Stanislav Kondrashov, `Rossiya ishchet novoe mesto v mire', Izvestiya, 6 March 1996, p. 3. 
169 Maksim Isayev, `Razvedka: Obshchenatsionalnoe dostoyanie', Nezavisimaya gazeta, 22 
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current difficulties, Russia remained a great power and that its policy towards the outside world 
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III. Russia's Motivations in its Behaviour towards the Former Soviet States 
In their efforts to conduct an active policy in the post-Soviet space, Russia's leaders were 
drawn by a series of motivations. First, deep economic and military ties kept the former 
republics very closely tied together. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the conduct of 
independent policies by the CIS states immediately brought to light the close inter-linkage 
of the CIS economies. Second, Russian politicians considered the near abroad as a source 
of constant conflict and instability, and expressed serious doubts about the viability of the 
newly independent states. A clear perception existed that direct threats to Russia's interests 
emanated from the near abroad. Presidential advisor Sergei Stankevich believed that 
Russia needed stability along its borders in order to turn full attention to its own economic 
problems. "' Some analysts, such as Andranik Migranyan, argued that the passiveness 
displayed by the international community had forced Russia to take over the task of putting 
an end to violence in the near abroad. `It has become clear that the world community 
cannot, and moreover does not want to get deeply involved in the Dniestr region, in 
Karabagh, or in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Migranyan noted, and added, `Unless Russia 
becomes seriously engaged as an intermediary and guarantor in these conflict zones, the 
violence will escalate further and the ethnic conflicts will spill over into the territory of the 
Russian Federation itself. ' 12 Conflicts resulted in streams of refugees, weapons, narcotics 
and crime pouring into Russia, which threatened the internal stability of the state. 173 
Third, Russian leaders were particularly concerned over the fate of Russians living in the 
former Soviet states, and over the strain that both Russian and non-Russian refugees 
migrating into Russia placed on the country's economy and on the population at large. `To 
where are we going to evacuate hundreds of thousands of residents of the Dniestr Region? 
What will we be able to offer them?.. Where will we get the money for this great migration 
from many areas of the former USSR where conflicts are flaring up? ', Deputy Foreign 
Minister Fedor Shelov-Kovedyaev asked in an interview with Nezavisimaya gazeta on July 
30 1992. Official records estimated the total number of refugees and forced migrants 
had to correspond to such a status. Primakov favoured the development of an equitable and 
mutually advantageous partnership with the West. 
"' Sergei Stankevich, `Rossiya uzhe sdelala antiimpersky vybor', Nezavisimaya gazeta, 6 
November 1992, p-2- 
172 Andranik Migranyan, `Rossiya i blizhnee zarubezh'e', Nezavisimaya gazeta, 12 January 1994, 
p. 4 
173 Aleksandr Aleksandrov, `Dolzhna li Rossiya vyvesti voiska iz Tadzhikistana? ', Rossiiskie 
vesti, July 22 1993, p. 1. 
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residing in Russia to be between 1.7 and 2 million people in May 1994. Most refugees 
came mainly from areas of conflict, such as Tajikistan, but also from Uzbekistan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Armenia, as well as from areas where they had difficulties in 
obtaining citizenship, such as in Latvia. 174 
Fourth, Russian leaders were extremely concerned about the potential disintegration of the 
Russian Federation, and about the negative impact that developments in the former Soviet 
space could have on the fragile territorial integrity of the Russian Federation. Particular 
concern in this respect was expressed over events in the Transcaucasus. In the view of 
Andranik Migranyan, 
'Russia cannot simply withdraw from the Transcaucasus, as it did from the Baltics 
or Central Asia. Withdrawal from that area will jeopardise Russia's presence in 
the Caucasus in general... a decision to withdraw from the Transcaucasus will 
bring neither peace nor stability on the borders with the Transcaucasus republics. 
To the contrary, it could have unpredictable consequences for Russia and its 
territorial integrity. Centrifugal tendencies in the republics and regions would 
receive a new impetus towards separatism and the disintegration of Russia... ' 75 
After leaving the Transcaucasus, Russia would be forced to abandon the North Caucasian 
autonomous entities, where Russia was already losing control. 176 Russian leaders felt that 
secessionist movements and separatist tendencies in the former Soviet states could set a 
precedent for events in Russia. This explained Yeltsin's unwillingness to support 
secessionist movements with a strong pro-Russian orientation, as well as his desire to exert 
some sort of influence over events in the near abroad. 
Fifth, Russian leaders were particularly anxious about the `threat' of Islamic 
fundamentalism emanating from the Central Asian republics, particularly from Tajikistan. 
Russian leaders became particularly wary about the spread of Islam when in July 1993, 
over twenty Russian border guards were killed in the Tajik-Afghan border. Kozyrev wrote 
in an article in Izvestiya on 4 August 1993 that putting up a barrier against Islamic 
extremism in Central Asia was one of the main reasons why Russian troops had been 
deployed along the Tajik-Afghan border. Similar views were expressed by Deputy Foreign 
174 The Russian Independent Institute for Social and Nationality-based Problems, `Emi-graine, 
Immi-graine: However You Say It, It Spells Migraine', Rossiia, 18-24 May 1994, p. 4, in CDPSP, 
XLVI, 1994,20, p. 12. 
"s Andranik Migranyan, `Podlinnye i mnimiye orientiry vo vneshnei politike', Rossiiskaya 
gazeta, 4 August 1992, p. 4. 
176 Andranik Migranyan, `The Soviet Union Has Gone Off in All Directions', Megapolis- 
Express, 28 October 1992, pp. 20-21, in CDPSP, XLIV, 43,1992, p. 11. 
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Minister Georgii Kunadze in an interview with Nezavisimaya gazeta on 29 July, 1993. 
Kunadze stressed the `need to prevent the explosive charge of Islamic extremism... from 
penetrating into Russia. ' Concern about Islam and its potential penetration into Russia was 
also voiced by leading journalists. Mikhail Leontiev, wrote in Segodnya on 20 July 1993 
that the spread of expansionist Islamic fundamentalism can be considered the internal 
affair of individual countries as much as the spread of expansionist fascism. "" However, 
Academician Aleksei Malashenko from the Institute of Oriental Studies, considered that the 
threat of Islam was being exaggerated and that there was not much Russia could actually 
do to prevent Islam from taking ground in Central Asia. He believed that Islam could take 
moderate forms if it was not repressed by Russia. 178 
Finally. Russian leaders were particularly worried about foreign states acquiring a 
predominant influence in the territories of the former Soviet Union. Russian leaders 
remained categorically opposed to the enlargement of NATO into Eastern Europe and the 
Baltic states. 17' The Russian Military Doctrine adopted in 1993 regarded `the build-up of 
forces on the borders of the Russian Federation to limits which upset the existing balance', 
as well as the deployment of foreign troops on the territory of states adjacent to the 
Russian Federation as a direct threat to the security of Russia. "8° Russia's concerns, 
however, were not limited to these eventualities. Fear of foreign, particularly Western, 
direct participation in the resolution of conflicts in the former Soviet Union was strong 
among members of the Russian political elite. ' 81 In July 1992, Marshal Shaposhnikov, then 
CIS Commander-in-Chief, overtly opposed UN peacekeeping intervention in the military 
conflicts that had arisen in the near abroad. Asked by a journalist as to whether the UN 
would be asked to participate in settling the Dniestr and Karabagh conflicts, he replied, `I 
am categorically opposed. I think the CIS is quite capable of dealing with all issues that 
arise within the CIS. Are we to allow foreign peacemakers make peace between us? 3182 
This view was not initially supported by the Foreign Ministry, which throughout 1992 and 
1993 asked the UN and the CSCE to help Russia settle the conflicts in the near abroad. 
However, Foreign Minister Kozyrev's view changed during the autumn of 1993, as he 
"7 Mikhail Leontiev, `Stanet li Rossiya vtorym Tadzhikistanom? ', Segodnya, 20 July 1993, p. 3. 
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181 Yurii Glukhov, `Kroty istorii roiut vslepuiu', Pravda, 24 February 1992, p. 1; Vladimir 
Peresada, `NATO i Nakhichevan', Pravda, May 26 1992, p. 3. 
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openly challenged the leading role of the UN and the CSCE in peacekeeping in the near 
abroad. 
Some journalists expressed concern for the eventual emergence of a `cordon sanitaire' 
around Russia, which would control Russia's export arteries and plunge Russia into 
isolation. ' 83 Academician Aleksei Vasilev went as far as expressing concern over the 
integration of all states of the former Soviet Union into the CSCE. Although he regarded 
CSCE's participation as positive, he hoped it would not become a channel for Western 
influence in the area. 184 Vasilev was also worried about the increased influence of Iran and 
Turkey in Central Asia and the Transcaucasus. Similar anxieties were voiced by various 
politicians, such as Sergei Stankevich, Vasilii Lipitskii, a member of Rutskoi's party, and 
above all Andranik Migranyan. 'Russia's long-term interests require that Turkey's advance 
into the Transcaucasus, and into Central Asia be halted. This advance could disrupt the 
balance of power on Russia's southern borders and create a potential threat to its 
interests. ''S' Similar concerns were even expressed by Kozyrev during 1994, with 
particular reference to potential Turkish peacekeeping operations in Nagorno-Karabagh 
and Russia's potential loss of control over export routes to Turkey, Georgia and Iran. '86 
IV. Russian minorities in the Baltic States: Citizenship Laws 
and Troop Withdrawals 
The current section will provide an overview over the development of Russian policies 
towards the Baltic states as far as Russian minorities are concerned. ' 87 The collapse of the 
Soviet Union had a major impact on the Russian communities living beyond the borders of 
the Russian Federation. Virtually overnight, large numbers of ethnic Russians - 25 million 
according to 1989 estimates - and Russified non-Russians found themselves living as 
minorities in the new independent states. 188 This new situation had a profound impact on 
the lives of the Russian diaspora. Used to occupying, if not a privileged status, at least a 
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similar position to the titular nationalities in the non-Russian republics, Russians suddenly 
became second-class citizens. 's9 As a result, Russian politicians on almost all sides of the 
political spectrum came out vociferously in support of Russians' human and civil rights. 
The situation of Russian minorities proved to be extremely adverse in the Baltic states, 
particularly in Latvia and Estonia, in view of the restrictive citizenship laws that were 
adopted, and which in essence, left a high number of Russians, stateless. Russians in 
Estonia and Latvia represented a significantly high percentage of the population at the time 
of Baltic independence - approximately 30.3 percent of the total population in Estonia and 
34 percent in Latvia. 190 The demographic Russification which occurred after 1945 created 
among Latvians and Estonians the perception that the character of their country was 
changing and that their culture and survival as a nation was in danger. 19' Consequently 
they adopted a series of language and citizenship laws aimed at reversing the Russification 
trends. 
1. Citizenship Laws in Estonia and Latvia 
Although citizenship was not denied to Russian minorities, the conditions for naturalisation 
remained quite difficult to fulfil. The Estonian citizenship law, adopted on 26 February 
1992, stipulated that only those who had resided in Estonia before 1940 and their 
descendants would be granted automatic Estonian citizenship. Others currently residing in 
Estonia, including the vast majority of the Russian population, were forced to apply for 
citizenship, and fulfil the stipulated conditions in order to become naturalised - namely 
having resided in Estonia for two years, starting on 30 March 1990; showing minimal 
competence in the Estonian language, and swearing allegiance to the Estonian state. 
192 On 
the surface, these stipulations sounded quite inclusive. However, the two years of residency 
began only after 30 March 1990, which meant that non-citizens could obtain citizenship 
only on 30 March 1993 at the earliest, if the extra year 
between the submission of the 
application and the granting of citizenship is taken account. 
Until that time, even those who 
had lived their entire lives in Estonia, but could not trace their roots back to inter-war 
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Estonia, were foreigners. In addition, the language requirements for naturalisation were 
unclear in the law and, therefore, there was room for discretion by local government 
officials. 193 Although modifications to the law followed in February 1993 and January 
1995, upon recommendation from the Council of Europe (CE) and the Conference on 
Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), the major elements of the law were left 
unaltered. 194 The modifications did not increase the number of applications for citizenship, 
because potential applicants still found it difficult to reach the required level of proficiency 
in Estonian. 19s 
The law that caused the most controversy was the `law on Aliens', adopted on 21 June 
1993, which stipulated that all non-citizens had to obtain residence and work permits 
within two nears if they wished to remain in Estonia. At the same time, they had to decide 
whether they wanted to apply for either Estonian or another citizenship, or else apply for 
an Alien's passport. Dual citizenship was excluded. The majority of non-Estonian citizens 
were residing in Estonia on the basis of their Soviet registration or propiska and most of 
them had neither applied for Estonian citizenship nor taken Russian citizenship. 196 This law 
therefore was aimed at putting an end to this situation. The main problem with the law was 
not only that it had a retroactive effect - it was designed for those who would come to 
Estonia in the future as well as for those who were residents in Estonia before 1 July 1990 
- but that it gave no guarantees to non-Estonians that they would be granted a residence 
permit, which in any case would have to be renewed every five years. 197 It was seen by 
members of the Russian-speaking community and by the Russian leadership as giving the 
Estonian authorities the opportunity to expel non-citizens who had lived most, if not all of 
their lives in Estonia. 198 In response to criticisms from the CE and the CSCE High 
Commissioner for National Minorities (HCNM), the Estonian parliament adopted a 
modified version of the law on 8 July 1993, which guaranteed residence and work permits 
to those permanent residents of Estonia who had settled in the country prior to 1 July 
193 Lowell Barrington, The Domestic and International Consequences of Citizenship in the 
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1990.199 Although the requirement that permanent residence permits had to be renewed 
every five years was dropped, aliens were initially granted only a temporary permit which 
could be exchanged for a permanent residence permit only after a three-year period. In 
other words, although the independent recommendations were taken into account, the basic 
thrust of the law was left unaltered. 20° Moreover, the conditions for denying a residence 
permit as stipulated by the law were hardly modified, thus allowing too much room for 
arbitrary decisions. 201 
In Latvia, the official citizenship law was not adopted until 22 July 1994. Prior to that, the 
Latvian Supreme Soviet adopted a resolution on 15 October 1991 which determined that 
only those who could trace citizenry back to 1940 could obtain Latvian citizenship 
automatically. , °2 The Latvian Supreme Soviet decided that the official citizenship law 
could only come into effect after the establishment of the Latvian Parliament, the Saeima. 
Naturalisations were not allowed in practice until the formal guidelines were established, 
and therefore, few Russians had a chance to become citizens until the official law was 
passed. During 1993-1994, the Latvian Parliament discussed a series of draft laws, which 
draw sharp criticisms from the CE and the CSCE. The main objection to the draft law 
adopted on first reading by the Saeima on 25 November 1993 was the introduction of a 
system of annual naturalisation quotas for non-citizens, which foresaw that only about 
2,000 people would be able to obtain citizenship each year. This meant that about 500,000 
permanent residents of the republic would end up as stateless persons before the year 
2000.203 Moreover, these quotas would be decided upon `taking into consideration the 
demographic and economic situation in the country, in order to ensure the development of 
Latvia as a single-nation state. '204 The draft law also envisaged a ten-year residency 
threshold, conversational ability in the Latvian language, knowledge of the Latvian 
constitution, and an oath of loyalty to Latvia. 205 
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The law on citizenship adopted on second reading by the Saeima in June 1994 ignored the 
recommendations of the CE and CSCE, and instead retained the system of quotas. This 
draw great criticism from the CE, which noted that if Latvia intended to join the 
organisation, it had to modify the law. 206 As a result, on 22 July 1994, the Saeima adopted 
a final law which followed the CSCE and CE recommendations regarding the quota 
system. However, the law still remained very exclusive, given that the application review 
was based on the age and place of birth of the applicant. Although there were no longer any 
fixed quotas limiting the number of applications that could be accepted, most non-Latvians 
could not get automatic citizenship and many could not even apply for naturalisation until 
after the year 2000.207 Although CSCE HCNM Max van der Stoel noted that the Latvian 
law conformed on the whole with the recommendations of international organisations, he 
still complained about the `excessively high demands' placed on the applicants for 
citizenship with regard to knowledge of the Latvian language. 208 The language requirement 
in fact proved to be a major obstacle in the acquisition of Latvian citizenship. 209 Although 
opinion polls had shown that an overwhelming majority of non-citizens wanted to acquire 
Latvian citizenship, the number of applicants was extremely low. 2'0 However, the laws 
were not modified. 2" In addition, several irregularities were noted in the application of the 
law 'On the Registration of Residents' (1991), and the `Law on the Status of Former 
USSR Citizens who are not Citizens of Latvia or any other State' (1995) which were 
aimed at regulating the status of non-citizens residing in Latvia. 212 
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The Russian community, not being able to obtain automatic citizenship, was denied a 
number of significant political and economic rights. In Estonia, non-citizens were not 
allowed to vote in national elections. As a result, virtually, all the Russian-speaking 
population, was forced to wait at least until March 1993 to obtain citizenship, and thus 
saw their right to vote in parliamentary elections, which they had exercised in March 1990, 
taken away. 213 Russian residents who did not hold Estonian citizenship were also barred 
from holding national or local offices and from becoming members of political parties. 214 
However, resident non-citizens were allowed to vote in local elections, although they were 
barred from running as candidates. 215 Moreover, non-Estonian citizens were initially 
neither allowed to participate in the privatisation process nor to own land. However, on 3 
May 1994, the government of Estonia adopted a resolution that guaranteed social and 
economic rights to those non-citizens who were registered as permanent residents of 
Estonia before July 1990.216 In Latvia, the restrictive citizenship laws had an even more 
negative impact on the political and economic rights of the non-Latvian residents. Non- 
citizens were not allowed to vote in either national or local elections. Those without 
citizenship were prohibited from holding state office, from serving as judges or barristers 
and from taking part in diplomatic and consular services. Moreover, non-citizens were not 
allowed to own land and other natural resources, and were prohibited from buying houses 
from the state and, in some cases, from purchasing privatised co-operative flats. Also, non- 
citizens received fewer privatisation vouchers and smaller pensions. Finally, prior to 1995, 
they were not guaranteed the right to return to Latvia after leaving, nor the right to choose 
their place of residence. 2 ' 
2. Russia's Policies in Support of the Russian-speaking Population 
In order to reverse the citizenship laws adopted by Estonia and Latvia, the Russian 
government conducted an intensive diplomatic campaign aimed at enlisting the support of 
2 13 Leonid Levitskii, `Neestonskie zhiteli Estonii otstraneny of vsenarodnogo golosovaniya', 
Izvestiya, 29 June 1992, p-3- 
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the international community for a modification of the laws. In addition, it put pressure on 
the Estonian and Latvian governments by linking the issue of Russian minorities' rights to 
the withdrawal of Russian troops stationed in those countries. As far as the first aspect is 
concerned, throughout 1992-1996, the Russian Foreign Ministry made regular and 
consistent appeals to the UN, the CE and the CSCE expressing concern over the 
discriminatory practices conducted by Latvia and Estonia, and demanding their 
intervention in favour of a resolution of the contentious issue. In September 1992, Kozyrev 
,, rent as far as requesting that the UN become the guarantor of the rights of the Russian 
minorities, and specifically asked that a UN guardianship be established over national 
minorities. 218 However such initiative did not receive much support. As highly restrictive 
citizenship laws were adopted in 1993-1994, the rhetoric of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
became much more assertive. Foreign Minister Kozyrev and his deputy Vitalii Churkin 
went as far as labelling the Baltic states' behaviour "apartheid" and "ethnic cleansing". 219 
However, the Russian Foreign Ministry made it clear that it intended to find a solution to 
the controversy within the framework of generally recognised international standards and 
rules, and concentrated most of its efforts on the diplomatic front, by continuing its appeals 
to the UN, the CSCE and the CE. 22° Russia's efforts to find a diplomatic solution to the 
question of Russian minorities involving an active international participation suggests that 
Russia was not trying to use the Russian diaspora as an instrument of Russian hegemony 
over the Baltic states. On the contrary, Russia was willing to bring in international 
organisations in order to protect the rights of the Russian diaspora and to allow for a better 
integration of Russians into the Latvian and Estonian societies. 
The Russian government also tried to put pressure on the Baltic states by making the 
withdrawal of Russian troops conditional upon the modification of the discriminatory 
legislation. During the 1992 negotiations with Latvia and Estonia on modalities of the 
withdrawal of Russian troops, the Russian Foreign Ministry regularly demanded that 
retired military officers be given the opportunity to obtain Latvian citizenship, and that 
those soldiers and officers who wanted to remain in Latvia or Estonia after demobilisation, 
as well as all Russians already living there, be granted automatic Latvian or Estonian 
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citizenship, according to where they lived. "' Furthermore, in August 1992, Foreign 
Minister Kozyrev made the withdrawal of troops conditional upon a change in the laws that 
infringed upon the rights of the Russian-speakers. 222 On 29 October 1992, President 
Yeltsin went as far as ordering a temporary suspension of the withdrawal of Russian 
troops from Latvia and Estonia, in order to put pressure on Tallinn and Riga so that they 
modify their citizenship laws. '`' However, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Vitalii 
Churkin denied that Moscow's progress on troop withdrawals was directly dependent on 
the resolution of the minorities problem, arguing instead that Moscow was only calling 
upon the governments of the Baltic states to address these issues in a civilised manner with 
due consideration for the existing historical realities. '224 Despite the denials, however, the 
linkage between both issues remained clear. In particular, Russia's decision in September 
1992, to agree to the withdrawal of troops from Lithuania, a country which had a much 
higher military-strategic value for Russia, but which had introduced much less more 
inclusive citizenship laws, clearly indicated that the Russian government was using the 
presence of Russian troops to put pressure on the Estonian and Latvian governments to 
improve the condition of Russians living in those countries. 225 Moreover, during 1993- 
1994, the Russian Defence Minister several times openly threatened to suspend the 
withdrawal of Russian troops unless discrimination against Russian minorities stopped. 226 
However, Russia never actually implemented these threats, and all attempts to link the 
issue actually failed. Despite all the rhetoric, the withdrawal of all Russian troops from the 
Baltic states was completed punctually, on 31 August 1994. 
Although it has often been argued that Russian leaders used the fate of Russian minorities 
to keep a military presence in the Baltic states, 227 the evidence seems to show that, despite 
early wishes to keep a small military presence in the area, Russia agreed in early 1992 to 
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withdraw its troops from the Baltic states. Russia's intention to withdraw its troops is 
indicated by the preliminary agreements reached to that effect with the Baltic states in 
January 1992, the various rounds of negotiations on the specifics of the withdrawal held 
during 1992-1993, and above all, the slow, but uninterrupted, withdrawal of all Russian 
troops from the region between 1992 and 1994, despite the lack of formal agreements. 
Russia's decision to withdraw its troops was influenced, to a great extent, by the pressure 
exerted by Western countries, particularly the United States, and its decision to make 
economic aid to Russia conditional upon the withdrawal of Russian troops. However, 
Russia's behaviour still indicated a readiness to relinquish its presence from an area of 
major strategic importance, and as such attested to the absence of a neo-imperialist policy. 
Although the withdrawal of troops was never smooth, the delays experienced were 
primarily related to the acute lack of housing and to the desire to provide adequate living 
and employment conditions for Russian servicemen returning home, as well as to attempts 
to bring pressure to bear on the Latvian and Estonian governments so that they did not 
228 violate the rights of Russian minorities. 
The Russian government also reverted to economic measures in order to bring pressure to 
bear on the Estonian and Latvian governments. When the Estonian parliament adopted the 
first version of the Law on Aliens in June 1993, the Russian government threatened to 
impose economic sanctions, and on 25 June temporarily suspended Estonia's gas supplies. 
Although Russian leaders insisted that the halt in supplies was related to unpaid arrears of 
10 billion rubles, Russia's actions seem to have also been motivated by the desire to put 
pressure on Tallinn so that it drop the Law on Aliens. 22' This was indicated by the fact that 
gas deliveries from Russia to Estonia resumed shortly after the Estonian government 
delayed ratification of the law. 23° Yeltsin's suggestion, on 24 June 1993, that the Estonian 
leadership, yielding to the pressures of nationalism, had `forgotten certain geopolitical and 
demographic realities, which Russia could remind it of ', indicated that Russia was ready 
to act assertively. 231 Similarly, when in the Summer of 1994, the Latvian government 
adopted the various draft citizenship laws, Russian leaders threatened to impose economic 
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229 Russia's claims might well have been true given Russia simultaneously cut off supplies to 
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sanctions and made implementation of the Most Favoured Nation status dependent on the 
successful resolution of the citizenship issue. 
3. Assessment of Estonian and Latvian Policies and of Russia's Responses 
Were Russia's concerns and complaints regarding Russia's rights in the Baltic states 
legitimate, or were they instead intended as an instrument for exerting hegemony over the 
Baltic states'? The UN fact-finding missions to Estonia on 7-11 February 1992, and Latvia 
on 27-30 October 1992, found neither evidence of discrimination along ethnic or religious 
grounds, nor traces of gross and systematic violations of human rights. 232 Instead, the UN 
observed considerable anxiety among the Russian, Belorussian and Ukrainian communities 
inhabiting Latvia and Estonia in view of the restrictive citizenship laws. 233 Similar 
assessments were expressed by the CSCE HCNM, Max van der Stoel, who noted that 
there was neither evidence of persecution of the non-Latvian/Estonian population nor 
incidents pointing to inter-ethnic violence. 234 However, the Commissioner also added that 
given that the majority of non-Latvians and non-Estonians wished to remain in Latvia or 
Estonia respectively, the Latvian and Estonian governments had to conduct a policy aimed 
at their integration. 235 
International law gives states great - though not unlimited - freedom in setting requirements 
for citizenship. Article 1 of the 1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions relating to 
the Conflict of Nationality Laws stipulates that `it is for each state to determine under its 
own law who are its citizens. '236 Article 15 (1) of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights stipulates that `everyone has the right to a nationality' but this provision did not 
oblige Estonia or Latvia to grant citizenship to all its residents without conditions. 237 In 
other words, the issue of citizenship was left by international law within the realm of a 
state's jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the fact that the citizenship laws adopted by these 
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countries left over one third of the population stateless, and consequently deprived of 
important political and economic rights, indicated the existence of a major gap in 
international law. The Estonian and Latvian cases were particularly relevant because of the 
repercussions of the citizenship laws on the democratic character of both states. As the 
Helsinki Watch report on Estonia wrote, `a representative democracy in which nearly forty 
percent of the population does not enjoy citizenship rights is far from representative. '238 
Moreover, the lack of citizenship for long-term residents and people born in either Latvia 
or Estonia had an impact on their political and economic rights. It can therefore be argued 
that Russia had a strong case for expressing concern over the fate of Russians living in 
these two countries, since they were suffering from some kind of injustice. 
Some scholars, however, questioned the right of Russia to actually claim protection over 
these communities. Neil Melvin argued that the case for Russia's involvement with the 
Russian-speaking communities in all former Soviet states is extremely weak. `It is far from 
clear what the basis for Russia's claim to have a special relationship to these communities 
is, ' he wrote . 
239 In his view, there was little evidence of formal discrimination against 
Russians, and consequently, the reason why the issue of the Russian Diaspora has become 
so important lies in domestic politics. 240 Although there is little doubt that the Russian 
government reacted to pressure from the domestic opposition, which demanded a more 
assertive policy regarding Russians in the Baltics, Melvin's views are not entirely correct. 
No state could ignore the presence of millions of its co-ethnics concentrated, as many of 
the Russians abroad are, just across its borders. The Russian government faced the 
daunting task of providing housing and jobs to a large numbers of Russians if they 
suddenly decided to return to Russia. If for no other reason, therefore, the Russian 
authorities had a legitimate interest in the fate of co-ethnics outside Russia's borders. Rein 
Mullerson also argued that `it would certainly be unrealistic to think that states would 
completely ignore the plight of their ethnic brethren in other countries. '24' However, 
Mullerson noted that from the point of view of international law, the mother countries had 
no legal grounds for `protecting' ethnic brothers. International law permits states to 
exercise diplomatic protection of their citizens abroad. Citizens of other countries or 
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stateless persons, whatever their ethnic origin, are under the protection of international 
human rights law and not that of the state where their ethnic brethren lives. Thus, 
according to Mullerson, Russia had no more right to interfere on behalf of the Russian 
minority in Estonia than, for example, Great Britain had. But Mullerson also noted that it 
would be unrealistic to expect 'motherlands' to remain indifferent to real violations of the 
rights of their ethnic brothers and sisters in other countries. '242 Consequently it can be 
argued that, although in purely legal terms Russia had no right to claim the protection of 
ethnic Russians across its borders, it still had a kind of moral right to express concern for 
fate of the Russian diaspora abroad. '43 
V. Conclusions 
Most members of the Russian leadership and the Russian political elite at large had serious 
difficulties in accepting the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the emergence of a new 
Russian state within the administrative borders of the old RSFSR. Their idea of "Russia" 
remained closely linked with the former Soviet Union and the former Russian Empire, both 
in terms of territorial dimension and population composition. Moreover, Russians were at 
pains with accepting the fact that their country no longer fitted entirely with the qualities of 
a "great power" in the world arena. Russian national consciousness had been shattered by 
the psychological effects of Russia's loss of empire. However, despite the longing for 
empire, the Russian leadership, President Yeltsin and Foreign Minister Kozyrev in 
particular, did not adopt a neo-imperialist attitude towards the FSS when the Soviet Union 
collapsed. On the contrary, endowed with a strong anti-imperialist approach Yeltsin and 
Kozyrev attempted during 1992 to bring Russia into the 'civilised group of Western 
nations', and treated the former Soviet states as independent and sovereign entities of 
international law. However, harsh criticisms from both Moderate and Imperialist 
Nationalists groups, as well as events in the former Soviet states, such as the eruption of 
military conflicts, the discrimination against Russian minorities, and the deep economic 
interdependence among the FSS, compelled Kozyrev to adopt a more active stance towards 
the near abroad. During 1993, the tone of the Russian political discourse became 
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increasingly assertive, as Kozyrev and Yeltsin increasingly adopted neo-imperialist stances, 
giving in to Moderate Nationalists who challenged Yeltsin's power base on the domestic 
and foreign policy fronts. Kozyrev regularly referred to Russia's intention to preserve its 
influence over the FSS, whereas Yeltsin spelled out the main areas of Russian foreign 
policy priority: the settlement of the conflicts in the former Soviet space, the protection of 
the rights of Russian minorities, and the integration of the former Soviet states within the 
CIS framework. These three elements remained a priority of Russian policy throughout 
1994-1996. 
Despite the assertive tone adopted by Russian foreign policy makers, the foreign policy 
record during 1993-1996 was not as neo-imperialist as indicated by the discourse, except 
for certain areas, such as military integration and conflict resolution. And here again, 
Russia's policies often followed legitimate state interests, such as the restoration of 
stability along Russia's borders, the prevention of the spread of weapons, drugs into 
Russia, and regularly underwent significant modifications. More often than not, Russia's 
policies were characterised by a lack of clarity and disarray, rather than by the systematic 
pursuit of national interest, a result of Yeltsin's attempt to reach a broad domestic 
compromise to counterbalance his own domestic political weakness. Still, Russia remained 
highly involved in events in the former Soviet Union, and this was determined by various 
factors. First, deep economic and military links tied all former Soviet states together 
making it extremely difficult for Russia to adopt an isolationist policy. Second, the 
presence of a large Russian and Russian-speaking community in the near abroad, whose 
civic rights were often infringed upon, particularly in the Baltic states, meant that Russian 
leaders could not just stand idly by. Third, Russian leaders considered the near abroad a 
source of constant instability and conflict, and feared the spread of weapons, refugees, 
drugs and criminals into Russia. No borders existed between the former Soviet states, and 
as a result, events in the near abroad had a direct impact on Russia's internal 
developments. Fourth, Russian leaders were very much concerned about the potential 
disintegration of Russia and the effects that events in the near abroad could have on 
Russia's own fragile territorial integrity. Fifth, Russians feared the spread of Islamic 
fundamentalism in Russia, as well as the overall spread of instability. Finally, Russians 
tended to view the former Soviet space as a sphere of Russia's vital interests and exclusive 
influence, and as such were particularly worried about other states acquiring a predominant 
influence in the region. Although they welcomed UN and CSCE/OSCE participation in the 
mediation of conflicts in the FSS, they refused to grant these organisations a predominant 
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role in the post-Soviet space, and to allow foreign military forces play the role of 
peacekeepers, thus indicating a reluctance to totally discard Russia's imperial legacy. 
As far as Russian minorities are concerned, this section shows that in the case of the 
protection of Russian diaspora, Russia was following its legitimate state interests and was 
not trying to use the difficulties faced by the Russian communities in these countries as a 
pretext to exert or keep some sort of influence in the area. On the contrary, the fact that 
Russian leaders put pressure on the Estonia and Latvian governments to facilitate their 
acquisition of citizenship by Russians, shows that Russian leaders actually wanted these 
minorities to integrate into their new state. In other words, Russian leaders did not display 
a neo-imperialist behaviour. Russian leaders showed concern for the fate of Russian 
minorities for a variety of reasons: First, Russian leaders were rightly worried about the 
economic and social consequences that might arise as a result of a massive influx of ethnic 
Russians back into the mother country, if these Russians were unable to integrate into their 
ne«- states. Second, Russian leaders could not remain indifferent to the fate of their ethnic 
brethren, once it became quite obvious that they were suffering from some sort of 
discrimination, if only on moral grounds. The fact that such a high percentage of the total 
population of each country, roughly 30 percent, was not granted immediate automatic 
citizenship, showed that there was a problem. It can therefore be argued that Russia's 
polices followed legitimate state concerns and not a neo-imperialist agenda. The Russian 
government was not using the fate of Russians in order to restore some sort of influence 
over the region. Despite the fact that certain members of the Russian political elite would 
have liked the Russian government to be more protective of Russians in the Baltics, and 
Communists and Nationalists put great pressure on the government, Russian politicians 
mostly used diplomatic methods to press their case. Russian leaders also several times 
linked troop withdrawals to the fate of Russian minorities, as a means to putting pressure 
on the Baltic governments so that they modify their legislation. However, under Western 
pressure, Russia eventually withdrew its troops from the area, and sought other means to 
protect Russians living in Latvia and Estonia. Pressing the case of Russian minorities in 
the Baltics at various international forums eventually proved much more successful. 
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Chapter 2: Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States 
The current chapter will examine whether Russia used the CIS framework as a vehicle of 
hegemony over the former Soviet states, and as instrument of integration of the CIS states 
into a Russian-led union; or whether instead, Russia's policies reflected an attempt to 
establish close political, military and economic co-operation and integration, on a voluntary 
basis, among the CIS states, for the benefit of both Russia and the other CIS member 
states., -" The chapter will analyse Russia's motivations behind the creation of the CIS, as 
well as its policies regarding CIS military and economic integration, in an attempt to 
determine whether they fitted the pattern of "neo-imperial" behaviour. In this section, 
Russia's policies towards the CIS as an organisation will be analysed, as opposed to 
individual policies towards the FSS, which will be examined in subsequent chapters. 
Russia's bilateral relations with the other CIS states in the military and economic sphere 
will be examined whenever Russian leaders found bilateralism a more effective way of 
pursuing their objectives in CIS affairs. 
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I. The Path Towards the Creation of the CIS 
On 8 December 1991 the leaders of Ukraine, Belorussia and the RSFSR put an end to the 
seventy years old Soviet state and created the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) 
out of its remains. They were joined on 21 December 1991 by most of the former USSR 
republics with the exception of the Baltic states, which had achieved internationally 
recognised independence after the August 1991 coup, and Georgia, which at the time was 
caught up in a fierce civil war between supporters and opponents of President Zviad 
Gamsakhurdia. Initially conceived as an association of independent states united by their 
common Soviet past, the CIS was aimed at dismantling the old state structures of the 
USSR and at preserving a common economic and military space. 24' The establishment of 
this new entity wvas the result of long and almost always fruitless negotiations, begun in 
1990 between the centre and the USSR republics, and aimed at establishing a new Union 
treaty that would adapt the old state structures to the new political realities. The growing 
aspirations of the various Soviet nationalities for self-determination, reflected in the various 
declarations of sovereignty adopted by all USSR republics between late 1988 and 1990, 
seriously questioned the integrity of the Soviet state. Sovereignty declarations and 
amendments to republican constitutions often granted republican laws precedence over 
those of the Union, thereby undermining Union prerogatives and disrupting national 
economic policy. 2 The - Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, also had to face the emergence 
of the RSFSR as a political force in its own right, distinct from the centre, and a defender 
of the interests of the Russian state. Russia's leader, Boris Yeltsin, became a serious 
challenge to Gorbachev as he managed to get legislation adopted that sought to wrest 
control of the RSFSR economy from the all-Union bureaucracy and to implement market 
reforms. Yeltsin's presidency pitted the giant Russian republic, with more than half of the 
population of the Soviet Union, three fourths of its territory, and much of its natural 
resources, against the centre. 
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The draft Union Treaties proposed in November 1990 and March 1991 significantly 
expanded the powers of the republics by introducing confederate elements into what was 
still described as a federal state. However, they were insufficient to satisfy many of the 
republics. Indeed, for the Baltic republics, Armenia, Moldova and Georgia, the whole 
process of negotiating a new federal settlement was, by late 1990, considered superfluous. 
The first draft Union Treaty published in November 1990 had been deemed unsatisfactory 
even by some of the republics that had declared themselves in favour of remaining part of 
the Union. Faced with a growing paralysis of power, Gorbachev decided to bypass the 
republican leaderships and parliaments and to appeal directly to the population. In March 
1991, he called a Soviet-wide referendum on the desirability of a reformed Union. 
Although the referendum was boycotted by the authorities of six republics (Georgia, 
Armenia, Moldova and the three Baltic republics) it received the endorsement of the 
majority of the population in the remainder republics. This provided an incentive for 
further negotiations on a Union treaty. A new process was set in motion after a meeting 
held in Novo-Ogarevo on 23 April 1991, between Gorbachev and the nine republics which 
had held the referendum, namely Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and 
the four Central Asian republics. But from the early stages of the negotiations, fundamental 
differences emerged between the various republics on the one hand, and the leaders of the 
USSR on the other, that were never reconciled. Whereas Gorbachev insisted that the future 
political union had to be a state in its own right, with a single all-Union market, common 
monetary systems, finances, price policies and taxes, by 1991 republican leaders began 
pushing for a confederation of sovereign states. Consequently, the series of negotiated draft 
treaties were, above all, the result of temporary compromises and contained essential 
contradictions, particularly regarding the very nature of the new Union state and the 
relations of the republics to the centre. The attempt to build up a confederation of sovereign 
republics within the framework of a federal state was a contradiction in terms and this was 
shown in the series of draft treaties which were negotiated throughout 1991. The Treaty on 
the Union of Sovereign States, which was agreed upon on 23 July 1991 and was to be 
signed on 20 August 1991, stated in Article 1 that `Each republic party to the treaty is a 
sovereign state' but then added that `The USSR is a sovereign, federate democratic state, 
formed as a result of the unification of equal republics and exercising state power within 
the limits of the powers voluntarily invested to it by the parties. 
Q48 
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The failed August 1991 coup gave a decisive boost to the ongoing process of disintegration 
and dramatically altered the political landscape in the USSR by increasing the weight of 
the republics in relation to the centre. The Baltic republics obtained internationally 
recognised independence, the centre became completely discredited and weakened, and 
Russia emerged as the dominant republic. In early September 1991, changes were made in 
the structure of the Union parliament and in the top executive organs that gave the 
republics a dominant role. 1-49 Executive power was transferred to a State Council consisting 
of the republican presidents to whom the defence, security (KGB), internal affairs (MVD) 
and foreign policy organs were subordinated, and to an Inter-republican Economic 
Committee in charge of implementing economic reform and social policy. As a result, 
republican representatives became officially involved in decision-making in such key areas 
as foreign policy and defence. Russian leader Boris Yeltsin gave an additional blow to the 
Union during the Autumn of 1991, when he nationalised control over natural resources on 
RSFSR soil, made Russia responsible for the 1991 budget, and took control over the entire 
Soviet economy on Russia's territory, the result of which was the closure of 80 percent of 
the USSR government. 250 In spite of the strength of centrifugal forces, a number of factors 
played in favour of the continuation of some form of political and economic union: the 
interdependence of the republican economies, the presence of a large Russian Diaspora in 
the non-Russian republics, the existence of a unified military structure, and the threat of 
mutual territorial claims should the Soviet Union cease to exist. The need for Western 
credits and assistance to cope with the ever worsening economic situation made it a matter 
of urgency for the republics to present some semblance of order by reaching agreement on 
economic and political union. In October 1991, ten of the twelve remaining republics 
signed a treaty setting up an Economic Community, but the latter failed to materialise. 
Negotiations for a political union also resumed in October but again similar disagreements 
re-emerged regarding the very nature of the new political union. 
'1'' The final blow to the 
treaty was given, however, by Ukraine's overwhelming vote for independence on 1 
December 1991, which determined Yeltsin's final decision to break with the old centre and 
create a new association of truly independent states - the Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS). 
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II. The Creation of the CIS 
The CIS was initially conceived as an association of independent states aimed at putting an 
end to the Soviet Union as a subject of international law, dismantling the old state 
structures of the USSR and establishing new-type relations among its members on the 
basis of mutual recognition and respect for state sovereignty, equality and non-interference 
in internal affairs. 2'1 However, it was also conceived as an instrument for the preservation 
of a common economic and military-strategic space and for the promotion of co-operation 
in the fields of security, economic and foreign policy. 253 Co-operation was expected to be 
particularly deep in the field of economic policy due to the legacy of close economic 
interdependence amongst the former USSR republics. The republics pledged to conduct co- 
ordinated radical economic reform, and to construct economic relations and carry out 
settlements on the basis of the existing monetary unit - the ruble. The CIS states also 
agreed to co-ordinate their foreign policies as well as to preserve, and maintain under joint 
command, their common military-strategic space, including single control over nuclear 
'sa weapons, so as to ensure international stability and the security of CIS member-states. 
What led to the dismantling of the USSR and what were the objectives pursued by the 
Russian leadership when establishing the CIS? The leadership of the RSFSR has often 
been accused of contributing to the dismantling of the Soviet Union, indeed of being the 
main promoter of the collapse of the Soviet state. 255 Although there is hardly any doubt that 
many of the policies conducted by the Russian leadership during 1991, and especially after 
the August coup of 1991, dealt a significant blow to the preservation of central union 
structures, it would be a mistake to assume that the ultimate objective of Russia's policies 
was the dismantling of the Union. Not only did many of the non-Russian republics play a 
big part in the process of disintegration, but President Yeltsin's policies were aimed above 
all at destroying the totalitarian nature of the Soviet state and at introducing market 
reforms. In view of the fierce opposition to radical reform at Union level, Yeltsin decided to 
use Russian governmental structures to pursue his policies. Interviewed by Soyuz, Yeltsin 
252 The CIS states also recognised and respected the territorial integrity of one another and the 
inviolability of existing borders within the Commonwealth. (Agreement on the Creation of the 
CIS, pp. 1-5. ) 
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explained that when he became USSR People's Deputy, he soon understood that there 
would be no radical reforms at the union level and so I thought to myself: If the reforms 
cannot be carried out at that level, why not try Russia? '256 In fact, during 1990, the 
Russian parliament under Yeltsin acted more radically than the all-Union legislature voting 
in favour, for example, of an immediate switch to a market system -a drastic move that the 
USSR Supreme Soviet rejected . 
251 In his book, The View from the Kremlin, Yeltsin 
explained that his disagreements with President Gorbachev during the winter of 1990-91 
resulted, among other things from the latter's decision to bury the 500-day programme. `It 
had been our only economic hope at the time, ' he wrote. 258 
Yeltsin, however, seemed most willing to conduct reforms within the Union, if renewed 
structures would grant Russia significant powers to do so, as indicated by his support for 
the Treaty on the Union of Sovereign States which was expected to be signed on 20 August 
1991. The treaty left all global matters of foreign policy, defence and a large part of the 
financial system under Soviet control, but granted Russia the right to conduct its own 
economic reform programme independently. 259 `It will create the conditions for transferring 
to the Russian republic's jurisdiction all enterprises and organisations operating on Russian 
territory and, in turn, will make it possible to accomplish what is perhaps the most 
important task - immediately granting the republics the right to choose for themselves the 
form of ownership and terms of economic management, ' Yeltsin noted in support of the 
treaty. 260 But the August 1991 coup dealt a severe blow to the negotiations on the Treaty 
on the Union of Sovereign States. Russia and most republican leaders proceeded hastily 
towards the dismantling of the Soviet state. On the one hand, Russia seized control over the 
Union structures, especially the economic bodies, and on the other hand, the Soviet 
republics began demanding increasing powers from the centre. Immediately after the coup, 
most republics declared their independence from the USSR, many placed Communist Party 
property under republican jurisdiction, and some started forming their own armed forces. 
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the Soviet Empire, Princeton, New Jersey, 1993, p. 55. 
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Executive power was transferred to a State Council composed of the Presidents of the 
republics, which in early November 1991 abolished 36 Union ministries and 37 
departments, including the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, the Ministry of 
Justice, the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Agriculture. `61 
Moreover, efforts to conduct a co-ordinated policy of economic reforms within a common 
economic space did not see the light of day, either. Whereas for many republics the 
preservation of the union was seen as a means of prolonging subsidies from the centre in 
the form of budget transfers and low internal prices, Russian leaders were anxious to start 
economic reform by freeing internal prices. Russia's decision to launch a package of 
radical market reforms in mid-November 1991, which introduced major changes in the 
functioning of the Russian economy, was not followed by the rest of the republics, leading 
to severe havoc at Union level. In addition, Ukraine's decisions to set up its own armed 
forces, to distance itself from the economic treaty, and to conduct a referendum on 
independence, dealt another blow to the union. Russia would have hardly accepted a union 
that would not have included Ukraine. As Rossiiskaya gazeta journalist Vladimir 
Kuznechevskii wrote `it would be very difficult to be part of the Union without Ukraine, its 
own blood sister, ' and added, `this is difficult to imagine even genetically and 
psychologically: Russia began in Kiev after all. '262 
In view of these developments, on 8 December 1991, Yeltsin together with the Ukrainian 
and Belarussian republican leaders put an end to the USSR and created the CIS. Russia's 
decision was determined by various factors. First, it appeared as a means of overcoming 
the impasse in talks on the new Union Treaty. 263 In the words of RSFSR State Secretary 
and first Deputy Chairman of the government, Gennady Burbulis `[the CIS] is a 
constructive way out of the long negotiating process. Hopefully a full-blooded and fully 
viable union of independent states will be created on the ruins of the totalitarian communist 
system. ' 264 Russian leaders had become aware that the process of the secession of the 
republics from the USSR and the formation of independent states had become a real fact. 
According to Russian State Counsellor Sergei Shakhrai, `the actual inactivity of the union 
26' G. Alimov, `Chto zhe budet esli ustanet ne karaul, a narod? ', Izvestiya, 5 November 1991, p. 1. 
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bodies is obvious. Therefore, at issue is not the dismantling of the union, not the legal 
decision to eliminate it, but a medical diagnosis, the establishment of a fact. '265 Thus, an 
association of independent states appeared as the only possible solution to overcome the 
existing deadlock . `6b 
Second, Russian leaders were particularly concerned with the reluctance of Ukraine to sign 
any kind of Union Treaty and were aware of the dangers that a reckless dismemberment of 
the USSR could bring about. In his speech to the Supreme Soviet on 12 December 1991, 
Yeltsin explained: `On 1 December, the people of Ukraine voted for independence in a 
referendum. Ukraine has refused to sign the treaty and the consequences of this are 
obvious: serious disruptions in the geopolitical equilibrium in the world, and an escalation 
of the conflicts within the former Soviet Union. Under these conditions, it would have been 
criminal to conclude a treaty on a Union of seven republics, without Ukraine, to remain 
calm, wait for the next co-ordination meetings and not do anything. '267 In an interview with 
paper Trud, Yeltsin again stressed that `without the Ukraine we do not represent the Union. 
First, it is a state with a colossal population - 52 million people. Second, 11 million of 
these are Russian. Third, we are linked by a millennium of history and by thousands of 
economic, political and social threads to this day. ' 268 The presence of over 25 million 
Russians in the new independent republics also determined the creation of an organisation 
which could deal with the problems resulting from discrimination and violation of their 
human and civic rights. 269 
Finally, the reform-minded and democratic politicians of the RSFSR saw the CIS as a way 
of finally getting rid of the centre, and gaining control over the Russian economy, its 
enterprises and natural resources, in order to carry out the long-awaited radical economic 
transformations. As Sergei Shakhrai noted `the Commonwealth has opened the way for 
economic reform in the Russian Federation', and added that `from now on, the Russian 
government and parliament will not have to fight on three fronts, against the old Union 
structures, against the lack of agreement among the positions of republics having different 
265 ibid., p. 37. 
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social and economic conditions, and against the crisis in the economy. '27° The CIS 
agreements in fact, stipulated that members should conduct radical economic reforms, 
within the common economic space . 
21' The CIS, however, was not conceived by Russian 
leaders simply as an instrument of `civilised divorce. ' Russian leaders saw it as a new 
mechanism aimed at co-ordinating the relations of the republics that had been part of a 
single unified state, and as a means of peacefully dividing the USSR assets and property 
among its member states. 
III. Russia's Policy Orientations Towards the CIS 
Russia's policy towards the CIS underwent significant evolution in 1992. Whereas in the 
Autumn of 1991, the view had prevailed that only by significantly reducing the power of 
the Union structures, and eventually abolishing the centre altogether, Russia would quickly 
and effectively pursue economic and political reforms, already in early 1992, preserving a 
high degree of integrity within the post-Soviet space became a main foreign policy priority. 
As early as February 1992, at a seminar on "Russia's role in the New World", Foreign 
Minister Kozyrev noted that Russia's foreign policy attached particular importance to the 
establishment of a viable CIS. In his view, `the forming of the CIS involves our vital 
interests and fundamental issues connected with Russia's joining the civilised world. 1272 He 
stressed that Russia's interests in the CIS lay, in particular, in preserving a single army, an 
integrated economy, a unique cultural space and a common language. 273 Kozyrev, however, 
made it clear that the CIS would be formed on a strictly voluntary basis. In his view, `the 
viability of the emerging CIS lies in the fact that natural ties will be much stronger than the 
shackles of a totalitarian system. 3274 Forcible restoration of the USSR was considered 
counter-productive. Instead, patient and persistent talks with CIS partners was seen as the 
most complex, but the only realistic path towards strengthening the CIS. Russia would 
seek co-ordination of joint work `every time our Commonwealth partners are ready for it, ' 
Kozyrev noted. 275 This strategy of co-operation on a strictly voluntary basis, which became 
270 Konstantin Katanyan, `On the Path of Major Reforms', Kuranty, 6 January 1992, p. 4, in 
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one of the main elements of Russia's policies towards the CIS, reflected a passive attitude 
towards the CIS and significantly hindered Russia's thrust towards integration. It was 
based on the assumption that the new states would be unable to resist the gravitational pull 
of Russia's military and economic influence, and would eventually re-orient themselves 
back to Moscow. It also reflected Moscow's intention to abandon its previous imperialist 
policies, and to conduct relations with its former `colonies' on an equal basis. 
Russia's lenient attitude towards the CIS and the growing centrifugal tendencies of the CIS 
states resulted in a rapid disintegration of the post-Soviet military and economic spaces. In 
the early Spring of 1992, most CIS states began setting up their own armed forces, and in 
May 1992, Russia itself went ahead with the creation of its own military structures, thus 
eliminating hopes that a united, albeit smaller, CIS army could be preserved. In the 
economic sphere, the inter-republican trade system collapsed as tariff barriers were erected, 
Russia took control over the ruble, republics introduced parallel currencies, and CIS states 
conducted uncoordinated economic policies. Although the CIS had allowed for a peaceful 
division of former USSR assets, it seemed to lack the necessary instruments to put an end 
to the bloody ethnic conflicts which were ravaging some of the CIS states in the Spring and 
Summer of 1992. Disagreements among CIS members as to the degree of CIS co-operation 
desired led to the emergence of a group of states within the CIS ready for closer co- 
operation (Kazakhstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Armenia, all of 
which signed the Collective Security Treaty) and another group of states for which the CIS 
was just a mechanism for `civilised divorce' (Ukraine, Moldova, Azerbaijan, and to a 
lesser degree Turkmenistan. ) In view of the different approaches towards CIS integration, 
Russian leaders planned to push forward integration with those states ready to do so, and 
to form with them a political and economic core which would be the locomotive of 
integration and reforms. 276 Behind the idea of a `varied speed' development of the CIS, lay 
the hope that those states that did not participate in the early CIS development would 
sooner or later join the developing institution. However, the Russian leadership did not 
initially identify the CIS states with which the country had an interest in developing closer 
co-operation, either for economic, cultural, or geopolitical reasons. During 1992 and 1993, 
all CIS countries were seen as vital to Russia's interests, thus indicating that Russia did 
not have a clear CIS integration project. Only in 1995 were Belarus, Kazakhstan, 
276 Kozyrev's Address to the Sixth CPD. (Moscow Radio Rossii Network, 18 April 1992, in FBIS- 
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Kv, rgyzstan and Armenia clearly singled out as crucial military and economic allies, and 
efforts to deepen integration further with them were conducted. 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs' policy of voluntary co-operation with the CIS was 
interpreted by members of the opposition in parliament and certain figures in the Russian 
leadership as not properly fulfilling Russia's interests. 27 As described in Chapter 1, the 
opposition in Parliament viewed the former Soviet states as falling within Russia's natural 
sphere of interest and considered the CIS as an instrument of Russia's hegemony over the 
former Soviet states. Evgeny Ambartsumov, Chairman of the Supreme Soviet's Joint 
Committee on International Affairs and Foreign Economic Relations, called for Russia to 
play a leading role in a future confederation of states, and recommended that Russia 
consider the entire geopolitical space of the former Union a sphere of vital interests. '278 
Similarly, political scientist Andranik Migranyan called for Russia to play an active role in 
the CIS since 'within the CIS, Russia is de jure and de facto called upon to play a special 
role in the entire geopolitical space of the former Soviet Union. 3279 In August 1992, the 
Council for Foreign and Defence Policy, in its report A Strategy for Russia, called for 
deeper CIS integration and argued in favour of Russia conducting `an enlightened post- 
imperialist course, which would involve efforts to preserve and build CIS inter- 
governmental structures. 1280 Major efforts had to be conducted to build a compact network 
of permanent inter-governmental organs which would regulate relations in all spheres of 
life: economy, transport, energy, finance, education, culture and defence. 28' The report also 
identified a particular group of former Soviet states - Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Georgia - 
as vital to Russia's interests, and argued in favour of creating a deeper union with them. 
Following this last view, many political analysts argued that Russia should abandon its 
policy of granting concessions to unsupportive CIS states, such as Ukraine, and should 
instead, deepen integration with those states most prone for co-operation, 282 
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In view of these critics, the Russian Foreign Ministry began revising its CIS policies. In 
September 1992, Deputy Foreign Minister Fedor Shelov-Kovedyaev, produced a report 
which argued in favour of adopting an active CIS integrationist policy. 283 Shelov- 
Kovedyaev recognised that Russia's initially passive and uncoordinated policies towards 
the CIS had led to a loss of influence throughout the area, but argued that Russia could 
only restore its influence and acquire an internationally recognised role as leader in the 
former Soviet space on the basis of dynamic and successful reform at home. The 
reinvigoration of Russia was seen as a precondition for a `co-ordinated and firm policy' in 
the near abroad, and a 'decisive break-through in the direction of integration in the CIS. '284 
Shelov-Kovedvaev suggested that Russia conduct a differentiated policy in the CIS and 
that it deepen relations with those countries whose policies coincided with those of Russia. 
He insisted, however, that integration should be a gradual process and that Russia should 
take into account the interests of other states when implementing reform policies that were 
liable to affect them. "' In other words, although CIS integration was to be given top 
priority, it was recommended that Russia act with caution. Although Shelov-Kovedyaev 
resigned shortly after handing in his proposals, his recommendations were taken over by 
the Russian Foreign Ministry. For instance, the Draft Concept of the Foreign Policy of the 
Russian Federation, approved in November 1992, referred to `relations with the near 
abroad' as a priority of foreign policy and insisted on the necessity of strengthening co- 
operation within the CIS. 286 Writing in January 1993, Kozyrev supported the preservation, 
in an appropriate legal form, of a Russian military presence in the former Soviet states, the 
joint defence of the foreign borders of the CIS, the preservation of a single economic space 
and the defence of Russians abroad. '287 In spite of the Ministry's intentions to activate CIS 
policy, pressure from the opposition, which was still dissatisfied with Russia's policy, 
continued. At the Seventh Congress of People's Deputies in December 1992, deputies 
appealed to the parliaments of the new independent states to create a new confederation 
with all the former Soviet states. 
288 Similarly, the Civic Union's January 1993 programme 
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insisted on the need to create a new confederation on the territory of the former USSR 
which would replace the CIS, seen as a non-viable organisation in the longer term. 289 
In view of the mounting centrifugal tendencies and in order to counter the ever-increasing 
pressure, the Russian Foreign Ministry adopted a more assertive policy towards the CIS 
during 1993, especially at rhetoric level. Russian leaders began talking with greater 
insistence about the need of deepening military and economic integrating among the CIS 
states and strengthening CIS institutions. In February 1993, speaking at the Civic Union 
Forum, Yeltsin stressed the need for closer integration among the states of the 
Commonwealth. He noted that `our countries, which until recently constituted one country, 
perceive especially strongly today, how great their mutual independence is' and stated 
clearly Russia's special role on the territory of the former USSR as being the main 
guarantor of peace and stability in the post-Soviet space. 29° The following month, in view 
of the coming meeting of CIS Heads of State, Yeltsin appealed for increased military and 
economic co-operation within the CIS, for the strengthening of the CIS institutions, and for 
the implementation of the CIS Charter in order `to prevent the CIS from becoming an 
amorphous organisation. ' 291 At the April 1993 CIS summit in Minsk, Yeltsin spelled out in 
detail Russia's strategy for the CIS. In the economic field, Yeltsin placed particular 
emphasis on the need to develop multilateral co-ordination in key industrial sectors, to co- 
operate in the sphere of investment, and to create a new and effective currency union. In 
order to achieve tight economic co-operation, a special permanent committee with 
`appropriate powers' had to be created. Yeltsin also called for the creation of a defensive 
union and even mentioned the possibility of setting up joint armed forces in the future, 
under single command. With regards to the CIS Charter, which had been adopted by a 
group of CIS states in January 1993, Yeltsin made it clear that those states that did not 
sign it remained outside the main channels of CIS co-operation. 
292 Similarly, the Basic 
Provisions of the Russian Federation Foreign Policy Concept approved by Yeltsin in 
April 1993 stressed Russia's special responsibility `for the creation of a new system of 
positive relations among the former Soviet states, Russia being the guarantor of the 
289 Alexander Rahr, `Russia: the struggle for power continues, ' RFE/RL Research Report, 5 
February 1993, p. 3. 
290 Russian Television, 28 February, 1993, in FBIS-SOV-93-038,1 March 1993, p. 21. 
291 `El'tsin obratilsya k lideram SNG', Nezavisimaya gazeta, 18 March 1993, p. 1. 
292 Ostankino Channel 1 TV, Moscow, 16 April 1993, in BBC SWB, SU/1666 Cl/1 and C1/2, 
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stability of those relations. 29' Top priority was given to relations with the former Soviet 
republics and to the desire to achieve the greatest possible degree of integration among the 
states of the former Soviet Union. Moreover, actions aimed at undermining the 
integrationist process within the CIS were considered a fundamental threat to Russia's 
security - . 
'9 4 
In spite of all these vehement calls for deeper CIS integration, the record for 1993 remained 
mixed. In the institutional field, a CIS Charter outlining the main objectives and the 
structure of the organisation was adopted, and Russian pressure brought new members 
back into the organisation in the Autumn. 295 However, no supranational or enforcing bodies 
were created and most of the agreements signed were never implemented. In the economic 
field, the process of disintegration did not stop, as trade continued to decline, Russia 
reduced its subsidies and increased its energy prices, the ruble zone was brought to an end, 
and the integration projects adopted, the Economic Union in particular, were too ambitious 
to be implemented in the short term. In the military sphere, very little was achieved at 
multilateral level. The Collective Security Treaty failed to develop into a multilateral 
instrument for security and no supranational air defence and border protection systems 
were set up. Most CIS states proceeded with the creation of their own armed forces, and 
Russia itself tried to achieve integration outside of the CIS structures, through a dense 
network of bilateral relations. These bilateral agreements, however, allowed Russia to 
increase its military presence in the CIS area, in the form of peace-keeping operations, 
military bases, military assistance, technical co-operation, air defence and border 
protection, and eventually formed the basis of the multilateral integration projects agreed 
upon in 1995-1996. 
Russia's inability to achieve higher levels of integration was to a large extent attributed to 
Russia's reduced financial resources as well to the reluctance of most CIS states to set up 
supra-national organs. The benefits of economic reform in Russia were taking longer than 
expected to arrive, and the CIS states, although in need of Russia's economic support, 
were adamant in their refusal to subordinate themselves to new organs of power, where 
Russia was expected to play a predominant role. Paradoxically, Russia also proved 
293 Viadislav Chernov, `Natsional'nye interesy Rossii i ugrozy dlya ce bezopasnosti', 
Nezavisimaya gazeta, 29 April 1993, p. 1. 
294 ibid. 
295 Azerbaijan joined the CIS in September 1993, Georgia in December 1993, and Moldova in 
April 1994. 
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reluctant to create supranational organs. Kazakhstan's initiatives to create an `Eurasian 
Union' with those CIS states in favour of deep economic, military and political integration, 
did not enjoy Moscow's support. 296 If implemented, Kazakhstan's proposals would have 
radically altered the nature of the existing CIS, transforming its ailing structures into an 
organisation similar to the European Union. Nazarbaev's Eurasian Union envisaged the 
delegation of some powers to interstate co-ordinating bodies, the creation of powerful 
common executive organs enjoying substantial supranational powers, for co-operation 
above all in the economic sphere, 297 Russia refused to accept such a union because it would 
have placed Russia under collective control within the Eurasian Union framework. 
Although this was never openly acknowledged, Russia's integration concepts did not 
envisage the surrender of Russian sovereignty to supra-national organs. On the contrary, it 
was usually assumed that states would co-ordinate or subordinate their economic and 
military policies to Russia. 
In `iew of Russia's difficult economic situation and Russia's reluctance to create supra- 
national organs where it would not be dominant, the idea that integration had to be pursued 
strictly in accordance to Russia's own interests, and that it had to be economically 
beneficial to Russia, began gaining ground among the political elite during 1994, and 
eventually became one of the main elements of Russia's CIS strategy. During 1994-1995, 
the goal of achieving deep CIS military and economic integration remained, but emphasis 
was placed on cost-effectiveness. In his speech to the Federation Council, Yeltsin spelled 
out Russia's aim of reaching closer CIS military and economic integration, but added that 
`integration should not damage Russia itself, nor should it be effected at the cost of our 
forces and resources, material and financial alike, being stretched to breaking point. '298 
Similarly Foreign Minister Kozyrev at a Russian Foreign Policy Council meeting in the 
Summer of 1994 stressed that integration had to benefit both sides, and made it clear that 
Russia would reject those proposals put forward by some CIS states, which were clearly 
motivated by the bid to get more help from Russia. 29' Renewed emphasis was also placed 
on the idea that Russia had to become a strong economic and political state first, before 
CIS integration could go ahead. It was assumed that a strong and economically successful 
296 'Nursultan Nazarbaev: "We Need a Union", Literaturnaya gazeta, 19 August 1992, in 
CDPSP, XLIV, 1992,33, p. 23; Vitalii Portnikov, `Evraziiskii Soiuz po Nazarbaevu poimut li 
prezidenta Kazakhstana na etot raz? ', Nezavisimaya gazeta, 31 March 1994, p. 1. 
297 ibid. The Eurasian Union also envisaged a common citizenship and freedom of movement for 
citizens of the union's states. 
298 Moscow, Ostankino TV, 24 February 1994, in FBIS-SO V-94-03 7,24 February 1994, p. 19 
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Russia would act as a magnet of further and deeper CIS integration. 300 These policy 
orientations were shared by most members of the influential Council on Foreign and 
Defence Policy. In their second document Strategy for Russia (2) published in May 1994, 
they suggested that Russia set up a relationship, whereby the political independence of the 
CIS states was preserved in exchange for unlimited access to their markets of goods, 
services, and capital. An effective defensive military-political union was to be set up as 
well as a single legal space for all ethnic minorities that would ensure their full rights. 3o' 
This policy was considered cheaper and more profitable than a union of states, since 
Russia would not bear direct responsibility for maintaining the standard of living of the 
populations of the CIS states, while at the same time it would secure for itself access to 
their natural, economic and human resources. 302 Only after getting out of the economic 
crisis, successfully implementing economic reform, and achieving economic prosperity 
would Russia be able to afford closer integration with those former USSR republics that 
would want it. Integration would then proceed, only if it was advantageous to Russia. 3o3 
Russia's CIS integration record during 1994 and early 1995 reflected this combination of 
assertiveness and cost-effective integration. In the economic sphere, the Belarus-Russian 
monetary union was abandoned, because it was considered too expensive and not capable 
of entirely satisfying Russia's economic interests. Instead, efforts were conducted to 
develop mutually advantageous economic relations among the CIS states. The signing of 
the agreement on a Free Trade Area (April 1994) and the Customs Union between Russia, 
Belarus and Kazakhstan (January 1995), aimed at a further liberalisation of trade between 
Russia and its CIS counterparts, were examples in this direction. In the military field, 
assertiveness seemed to dominate over caution. New emphasis was placed on the 
restoration of the unity of the CIS military-strategic space, to be achieved by the 
materialisation of the principle of collective security, the restoration of the air defence 
system, joint border protection, the legalisation of military bases in the CIS states, and the 
creation under Russia's aegis, of coalition and, in future, united CIS armed forces. 
304 
300 ibid. 
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However, Russia rejected the far more ambitious integration projects proposed by the CIS 
Staff for Military Co-ordination which came close to a restoration of the old Soviet 
military infrastructure, and also tried to share the financial burden involved in joint 
operations with its neighbours. 
During the rest of 1995 the main traits of Russia's policy orientation towards the CIS, as it 
developed throughout 1994, became crystallised. CIS integration remained a top priority of 
Russia's foreign policy and all efforts were devoted to bringing about a common economic 
space and a collective security system. However, the notion that integration should not 
harm Russia's interests and that economic benefits had to be obtained from integration 
remained a priority. 315 Emphasis was put on the idea that Russia had to profit from free 
access to CIS markets and CIS resources, as well as from free transit through the CIS 
space. 306 Moreover, CIS states were expected to reach a similar level of economic 
development for integration to proceed. 307 However, the coming presidential and 
parliamentary elections resulted in an increased emphasis on CIS integration in late 1995- 
early 1996. The powerful challenges faced by Yeltsin and his supporters from parties and 
candidates supportive of CIS integration prompted the former to undertake several 
initiatives that had a direct bearing on the integration issue. Authoritative documents which 
defined Russia's CIS policy were published. Of particular relevance was the Strategic 
Course of Russia Towards the Member States of the CIS (September 1995) which 
amounted to the most comprehensive single presidential document on Russia's policy 
towards the CIS up to that date. 308 The document spelled out in a systematic form the main 
objectives of Russia's CIS policy. Russia's main aim in the area was `to create an 
economic and political integration of states, capable of occupying a fitting place in the 
world. '309 Integration was considered essential for the sake of containing centrifugal 
level, potential security threats to Russia remained in the form of inter-ethnic conflicts, the 
expansion of Iranian and Turkish influence, Islamic extremism, and the modernisation and 
development of Western offensive armaments. Military integration was seen as the best way to 
counter these threats. ('Rossiya i SNG: Nuzhdaetsya li v korrektirovke pozitsiya zapada? ', 
Rossiiskaya gazeta, 22 September 1994, pp. 1,6. ) 
305 'Vystuplenie Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii Borisa El'tsina na zasedanii glav gosudarstv 
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tendencies inside Russia and for ensuring lasting stability within the CIS states as well. 
However, CIS co-operation had to be conducted only if it did not impair Russia's national 
interest. Russian leaders considered that the most effective way to achieve this goal was to 
allow each country to choose its own mode of rapprochement. Bilateral ties, which would 
take into account the specific peculiarities of each states, were to be developed as a 
complement to multilateral forms of co-operation. 31' The emphasis on bilateralism was also 
complemented with the identification of an `integrated core' within the CIS. 
This new emphasis on assertive and selective integration, driven to a great extent by 
political expedience, resulted in the signing of fairly ambitious economic agreements - the 
Russian-Belarussian treaty on the creation of a Community of Sovereign States (April 
1996) and the agreement on Deepening Integration in the Economic and Humanitarian 
Fields among Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan (March 1996). In the military 
sphere, the CIS Collective Security Concept was approved in February 1995, and various 
agreements aimed at developing bilateral military co-operation among Russian and CIS 
armed forces, as well as joint CIS border protection and joint CIS air defence were reached 
during 1995-1996 
. 
'" However, the implementation of these agreements remained only 
partial. It can therefore be concluded that Russia's policy towards the CIS only partially 
reflected a neo-imperial design. Russia's CIS policy orientations underwent a significant 
evolution since the CIS's inception in December 1991. Whereas in the Autumn of 1991, 
the leadership of the RSFSR tended to view the centre as an obstacle to the pursuit of 
Russia's economic reform, once the Soviet Union collapsed Russian leaders tried to 
310 'O deistvennosti gosudarstvennoi vlasti v Rossii', Rossiiskaya gazeta, 17 February 1995, p. 1. 
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on Cooperation with the CIS States) 
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preserve some sort of unity within the post-Soviet space. However, the prevalence of strong 
anti-imperialist' feelings both within Russia and in the other CIS states during 1992, and 
Russia's emphasis on improving relations with the West, resulted in the adoption of a 
relatively passive CIS policy which argued in favour of CIS integration on a strictly 
voluntary basis. But further disintegration of the post-Soviet space and mounting pressure 
from the opposition prompted President Yeltsin and Foreign Minister Kozyrev to adopt a 
more assertive policy, especially at rhetoric level. 
Russia's efforts at pursuing deeper integration during 1993-1994 were dovetailed by the 
CIS states' increasing desire to develop closer ties with Russia, a result of their bad 
economic performances and of the awareness that links with Russia were stronger and 
more difficult to destroy than initially envisaged. Russia's integration policies, however, 
were hindered by the reluctance of most CIS states to subordinate themselves to supra- 
national organs where Russia was bound to play a dominant role in view of its heavy 
economic, military and political weight, as well as by Russia's own economic constraints. 
Russia, in turn, proved reluctant to develop the CIS into an supranational organisation, 
which would entail surrendering sovereignty into the hands of other CIS states. 
Consequently, during 1994-1995, the view started to develop among the Russian leadership 
that integration had to be aimed above all at fulfilling Russia's own vital interests and 
should be conducted at relative low cost. Although the goal of deep integration remained a 
top priority, policy-makers increasingly focused on bilateral relations and the identification 
of an -integrated core' within the CIS, with which closer ties had to be developed. Russia's 
policy orientations reflected more an attempt to fulfil the state's legitimate interests rather 
than an coherent effort to pursue a neo-imperialist policy. Although nostalgia for the Soviet 
Union remained deeply embedded in Russian political thinking, especially among the 
opposition, and was reflected in most of the rhetoric after 1993, the actual policies of the 
government tended to be much more cautious. This was shown by the fact that many of the 
most ambitious integration projects were never implemented. 
The CIS remained an amorphous organisation during 1992-1996 also because of the 
unwillingness and inability of Russia and the CIS states to develop political institutions and 
co-ordinating instruments at supranational level which would guarantee a more effective 
functioning of the organisation. Neither the founding documents nor the CIS Charter 
envisaged the creation of any supranational bodies enjoying the power to impose decisions 
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on member-states. 312 The Charter clearly stated that the CIS was not a state, and that 
relations among its members were to be based on the respect öf sovereignty, the right of 
self-determination, the inviolability of frontiers, the non-use or threat of force and non- 
interference in domestic and foreign affairs. 313 Moreover, the highest bodies of the CIS, the 
Council of Heads of State and the Council of Heads of Government, which enjoyed 
executive power, adopted all decisions by consensus. In addition, the Charter stated that 
any state could declare non interest in a given question, which should not be regarded as 
an obstacle to making a decision. '314 This condition, which allowed a state to opt out of 
provisions with which it disagreed, and which was aimed at avoiding the veto, was 
extensively used by CIS members. 315 As a result, support for most of the CIS documents 
was far from unanimous, leading to a differentiated membership within the CIS. A first 
group of states, comprising Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan 
and initially Uzbekistan, usually favoured close co-operation within the CIS and signed 
most CIS agreements. A second group, consisting of Azerbaijan, Moldova, Turkmenistan, 
Ukraine, and after 1994 Uzbekistan, only signed a minority of CIS agreements, and either 
opposed the creation of co-ordinating structures or entered into them half-heartedly. 
A further obstacle to effective co-ordination within the CIS was the lack of any mechanism 
for enforcing compliance with the signed agreements. Decisions taken within the 
institutions of the Commonwealth were not legally binding even upon those members that 
had agreed to them. In such cases as the Inter-state Economic Committee, where executive 
functions were mooted, they were to little effect. 316 Some agreements did have a legal 
standing by virtue of being international treaties requiring ratification by national 
parliaments, such as the founding CIS agreements, the Collective Security Treaty and the 
Treaty on Economic Union. However, once signed by individual heads of state or 
government and subsequently ratified, there was no guarantee that their provisions would 
be carried out and no machinery for punishing non-fulfilment. The CIS states' leaders were 
in fact never able to agree on a mechanism on implementation of joint decisions. 
3 ' 
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Moreover, from the very beginning of the creation of the CIS, differences of opinion on the 
introduction and the pace of economic reform, as well as on the establishment of a common 
military-strategic space, resulted in violations of provisions previously signed leading to a 
total lack of co-ordination in economic and military policy. This inconsistent behaviour 
resulted from the contradictory visions of the various CIS states regarding the aims and 
purposes of the organisation. From the very beginning Ukraine made it clear that it viewed 
the CIS as an association of independent states, where decisions could not be imposed on 
its members. 31' Fearful of any attempt to resurrect the old Soviet centre in a new guise, 
Ukrainian leaders opposed the development of CIS executive structures and viewed the 
organisation simply as a transitional mechanism. Ukraine's sceptical view of the CIS was 
also shared by Azerbaijan, Moldova and Georgia, all of which were brought back into the 
organisation by either Russia's military pressure (Georgia and Azerbaijan) or economic 
pressure (Moldova) in late 1993-early 1994. The Central Asian states, with the exception 
of Turkmenistan, instead, became the most active supporters of close CIS integration, a 
result not only of their high level of economic dependence on Russia, but also of the 
presence of large Russian minorities in their territories, such as in Kazakhstan, or to 
internal political instability, such as in Tajikistan. Uzbekistan eventually adopted a more 
independent line in 1995-1996. The Central Asian republics were joined by Belarus and 
Armenia in their support for close integration. 319 
Russia, in turn, also proved reluctant to accept the creation of supra-national organs which 
might have resulted in other CIS states dictating policies to Russia. Russian leaders, 
instead, preferred to develop bilateral forms of co-operation where they felt Russia's 
interests were best taken into account. This was particularly reflected in the broad net of 
military agreements which tied CIS's state security to Russia. In the economic field, 
agreements were less the result of attempts to create CIS economic dependence on Russia, 
and were mainly dictated by the logic of mutual economic profits. Moreover, Russian 
leaders accepted that other CIS states disagree over the CIS development and allowed for 
the cohabitation of very contrasting views within the organisation. This indicated that 
Russian leaders both lacked the willingness and the financial capabilities to create a neo- 
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empire. It had become clear to Russian leaders that the only way to dominate supranational 
political CIS organs was through the setting up of a new state, something both Russian and 
other CIS leaders refused to contemplate. 
IV. Economic and Monetary Integration Within the CIS Framework 
The current section will examine Russia's policies towards the CIS in the area of economic 
integration, in an attempt to determine whether Russia's policies were aimed at creating an 
economic sphere of influence or informal empire through the preservation of an integrated 
economic space closely tied to Russia. The section will first look at Russia's economic 
policies in the trading sphere and then will analyse Russia's monetary policies towards the 
CIS states. Particular attention will be paid to the process of monetary integration with 
neighbouring Belarus. 
1. Economic Integration 
During the period under examination, Russia's economic policies towards the CIS states 
were largely determined by the legacies of the Soviet command economy: a high degree of 
economic interdependence among the former Soviet republics, Russia's economic 
predominance within the USSR, and the collapse of the Soviet economy which left all 
republics immersed in a deep crisis. The former Soviet republics were part of a highly 
integrated and centralised economic command system, where planning was largely carried 
out by sector. The emphasis on economies of scale through the operation of large 
enterprises, resulted in the concentration of production in a limited number of enterprises 
and high levels of republican specialisation. As a result, inter-republican trade remained 
extremely high, even when compared to other trading blocs. Seventy-five percent of the 
Soviet trade prior to independence was conducted at intra-republican level. 32' Moreover, 
not only were the republics highly integrated, but they were all, to a great extent, dependent 
on trade with Russia, both in terms of exports as well as imports. Russia was, still in 1995, 
the largest destination of CIS states' exports, and in the majority of cases accounted for 
more than half of the individual republics' `intra-Soviet' trade. 
32' Russia was also the main 
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321 Alan Smith, International Trade and Payments in the Former Soviet/CMEA Area: 
Reorientation or Reintegration?, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1994, p. 37. 
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industrial partner. In 1991, Russian industries produced two-thirds of the machinery and 
the preponderant share of the R&D and military potential . 
322 This high level of integration 
argued in favour of a concerted effort to overcome the deep economic crisis. A steep 
decline in production, shortages of basic foods and plummeting capital investment had 
plagued all republics during 1991, while annual inflation reached 80 percent. 323 But the last 
months of 1991 brought to light the huge disagreements that existed among the various 
republican leaders. The last attempt to agree on an economic union - the Economic 
Community Treaty signed by ten republics in October 1991 - failed to materialise as it 
became bogged down in intractable discussions. 
a. 1991- 1992: The First Efforts to Keep a United Economic Space 
The deep integration of all CIS economies, the heavy reliance of all new independent states 
on supplies from Russia, as well as the bad shape of all post-Soviet economies placed 
Russia in a very difficult position when the Soviet Union collapsed. Russian leaders could 
either conduct the urgently needed economic transformation in Russia first and forget about 
the CIS states, at least for a while, or instead, they could decide to support the preservation 
of an integrated economic space and promote economic reforms within the CIS states. The 
first alternative would allow for much more successful economic reforms, but would 
initially lead to a sharp decline in trade and a loss of CIS markets for Russian products. 
Moreover, such a policy involved the risk of a potential collapse of the neighbouring 
economies, which would lead to chaos, poverty and instability along Russia's borders. The 
second alternative, instead, would entail high economic cost for Russia, but would provide 
a temporary respite for Russian industry and, eventually, would probably lead to the 
creation of a big economic market tied to Russia. In view of the deep economic, human and 
psychological ties that existed among the former Soviet states, Russian leaders decided to 
opt for the preservation of an integrated economic space within the CIS framework, seen as 
the best way to manage the transition towards new and totally independent economies. 
The CIS founding agreements stipulated for the preservation of a single economic space 
with the ruble as a common currency, co-ordinated foreign economic activities and customs 
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policies, as well as free transit of goods. 324 Russian leaders also pressed for the 
introduction of co-ordinated radical economic reforms in all other CIS states. The new 
Russian team of economic reformers, led by Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar, showed great 
determination to conduct radical economic reforms within Russia. But the sharing of a 
common currency, the transparency of CIS borders, and the high-degree of inter- 
dependence among post-Soviet economies, all called for a high level of economic co- 
ordination among CIS republics. Russia therefore agreed with the other CIS leaders to 
conduct co-ordinated radical economic reforms, to co-ordinate individual budget and fiscal 
policies, as well as to synchronise the liberalisation of prices. CIS leaders also decided to 
conclude an inter-bank agreement `aimed at checking monetary issuing, ensuring effective 
control over money supply and creating a system of mutual settlements' in order to prevent 
an upsurge in inflation and sustain the value of their common currency. 325 But, because of 
the absence of common decision-making or regulating institutions, which CIS countries, in 
particular Ukraine, refused to create, CIS states immediately started to conduct 
independent and totally uncoordinated economic and monetary policies. As a result, 
transition to a market economy proceeded at very different paces, Russia usually 
transforming more rapidly than the rest of the CIS states. This situation led to major 
disruptions in the distribution system, which resulted in a sharp fall of intra-CIS trade, and 
the eventual disintegration of the Soviet economic space. 
i) Inter-state Trade Collapse 
Between late 1991 and 1993 trade among the former Soviet states contracted quite 
significantly. In 1992 interstate exports fell by 32.6 percent and imports by 22.6 percent 
compared to 1991, and in 1993, trade declined even further. Exports fell by another 23.7 
percent and imports by 25.3 percent. By the end of 1993, therefore, exports had declined 
by an overall 56.3 percent and imports by 47.9 percent. 
326 Although some reduction in 
inter-state trade was to be expected, since previous trade patterns among the Soviet 
republics had not been based on comparative cost or 
location advantage but on political 
expediency, the extent of the decline far exceeded expectations. 
Many factors explain this 
development. The dissolution of the central command system (Gosplan), which in the past 
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had allocated resources and regulated intra-republican trade, and the absence of an efficient 
market mechanism to replace it, contributed to a great extent, to the significant declines in 
trade volumes. Decline in trade volumes led in turn to the disruption and fall in production, 
further aggravating the decrease in trade. Decline in trade was also the result of 
protectionist trading policies. During the first half of 1992, all CIS governments resorted to 
the widespread use of export controls and licensing requirements. These trade barriers 
were introduced because of the wide variation in the pace of price liberalisation among CIS 
countries, which resulted in significant price differences among the CIS republics for a 
number of products. '`' In order to avoid the outflow of goods and ensure the supply of 
goods in the domestic market, restraints were placed on exports to prevent the price- 
controlled commodities from being exported to markets with higher prices within the ruble 
zone, or abroad. Export controls were also the result of rapid inflation and the lack of 
monetary co-ordination within the ruble zone, which meant that each country had a strong 
incentive to import goods and pay for them in rubles of declining value. Although Russia 
alone had retained control over the printing of cash rubles, all other central banks in the 
ruble zone created credit in non-cash rubles during the first half of 1992, which were used 
to purchase goods anywhere in the ruble area. Consequently, countries guarded against 
accumulating ruble assets in exchange for goods by imposing quantitative limits on 
exports. 38 Some CIS countries, including Russia, imposed export restrictions to keep 
domestic prices of vital raw materials well below market prices. 329 
Finally, payment problems also became a serious impediment to inter-state CIS trade. The 
disintegration of the Soviet Union brought with it the dissolution of the unified banking and 
monetary systems. Fifteen independent central banks quickly emerged, and exporters no 
longer had the guarantee of the Soviet Central Bank for interstate payments. Consequently, 
a network of correspondent accounts was established in early 1992 among the central 
banks of the fifteen states, and all payment orders were cleared through these accounts. But 
the system became clogged, since it took up to two to three months to clear an interstate 
payments order. In the post-Soviet inflationary environment, these long delays implied 
huge 
costs for traders attempting to use the banking system. The payments situation 
deteriorated 
327 Vlardimir Konovalov, `Russian Trade Policy', in Trade in the New Independent States, eds. 
Constantine Michalopoulos and David G. Tarr, Studies of Economies in Transformation, 13, The 
World Bank, Washington DC, 1994, pp. 34-35. 
328 Constatine Michalopoulos, Trade Issues in the New Independent States, Studies of Economies 
in Transformation, The World Bank, Washington D. C., 1993,7, p. 6. 
329 Benedicte Vibe Chirstensen, The Russian Federation in Transition, p. 8. 
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even further after July 1992. With rising prices for energy products, Russia's main export 
commodity, Russia began to accumulate large surpluses on its bilateral trade balances with 
most of the former republics. In order to avoid unlimited financing of its trade surpluses, to 
control the amount of credit extended to other countries, and to stem the outflow of goods, 
Russia imposed credit limits on the central bank correspondent accounts in July 1992. 
When a CIS state exceeded its limits, the Central Bank of Russia (CBR) could refuse to 
clear the payment orders of enterprises in the debtor country, meaning that Russian 
exporters would not be paid for the goods they shipped to that country. 33' This mechanism 
further contributed to the sharp decline in trade. 
ii) Russia's Efforts to Avert a Total Collapse of the CIS Economic Space 
The collapse of intra-CIS trade and the reluctance of most CIS republics to introduce 
painful radical economic reforms confronted Russian leaders with the dilemma of either 
subsidising trade among the CIS states, which involved very high costs, and promoting the 
latter's economic transformation, or abandoning the newly independent states to their own 
fate, with all the negative consequences involved for Russian industry, intra-CIS trade, and 
CIS states' economic development. Russia decided to support CIS trade, and adopted 
various 'ad hoc' measures aimed at preserving the flow of goods within the CIS: `technical 
credits', cheap energy resources and bilateral state-to-state trade agreements. Most of these 
measures were not part of a coherent programme of economic integration. They 
represented a reaction to economic developments within the CIS space, which often 
remained beyond Russia's control, and a response to the growing political pressure exerted 
by the parliamentary opposition during the Spring of 1992. The dominant Civic Union 
faction within the Supreme Soviet increasingly spoke of the need to reverse the sharp 
decline in industrial production, in spite of the costs involved. In fact, many of the adopted 
policies entailed high economic costs, and hampered the difficult process of macro- 
economic stabilisation which the team of economic reformers in the Russian government 
was trying to carry out. Members of the new Russian `coalition government', which was 
formed after the Sixth Congress of People's Deputies in May 1992, and which included 
three representatives from the industrial sector - Viktor Chernomyrdin, Vladimir Shumeiko, 
and Georgii Khizha -, as well as the new leadership of the CBR, had an interest in keeping 
330 Constantine Michalopoulos and David G. Tarr, `Summary and Overview: Developments since 
Independence', in Trade in the New Independent States, pp. 5-8; John Odling-Smee, Financial 
Relations Among Countries of the Former Soviet Union, (hereafter Financial Relations), IMF 
Economic Reviews, 1, Washington D. C., 1994, pp. 6-7. 
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Russian industries operational, preserving the traditional markets for Russia's un- 
competitive goods, and avoiding the complete collapse of the CIS economies, despite the 
costs involved. Acting Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar decided to compromise and accept 
many of their un-orthodox economic solutions, as the best way to manage the transition 
towards the emergence of independent CIS economies. 33' The policies adopted were not 
really part of a clearly-devised strategy to create an informal empire over the CIS states. 
On the contrary, they were primarily intended to sustain Russian industry and to avoid a 
total collapse of the CIS economies. Moreover, policies were often conducted in an erratic 
and incoherent fashion, indicating the absence of a clearly defined strategy, a result of the 
presence within the same government of members with radically opposed views on 
economic reform, namely Gaidar on the one hand, and Chernomyrdin and Khizha on the 
other. 
- Technical Credits 
Russia's decision in July 1992 to impose credit limits on the CIS states' central bank 
correspondent accounts, however sensible it was, dealt another blow to Russian-CIS trade, 
given that most CIS states quite quickly exceeded their own limits. In order to avert a 
further decline in trade and promote national industry, the CBR proceeded to grant 
overdraft facilities, or `technical' credits to the CIS states on very easy terms and without 
restrictions, so as to enable them to purchase Russian goods. These technical credits in fact 
amounted to Russian subsidies. Initially, the overall limit for facilitative credits to all the 
republics was set at 215 billion rubles for the second half of 1992. However, Viktor 
Gerashchenko, appointed head of the CBR in July 1992, provided facilitative credits to the 
CIS republics well exceeding the established limit of 215 billion rubles. According to 
Russian Economist Andrei Illarionov, over 1.5 trillion rubles or $7 billion dollars were 
provided to the CIS republics in the form of `technical credits' during 1992 mid-1993.332 
This amounted to 9.5 percent of the Russian GDP. 
333 In the period between 1 July and 1 
September 1992 alone, Georgia was granted 20 billion rubles, Azerbaijan, 5 billion rubles, 
and Belarus 40 billion rubles, while the channel for emission by Ukraine remained wide 
331 Personal Interview with Vladimir Mau, formerly Economic Advisor of Prime Minister Egor 
Gaidar, Moscow, December 1996. 
332 Andrei Illarionov, `Skol'ko stoit druzhba? kak tsentrobank finansiruet byvshie respubliki 
soiuza', Izvestiya, 16 September 1993, p. 4. 
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open. 33" This huge financing of the CIS republics' trade deficits allowed for a preservation 
of Russian-CIS trade, but at a very high cost, given that the republics were unable to cover 
the credits and became highly indebted towards Russia. By the end of 1993, CIS states' 
debts to Russia amounted to U$ 5.2 billion. 335 Ukraine was the highest debtor with U$ 2.5 
billion. followed by Kazakhstan (US 1.25 billion), Belarus (U$ 385 million) and 
Uzbekistan (U$ 418 million). 336 
- Low Prices for Russian Energy and Raw Materials 
During 1992-1993, Russia abstained from totally liberalising the prices of energy and other 
raw materials, which it sold to the CIS states. Although the Russian government slowly 
raised the prices of oil and gas, it still continued to sell its energy well below world market 
prices. Russia's policies were determined by the nature of Soviet energy-intensive industry. 
With such energy- and material-intensive production techniques, a price rise for basic 
resources to world levels would have caused a dramatic increase in the costs and prices of 
all finished products, including foodstuffs, leading to a collapse of CIS production, to 
which Russian industries were tightly bound. Raising domestic prices for basic 
commodities to the world level would have required the reconstruction of the technical 
basis of the CIS states' industry and agriculture, so as to attain world standards of unit 
consumption of energy and raw materials. 337 This required time and involved high 
economic costs, which the CIS states were unwilling to pay. But the lack of reform meant 
that, in spite of the lower prices, CIS state still accumulated large arrears with Russia, 
which were subsequently consolidated in state-to-state debts. By mid-1995, for example 
Ukraine's gas debt to Russia reached U$ 2 . 
277 billion, Belarus' debt U$ 459 million, and 
Kyrgyzstan's debt U$ 256 million. 33s 
- Multilateral and Bilateral Trade Agreements 
334 Ivan Zhagel, `S Ukrainy v Rossiiu dengi perevesti trudno, a iz Rossii na Ukrainu perevodit' 
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336 ibid. 
337 Yury V. Shishkov and Vladimir R. Yevstigneyev, Economic Relations Within the CIS: How 
Relevant is the Experience of Cooperation and Integration in Western Europe?, London, Federal 
Trust for Education and Research, 1994, pp. 20-21. 
338 Constantine Michalopoulos, Payments and Finance Problems in the CIS, p. 20. 
96 
Efforts were also conducted to establish a multilateral system of free trade within the CIS, 
which would bring down customs barriers. On 13 March 1992, Russia, Armenia, Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan signed an 
Agreement on the Principles of a Customs Policy and a Statute on a Customs Council. 
However, the subsequent course of events showed that most states were not ready for such 
a customs union. Some states began to repudiate the accord because they were unwilling to 
free exports, while others took measures that went against the logic of that union. For 
example countries such as Ukraine profited from the agreement to re-export Russia's cheap 
oil and fertilisers abroad. 339 In view of the failure of multilateral arrangements, CIS states 
resorted to bilateral sate-to-state agreements, to guarantee the supply of goods, at 
preferential prices. A network of massive inter-governmental barter agreements analogous 
to the system of state trading under CMEA countries slowly developed. Bilateral trade 
agreements, however, failed to maintain the level of inter-state trade. Deliveries were 
frequently less than half the contracted amount because price controls reduced incentives to 
export, and enterprises often failed to supply the agreed quantities or attempted to export 
on their own. Moreover, analogous to the CMEA problems, there was no agreement on 
how to settle imbalances in the agreed trade, i. e. no way to enforce agreement. Actual 
fulfilment of contracts varied considerably by country, from 7 percent for Azerbaijan, to 
3`"' 87 percent for Turkmenistan . 
Russia's efforts to keep trade flowing had partial success. Although trade contracted 
significantly during 1992 - exports fell by 32.6 percent and imports by 22.6 percent - 
it did 
not collapse entirely, and Russia succeeded in remaining the main trading partner of all 
CIS states. However, by the end of 1992, the nature of the CIS economic space had 
radically changed. Very little was left of the previous open trade regime. The borders 
between the CIS states lost their former openness, owing not only to the numerous 
quantitative and tariff restrictions but also to the widening divergencies among the national 
monetary, credit and fiscal systems, and to the exacerbation of the problem of non- 
payment. The CIS economic space therefore became an area where trade was conducted 
mainly at state level on a bilateral basis, and where Russian credits and subsidies, 
in the 
form of cheap energy and raw materials, as well as the common currency, allowed 
for the 
preservation of a significantly reduced, 
but still important, flow of goods. Although 
339 Aleskandr Shokhin, `My zainteresovany v inostrannykh investitsiyakh, no ne na liubykh 
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Russia's efforts to subsidise CIS trade might be interpreted as neo-imperialist behaviour, 
the evidence seems to indicate that such policies reflected an effort to manage the transition 
towards the emergence of independent and market-oriented CIS economies, subsidise 
Russian industry, and avoid the total collapse of the CIS economies. Russia's policies 
during 1992 were not part of a well designed and properly implemented policy aimed at 
restoring an economic empire in the former Soviet states. There was no attempt to draw 
economic resources from the CIS neighbours nor to prevent them from diversifying trade 
with non-CIS states. Russia's policies therefore cannot be seen as fitting the neo- 
imperialist pattern. 
b. 1993- 1995: A New Emphasis Towards Multilateral Forms of Trade 
During 1993-1995 Russia's policies towards the CIS in the area of trade and economic 
integration underwent a significant change. On the one hand, Russia substantially reduced 
its credits to all CIS states, and although it continued to subsidise the sale of energy, its 
prices increasingly approached world market levels. On the other hand, it progressively 
liberalised its CIS trading regime and reached various CIS economic agreements aimed at 
bringing down trade barriers, setting up common customs tariffs, and increasing the level 
of economic policy co-ordination among CIS states. Although most of these agreements 
were only partially implemented, they indicated an attempt by Russia to create within the 
CIS a highly integrated economic-trading block, based on free-trade. Previous efforts to 
preserve, within the CIS, a Russian-subsidised trading-zone were replaced by efforts to 
create a more economically efficient and viable union, based on free market principles. The 
motivations behind such a policy were both political and economic. On the one hand, in 
late 1992 and early 1993, Russian leaders, under growing pressure from domestic 
opposition, adopted an increasingly assertive policy towards the former Soviet states, 
which involved efforts to achieve deeper CIS military, political and economic integration. 
All economic union projects were therefore part of a political effort to bring CIS countries 
closer to Russia. On the other hand, the economic union agreements reflected Russia's 
desire to create within the CIS a more integrated economic space based on free market 
principles, where Russia would find a market for its own products, would obtain 
free 
transit for its goods, and would be able to better control the trading activities of its own 
neighbours, and thus avoid illegal re-export of 
its own goods. The new projects, with their 
emphasis on free trade and absence of subsidies, 
indicated an effort to reach deeper 
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economic integration without paying too high a price. As such these projects did not reflect 
an attempt by Russia to set an informal economic empire in the CIS. 
i) Russian Credits and Energy Exports 
During the first half of 1993, the CBR continued to provide substantial `technical' credits 
to the CIS economies, not only for the purchase of Russian goods but also for the provision 
of currency by Russia. Between January and June 1993, an additional US$ 1.2 billion were 
extended, raising the total amount of credits to the CIS to US$ 5.2 billion. 34' However, a 
major change of policy occurred in the summer of 1993. Under pressure from the Finance 
Ministry, in July 1993, Russia transformed these easy term credits into state-to-state 
credits, usually denominated in US$ dollars at LIBOR linked interest rates and with a 
variety of maturities. 3 12 Although new state credits of this kind were still issued by Russia 
to all CIS states during 1993-1995, the amounts were significantly reduced (Table 1). 
Russia's total credits to the CIS amounted to US$ 702 million, compared to US$ 5.2 
billion during 1992 to mid -1993.3``3 
Table 1: Russia's Credits to CIS states 
CIS state 1992- mid 1993 `technical 
credits' (in US$) 
mid 1993- mid 1995 state 
credits (in US$) 
Belarus 385 million 81 million 
Kazakhstan 1,250 million 68 million 
Ukraine 2,500 million 204 million 
Tajikistan 254 million 127 million 
Total credits to the CIS 5,200 million 702 million 
Source: Constantine Michalopoulos, Payments and Finance Problems in the CIS, The 
World Bank, April 1996, p. 20. 
341 Constantine Michalopoulos, Payments and Finance Problems in the CIS, The World Bank, 
April 1996, p. 19. 
342 ibid. pp. 19-2 1. Personal Interview with Andrei Illarionov, Economist, Moscow, October 1995. 
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Russia also continued to sell energy products to CIS states at prices lower than world 
levels, in spite of their accumulation of arrears. 344However, quantities were reduced, and 
prices were progressively raised, as they tended to approach world levels (Table 2). By 
1995, the price of crude oil reached 66 percent of the world level, that of natural gas 63 
percent, and that of coal 89 percent. 
Table 2: Russia's Energy Prices to the CIS states as Percentages of World Prices 
Energy 
product 
CIS price in 
1992 
CIS price in 
1993 
CIS price in 
1994 
CIS price in 
1995 
CIS price in 
1996 
Crude oil 10.3% 50.3% 58.4% 66% 72% 
natural gas 8.1% 38.1% 50.5% 63% 92% 
coal 12.6% 32.7% 50.6% 89% 123% 
Source: Russian Economic Trends, 1993-1996 
These policies were a result of Russia's unwillingness and inability to continue subsidising 
the CIS economies, and its need to increase its own budget revenues from the sales of 
energy products, its main exporting commodity. The Russian government's tougher line 
was part of an attempt to achieve macro-economic stabilisation inside Russia. Although 
such a policy was never conducted effectively and coherently over a longer term period, it 
remained the main objective of the Russian government, which preferred to subsidise 
domestic Russian industry and agriculture rather than the CIS states' economies. 
Moreover, in 1993, Russia started to divert its trade outside of the former Soviet Union. 
Whereas in 1990, the other Soviet republics had accounted for the lion's share of Russia's 
total trade - 70 percent of Russia's exports and 
47 percent of Russia's imports - by 1994, 
the CIS accounted for only 42 percent of Russia's exports and 46 percent of 
its imports. 345 
By 1995, the CIS share of Russia's trade was even smaller: only 17.6 percent of Russia's 
exports went to the CIS whereas 27 percent of 
its imports came from the CIS. 346 This 
implied that Russia had a smaller stake than before in preserving Russian-CIS trade 
flowing. 
344 By mid-1995 the overall CIS debts amounted to 
U$ 3 billion. (ibid. ) 
aas Russian Economic Trends, (RET), 3,1994,4, p. 82. 
346 Russia: Country Profile, The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), 1995-1996, p. 37. 
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ii) Multilateral Trade Agreements 
Russia's decision to reduce its credits to the CIS and to increase the prices of its main 
trading commodities, such as energy products, indicated that the Russian government was 
no longer ready to pay whatever price was necessary for the preservation of a ill- 
fiinctioning integrated economic space under its own influence. Instead, the Russian 
government decided to press ahead with more efficient integration projects, which would 
entail much lower costs for Russia. The implementation of such projects, however, 
required tight economic co-ordination and a similar level of economic development among 
CIS states, which in turn required substantial financial support, something only Russia 
could provide. Russia's unwillingness to subsidise the CIS states' economic transformation 
unless it managed to oversee the co-ordination of economic and financial policies, as well 
as the tendency of many CIS states not to abide to the terms of treaties already signed, 
explain why the integration projects either did not function properly or either failed to 
materialise altogether. 
- Integration Projects 
As part of the overall trend experienced by Russia's foreign policy in late 1992 and early 
1993 towards a more assertive stance in the near abroad, the Russian government pursued 
an 'integrationist' agenda at CIS level, both in the economic and military fields. Economic 
factors, such as the development of trade, the access to transit routes and the control of re- 
exports, played an important part in Russia's attempts to create a highly integrated 
economic union. However, Russia's policies were also very much the result of the pressure 
exerted by influential factions within the Supreme Soviet, particularly the Civic Union, by 
high-ranking politicians such as Supreme Soviet Speaker Ruslan Khasbulatov and Vice- 
President Aleksandr Rutskoi, and by influential members of the political elite, such as 
Sergei Karaganov, Andranik Migranyan, and Sergei Stankevich, all of which called for 
deeper CIS economic and military integration. The Civic Union in particular, insisted that 
economic integration, even restricted to a smaller group of CIS states, namely Russia, 
Belarus, Kazakhstan, and the Central Asian republics, was essential. The existence of 
extremely close economic links among the CIS states, the desire to avoid the total collapse 
of Russian industry, the necessity to 
find markets for Russian and CIS un-competitive 
goods, the lack of viability of CIS national currencies, as well as the social and 
human ties 
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that linked CIS people together, all these elements argued in favour of keeping an 
integrated CIS space. '4' 
Yevgenii Yasin, Civic Union's chief economist, favoured the creation of a single economic 
space with a restricted group of countries sharing a single currency. States would have to 
accept rather strict obligations in the areas of finance, taxes, banking, and trade, and agree 
to create powerful common co-ordinating bodies at CIS level, where Russia would play a 
dominant role. 34' However, Yasin did not specify how such a system would function, nor 
how it would be set up. In fact, most supporters of economic integration were very vague 
wehen discussing the exact configuration of an economic union. It was never clear whether 
they supported a free market area or a regulated economic union. Not even the Communist 
Party (CPRF) specified whether it would favour a return to the old-style state regulated 
economic integration, or whether instead it would support a `mixed economy-Russian 
subsidised' union. Orthodox liberals tended to be more precise. Andrei Zagorskii, 
Professor at the Moscow State Institute for International Relations (MGIMO), for 
example, called for a `free trade-free market' area, resembling NAFTA or EFTA, but 
insisted that a union should only be reached when all states achieved a similar level of 
349 market reform . 
``9 
The Russian government, having undergone a major reshuffle in December 1992 when 
Chernomyrdin replaced Gaidar as Prime Minister, initially remained divided over the issue. 
Boris Fyodorov, the new liberal Finance Minister, insisted that integration should only be 
carried out if member states conducted strictly co-ordinated credit-and-monetary as well as 
budget-and-fiscal policies. 3so Otherwise, Russia would end up subsidising the economies of 
the less reformed republics, to its own disadvantage. Chernomyrdin, instead, openly 
supported the economic re-integration of the CIS republics. `Our sacred duty as leaders is 
to look for ways, solutions and methods for organising this alliance, primarily an economic 
34' Evgenii Yasin, `The Economic Space of the Former Soviet Union, Past and Present', in 
Economic Consequences of Soviet Disintegration, ed. John Williamson, Insitute for International 
Economics, Washington DC, 1993, pp. 32-35. 
348 ibid. p. 34. 
349 Andrei Zagorskii, `SNG: Ot dezintegratskii k reintegratsii?, Issledovanie Tsentra Mezhdu- 
narodnykh Issledovanii MGIMO, 
Moscow, March 1994, pp. 17-18. 
350 Boris Fedorov, `Comment', in Economic Consequences of Soviet Disintegration, pp. 84-85; 
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one' he said on occasion of the CIS Meeting in Minsk on 28 April 1993.351 Representing 
the interests of the energy complex, he was well aware of the close inter-linkage among the 
oil and gas enterprises throughout the former Soviet Union, both in terms of production and 
transportation. ''_' He therefore had every interest in keeping trade flowing between the 
republics, and negotiated a series of both bilateral and multilateral economic and trade 
agreements with Russia's CIS partners. However, as Prime Minister, Chernomyrdin also 
became responsible for the overall performance of the Russian economy, and therefore 
refrained from implementing any integration project which might have implied big 
sacrifices for Russia in terms of subsidies and inflation. In fact, all multilateral trade and 
economic agreements signed followed the model of a free-trade and free-market area, and 
usually stipulated for the pursuit of co-ordinated fiscal-and-budget, monetary-and-credit 
policies. The Russian government wanted to avoid the creation of an economic area, be it a 
customs union or a monetary union, with states that were conducting very different 
economic policies and were at different stages of economic reform. Such a union would 
have resulted in serious trade disruptions with negative consequences for Russia. For 
example, differences in the value of currencies could deeply hurt national industries, since 
they would be faced with extremely cheap goods, or state-subsidised products could result 
in the practice of `dumping. ' In fact, for an economic union to function properly, a 
homogenous economic space had to be attained, and this implied serious modifications to 
the CIS's economic and social policies. 353 
The CIS republics themselves were also very interested in tightening their economic 
relations with Russia, but for slightly different reasons. On the one hand, their economies 
remained highly inter-linked, and they needed each other, especially Russia, for inputs and 
markets. On the other hand, their bad economic performance persuaded them to turn to 
Russia for help. As journalist Pavel Shinkarenko pointed out, whereas in 1992, the ideas of 
a customs and a currency union had been rejected out of hand, by early 1993, with the final 
bad economic figures for 1992 in hand, CIS leaders believed that they could be saved from 
disaster only by joining a union with Russia. 354 CIS leaders in fact tended to interpret the 
creation of an Economic Union as access to cheap Russian energy resources and raw 
351 `Soveshchanie v Minske bylo nedolgim, no poleznym', Nezavisimaya gazeta, 30 April 1993, 
p. 3. 
352 Y Perepletkin, `Neftepromyshlenniki SNG ob"edinyaiutsya', Izvestiya, 7 February 1992, p. '. 
353 Pavel Shinkarenko, `Sodruzhestvo vykhodit iz "pike" ', Rossiiskie vesti, 18 May 1993, p. 2. 
354 ibid. See also Petr Kozarzhevsky, `Politicheskie i ekonomicheskie otnosheniya Rossii s 
drugimi postsovetskimi gosudarstvami', in Vtoroi God Ekonomicheskikh reform v Rossii, eds. 
Marek Dombrovsky and Petr Kozarzhevsky, Warsaw, 1994, p. 70. 
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materials, as well as preferential credits. They saw this kind of subsidised union as an 
alternative to deep, but painful economic reforms. In July 1993, Russia had stopped all 
technical credits with former Soviet republics and the granted credits were transformed into 
debts of the recipient states towards Russia. CIS leaders therefore hoped that in a new 
economic union, Russia would reverse its policy and again provide cheap credits. 
- Integration Treaties 
On 24 September 1993, nine CIS states signed the Treaty on the Economic Union, which 
envisaged the progressive creation of an economic union, based on the model of the 
European Union, in other words a highly economically homogenous, free-market space. 355 
First, a free trade association would be set up, whereby CIS states would gradually reduce 
and eliminate internal customs duties, taxes and other similar restrictions. Then, a customs 
union would be created, in which states would establish a common customs tariff with 
regard to third states, and co-ordinate their foreign trade policies. Third, a common market 
of goods, services, capital and manpower would be formed, leading to the establishment of 
a monetary union as the last step. The Economic Union would result. in the free movement 
of goods, services, capital and manpower, and also `co-ordinated monetary, budget, tax, 
prices, foreign trade, customs and foreign exchange policy. '356 As part of the 
implementation of the Treaty on an Economic Union, an agreement among all CIS states 
on the creation of a Free Trade Area was reached on 15 April 1994.357 Countries agreed to 
gradually abolish customs duties, taxes, fees and quantitative restrictions on mutual trade. 
They also pledged to create an effective system of mutual settlements and payments for 
trade and other operations, and agreed to co-ordinate their trade policy with respect to third 
countries. Free transit for goods within the area was guaranteed, and countries committed 
themselves not to allow the un-sanctioned re-export of commodities. "' 
In January 1995, Russia reached an agreement on a customs union with two of its major 
CIS trading partners, Belarus and Kazakhstan, both of which were the most ardent 
ass Treaty on the Formation of the Economic Union, 24 September 1993, translated by RIA- 
Novosti, London, 1993. The treaty was signed by Russia, Belarus, Moldova, Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Turkmenistan joined the union 
as a full member on 24 December 1993, and Ukraine became an associate member on 15 April 
1994. 
356 ibid., p. 3. 
3s' `Soglashenie o sozdanii zony svobodnoi torgovli', Ekonomika i Zhizn ', May 1994,19, p. 16. 
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supporters of economic integration. 15' The treaty envisaged, in an . 
initial phase, the 
abolition of customs duties and quantitative restrictions on trade, and the introduction of 
common customs schedules with regard to third countries. In a second stage, the treaty 
stipulated for the shifting of control over the movement of goods within the boundaries of 
Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan to the external borders of the customs union. Russia had a 
particular stake in such a union. On the one hand this treaty granted Russia duty free 
transit of its goods, especially natural gas shipments, through the territories of Belarus and 
Kazakhstan. On the other hand, Russia hoped that the treaty would allow it to better 
control the illegal re-export of Russian goods. 36° Belarus and Kazakhstan in turn would 
benefit from the purchase of Russian goods, especially energy products, free of tax. 361 In 
order to ensure the successful function of the union, the treaty envisaged the `co-ordination 
of the implementation of economic reforms and the creation of a uniform economic 
mechanism, based on market principles, for regulating the economy. 161 Moreover, a 
memorandum was signed according to which foreign trade, customs, monetary and price 
laws in each country would be standardised. 
- Treaty Implementation 
The September 1993 Economic Union project failed to materialise in its entirety, given the 
different level of economic development of the CIS economies, the lack of substantial 
market transformation in most of them, and the unwillingness of the CIS states to partially 
surrender economic sovereignty for the sake of substantially improving the countries' 
economic performances. Russia and the CIS states failed to create a single market of 
goods, capital and services, and to share a single currency. As explained above, such an 
economic union required that the CIS states co-ordinate their states' economic and 
financial policies with those of Russia, something most states were reluctant to do. 363 The 
development of an economic union entailed a fast transition towards a market economy, 
and this could only be achieved with massive external aid. Although Russia was the only 
country ready to provide such aid, its leaders were not willing to conduct massive expenses 
without any guarantees of success. In other words, any serious step towards deep economic 
359 Sergei Rybak, `Sozdan tamozhenny soiuz', Nezavisimaya gazeta, 31 January 1995, p. 1. 
36° RET, 3,1994,4, p. 83. 
361 ibid.; RET, 4,1995,3, p. 72. 
362 Sergei Rybak, `Sozdan tamozhenny soiuz', p. 1. 
363 Aleksandr Bekker, `Ekonomicheskii soiuz na politicheskikh podporkakh', Segodnya, 28 
September 1993, p. 2. 
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integration could only be obtained with Russian economic support, which would only be 
forthcoming, if the republics were ready to submit a substantial part of their sovereignty to 
CIS supranational bodies, controlled by Russia. CIS states, particularly Ukraine, were 
reluctant to accept such an option. The establishment of the Inter-state Economic 
Committee (IEC) in October 1994 created the hope that some sort of economic co- 
ordination would be achieved. The IEC was to be responsible for developing joint CIS 
economic programmes and monitoring the progress of economic reform. " However, 
because the CIS states were allowed to decide exactly what powers they wanted to delegate 
to the IEC, the latter failed to develop into a truly effective structure, and simply remained 
an auxiliary agency. 365 
Some progress was made towards the implementation of the free trade area. During 1994- 
1995 some CIS states, particularly Russia, began to liberalise their trading regimes. In 
May 1994, the Russian government abolished export quotas on most products, except for 
fuels, metals, timber and chemicals, Russia's key trading commodities. A , year 
later, in 
January-February 1995, export quotas were eliminated altogether. Moreover, between 
April and October 1995, Russia reduced export taxes on a number of exported 
commodities, including crude oil and petroleum products, and between late 1995 and April 
1996, all export taxes were eliminated, except for crude oil. 366 Russia's import policies 
however, moved in the opposite direction. In July 1994, Russia introduced a new system of 
tariffs on imported goods, and in January 1996 it imposed an excise tax on excisable goods 
imported from Ukraine and other CIS countries, leading to major disruptions in functioning 
of the CIS trade regime. 367 The non-Russian CIS states, instead, conducted very little trade 
liberalisation except for Kyrgyzstan, Armenia, Georgia and Moldova, and then again in 
some cases the main exporting items remained subject to tariffs. Georgia banned the export 
of 14 food items and Moldova imposed quotas for exported grain. The record of 
implementation of the free trade area during the period under examination, therefore, 
remained mixed. As far as Russia is concerned, although its trade liberalisation 
corresponded with the nature of the free trade agreements signed with the CIS states, the 
364 A wide range of IEC decisions would be adopted by an 80 percent majority, 50 percent of the 
votes belonging to Russia. 
365 Vitalii Portnikov, `Sozdan Mezhgosudarstvennyi Ekonomicheskii Komitet', Nezavisimaya 
gazeta, 22 October 1994, p. 1. 
366 RET, 4,1995,4, pp. 77-78; RET, 5,1996,1, pp. 82-83; RET, 5,1996,2, pp. 92-93. 
367 Vadim Bardin and Konstantin Levin, `Prime Ministers Try to Assemble a Matryoshka Doll', 
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main motivation behind such policies was Russia's desire to join the World Trade 
Organisation and to comply with its requirements. 
The more ambitious customs union signed by Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, also had a 
mixed record. The three states proved unwilling to co-ordinate their economic and financial 
polices, and this made implementation of the treaty quite difficult. In fact, the parties to the 
treaty were countries with striking differences in their economy and unlikely to adapt to 
each others models. Although some initial successes in trade policy were achieved - the 
customs borders between Russia and Belarus were eliminated in May 1995, the border 
with Kazakhstan was lifted during the first half of 1996, and in 1996 all three countries 
negotiated a common external tariff based on the Russian tariff - during 1996 all three 
members unilaterally introduced modifications to the external tariffs they applied. 368 As a 
result , the so-called 
`Belarussian corridor' opened as a lucrative channel for smuggling on 
a massive scale. Western and other CIS goods, were registered as Belarussian goods and 
imported into Russia with zero taxes. 369 
It can be concluded then that the different interpretations given to the economic union by 
Russia and the CIS states, the divergent performance of their economies, the unwillingness 
of Russia to provide substantial financial help to the CIS state to support their economic 
transformation, and the CIS states' unwillingness to co-ordinate their economic and 
financial policies with Russia, and finally, the regular violation of treaty provisions by all 
CIS states, all these factors determined the total absence of implementation of the most 
ambitious integration treaties reached by Russia and the CIS states and the partial success 
of the less ambitious projects. Russia failed to transform the CIS into an active and well- 
functioning trading area, as intra-CIS trade continued to decline during 1993-1995. 
Although a slight pick up in trade was registered in late 1995-early 1996, it resulted 
primarily from an increase of CIS imports to Russia. During 1993-1995, therefore, Russia 
did not manage to set up an economic neo-empire in the CIS, through a Russian-led CIS 
economic union. The various CIS integration agreements were never properly implemented 
as Russian leaders refused to pay the high price of an entirely subsidised union. Moreover, 
Russia reduced credit subsidies to CIS states and increased the price of its energy products. 
368 RET, 5,1996,1, p. 84; Constantine Michalopoulos and David Tarr, The Economics of Customs 
Unions in the Commonwealth of Independent States, Policy Research Working Paper, 1786, The 
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It can therefore be argued that during 1993-1995, Russia did not really envisage the 
conduct of a neo-imperialist economic policy towards the CIS states. 
c. Deeper Integration During the Last Months of Yeltsin's First Term Presidency 
Economic integration received a major boost during the first half of 1996, in spite of the 
difficulties encountered by CIS states so far. The arrival at the Russian Foreign Ministry of 
Evgeny Primakov, an outspoken supporter of deep CIS military and economic integration, 
resulted in the signing of two highly ambitious integration treaties, which if implemented 
would have resulted in the creation of an economic block very much tied to Russia: The 
Treaty on the Deepening of Integration in the Economic and Humanitarian Fields Among 
Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan (Quadrilateral Agreement) signed on 29 
March 1996, and the Community of Sovereign States created by Russia and Belarus on 2 
April 1996. Although both agreements were largely aimed at deep economic integration 
they were driven primarily by political motivations. Mounting pressure from the nationalist 
and communist opposition in the newly elected Duma (in mid-March 1996 the Duma 
passed a resolution which repealed the December 1991 CIS Founding agreements, and 
called for deeper integration among the former Soviet states) and the coming Russian 
presidential elections in June 1996, put pressure on President Yeltsin and his government to 
gain the upper hand in terms of CIS integration. 370 
The Quadrilateral Agreement aimed at the creation, in the long run, of a `community of 
integrated states' and envisaged the establishment of a single market, with a single 
currency and common energy and transport systems. 371 In order to achieve such a high 
level of integration, signatory states were expected to co-ordinate tightly their monetary- 
and-credit and currency-and-financial legislation, as well as their industrial and agrarian 
policies. Signatory states were expected to complete the customs union and create an 
efficient payments union in a first stage. The treaty was not limited to strictly economic 
integration. It also envisaged that parties would co-ordinate their foreign and security 
policy, as well as their social and education policies. Moreover signatory states agreed on 
the creation of joint administrative bodies to implement integration: an Inter-state 
Council, 
the supreme administrative body with capacity to adopt binding decisions; the 
Integration 
370 `Raspad Soiuza byl neizbezhen', Rossiiskaya gazeta, 16 March 1996, p. I; Gleb Cherkasov, 
`Duma denonsirovala "Belovezhskie Soglasheniya" ', Segodnya, 16 March 1996, p. 1. 
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Committee, the permanent executive body; and an Inter-parliamentary committee, 
responsible for inter-parliamentary co-operation. 372 The treaty's objectives remained far too 
ambitious. The likelihood of achieving co-ordination in the pursuit of economic reforms, 
financial and monetary policies were extremely slight, as were the chances of introducing a 
single currency. 
Similarly, the Community of Sovereign States signed by Belarus and Russia, was as 
difficult or even more difficult, to implement. Aimed at uniting `the material and 
intellectual potentials of the two countries', it stipulated for even tighter economic and 
political integration than the Quadrilateral Agreement. 373 The treaty envisaged the 
synchronisation of Russia's and Belarus' economic reforms, the creation of a uniform base 
of laws and regulations in order to remove all interstate barriers and restrictions, and to 
ensure equal opportunities for unrestricted economic activity. It also envisaged the 
completion of the customs union, the introduction of a standardised system of anti- 
monopoly legislation, taxes, state support for production, and rules of investment. The 
monetary, credit and budget systems were to become standardised by the end of 1997, and 
conditions for the introduction of a common currency were to be created. Joint structures 
were to be established to manage the integration process. As with previous less ambitious 
economic union treaties, the Belarussian-Russian union treaty proved difficult to 
implement because of the different levels of market reforms in both countries, the bad 
shape of the Belarussian economy compared to Russia's, and the latter's reluctance to 
subsidise Belarus' economic transformation. As Izvestiya journalist Otto Latsis pointed 
out, the treaty had more of a geopolitical significance than an economic long-term impact. 
It was a trade off between a reduction or cancellation of debts and the possibility to use 
military bases. 374 
d. Conclusion 
This section has shown that Russia's policies in the field of economic integration went 
through several phases, a result not only of Russia's own economic performances, 
capabilities and domestic developments, but also of the behaviour of the various CIS 
372 ibid. 
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states, which were reluctant to surrender part of their economic sovereignty to Russia and 
therefore missed a major opportunity to improve their economic situation with Russian 
assistance. Russia's support for the preservation of a single economic space with a single 
currency when the CIS was set up was largely determined by the legacies of the Soviet 
command economy which had tied the CIS states very closely together, and by the 
perception that economic co-operation was the best way for Russia to manage the 
transition towards the emergence of independent free-market based CIS economies. These 
same factors determined Russia's decision to provide substantial subsidies in the form of 
cheap energy, raw materials, and credits, when trade started to decline sharply during the 
course of 1992 due to the emergence of trade barriers and payment difficulties. However, 
by early 1993, the strains of this very costly policy started to be felt. Russia decided to 
reduce its subsidies to the CIS states and to pursue integration on a less expensive basis. In 
fact, the new economic integration projects attempted to create an economic union on the 
basis of tight economic co-ordination and a free trade regime. But the other CIS states 
tended to perceive CIS integration as a way of keeping the previous industrial ties and of 
receiving subsidies from Russia, during a transitional period until they would able to 
develop independently. This contrasting views explain to a great extent why most of the 
CIS agreements failed to materialise. Highly dissimilar economic developments and 
Russia's unwillingness and, above all, inability to subsidise the costly CIS economic 
transformations made effective integration almost impossible. Russia therefore failed to 
transform the CIS into a highly integrated Russian-led single market. 
Although Russia did not conduct an active neo-imperialist policy in order to restore a 
economic union, its economic predominance and the continued dependence of the CIS 
states on trade with Russia, as well as their high level of indebtedness towards Russia, 
created an area where Russia remained economically hegemonic. The CIS's dependence on 
Russia, however, was not only determined by the Soviet inheritance of high economic inter- 
dependence, but was above all by the lack of political will of the CIS leaderships to 
conduct radical economic reforms, preferring instead to rely on Russian financial 
assistance. Russia's policies in the area of CIS economic integration therefore cannot be 
seen as part of an effort to restore an informal economic empire in the CIS. Economic 
imperialism requires not only a coherent political `project' of empire-building, which was 
certainly absent in this case, but also a conscious attempt to set up a one-way economic 
relationship, where the dominant economic power draws economic resources from its 
weaker neighbours and prevents them from 
diversifying. Such one-way relationship was 
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not present either. In this case, Russia's CIS economic integration projects were intended to 
benefit both sides, and often received the support of the non-Russian CIS states themselves. 
Russia's initial subsidising of Russian-CIS trade should be interpreted not only as a way to 
preserve markets for Russian goods, but also as a means of managing the transition of a 
highly integrated state-command economic space into an economic space formed by fifteen 
independent countries in transition to a market economy. This cannot be considered 
economic imperialism. ' Russia's willingness to grant important subsidies to the CIS 
states, especially during 1992-1993, were primarily dictated by a desire to support Russian 
industry and to preserve stability in the former Soviet space. 
2. Monetary Integration: The Ruble Zone 
The current section will examine the functioning of the ruble zone, which was set up when 
the Soviet Union collapsed in December 1991 and lasted until November 1993, in order to 
determine whether Russia tried to keep the CIS states under its economic sphere of 
influence through the preservation of a Russian-controlled ruble zone. A final section will 
look into detail at the negotiations on the creation of the Russian-Belarussian monetary 
union, which eventually failed to materialise. 
a. Russia and the CIS States Decide to Preserve the Ruble as Their Currency 
When Soviet republican leaders created the CIS, they agreed to preserve the ruble as their 
common monetary unit. The main aim of this decision was to conduct a 
`soft' transition 
towards the introduction of national currencies. In order for the common currency to 
remain strong and function properly, CIS leaders committed themselves to co-ordinate 
tightly their economic and monetary policies. They also pledged to conclude an 
inter-bank 
agreement aimed at controlling money issuing, ensuring effective control over monetary 
supply and establishing a system of mutual settlements. 
37' However, CIS states failed to 
reach agreement on the creation of a supra-national 
bank responsible for the regulation of 
cash issuing and for the determination and 
implementation of common credit and monetary 
policies - an essential instrument 
for the proper functioning of a monetary union. Instead, 
Russia dissolved the Soviet Central Bank (Gosbank) and transferred its facilities to the 
315 Declaration of the Governments of Belarus, the 
Russian Federation and Ukraine on 
Coordination of Economic Policies, p. 7. 
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Russian state. 376 This move was dictated by Russia's desire to hold control over currency 
issuing within the ruble zone, the inability of CIS states to agree on the creation of a 
common inter-state bank, and the desire of some CIS states, in particular Ukraine, to 
introduce their own currencies 
Although during late 1991 and early 1992, Russia had pushed for the creation of an inter- 
state banking system, CIS leaders failed to agree on the bank's structure. Russia's 
condition that decisions should be adopted in accordance with the shares of capital 
invested, and not in accordance with the number of members in the banking union, became 
the main obstacle. 3 ' CIS states refused to accept this condition because it automatically 
placed Russia in a dominant position, given that it was by far the major capital investor. 
The absence of a supranational banking agency resulted in a total lack of co-ordination 
among CIS states of their monetary and credit policies. This led to major disturbances in 
the functioning of the ruble zone and eventually contributed to its final collapse. On the one 
hand, Russia forced the CIS states to turn to the CBR for additional cash given that it 
alone controlled the former Soviet Central Bank. On the other hand, the CIS states, being 
unable to obtain cash under their own terms, relied on non-cash issuing (credit issuing) for 
the creation of money. 378 In the absence of a supranational agency CIS states logically 
preferred to issue credit independently rather than obtain cash-credits from the CBR, and 
thereby have - to all intents and purposes - their budgets approved by Russia. This issuing 
of credits occurred without any supranational control and without any overall co- 
ordination, leading to the rapid devaluation of the ruble, the erection of inter-state trade 
barriers, and the end of the single economic space 
For Russia, this system of unchecked supply of credit had three major negative 
consequences. First, it permitted other CIS states to buy Russian goods, almost for free, 
since until July 1992 no limits had been placed on the deficit which republics were allowed 
to accumulate in their correspondent accounts with the CBR. As a result, goods were taken 
out of Russia as if by a vacuum cleaner. Second, CIS states accumulated huge debts 
towards Russia, which by early May 1992, reached 100 billion rubles, and by June 1992 
376 Ivan Zhagel, `V. Gerashchenko ushel v otstavky', Izvestiya, 26 December 1991, p. 2. 
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amounted to 214.7 billion rubles. 379 Third, the system resulted in very high levels of 
inflation in Russia - approximately 15 percent per month - and thwarted Russia's efforts to 
stabilise the foreign exchange value of the ruble. 38° Inflation in Russia was exacerbated 
further by the decision of some CIS states to introduce provisional currencies in the form 
of coupons, which led to an overall increase in the money supply. 38' The ruble zone, 
therefore, became a very expensive experiment for Russia. Although the Russian 
government had managed to control cash issuing to a certain extent, non-cash issuing, 
«hick accounted for 90 percent of the rubles in circulation, was virtually out of its control. 
By the spring of 1992, it became clear that unless Russia managed to successfully co- 
ordinate monetary, financial and economic policies with the other CIS states, it would be 
forced to introduce its own currency and conduct economic reforms independently from the 
382 other FSS, in order to avoid total financial collapse. 
However, neither of this two alternatives were adopted and the Russian government instead 
attempted to establish some sort of control over the existing ruble zone. In July 1992, 
Russia imposed limits on the credits it provided to other CIS republics through their CBR 
correspondent accounts, in order to regain control over the money supply and curb 
inflation, as well as to limit the level of indebtedness of the CIS states towards Russia. 383 
When a country exceeded its limits, the CBR could refuse to clear the payments orders of 
enterprises in the debtor CIS country. As a result, CIS countries were forced to obtain 
rubles from Russia - either by selling their own goods to Russia, or by obtaining Russian 
credits - in order to buy Russian goods. 
384 This new procedure protected Russia's interest 
since it contributed to financial stabilisation in Russia and in theory allowed Russia to 
indirectly limit and regulate the issuing of money of the ruble zone countries. 385 However, 
at the same time, it penalised Russian enterprises which depended on trade with the other 
ruble zone states. Frequently an enterprise could not receive money from a CIS customer 
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380 Brigitte Granville, Farewell, Ruble Zone, p. 10; P. Fillipov, V. Golubev, G. Tal, `Gerashchenko 
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for goods that had been delivered, merely because the limit on reciprocal payments between 
CIS states had been reached 
In view of this situation, Russian state enterprises increased their pressure on the CBR to 
raise the level of credit ceilings so as not to halt the flow of goods. Sensitive to the plights 
of Russian enterprises, in July 1992, the Central Bank of Russia proceeded to grant credits 
to foreign banks on exceptionally easy terms and without restrictions, the so-called 
`technical credits'. Initially, the overall limit on credits was set at 215 billion rubles for the 
second half of 1992. However, soon after the introduction of the bilateral clearing system, 
Viktor Gerashchenko became head of the CBR, and during the summer and autumn of 
1992 he provided facilitative credits to the CIS republics well exceeding the established 
limits. According to Andrei Illarionov, over 1.5 trillion rubles or 7 billion U$ dollars were 
provided to the CIS republics in the form of `facilitative credits' in 1992 causing 25 
percent of inflation in Russia. 386 This huge financing of the CIS republics' trade deficit, 
totally nullified the effects of the July 1992 measure, since it increased Russian 
expenditures and augmented inflation in Russia, thus dealing a severe blow to all efforts 
aimed at macro-economic stabilisation carried out by reformers in the government. Such a 
policy brought to light the strong internal incoherences of Russia's economic policies 
towards the CIS, a result of the contradictory composition of the Russian government and 
of the struggle for power between the government and the Supreme Soviet. Gerashchenko, 
the Supreme Soviet, as well as members of the government with close ties with the 
industrial and agrarian lobbies were eager to conduct an extremely loose credit policy for 
the sake of sustaining Russia's industrial production. These views were in contradiction 
with the policies of reformers in the Russian government, such as Yegor Gaidar, who were 
concerned first and foremost with macro-economic stabilisation. 
Why did the Russian government decide to preserve the ruble zone under these conditions? 
The preservation of a single currency allowed for a continued flow of goods both into 
Russia and out of Russia and, consequently, prevented a total fall in Russian industrial 
production. Second, the existence of a single currency controlled to a certain extent by 
Russia significantly favoured the purchase of Russian goods. Enterprises who depended on 
Russian inputs found it more convenient to buy them in Russia than abroad, due to their 
386 Andrei Illarionov, `Skol'ko stoit druzhba? ', p. 4. 
114 
shortage of hard currency. "' Once republics introduced their own currencies, trade was 
bound to be diverted to third countries. 38' Third, there was a very high chance that the 
republics' new currencies would be weaker than the rouble and therefore, non-convertible 
and non-functional. The risk emerged of a reproduction of the old CMEA trading system, 
which resulted in endless multi-lateral clearing operations. 38' The ruble was therefore 
preserved as a common currency during a transitional phase before the CIS states felt 
economically strong enough to introduce their own currencies. In fact, many of the CIS 
states themselves preferred to stay in the ruble zone instead of introducing their own 
currencies, because this allowed them to continue trading with Russia at preferential prices. 
Internal factors also very much determined the preservation of an uncontrolled and highly 
expensive ruble zone. Under increasing pressure from both the industrialist lobby, who 
favoured close economic links with the CIS, and the nationalist and communist opposition 
in the Supreme Soviet, which favoured the restoration of the old Union, the Russian 
government did not want to be seen responsible for bringing the ruble zone to an end. 
Above all, the Russian government was unable to control the activities of the CBR, the 
main entity responsible for the huge amount of credits extended to the CIS republics, 
because it remained under the control of the Supreme Soviet, which was very much in 
favour of subsidising Russian industry, through the preservation of a single CIS economic 
space and a single CIS currency. Last but not least, the International Monetary Fund 
supported the preservation of the ruble zone. 
b. The Ruble Zone Questioned 
By the Autumn of 1992, the viability of the ruble zone started to be questioned. Russian 
radical reformers seriously began to consider the possibility of bringing the existing ruble 
zone to an end and creating a new ruble zone under Russia's total control. Aleksandr 
Shokhin, vice-Chairman of the Russian government, made it clear that Russia's interests 
demanded that the CIS member states clearly define their position on whether they intended 
to remain in the ruble zone, or instead, preferred to introduce their own national 
387 On concern over the potential introduction 
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currencies. j90 In his view, those republics which decided to stay in the ruble zone had to 
agree to co-ordinate their monetary policies very closely with Russia, while those that 
preferred to introduce their own currencies had to leave the ruble zone in a civilised way, 
without detriment to Russia or other states. 391 Russia should then conclude with all 
members of the ruble zone bilateral agreements that defined the leading role of the CBR in 
regulating monetary circulation within the boundaries of the zone. The new ruble zone, 
therefore, was to be a Russian-controlled zone, where countries would use the Russian 
ruble and would follow Russian rules, instead of a zone where republics shared a 
supranational currency over which they could exert a certain degree of control. Although it 
might seem that such a policy amounted to economic neo-imperialism, in fact, it resulted in 
quite the opposite. Russia's attempts to totally control the sharing of its own currency 
made perfect economic sense, and the more stringent the demands for sharing the currency, 
the more likely CIS states would refuse to join, as was eventually shown. The ruble zone 
experiment had in fact exhausted itself. Russia's financial resources had reached a limit, 
and the CIS states, instead of following tight credit and monetary policies, continued to 
accumulate debts with Russia. However, most CIS states were reluctant to leave the ruble 
zone, except for Ukraine and Kyrgyzia, as well as the Baltic states, which were not in the 
CIS. 392 Some CIS states had not yet printed new money, others simply could not afford to 
have their own currency. Moreover, the use of the ruble avoided the introduction of painful 
measure aimed at macro-economic stabilisation, essential for the introduction of their own 
currencies, and also guaranteed cheap Russian energy resources and facilitative credits. 393 
Some countries viewed continued access to financing and subsidised energy imports from 
Russia as being dependent on the nature of their monetary arrangements. 394 
c. End of the `Old-Type' Ruble Zone and Negotiations on a `New-Type' Ruble Zone 
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The ruble zone was brought to an end quite abruptly on 24 July 1993, when the CBR 
announced that pre-1993 ruble bank notes would no longer be legal tender in Russia. 395 
The main impact of this measure was to `Russify' the ruble and therefore de-link the cash 
component of the money supply of the other states in the ruble zone, from that in Russia. 396 
The CBR's decision on a compulsory exchange of money effectively forced republics to 
choose between the Russian ruble and the introduction of their own currencies, thereby 
putting an end to the ruble zone, as it had existed since 1992. Between July and November 
1993, Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan proceeded with the introduction of 
their national currencies. At the same time, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Belarus 
and Armenia began long negotiations with Russia aimed at setting up a `new-type' ruble 
zone, where rules were determined entirely by Russia. 
Unlike previous negotiations, which envisaged the establishment of a supra-national 
banking agency that would regulate the ruble's circulation, negotiations on the creation of a 
new-type' ruble zone started from the premise that Russia would keep total control over 
the money supply. Moreover, until the parliaments of the other CIS countries approved the 
necessary agreements, Russia simply refused to give those countries cash rubles. It agreed 
to do so only on a commercial basis, within the framework of previous agreements on 
providing credits to other states. 397 Strong pressure was therefore placed on those countries 
who wanted to join the Russian ruble zone. Although such policies buried, at least for the 
foreseeable future, the possibility of keeping the ruble as a common CIS currency, they 
were perfectly understandable from Russia's economic viewpoint. They showed that 
Russia was not ready to pay any price for the sake of keeping the CIS states within the 
ruble zone. Russia was only ready to share the ruble if it had total control over monetary 
circulation within the zone. In other words, Russia was willing to keep the CIS states 
within the ruble zone only if the costs were not exorbitant. 
Preliminary agreements on the practical measures to create a new-type ruble zone were 
reached on 7 September 1993 with Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and 
Uzbekistan. The agreements tied the economic and financial policies of the signatory states 
very closely to Russia's. If implemented, these agreements would have resulted in the 
complete surrender of those countries' economic sovereignty to Russia, given that Russia 
395 `Soobshchenie Tsentral'nogo Banka Rossiiskoi Federatsii', Rossisikaya gazeta, 27 July 1993, 
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would totally control their macro-economic policies. The agreements, in fact, not only 
provided for the existence of a single money-issuing centre, the CBR, but they also 
stipulated that those countries wishing to share the Russian ruble were obliged to co- 
ordinate with Russia the basic parameters of their monetary, credit, financial, foreign- 
exchange and customs policies, as well as the amounts of their currency interventions in the 
markets, the size of the money supply on the territories of the states participating in the 
agreement, and the amounts of consolidated budget deficits. 39' Again, although these 
measures might seem `neo-imperialist' at first sight, they instead reflected the pursuit of 
legitimate economic interests. Russia's policies made perfect economic sense, since they 
reflected Russia's desire to control the currency it was ready to share with other states. 
Russia did not intend to economically exploit the CIS states nor to force them into the ruble 
zone. In fact, the CIS states were free to refuse to join the treaty, which eventually they did. 
These agreements were the closest Russia ever arrived at restoring the monetary union on 
its own terms, since all the ruble zone states would have had their economic policies 
determined entirely by Russia. However, there was also a downside for Russia. Most 
probably, CIS states would prove unable to immediately fulfil all the economic criteria set 
up by Russia. Therefore, Russia run the risk of ending up financing their budgets, in order 
to sustain the value of ruble and avoid the financial bankruptcy of the states in the union. 
This primarily explains why eventually, under pressure from Russian reformers, the `new 
type' ruble zone failed to see the light of day. However, efforts to put it in place were still 
carried out during the autumn of 1993. 
During the course of September 1993 all five signatories of the framework agreement 
entered into bilateral agreements with Russia on the procedures of monetary co-ordination 
and unification. Many of these signatory states made major efforts to fulfil the stipulated 
conditions in order to eliminate the uncertainties associated with the interim situation. But 
eventually the whole deal collapsed in November 1993, when Russia asked countries to 
collateralise, with gold or foreign exchange, some 50 percent of any new bank notes 
delivered, with full compensation to be made if a country exceeded monetary ceilings. The 
conversion rate for national rubles to Russian rubles also became a matter of 
debate, with 
CIS states seeking a 1: 1 currency conversion and the Russian authorities preferring rates 
closer to market levels. All these conditions proved unacceptable to 
Kazakhstan, 
398 Elena Kolokol'tseva, `Rublevaya zona novogo tipa', Segodnya, 9 September 1993, p. 1. 
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Uzbekistan, and Armenia, which instead decided to introduce their own national currencies. 
On 15 November 1993, Kazakhstan introduced the tenge as its national currency, and 
Uzbekistan introduced sum-coupons to circulate in parallel with the ruble, to be followed 
by a permanent currency in the second quarter of 1994. Armenia introduced the dram at 
the end of November and the authorities of Belarus announced their intention to make the 
rubel sole legal tender in the near future. However in early January 1994, Belarus changed 
policies and began negotiations on monetary union with Russia. Tajikistan, the only state 
of the CIS that had not moved to differentiate its currency, reached a preliminary 
agreement on the provision of 100 billion new Russian rubles from the CBR. 399 For almost 
a year and a half, Tajikistan lived both with old and new Russian rubles. But serious 
difficulties in keeping the adequate amounts of cash in circulation forced the Tajik 
authorities, under Russian pressure, to introduce Tajikistan's own currency in May 
1995.400 
Russia's stringent economic conditions brought to light Russia's reluctance to restore the 
ruble zone at any price. Russian leaders were not ready to share a common currency over 
which they had no total control, for the sake of keeping the CIS states in a monetary sphere 
of influence. Given that the economic costs far outweighed the economic advantages, 
Russia gave up its attempts to create a Russian-dominated ruble zone. CIS states were 
unwilling to agree with Russia their economic policies and proceeded to introduce their 
own currencies. Belarus for a while seemed to be the exception. 
d. Russian-Belarussian Monetary Union 
The monetary reform of July 1993, which `Russified' the ruble forced Belarus to choose 
between adopting the Russian ruble as its currency, and consequently following Russia's 
macro-economic policies, or instead, introducing its own currency and pursuing 
independent policies. In the Summer of 1993, Belarus' economic policy was so precarious 
that its leaders seemed willing to give up a substantial part of the state's sovereignty for the 
sake of reaching an economic and monetary union with Russia. Belarus' decision in 1992 
to pursue a gradual approach to structural change and to favour the maintenance of 
traditional economic management methods proved to have extremely negative consequences 
on the economy - the country became 
increasingly dependent on credits and cheap energy 
399 John Odling-Smee, Financial Relations, p. 44. 
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from Russia - and this eventually created serious doubts regarding its viability as an 
independent country . 
401 The impact of the terms of trade shock, in particular Russia's 
selling of energy at world prices, meant that Belarus needed two to three times its current 
budget to cope with these higher energy expenses. In view of this situation, Belarus' 
leaders signed all the appropriate agreements aimed at merging Belarus' monetary system 
with Russia, in the autumn of 1993. `10' These agreements entailed a significant surrender of 
sovereignty, since they deprived Belarus of any possibility of conducting independent 
monetary and credit policies. They established common credit amounts, interest rates, 
taxation principles, and methods for regulating prices and the population's income, and 
provided for a common set of rules regulating foreign economic activity and trade 
procedures with third countries. 4" Further agreements were reached in mid-January 1994, 
whereby the Belarussian and Russian authorities agreed to unite both countries' monetary 
systems in the near future. `` 10 
Negotiations on monetary union began in earnest once its main Russian adversaries, Yegor 
Gaidar and Bons Fyodorov, resigned from the Russian government in late 1993 - early 
1994. The process was given additional acceleration after the removal of Stanislav 
Shushkevich as speaker of the Belarussian parliament in early 1994. During the first 
quarter of 1994, Russian-Belarussian negotiations centred on four main issues. First, the 
rate at which the Belarussian rubel would be exchanged to the Russian ruble. Belarus 
wanted a 1: 1 exchange rate, but the National Bank of Belarus's rate in 1994 was 1 ruble 
for 5 rubli. Second, governments discussed the potential unification of both countries' 
budgets. Russia believed that consolidated budgets might allow it to better control the rate 
of inflation in both countries, whereas Belarus was not very keen on having its budget 
determined by Russia. 40' Third, negotiations focused on whether the National Bank of 
Belarus would retain its currency issuing rights within limits established by the CBR. The 
National Bank of Belarus was particularly keen on retaining issuing rights, and its 
Chairman, Stanislav Bogdankevich, became the main opponent of surrendering such 
prerogatives, which would have transformed the Belarussian Bank into a mere commercial 
branch of the CBR, limiting its activities to the financing of Belarus' budget deficit within 
401 Belarus, IMF Economic Reviews, 1993,11, p. 2. 
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the limits set by the Central Bank of Russia. Finally, both sides discussed the price of 
Russia's energy resources. Belarus insisted on paying Russian domestic energy prices, and 
demanded the lifting of export duties. 406 
It was clear that if Belarus accepted monetary integration on Russia's terms, especially as 
far as a consolidated budget and a single emission centre were concerned, it would partially 
surrender its economic sovereignty to Russia. On the other hand, if Russia agreed to 
monetary integration according to Belarus' wishes, the whole undertaking could turn out to 
be extremely expensive and risky, since Russia would not be able to control monetary and 
credit supply within the zone. This point was raised several times by opponents to the 
union, particularly by key liberal figures such as Yegor Gaidar and Boris Fyodorov, who 
claimed that even if a deal was reached according to Russia's demands, there was no real 
guarantee that it would work properly. Gaidar insisted that the implementation of the plan 
would place a heavy burden on the Russian budget and would also lead to a surge of 
inflation. He argued that Russia would end up financing the Belarussian budget and 
providing Belarus with additional cash. 40' However, his position remained that of a 
minority. Most Duma deputies favoured bringing about economic union, even if this 
implied high costs for Russia. Sergei Glaziev, Chairman of the State Duma Committee on 
Economic Policy, insisted that integration of the two states' monetary systems would have 
many advantages for Russian enterprises and also promote the restoration of severed 
economic ties. 408 It was becoming increasingly clear that merger of the two economic and 
monetary systems was no longer viewed only in terms of economic advantages, but mostly 
in terms of the eventual political and strategic benefits such a union would provide to 
Russia. 
The draft treaty on Belarussian-Russian monetary union was finally signed on 12 April 
1994. Some liberal analysts, such as Izvestiya journalist Mikhail Berger, viewed the 
agreement as a readiness by Belarus to relinquish part of its economic sovereignty in 
exchange for a more reliable currency and stronger economic ties with Russia. Russia, in 
turn seemed ready to sacrifice its incipient economic stability for the sake of certain 
406 Stanislav Evgenev, 'Ekonomicheskii soiuz v ekstrennom ispolnenii? ', Moskovskie novosti 
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geopolitical advantages. 40' However, the agreement provided significant advantages to 
Russia. It settled the issue of the status of the National Bank of Belarus in Russia's favour, 
since it stipulated that all credit and monetary policy within the new borders of the ruble 
space would be set by the CBR. Russia also obtained significant benefits in terms of free 
transit of its goods through Belarussian territory and free leasing of strategic military 
facilities on Belanissian territory . 
410 The Belarussian side also obtained important benefits. 
All duties on Russian energy resources were to be removed, and the exchange rate of the 
`cash-ruble' for the `cash-rubel ' was set at 1: 1, a rate extremely advantageous for Belarus. 
It was also assumed that Belarus would be forgiven its debts arising from state credits. 
Moreover, Belarus was able to keep the hallmarks of conducting its own economic policy. 
Although the CBR remained the only issuing centre for the common system, Belarus 
retained its own budget. It was clear that the Belarussian budget deficit would be 
eventually financed by CBR and the Russian Ministry of Finance. 41 The overall cost for 
Russia of monetary integration was therefore estimated at approximately $2.5 billion . 
412 
Although Russia obtained some economic and political advantages, it was also evident that 
Russian authorities were unable to hold total control over the Belarussian economy, and 
this placed Russia in an extremely vulnerable economic position. The ambiguity of the 
agreement, which allowed for one issuing centre and two budgets was bound to lead to 
disagreements and possible disputes, and most probably to Russia financing the 
Belarussian deficit. 
Disagreements on the final exchange rate, the unwillingness of Belarus to adjust to 
Russia's financial, credit, customs and tax policies, and above all the reluctance of 
Chernomyrdin to carry on with integration, eventually buried all efforts to set up a 
Belarussian-Russian monetary union, and the project was abandoned in August 1994.413 
Despite the major negotiating efforts, Chernomyrdin eventually proved much more 
cautious than initially expected. Concerned with attaining macro-economic stability, he 
repeated several times that substantial differences in the pace of economic reform between 
the two countries made any attempt to unify the monetary systems impossible. `Right now 
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unification would mean that Russia would take on the additional burden of a neighbouring 
state's problems', he noted, and added, we cannot afford that. '414 Chernomyrdin had 
succeeded, with great difficulty, in lowering the rate of inflation to 5 percent a month 
during the first half of 1994, and was therefore reluctant to make a move that was bound to 
worsen the economic situation of Russia, for the sake, 'of not so obvious dividends in one 
narrow segment of Russian foreign policy. '` 15 
The Russian-Belanissian monetary union represents a very indicative case of Russia's 
reluctance to conduct an active neo-imperialist policy. Belarus proved to be the country 
most eager to join Russia in a monetary union, and eventually in an economic union as was 
shown above, in a way that would have served Moscow's imperialist purposes, if it really 
had any. However, the Russian -Belarussian monetary union failed to materialise, primarily 
due to the unwillingness of Russian leaders to subsidise the Belorussian economy, and also 
due to the reluctance of certain Belarussian leaders, especially the head of the Central 
Bank, to hand in control over money issuing and the Belorussian budget to Russia. Russian 
leaders were unwilling to pay too high an economic price for the sake of bringing Belarus 
within a Russian ruble zone which would not be totally under its control. This showed that 
those Russian officials who were in charge of conducting Russia's economic policies, 
mainly Prime Minister Chernomyrdin and the various heads of the Finance and Economics 
Ministries, and which were reluctant to sacrifice macro-economic stabilisation and the 
potential successes of economic reform for the sake of economically absorbing a CIS state, 
managed to impose their views over those more favourable to integration. It can then be 
concluded that Russia's desire to restore a neo-empire in the former Soviet space remained 
rather limited and incoherent. 
V. CIS Military Integration 
The current section will examine the processes of CIS military integration from Russia's 
viewpoint, in order to determine whether Russia's policies were aimed at preserving the 
CIS states within a Russian military sphere of influence. The section will show that during 
the period under examination Russian leaders considered control over the entirety of the 
post-Soviet space essential for the fulfilment of Russia's own security, and therefore 
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attempted to preserve, either through multilateral or bilateral agreements, this area under 
their own influence. However, Russian leaders proved unable to restore the old model of 
military organisation. On the one hand, Russian leaders proved unwilling and unable to 
counter the centrifugal tendencies of the CIS states and the latters' desire to create their 
own military infrastructures. On the other hand, Russia lacked the necessary financial 
resources to re-create highly integrated military structures. Moreover, the Russian military 
establishment proved unwilling to subordinate itself to military supranational institutions. 
All these factors account for the partial success of CIS military integration. 
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1. Russia's New Strategic Environment 
The end of the Cold War and the transformation of the old rivalry between the Soviet 
Union and the Western powers into a new partnership based on trust and mutual co- 
operation significantly reduced the military challenge posed by the NATO alliance on 
Soviet territory, and allowed for a radical revision of the USSR's security strategy. But the 
unexpected collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence, in its place, of fifteen newly 
independent states created an entirely new geopolitical situation for Russia. The new 
Russian state, although still representing a significant portion of the earth surface, lost an 
important part of its territory in the strategically vital areas of Eastern Europe and the 
Transcaucasus. During the Cold War, Soviet military planners had based the defence of 
the Russian heartland on the forward deployment of high-readiness units in the western and 
southern fringes of the Soviet territory, on an air-defence network located mostly in the 
non-Russian republics, and on the assumption that the nations neighbouring Russia would 
not align themselves against it. 416 The loss of Eastern Europe dealt a severe blow to the 
implementation of such a forward-based strategy. But the loss of the European and the 
Transcaucasian republics completed the evisceration of Russia's traditional defence 
strategy. Russian Defence Minister Pavel Grachev clearly expressed his disarray in view of 
Russia's new disadvantageous strategic position, We have found ourselves faced with a 
truly unprecedented situation. The Moscow military district has essentially become a 
frontier district. '`"' In fact, the Moscow military district had almost no combat worthy 
troops and the largest, best equipped, and best trained forces were along Russia's western 
borders, especially in Ukraine and Belarus. 418 Moreover, the collapse of the Soviet Union 
severely disrupted the existing air-defence and early-warning systems, significantly eroding 
4' the defensive capacity of the new state. 9 
Although there were no potential aggressors on the horizon, Russian military strategists 
continued to reason in terms of a major threat against Russia coming from NATO. 
Russia's draft military doctrine, published in May 1992, stipulated that `states (or a 
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coalition of states) aspiring for world hegemony' represented a major threat to the 
country. `^° In view of this threat, it was believed that the defence of Russia could best be 
achieved by developing a forward defence strategy which entailed keeping the countries of 
the former Soviet Union in a tight military alliance with Russia, and retaining control over 
Soviet military assets located in the new independent states . 
``2' Although during the second 
half of 1992, concern about a major Western or NATO attack on Russia started to 
dwindle, and seemed to have almost totally disappeared in 1993 - there was no mention of 
it in the November 1993 Russian Military Doctrine - Russian military strategists still 
considered the stationing of powerful armed formations near Russia's borders as a direct 
military threat to the country's security. 422 These concerns were tied to the worry that 
Soviet military assets located outside Russia might fall under the control of hostile states, 
such as Turkey and Iran, which might then use these assets against Russia, in alliance with 
the former Soviet states. 42' In order to counter these potential threats, Russian strategists 
considered it essential to bring as many countries as possible into the CIS and the 
Collective Security Treaty, and to develop bilateral military links which would tie these 
countries closely to Russia. In addition, Russia tried to jointly patrol the external CIS 
borders and the CIS air space, to restore peace in areas of inter-ethnic conflict with 
Russian peace-keeping forces, and to keep a Russian military presence, even a small one in 
the form of military bases, in as many CIS countries as possible. Military bases would 
legalise Russia's military presence in the CIS countries and most probably deter the 
military involvement of other countries. 424 However, the Russian Ministry of Defence was 
aware that its scarce financial resources would not allow it to cover the costs of restoring 
and maintaining the former Soviet defence system. Therefore it tried to achieve its 
objectives by sharing the expenses and costs with the other CIS states. 
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2. Russia's Attempts to Preserve United Armed Forces (1991-May 1992) 
Long before the end of the USSR, the Soviet military leadership had to contend with 
developments which represented a threat to the unity of the Soviet armed forces, namely the 
increasing desire and efforts by some of the Soviet republics to set up their own national 
armed forces. Ukraine, Belarus and Armenia proclaimed the right to create their own 
armies in July-August 1990, and national defence institutions were established in 
Lithuania, Latvia and Moldova. Legislation on the establishment of national forces was 
introduced in the Baltic republics, Georgia and Armenia during 1990-1991.425 After the 
failed August 1991 coup, all three Baltic republics demanded the withdrawal of Soviet 
forces from their territory and Moldova and Azerbaijan expressed their intention to 
'nationalise' all military formations on their territory in order to create their own armed 
forces. Ukraine placed all troops stationed on its territory under the jurisdiction of its 
Supreme Soviet, and in September 1991, named Major General Konstantin Morozov as 
Defence Minister. 426 Ukraine's position was crucial in the struggle over military forces as a 
result of its size, population (52 million), vast military potential, defence industrial base 
(13 percent of the USSR's total) and geo-strategic position between Russia and the rest of 
Europe. 
These developments created great anxiety among the Soviet military command. Officers 
were concerned that the creation of national forces would endanger control over nuclear 
weapons, decrease the general combat capability of the armed forces, and divide the air 
defence and early warning structures, thus significantly eroding the USSR's defensive 
capabilities. The traditional concept that war would be conducted on a huge scale, 
requiring a united military structure, lay at the heart of Soviet and, subsequently CIS 
thinking. 427 Consequently, the potential collapse of the entire Soviet military machine, 
prompted the Soviet High Command to devise new organisational structures which, while 
taking account of the new developments, still kept the great bulk of the armed forces 
united. Chief of the Soviet General Staff, Army General Vladimir Lobov, saw the 
development of `national armies' as inevitable, but insisted on the setting up of a system of 
collective security centred around Moscow. Like the Warsaw Pact, each member state 
would contribute a national contingent in the interests of common security, which would be 
425 Roy Allison, Military Forces in the Soviet Successor States, Adelphi Paper, 280,1993, pp. 6- 
7. 
426 Sergei Tsikora, `Ukraina sozdaet vooruzhennye sily', Izvestiya, 23 October 1991, p. 1. 
427 Roy Allison, `Military Forces in the Soviet Successor States', p. 7. 
127 
controlled by the Council of Defence Ministers of the sovereign states. 428 Soviet Defence 
Minister, Marshal Evgeny Shaposhnikov, proposed that the Soviet armed forces remain 
under single, unified command. He suggested that the Soviet forces stationed in the 
republics be operationally subordinate to the General Staff, and their status be regulated by 
treaties between the Union and the republics, which would legalise their presence in the 
republics, and thus prevent the division of the armed forces and the hasty `privatisation' of 
its equipment. Small republican or national guards would be allowed to exist under the 
command of the republican president, but during wartime they would become part of the 
united armed forces. -`29 The draft Union treaty, which was negotiated by Soviet leader 
Mikhail Gorbachev and the republican leaders on 25 November 1991, granted the 
republics the right to create their own national armed formations, but still stipulated that 
the Union of Sovereign States would have integrated armed forces under centralised 
control. "30 However, all these efforts aimed at keeping united armed forces proved 
ineffective once the Soviet Union collapsed and some of the newly independent states went 
ahead with setting up their own armed forces. 
The founding CIS agreements signed on 8 December 1991 envisaged the preservation, 
under joint command, of a common military-strategic space, with single control over 
nuclear weapons. 431 However, as early as 12 December 1991, Ukrainian President Leonid 
Kravchuk named himself Commander in Chief of the Ukrainian armed forces and issued a 
decree on the creation of Ukrainian forces on the basis of the Kiev, Odessa and Carpathian 
military districts, and the forces of the Black Sea Fleet, with the exception of those troops 
that were part of the `strategic forces. '432 The behaviour of Ukraine, which mirrored the 
attitudes of Azerbaijan and Moldova, significantly hampered the chances of keeping a 
united army, and created major anxiety among the armed forces' senior command. Soviet 
officers were concerned about the loss of strategically vital areas in Europe and 
Transcaucasia, the weakening of the efficiency of the CIS armed forces, and the fate of 
433 servicemen serving throughout the Soviet Union. They therefore pressed hard for the 
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preservation of united armed forces at least during a three year transitional period. `134 The 
Russian political leadership was also strongly in favour of keeping united armed forces 
under CIS control. 435 CIS control actually meant Russian control, given that Russia would 
host the highest portion of the armed forces, would pay the highest share of the CIS 
defence budget, would become the main supplier of weapons, training and equipment, and 
would have the highest ratio of nationals serving as officers and in positions of high 
command in the CIS armed forces. 
The Russian leadership attempted to persuade the CIS states to keep the Soviet army 
united, but with little success, except for the former Soviet nuclear forces. At the 31 
December 1991 CIS Summit in Minsk Russia managed to convince all CIS states to put 
nuclear weapons under single control and to place the former Soviet `strategic forces' 
under joint command. The strategic forces were sufficiently broadly defined so as to 
include the strategic missile forces, the air force, the navy, the air defence forces, the space 
forces and the paratroopers. 436 However, at the CIS summit in Minsk on 14 February 
1992, the previous definition was revised in view of the disagreements that emerged 
between the CIS states, and it was agreed that the list of `strategic forces' was to be 
`defined by each state on agreement with the Strategic Forces Command, to be approved 
by the Council of Heads of State. ' 43' This meant that their size would be much smaller 
than initially envisaged, given that the composition of the forces would be the result of 
negotiations. As far as the non-strategic forces were concerned, at the 31 December 1991 
summit in Minsk, Russia succeeded in obtaining the support of Belarus, Armenia and the 
five Central Asian states to keep joint `general-purpose forces' and joint border troops 
under joint CIS command. 438 However, the CIS states were granted the right to create their 
434 'Obrashchenie k narodam, parlamentam, glavam pravitel'stv Sodruzhestva Nezavisimykh 
Gosudarstv i lichnomu sostavu vooruzhennykh sil', Krasnaya zvezda, 21 January 1992 p. 1. The 
appeal urged parliaments and leaders of the CIS states `to preserve the integrity of the state 
border, a single system of security, a single military-strategic space and a single system of 
command for the Armed Forces during a transitional period. ' 
aas Yeltsin's support for a united army during at transitional period 1992-1995: Yurii Lepskii and 
Aleksandr Potapov, `Boris Yeltsin: "It is very difficult for us, but we will stand our ground", 
Trud, 14 December 1991, p. 1-2 in FBIS-SOV-91-241,1991, p. 36; Radio Mayak and Interfax, 30 
December 1991, in FBIS-SOV-91-251,31 December 1991, p. 15. 
436 Agreement between the Members of the Commonwealth of Independent States on Strategic 
Forces, Tass, 31 December 1991, translated by RIA-Novosti, January 1992, p. 21. 
437 'Soglashenie mezhdu gosudarstvami-uchastnikami SNG o statuse strategicheskikh sil', 
Krasnaya Zvezda, 19 February 1992, pp. 1,5. 
438 Agreement between Commonwealth Heads of State on Armed Forces and Border Troops, 
Tass, 31 December 1991, translated by RIA-Novosti, January 1992, p. 24. 
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own armed forces, which opened the way to further disintegration. `439 At the next CIS 
meeting in Kiev on 20 March 1992, support for CIS general-purpose forces significantly 
dwindled. Only four states signed the agreement: Russia, Armenia, Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan. Moreover, the national armed forces, which were part of the general-purpose 
forces, remained subordinated to the national Defence Ministries, which were allowed to 
participate, together with the CIS command, in the development of operational planning, 
combat duty, training and direct combat control. ""' As far as border protection is 
concerned, Russia managed to get the five Central Asian states, Armenia and Belarus to 
agree to jointly protect the CIS borders at the Kiev CIS summit. However, the agreement 
which stipulated the status of the common CIS border troops, mustered only five 
signatures, those of Russia, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. In an effort 
to share expenses for the maintenance of a united CIS army Russia managed to reach 
agreement with all CIS states, except for Azerbaijan and Ukraine, at the Minsk summit on 
14 February 1992, on a single defence budget to be financed by all CIS states. 44' However, 
no mechanisms were established for the financing of current expenditures and as a result, 
the financial burden of most CIS forces fell on Russia. 442 
3. Russia Creates its Own Armed Forces (May 1992) 
Unable to maintain the integrity of the armed forces under CIS command Russia decided to 
go ahead with the creation of its own armed forces on the basis of the senior echelons 
located on Russian territory, the former Soviet forces deployed outside the former USSR 
(Germany, Poland, Mongolia and Cuba), and those located in the Baltic states, Armenia, 
Georgia, Azerbaijan and Moldova. In May 1992, a Russian Ministry of Defence was set 
up, whose staff was largely recruited from officers serving in the CIS Supreme Command 
and the former Soviet Defence Ministry. 443 Russia's decision to set up its own armed forces 
439 'Agreement on General Purpose Forces for the Transitional Period', Rossiiskaya gazeta, 21 
February 1992, translated by RIA-Novosti, March 1992, p. 30. The general-purpose forces would 
include those military formations, units and installations that did not belong to the `strategic 
forces', as well as the individual armed forces of the CIS states, which were voluntarily 
subordinated to the General Command of the CIS Joint Armed Forces. 
440 'O statuse sil obshchego naznacheniya Ob"edinennykh Vooruzhennykh Sil na perekhodnyi 
period', 20 March 1992, Sodruzhestvo, Informatsionnyi Vestnik Soveta Glav Gosudarsty i Soveta 
Glav Pravitelsty SNG, (hereafter Sodruzhetsvo), 1992,4, pp. 26-30. 
441 'Soglashenie mezhdu Gosudarstvami-uchastnikami SNG o formirgovanii edinogo oboronnogo 
biudzheta i poryadke finansirovaniya Vooruzhennykh Sil Gosudarstv Sodruzhestva', Krasnaya 
zvezda, 20 February 1992, pp. 1-3. 
442 Mark Webber, CIS Integration Trends: Russia and the Former Soviet South, The Royal 
Institute of International Affairs, London, 1997, p. 37. 
443 ibid. p. 37; `Soglashenii nemalo, no rabotaiut oni poka slabo', Krasnaya zvezda, 6 May 1992, 
pp. 1-2. 
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was determined by a series of factors. First, there was a growing perception that Russia's 
security interests would hardly be fulfilled by an undefined military organisation, whose 
composition, structure, subordination and allegiance remained extremely blurred. The 
establishment of national armies tied by a collective security pact, with joint force 
structures, was seen as a better option to satisfy Russia's interests and eliminate the 
concerns expressed by other CIS states that Russia would use the former Soviet army as an 
imperial tool' to restore power. ` Moreover, such an arrangement would ensure direct 
Russian control over the CIS armed forces. Second, there was growing concern among 
Russian political circles, that the army, deprived of a state and of civilian supervision, was 
getting out of control. Only by creating its own Defence Ministry and other military 
structures, could the Russian leadership ensure political control over the military. 445 Third, 
army units located beyond Russia's borders were being dragged into conflicts, often 
against their own will, and attempts to privatise the army's military equipment were 
endangering the lives of Russian servicemen. Moreover, the question of loyalty among 
individual soldiers was becoming an increasingly complicated matter. Russia, however, 
decided to retain the CIS Joint Armed Forces (JAF), in order to ensure continued central 
control over the former Soviet nuclear arsenal based outside Russia. The Russian military 
and political leadership also viewed these CIS defence structures as useful instruments for 
promoting Moscow's security interests throughout the CIS. The new organisational 
structure of the Joint Armed Forces placed Russian officers at key positions, thus ensuring 
Russia's control over such key formations as the CIS air defence, air force and navy, 
which still remained under joint command. 
4. Collective Security Co-operation (May 1992-end of 1992) 
The failure to create common CIS general-purpose forces and the establishment of 
Russia's own armed forces came hand in hand with Russia's decision to create a system of 
collective security. Signed in Tashkent on 15 May 1992 by the leaders of Armenia, 
Kazakhstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, the Collective Security 
Treaty (CST) was seen by Russia as an instrument for maintaining a united military- 
444 Sergei Rogov, `Commonwealth Defence Arrangements and International Security', CNA 
Occasional Paper, Centre for Naval Analysis, June 1992, p. 12. 
445 These views were expressed by then Russia's Deputy Defence Minister Andrei Kokoshin, 
See 
Natalie Gross, `Russia's Strategy: East or West? ', Jane's Intelligence Review, June 1992, p. 257. 
446 'Soglashenie ob organizatsii deyatel'nosti Glavnogo Komandovaniya Ob"edinennykh 
Vooruzhennykh Sil Sodruzhestva Nezavisimykh Gosudarstv na perekhodnyi period', 6 July 1992, 
Sodruzhesvto, 1992,6, pp. 69-70. 
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strategic space through the preservation of joint armed forces, and as means of creating a 
defensive alliance with those states most prone to military co-operation. 447 The CST was a 
reflection of Russia's military thinking at the time, which conceived Russia's security 
within the context of the CIS framework. The draft military doctrine published in May 
1992, stressed the need for close military co-operation with the other CIS states to ensure 
reliable defence in case of aggression, and suggested that Russia's armed forces be 
committed partly or completely to the CIS Joint Armed Forces. 448 The CST was also seen 
as a way of preserving under joint control those elements of the former Soviet army that 
had not been nationalised, or at least as a means of delaying the complete disintegration of 
the army. As Lt. -Gen. Leonid Ivashov, Secretary of the CIS Council of Defence Ministers, 
explained, the signing of the collective security treaty in Tashkent on 15 May 1992 was an 
attempt by the CIS Heads of State to put up a legal obstacle to the total collapse of the 
defence system of the USSR and to preserve a minimal level of security for their 
countries. '-`9 The Russian military envisaged that the former Soviet army, even if divided, 
would still function as a unified entity, as indicated in the May 1992 draft military 
doctrine, which foresaw the existence of national armed forces operationally subordinate to 
the High Command of the CIS Joint Armed Forces. 45' The CST did not explicitly provide 
for the establishment of joint armed forces. However, article 7, which stipulated that `the 
development and functioning of objects of the collective security system on the territory of 
party-states shall be regulated by special agreements', provided the legal foundation for 
further collective security co-operation and for the preservation of a united army. 451 Co- 
ordination of the joint actions of the signatory states was to be conducted by a Collective 
Security Council, composed of the leaders of the signatory states and the Commander-in 
Chief of the CIS Joint Armed Forces. 
The CST, however, failed to satisfy Russia's expectations. By the autumn of 1992, hopes 
of preserving a united army and creating an effective collective security system had almost 
447 `Treaty on Collective Security', Military News Bulletin (MNB), May 1992,5, pp. 1-2. The CST 
created a defensive alliance among the signatory states. Aggression against one member-state was 
considered an aggression against them all. Participants were barred from joining other military 
alliances, or taking part in actions aimed against another member state (art. 1). In the event of 
such an aggression occurring, all participating states were expected to render the necessary 
assistance including military aid (art. 4). 
448 Voennaya Mysl ', special edition, May 1992. 
449 Col. Nikolai Plotnikov, `Ot dezintegratsii k ob"edineniiu', Nezavisimaya gazeta, 6 July 1994, 
p. 1. See also Maj-Gen. Vasily Volkov, `Kollektivnaya Bezopasnost' Sodruzhestva', Nezavisimaya 
gazeta, 20 August 1994, p. 3. 
450 Voennaya Mysl ', special edition, May 1992. 
451 `Treaty on Collective Security', p. 2. 
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disappeared. First, as the CIS states proceeded with the creation of their own armed forces, 
CIS agreements reflected the increasing trend towards a nationally-based CIS defence. The 
first CIS Military Doctrine adopted by the six CST signatory states on 9 October 1992 
foresaw the fulfilment of CIS collective defence on the basis of both individual forces and 
the CIS Joint Armed Forces (JAF). The latter, however, were to be formed from 
contingents of troops belonging to the armed forces of the CIS states, which were 
voluntarily placed by each CIS state under the operational command of the JAF. 452 
Although most CIS states initially placed all their armed forces under CIS command, such 
moves were considered transitional until individual countries set up their own armed forces 
and military institutions. Moreover, the High Command of the JAF was entrusted with 
assisting in the building of the armed forces of the CIS states. 453 Second, very little was 
achieved in terms of the development of a collective security system. Although the October 
1992 CIS military doctrine did provide the basis for the creation of an integrated military 
system of joint forces and joint operational planning - the JAF would be based on `the 
collective guidance of the defences of the CIS states and a common operational control of 
the JAF of the CIS'- very little was achieved in practice. 454 The Joint Armed Forces by 
this time amounted only to the nuclear forces which were located in Russia, Ukraine, 
Belarus and Kazakhstan, as CIS states proceeded to set up national armed forces. 
Furthermore, the CIS JAF High Command's tasks were reduced to providing co-ordination 
and assistance in the field of collective security. 455 The Collective Security Council, which 
had been envisaged as a co-ordination body, was in turn entrusted with setting up another 
working body, also aimed at co-ordinating the actions of the CIS to ensure collective 
security. 456 Collective security, therefore, remained very much in the early stages of policy 
co-ordination. Very little was achieved in terms of joint operational planning or 
development of integrated military structures. Third, the 6 July 1992 agreement on a united 
air defence system under CIS command failed to materialise. 
The main reasons behind these developments were both the reluctance of most CIS states 
to subordinate themselves to supra-national organs, especially in the military field, where 
Russia was bound to play a dominant role, as well as the eagerness, even among those 
452 'Concept of Military Security of the Member-States of the CIS', 9 October 1992, MNB, 
December 1992, pp. 6-9. 
453 `Statute of the High Command of the Joint Armed Forces of the CIS', MNB, November 1992, 
p. 6. 
asa 'Concept of Military Security of the Member-States of the CIS', p. 9. 
ass 'Statute of the High Command of the Joint Armed Forces of the CIS', p. 6. 
456 'Concept of Military Security of the Member-States of the CIS', p. 9. 
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states that had signed the CST, to create their own armed forces and bring all military 
infrastructure in their territory under their own jurisdiction. Russian leaders at the time, 
proved unwilling to put too much pressure on the CIS states in order to preserve a united 
army and achieve deep military integration. Instead, by 1993, the Russian Ministry of 
Defence had given up efforts to create a united army and adopted a new approach in the 
area of CIS military integration. 457 Although the goal of creating a Russian-dominated 
military -strategic space in the CIS was retained, the Russian military preferred to pursue 
military integration independently from the supra-national CIS structures. The Russian 
military began increasingly to focus on bilateral forms of military co-operation with each 
individual CIS states, and worked towards the creation of coalition forces no longer 
458 subordinated to the CIS High Command, but to Russia instead. 
5. Further Disintegration of the CIS Military Space 
at Multilateral Level (1993-mid 1994) 
During 1992, Russian and CIS military institutions had worked in tandem to maintain 
Moscow's position as the focal point of an integrated security system on the territory of the 
former Soviet Union. But in early 1993, Russian military leaders found themselves 
increasingly at odds with both the CIS command and the majority of the CIS members that 
had signed the Collective Security Treaty, over the reorganisation of the CIS command 
structure, its subordination to political authorities, and the management of conventional 
forces. Russia along with Uzbekistan backed a proposal based on the old Warsaw Pact 
command structure that would have made the CIS commander a Russian deputy Defence 
Minister subordinate to the Russian Defence Minister. 45' The other signatories to the CST, 
as well as the CIS command, opposed this structure, mainly because it would have meant 
subordination to the Russian Defence Ministry. They proposed instead a structure that 
would follow the NATO model, maintaining a permanent CIS command subordinated to a 
collective security council, whose membership would have included the Presidents and 
Prime Ministers of the six member states. 46° The Commander in Chief of the Joint Armed 
457 Boris Gromov noted in the Spring of 1993, that the CIS Joint Armed Forces needed to be 
reorganised because it would be impossible to set up joint armed forces in the near future. (Itar- 
tass, 15 June 1993, in FBIS-SOV-93-113,15 June 1993, p. 3). 
458 Personal Interview with Andrei Zagorskii, Moscow, November 1996. 
459 Interfax, 1 March 1993, in FBIS-SOV-93-093,2 March 1993, p. 6; and Oleg Falichev, 
`Kollektivnaya bezopasnost' v SNG: po tipu NATO iii Varshavskogo Dogovora? ', Krasnaya 
zvezda, 2 March 1993, p. 1. 
460 ibid. 
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Forces, Marshal Shaposhnikov, still hoped to transform the collective security system into 
a CIS military-political alliance, with common tenets which could be embodied in a 
coalition' military doctrine. The goal was to create mixed-troop formations of CIS 
national armies at regional level. 46' This idea however, run into open Russian opposition in 
the spring of 1993. In May 1993, the Russian Ministry of Defence openly rejected the 
creation of permanent unified CIS armed forces in the foreseeable future, and supported the 
formation of such forces only during wartime. Various reasons explain Russia's new 
stance. First, Defence Minister Pavel Grachev became increasingly reluctant to subordinate 
himself to a superior body - the CIS High Command. Second, the Russian Ministry of 
Defence was concerned that the transformation of the CIS Command into an independent 
decision-making centre would drag Russian military forces into some new resource- 
consuming operation. 2 Russia's proposal was in fact heading in the opposite direction, 
having all CIS structures subordinated to the Russian defence ministry. Finally, the 
Russian Defence Ministry was aware of the lack of funding available for the setting up of 
such a supranational structure. Russia was the only country funding the JAF, and its 
leaders wanted to make CIS countries responsible for covering the expenses of their own 
463 national armies. 
The situation was resolved with Russia's decision to abolish the CIS JAF Command in 
June 1993, and replace it with a co-ordinating body, the `Staff for the Co-ordination of 
Military Co-operation' (SCMC). With the elimination of the CIS JAF Command, Russia 
dashed any hopes of setting up joint CIS forces in the foreseeable future. Instead, in 
August 1993, it brought forward a less ambitious collective security project, adopted by 
the CST signatory states in December 1993, which envisaged the defence of the CIS space 
on the basis of national armed forces of minimal strength. 
464 The project also foresaw the 
restoration of a joint air defence system and the joint protection of external CIS borders. 
465 
By 1994, the CIS SCMC was in fact working on the assumption that no joint armed forces 
would be set up in the near future, and that collective security would be achieved 
`with 
461 Aleksandr Zhilin, `Plan Shaposhnikova eshche ne sdan v arkhiv', Moskovskie novosti, 30 May 
1993, pp. 8-9. 
462 Pavel Baev, The Russian Army in a Time of Troubles, PRIO, London, 1996, p. 111. 
463 Personal interview with Andrei Zagorskii, Moscow, November 1996. For Grachev's comments 
on the topic see Aleksandr Zhilin, `Plan Shaposhnikova eshche ne sdan v arkhiv', p. 
8. 
464 The Russian Military Doctrine adopted in November 1993 envisaged cooperation among CIS 
states `in solving collective defence and security problems', 
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integration of CIS armed forces under joint command. ('Osnovnye polozheniya', p. 3). 
465 Viktor Litokvin, `Ministry oborony likvidirovali dolzhnost' Galvkoma, no ob"edinenye sily 
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[reduced] expenditures and with national forces of minimal strength. '` 6' Boris Pyankov, 
First Deputy Chief of Staff of the SCMC envisaged that, under these circumstances, 
collective security would be achieved by co-ordinating operational plans in the event of an 
external threat, by co-ordinating the training of troops in peacetime, and by military- 
technical co-operation. `6' 
6. Renewed Emphasis on Military Co-operation (Mid-1994-1996) 
By mid-1994 Russia's policy in the field of military integration underwent a major 
readjustment. Although all CIS states were reluctant to restore highly centralised structures 
with supranational bodies, and were focusing their efforts on dividing the former Soviet 
armed forces and strengthening their national armies, CIS leaders were aware that a certain 
degree of co-operation was necessary. 468 Most CIS states were experiencing enormous 
difficulties in setting up their own armed forces and needed Russia's financial support and 
technical expertise. Russia, in turn, was eager to keep the CIS states within a military- 
strategic alliance that would bind their security tightly to Russia. Although in 1993 
emphasis had been placed on developing bilateral relations, support within Russia's 
political and military circles for deeper multilateral co-operation increasingly gained 
strength, as Russia succeeded in bringing three additional CIS states into the CST - 
Azerbaijan, Georgia and Belarus. Russia's new emphasis on integration reflected the 
broader evolution that was occurring at foreign policy level in support for a more assertive 
policy towards the former Soviet states. The successes of Zhirinovsky's LDPR and of the 
Communist Party at the Duma elections in December 1993 only reinforced this trend, and 
prompted the Russian leadership to come out vociferously in support of increased military 
integration. 469 
Russia's emphasis on the formation of an integrated collective security system was also a 
result of the concern that Russia's neglect of military integration during 1993 had 
undermined the former Soviet integrated structures upon which Russian security was 
466 Liana Minasyan, Igor Rotar and Vitalii Portnikov, `My ne khotim pugat' mir. Voennoe 
sotrudnichestvo s tochki zreniya Koordinatsionnogo Shtaba', Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 4 June 1994, 
p. 3. 
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468 Maj. -Gen. Vasily Volkov, `Kollektivnaya 
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469 Yeltsin's Speech at the conference of the Command Personnel of the Russian Federation 
Armed Forces on 14 November 1994. ('Armiya kak zerkalo Rossiiskoi zhizni', Rossiiskaya 
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based. ` 7° In addition, the prospects of NATO enlargement increased support for deeper 
integration with the CIS states. The Strategic Course for the CIS, approved by Yeltsin in 
September 1995, put great emphasis on the need to create the right mechanisms for the 
implementation of a collective security system and the preservation of military 
infrastructure facilities in the CIS states on the basis of mutual agreements. The document 
also stressed the need to reach agreements that would regulate the status of military bases 
in the CIS states and the need to deepen co-operation in the protection of CIS outer 
borders. Support for CIS military integration also came from the Foreign Intelligence 
Service, headed by Evgeny Primakov. Primakov's report on the CIS, published in 
September 1994, saw CIS military integration as `a natural objective process' and noted 
that although tension had decreased at global level, potential threats to Russia's security 
remained, in the form of inter-ethnic conflicts, the expansion of Iranian and Turkish 
influence, Islamic extremism, as well as the modernisation and development of Western 
offensive armaments. 47' Military integration was seen as the best way to counter these 
threats. During 1994-1995, therefore, Russia placed new emphasis on the restoration of the 
unity of the military-strategic space to be achieved by the materialisation of the principle of 
collective security, the restoration of the air defence system, joint border protection, the 
legalisation of military bases in the CIS states, and the creation under Russia's aegis, of 
coalition, and in future united CIS armed forces. "' Bilateral ties were to complement 
developments at multilateral level. 
a. Military Integration and Regional Coalition Forces 
Russia's renewed support for CIS multilateral co-operation resulted in the adoption of a 
Collective Security Concept in February 1995. The concept represented a less ambitious 
version of the plans for military co-operation proposed by the CIS SCMC, which if 
implemented would have come close to restoring the old united Soviet armed forces within 
a single military-strategic space. The SCMC project, as presented by Lt. -Gen. Leonid 
Ivashov, Secretary of the CIS Defence Ministers' Council, envisaged in the short term, the 
creation of a `military-political alliance', understood as a system of permanent political and 
military bodies, common or joint military structures, joint armed forces, and co-ordinated 
operational planning and training. In the longer term, the `military-political alliance' would 
470 Valery Mironov, `Ot desintegratsii k ob"edineniiu', Segodnya, 20 July 1995, p. 5. 
471 `Rossiya i SNG: Nuzhdaetsya li v korrektirovke pozitsiya zapada? ', p. 1. 
472 Dmitrii Trenin, `Kollektivnaya bezopasnost' i kollektivnaya oborona', Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 4 
November 1994, p. 3. 
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develop into a highly integrated military structure, with supranational powers whose 
decisions would be binding on member states. States would share a common defence 
budget, in addition to the national defence budgets, as well as single armed forces under 
single command. 473 Ivashov proposed that the future collective security system be based on 
highly integrated regional subsystems, each with their own coalition forces, subordinated to 
bodies with supranational powers. 
The CST Collective Security Concept, instead, envisaged the creation of a collective 
security system based on regional coalition forces as well as on the armed forces of 
individual member states, a joint defence system and joint border protection. 474 The 
Concept did not rule out the formation of joint armed forces, but left this development to a 
later stage. The collective security system was to be created in various stages. Initially, the 
formation of individual armed forces was envisaged, as well as the establishment of a legal 
basis for a future collective security system and the development of military-technical co- 
operation. In a second phase, coalition forces and a joint air defence system were to be set 
up, and the possibility of creating joint armed forces was to be examined. The last phase 
foresaw the completion of the collective security system. However, the Collective Security 
Concept envisaged no supranational bodies, and the main CST organ - the Collective 
Security Council - retained purely co-ordinating functions. This showed that although 
Russia was eager to deepen military integration, the Russian Ministry of Defence remained 
reluctant to create new military organs with supra-national functions. In turn, most of those 
CIS states which seemed willing to develop tight military co-operation with Russia were 
generally motivated in their decisions by the desire to obtain Russian economic support and 
technical expertise for their military development, rather than by the conviction that their 
country's security would best be safeguarded by co-operating with Russia. 
The CIS Council of Defence Ministers of April 1995 saw the first attempts to set up a 
body responsible for joint military planning and operations. CST leaders agreed on the 
need to create a Committee of Chiefs of Staff of the CIS Armed Forces (CCC) under the 
SCMC, which would include the chief of the general staff of the national armies, and 
would be responsible for co-ordinating the armies' activities and for the joint operational 
473 Col. Nikolai Plotnikov, `Ot dezintegratsii k ob"edineniiu - kollektivnaya bezopasnost' 
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planning and the elaboration of other measures to ensure CIS security. `"' The Committee 
was to be headed, at least for the next year or two, by the Russian Chief of the General 
Staff. The CCC was set up at the March 1996 Council of Defence Ministers' meeting. 
Although the specific functions and the structure of the committee were not spelled out, 
Army General Viktor Samsonov, Chief of Staff for the Co-ordination of Military Co- 
operation, noted that the idea behind the committee's creation was to unite the potential of 
the general staffs, and to give the Chiefs of Staff a legal foundation for their work in the 
CIS context. Mikhail Kolesnikov, chief of the Russian General Staff, was appointed 
committee chairman. This meant that, under Russian leadership, the operational and 
combat training of national armies would be conducted particularly in the interests of 
Russia, as well as those of all CIS states. 
However, in spite of these renewed efforts to develop collective security, regional coalition 
forces were never implemented during the period under examination. On the one hand, 
many CIS states were reluctant to subordinate their forces to supra-national structures 
which would be dominated by Russia, the major military power. On the other hand, the 
basis of the coalition concept - the prior formation of national armies - remained 
incomplete. `'6 One of the main reasons behind such developments was, again, the lack of 
funding. 
b. Joint Border Protection 
At the CIS summit in Kiev on 20 March 1992, Russia had succeeded in getting the support 
of the five Central Asian states, Armenia and Belarus to jointly protect the CIS external 
borders, both by common CIS border troops and by the national border forces of each CIS 
state. 4" A Council of Border Troop Commanders, under the Chair of the Director of the 
Russian Federal Border Service, was set up in July 1992 to co-ordinate the operation of the 
border troops and implement the decisions taken by the CIS Council of Heads of State, the 
highest co-ordinating body for the protection of CIS borders. 478 However, the initial 
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attempts to jointly patrol the CIS external borders failed. The agreement on the status of 
the common CIS border troops which had been signed on 20 March 1992, mustered only 
the signatures of Russia, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan. 79 
Many CIS states decided to patrol their external border by themselves, such as Belarus, 
Azerbaijan, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and in many cases they opened up their borders with 
their non-CIS neighbours, leaving Russia's borders totally unprotected and open to the 
480 influx of drugs, weapons, refugees, and un-taxed goods. 
In view of this situation, in June 1992, Russia went ahead with the creation of its own 
border troops, and established bilateral agreements with the various CIS states in order to 
jointly or individually patrol their external CIS borders. Bilateral agreements to this effect 
were reached with Georgia (February 1994), Armenia (March 1994), Kazakhstan 
(December 1994), Turkmenistan (July 1992 and December 1993), Kyrgyzstan (October 
1992), Tajikistan ( July 1992) and Belarus (February 1995). By 1996, Russia was jointly 
patrolling these external CIS borders. Although these agreements clearly satisfied Russia's 
own security interests, they also met the needs of the CIS states, which most often lacked 
the resources and expertise to establish efficient border protection regimes . 
481 The 
possibility of creating a new border protection infrastructure along the perimeter of 
Russia's new borders had been examined during 1992 and 1993, but eventually, at a 
Russian Security Council meeting, held in September 1993, the Russian leadership decided 
to continue to defend the former Soviet border. The direct protection of Russia's new 
borders was considered too expensive, it would have taken a very long time to complete, 
and the border would have been shortened only by 2,000 km. Moreover, Russian leaders 
hoped that in the near future a politico-military union would be set up, rendering the new 
borders superfluous . 
482 In May 1995, Russia managed to obtain the agreement of Armenia, 
Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan for the development of a 
multilateral joint border protection system. Ukraine, Moldova, Azerbaijan, 
Uzbekistan and 
Turkmenistan refused to sign the treaty, the latter preferring an agreement with 
Russia on 
bilateral border protection. 483 However, hardly any co-operation on border protection 
479 `Soglashenie o statuse Pogranichnykh Voisk Sodruzhestva Nezavisimykh 
Gosudarstv', 20 
March 1992, Sodruzheslvo, 1992,4, pp. 36-39. 
480 For Yeltsin's concern for the open borders see: `Ya ne skryvaiu trudnostei i khochu, chtoby 
narod eto ponimal', Komsomol 'skaya Pravda, 27 
May 1992, p. 2; `What Russia's Borders look 
like', A'INB, August 1992, p. 1. 
481 Mark Webber, CIS Integration Trends, p. 42. 
482 Pavel Felgengauer, `Starye granitsy i "novye" bazi', Segodnya, 16 September 1993, p. 3. 
483 Vladimir Abarinov, `Rossiya nachinaet vozrozhdat' soiuz na `rynochnykh printsipakh', 
Segodnya, 30 May 1995 p. 3. The Strategic Course of Russia towards the CIS member 
States 
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developed at multilateral level; most joint border protection instead occurred at bilateral 
level between Russia and the individual CIS states. 
c. Air Defence 
The collapse of the Soviet Union dealt a severe blow to the existing air defence system, 
leaving the non-Russian CIS states without cover and opening up gaps in Russia's own air 
defences. Most radio-engineering troops, anti-aircraft and early-warning systems, as well 
as the best fighter planes were located beyond Russia's borders in the new independent 
states. 484 This situation prompted the Russian leadership to negotiate an agreement in July 
1992, with the leaders of most CIS states (Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan) on the preservation of a united air defence system, 
under the control of Russia's Air Defence Commander. 485 All signatories, plus Ukraine, 
also agreed to keep missile-attack warning and space surveillance systems under joint 
command and central control. Russia managed to agree on sharing the burdens of finance 
between Russia and the various CIS states. The systems became the property of the states 
where they were located, and each state became responsible for their maintenance. Despite 
the efforts, a jointly operated air defence system failed to materialise. When the CIS JAF 
Supreme Command was abolished in June 1993, central control over the system was lost, 
and air defence assets located in the CIS states started to be run directly by each individual 
CIS state. In view of this situation, Russia conducted major efforts to restore a united 
system at bilateral level. Agreements on joint air defence operation were reached with 
Armenia (March 1994, October 1994 and December 1995), Georgia (April 1995), 
Azerbaijan (April 1995), Kazakhstan (December 1994, January 1995), Kyrgyzstan (July 
envisaged a deepening of co-operation between CIS member states in the sphere of state border 
security. President Yeltsin considered it is necessary to proceed from the premise that the reliable 
protection of borders along the CIS perimeter corresponded with Russia's national interests and 
the common interests of CIS member states. Work had to be completed on settling a package of 
border questions with CIS member states and creating a treaty-legal basis for the stationing of 
Russian Federation border troops in these countries. The document envisaged studying the 
possibility of creating, in the future, regional command units of CIS member states border guard 
troops, and conducting efforts to create a uniform system for the protection of their borders. 
(Strategicheskii Kurs, p. 4) 
484 Col. Vladimir Simakov, `Air Space Defence in CIS Common Space', MNB, July 1995, p. 3; 
`General Prudnikov outlines the status of air defences in the CIS', Interfax, 3 August 1995, in 
FBIS-SOU 95-150,4 August 1995, p. l 
485 `Soglashenie o sisteme protivovozdushnoi oborony', 6 July 1992, Sodruzhestvo, 1992,6, 
pp. 66-67; `Soglashenie ob organizatsii deyatel'nosti Glavnogo Komandirovaniya Ob"edinennykh 
Vooruzhennykh Sil SNG', 6 July 1992, Sodruzhestvo, 1992,6, p. 69. 
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1994), Tajikistan (July 1994), Turkmenistan (June 1992), Belanis (January 1995), and 
Ukraine (April 1996) on the joint use of their air defence capabilities. 
In 1995, Russia resumed efforts aimed at reaching an agreement at multilateral level, 
which would slowly bring all CIS air defence components under Russia's control. At the 
February 1995 CIS summit, all CIS states except for Azerbaijan and Moldova adopted an 
agreement on a unified air defence system. The agreement foresaw the formation of a joint 
air defence system on the basis of the forces and installations of individual CIS states, 
involved in joint monitoring, early warning, and attack repelling. 486 The forces would be 
controlled by individual states, but their actions would be co-ordinated from the Central 
Command Post of the Air Defence Forces of Russia. 487 A CIS Co-ordinating Committee 
for Air Defence, under General Viktor Prudnikov, Commander-in-Chief of Russian Air 
Defence Troops, was immediately set up. It became responsible for co-ordinating the 
actions of all air defence forces, and for creating and upgrading the joint air defence 
system. Moreover, Russia started in April 1995 a programme aimed at restoring the air 
defence systems of Georgia, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, and repairing the systems of 
Armenia, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan with the final objective to merge the various systems 
under Russia's control. 488 
Russian leaders therefore managed to partially restore a unified air defence command, and 
succeeded in implementing some of the signed bilateral air defence agreements. During the 
Spring of 1996, Russia started undertaking joint patrols with Kazakhstan, Georgia and 
Belarus, and merged its air defence efforts with Armenia. 489 However, Azerbaijan's 
objection to participating in the air defence system, even at bilateral level, and its refusal to 
486 Mark Webber, CIS Integration Trends, p. 41. 
487 'Agreement on the Creation of a Joint Air Defence System of the CIS', 10 February 1995, 
1vINB, May 1995,5, pp. 6-7. The operations of early-warning facilities deployed beyond Russia's 
borders were supervised by the Russian MOD through the office of the Air Defence Forces of the 
Russian Federation. (Igor Korotchenko, `Protsess voennoi integratsii v SNG nabiraet silu', 
Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie-Nezavisimaya gazeta, 13 January 1996, p. 4. ) 
488 An agreement reached in November 1995 stipulated that the rehabilitation of the system was 
to be overseen and funded by an inter-state financial-industrial group centred on Russia's Granit 
state concern. (Yury Golotiuk, `Rossiya i Belorussiya nachali sovmestno zashchishchat' obshchee 
nebo', Segodnya, 2 April 1996 p. 2; Russian Television, 2 November 1995, FBIS-SOU 95-213,3 
November 1995 p. 12. `Decision on Progress in the Implementation of the Agreement on the 
Creation of a Joint Air Defence System of the CIS of 10 February 1995', i\INB, July 1995, p. 4; 
`Decision on the Provisions of Assistance in the Creation and Improvement of a Joint Air 
Defence System of Members of the CIS', t'INB, December 1995, p. 9; Interfax, 3 August 1995, in 
FBIS-SOU 95-150,4 August 1995, p. 1. ) 
489 Mark Webber, CIS Integration Trends, p. 41. 
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agree to a Russian lease of its early-warning radar station at Gabala, created a real 
problem for Russia, for as long as Azerbaijan remained out of the air defence system, the 
490 skies over the Transcaucasian region remained unprotected. 
d. Bilateral Military Co-operation Between Russia and the CIS States 
Besides the dense network of bilateral co-operation set up by Russia with most CIS states 
in the areas of air defence and border protection, Russia reached various bilateral 
agreements on military co-operation among individual armed forces with Belarus 
(December 1995 and May 1996), Kazakhstan (May 1992, March 1994, January 1995), 
Tajikistan (May 1993), Uzbekistan (May 1992 and March 1994), Kyrgyzstan (July 1994), 
Georgia (February 1994) and Armenia (August 1992). `9' Most of these agreements 
envisaged Russia's assistance in the formation of individual armed forces, both in terms of 
training, equipment and military expertise. Of particular relevance were the December 
1995 and May 1996 agreements with Belarus, which envisaged joint defence policy 
planning and the development of Russian and Belarussian armed forces on the basis of 
common principles. The 28 March 1994 agreement with Kazakhstan was also quite 
signifi cant, given that it envisaged the formation of integrated military units, which would 
operate under joint command, and would be assigned to joint defensive missions. A 
subsequent agreement reached with Kazakhstan on 20 January 1995 expanded co- 
operation further. Russia and Kazakhstan agreed to work towards the formation of united 
armed forces on the principles of joint planning and training, and to use military 
installations located on the territory of the other side in the interest of mutual security. 
Although military facilities were used jointly, joint Russian-Kazakh units were never set up 
- during the period under examination . 
492 Various agreements were also signed on military 
technical co-operation and co-operation in the field of defence production, with Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova. Although deep bilateral 
military co-operation developed between Russia and most CIS states, the most far-reaching 
agreements, in particular those signed with Belarus and Kazakhstan, were never 
490 Ilya Bulavinov, 'CIS Decides to Wait a While on Unifying against NATO', Kommersant- 
daily, 3 November 1995, p. 3, in CDPSP, XLVII, 45,1995, p. 21. 
491 Alexander A. Sergounin, On the Way to Integration: iVlilitary Technical Cooperation between 
the CIS rnember-states, Nizhnii Novogorod, 1996, pp. 25-37; Vladimir Kuleshov, `Sozdaiutsya 
sovmestnye voiska Turkmenistana i Rossii', Izvestiya, 9 June 1992, p. 1; `Dogovor mezhdu 
Rossiiskoi Federatsiei i Respublikoi Gruziya o druzhbe, dobrososedsvte i sotrudnichestve', 
Svobodnaya Gruziia, 4 February 1994, p. 1. 
492 `Stages of Military Cooperation', NINB, February 1995,2, p. 6. 
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implemented. 493 Moreover, strategically vital countries such as Ukraine, Azerbaijan, as 
well as Uzbekistan and Moldova refused to develop tight military co-operation with 
Russia. Nevertheless, Russia managed to keep an important military presence in these last 
two countries. Russia delayed almost indefinitely the withdrawal of the 14th Army located 
in Transdniestria, and succeeded in keeping its share of the Black Sea Fleet stationed in 
Ukraine. -194 In addition, it retained two military bases in Armenia, at Gyumri and Yerevan, 
and three military bases in Georgia at Batumi, Alkhalkalaki and Viziani, as well as the 
naval bases of Poti and Ochamchira. 49' The record of bilateral military co-operation 
therefore, remains mixed. 
7. Conclusion 
During 1992-1996 Russian leaders attempted, to a great extent, to preserve the CIS states 
under Russia's military sphere of influence. These efforts resulted from a concept of 
security, well-embedded in Russia's strategic thinking, which viewed the entire post-Soviet 
space as essential for Russia's security, as a sort of buffer zone dividing Russia from the 
'traditional' abroad. To this had to be added the presence of valuable military assets, which 
were coveted by Russia, and which were located in the former Soviet states. However 
Russia was faced in its enterprise with a radically different geo-political environment, 
reflected in the presence of fourteen new independent states eager to distance themselves 
from Russia, the former `imperial centre', and avid to create their own armed forces, seen 
as an essential attribute of their newly acquired sovereignty. Unable to persuade the CIS 
states to preserve a united military strategic space, and forced by its own financial 
difficulties to substantially reduce its military presence in the former Soviet states, Russia 
had to face the disintegration of the post-Soviet military space during 1992-1993. These 
developments significantly reduced the effectiveness and combat-capability of Russia's 
military machine, and prompted the Russian Defence Ministry to conduct efforts during 
1994-1996 aimed at re-establishing a united military-strategic space, through a network of 
bilateral and multilateral agreements. 
493 ibid. 
494 Final agreement on the fate of the Black Sea Fleet vessels, infrastructure and basing facilities 
was only reached in May 1997. 
495 'Dogovor mezhdu Rossiiskoi Federatsiei i Respublikoi Gruziya o druzhbe, dobrososedsvte i 
sotrudnichestve', p. 1; Ilya Bulavinov, `Results of Pavel Grachev's Visit to Transcaucasia', 
Kommersant-daily, 25 March 1995 p. 4, in CDPSP, XLVII, 1995,12, p. 22; Ilya Bulavinov, 
`Russian-Armenian Military Treaty: Russia Increases its Military Presence in the Transcaucasus', 
Kommersant-daily, 17 March 1995, p. 1, in CDPSP, XLVII, 1995,11, p. 22. 
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By early 1996, Russian leaders had managed, on the one hand, to give new emphasis to 
collective security through the adoption of a Collective Security Concept which envisaged 
the creation of regional coalition forces. On the other hand, they managed to provide 
substantial military assistance to the CIS states for the formation of their own armed 
forces, to partially restore the former Soviet air defence system, to patrol most of the 
external CIS borders with Russian troops, to preserve military bases in Georgia and 
Armenia, and to keep the peace in most of the -hot spots' of the former Soviet Union. In 
other words, it seemed as though Russia had been able to re-create a military sphere of 
influence within the CIS space. However, Russia's 'informal empire building' remained 
only partially successful. Many of the multilateral agreements remained un-implemented, 
especially those regarding the creation of regional forces under joint operational control. 
Moreover, strategically vital countries - Ukraine, Azerbaijan, the Baltic states, and 
Moldova - remained outside of Russia's reach. The Baltic states were not members of the 
CIS and had signed no military agreements with Russia, except for Latvia, which in 1994 
agreed to a four-year Russian lease of the Skrunda radar station. Ukraine and Moldova 
were not members of the Collective Security Treaty, refused to allow the presence of 
Russian troops patrolling their borders, and opposed Russia's military bases - the presence 
of the 14th Army and the Black Sea Fleet remained, at least in theory, temporary. 
Azerbaijan had signed the CST but remained adamant in its opposition to any Russian 
military presence in the country and refused to have Russian forces patrolling its external 
CIS borders. Of all these countries, only Ukraine agreed on the joint use of its air defence 
capabilities with Russia. The conclusion can therefore be drawn that Russia managed to 
restore only an imperfect military neo-empire in the CIS. 
VI. General Conclusion 
During the period under examination (January 1992 - July 1996), the CIS did not develop 
into a robust and performing organisation, similar to the European Union, NATO or the 
former Warsaw Treaty Organisation. Russian leaders did not succeed in establishing an 
effective inter-state association with co-ordinating bodies, a single economic space, a single 
currency, a single strategy for market reforms, a co-ordinated tax and customs policy, 
common citizenship, joint armed forces, easily crossed internal borders, and joint control 
over external frontiers. A vast amount of agreements - over 500 - were signed, but only 
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very few were ever implemented in a practical way. Countless efforts were made to provide 
the CIS with enforcement mechanisms which would ensure that agreements would be 
respected, but with little success. However, this does not mean that Russian leaders 
relinquished efforts aimed at deepening political, military and economic integration among 
the CIS states. In the military sphere, Russia managed to develop very tight co-operation 
with the CIS states, especially at bilateral level, it provided significant assistance to CIS 
states for the formation of their own armed forces, and succeeded in jointly patrolling most 
of the external CIS borders. Russia was also able to partially restore the old air defence 
system, and to impose the peace in most of the `hot-spots' of the former Soviet space with 
its own troops. In the economic sphere, Russia conducted major efforts aimed at 
developing trade among the CIS states and preserving a single currency during 1992-1993. 
Although the single market eventually disintegrated and the ruble zone collapsed in the 
Autumn of 1993, Russia managed to set up a customs union with a restricted group of CIS 
states in January 1995 (Belarus and Kazakhstan, later joined by Kyrgyzstan). Very 
ambitious integration projects were signed with Belarus, and the other partners of the 
customs union in the Spring of 1996, but diverse economic developments and reduced 
financial resources made their proper implementation almost impossible. Russia's 
dominant economic position as the main trading partner, however, allowed it to keep these 
states dependent on Russia. 
Although this record might suggest that Russia attempted and managed, to a certain extent, 
to restore a 'sphere of influence' or `informal empire' in the CIS, a close examination of 
the topic reveals a different picture. First, Russian leaders did not pursue a coherent and 
co-ordinated strategy of empire-building in the CIS, although their rhetoric might at times 
suggest such a policy. On the contrary, Russia's CIS policies varied throughout the period 
under examination, depending on domestic political developments and 
Russia's financial 
capabilities. Whereas in 1991-1992 disintegration tendencies predominated, 
by 1993 
efforts were again conducted by both Russia and some of the other 
CIS states to 
reintegrate. Second, Russia's policies were much more restrained than 
is frequently 
assumed, especially in the economic sphere, and often reflected 
Russia's legitimate concern 
of managing the transition towards the 
development of truly independent states within the 
post-Soviet space. Third, major co-operation and 
integration agreements were reached in 
the military sphere, particularly at 
bilateral level, which resulted in Russia partially 
restoring its military influence over the 
CIS states. However, Russia's successes were 
often offset by lack of implementation. 
Furthermore, Russia's policies were often limited 
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by the CIS states themselves, and by Russia's inability and unwillingness to impose its will 
and prevent the CIS states' diversification. Moreover, Russia did not want to pay the 
financial cost of military integration, and the Russian Defence Ministry feared 
supranational control. 
Fourth, Russia's successes in the sphere of economic integration were much less significant 
than in the military field. Although important agreements were signed (Economic Union, 
Customs Union, Free Trade Area, Quadrilateral Agreement, Community of Sovereign 
States) a single economic space never materialised, and intra-CIS trade never recovered, 
remaining far behind the pre-1991 figures. This is to be explained by the reluctance of 
Russia to provide the necessary financial investments required, by the reticence of CIS 
states to have their economic policies determined by Russia, and `last but not least' by the 
unwillingness of those responsible for economic policies in Russia to sacrifice macro- 
economic stabilisation and the benefits of economic reform for the sake of restoring an 
economic sphere of influence. As opposed to the Ministry of Defence, which saw the CIS 
as essential for the fulfilment of Russia's own security interests, the Prime Minister and the 
Russian Finance and Economics Ministries, in charge of economic policies, did not 
necessarily see Russia's economic success through CIS economic integration. They tended 
to give priority to economic reform in Russia first. Only after Russia succeeded in 
implementing economic reforms at home could deeper CIS integration proceed. The 
support provided for a ruble zone and for a single economic space during 1991-1992, was 
mainly determined by a decision to manage the transition to the creation of independently 
economic states. The CIS therefore did not become an area where Russia tried to re-create 
an informal economic empire, in spite of the fact that most CIS states remained dependent 
on trade from Russia. Russia itself increasingly diversified its trade relations outside the 
CIS, giving priority to trade with West, and focused its efforts in obtaining access to 
markets and resources in the CIS area. However it did not prevent the diversification of 
those states outside of Russia. 
The CIS also proved to be quite unsuccessful as a channel for Russia's influence in the 
political sphere. Many common political bodies were set up, but none was granted supra- 
national powers and therefore very little was achieved in terms of transforming the CIS into 
a robust political organisation where Russia would be able to play a dominant role. 
Moreover, doubts remained as to Russia's real desire to actually transform the CIS into a 
supra-national organisation. Russian 
leaders remained deeply concerned that supra- 
Missing pages are unavailable 
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bases, joint border-protection, or within the context of peacekeeping operations, and thus 
restore an informal empire in those countries; or whether, instead, Russia's operations 
resulted from a reaction to events on the ground, and followed primarily the objective of 
putting an end to violence. The weak and fragmented character of the Russian state and the 
fragility of the country's new political system, however, might have allowed for 
incoherence and confusion, and the absence of a clear pattern of behaviour, as far as 
involvement in the conflict-ridden areas is concerned. 497 The chapter will address this issue 
in order to determine whether there is enough evidence to sustain the neo-imperialist 
argument completely. 
The chapter will also examine Russia's involvement in the negotiating process, in order to 
determine whether Russia tried to reach a settlement which would suit its own interests at 
the expense of those of the belligerent parties, or whether instead Russia was mainly 
concerned with bringing the parties closer to a settlement. In other words, it will examine 
whether Russia tried to use the negotiations as a means of perpetuating its influence over 
the regions affected by war, or whether, instead, Russia was primarily interested in 
bringing about a peaceful settlement of the conflicts. This chapter will also ask whether 
Russia proved willing to integrate foreign actors into the negotiations and the peacekeeping 
activities; or whether, instead, Russia tried to displace regional or international actors from 
the negotiations, opposed the sending of non-CIS peacekeepers, and instead, pressed for the 
introduction of Russian-dominated peacekeeping forces. Opposition to the participation of 
international organisations and regional players in the negotiations and in peacekeeping 
497 Several authors have highlighted the inconsistent and ambivalent character of Russia's 
policies in the Abkhaz and Nagorno-Karabagh conflicts in particular, and in Transcaucasia in 
general, namely Pavel Baev, Edward Ozhiganov, Edmund Herzig, Alexei Zverev, Dmitri Danilov 
and Dmitri Trenin. (Pavel Baev, Russia's Policies in the Caucaus, p. 4; Eward Ozhiganov, `The 
Republic of Georgia: Conflict in Abkhazia and South Ossetia', in Managing Conflict in the 
Former Soviet Union, p. 390-392; Edmund Herzig, The New Caucasus: Armenia, Azerbaijan and 
Georgia, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1999, p. 106; Alexei Zverev, 
'Ethnic conflicts in the Caucasus. 1988-1994', Dmitri Trenin, `Russia's Security Interests and 
Policies in the Caucasus Region', and Dmitri Danilov, `Russia's search for an International 
Mandate in Transcaucasia', in Contested Borders in the Caucasus, ed. Bruno Coppieters, 
Brussels, 1996, pp. 51,98-101,141). Zverev stressed the confrontation between the Russian MOD 
and MFA in policy-making in Abkhazia, whereas Ozhiganov argued that the attitude of the 
Russian Federation toward the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict reflected the fluctuations of internal 
policy struggles and the complex mix of actors on the Russian political scene. Dmitri Danilov, in 
turn, argued that the inconsistencies of Russia's policies in Transcaucasia reflected a 
confrontation between two different political currents in Russia itself. One current favoured the 
restoration of Russia's influence over the near abroad by all possible means, including force, 
whereas the other argued in favour of a retreat 
from the region. Russia's policies in Transcaucasia 
fell between these two lines. 
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operations would strongly imply neo-imperialist behaviour, and is worth looking at as an 
important indicator. But it can be no more than an indication, however, since, readiness to 
involve foreign actors in the negotiations or peace operations does not necessarily indicate 
the absence of a neo-imperialist strategy. The presence of international mediation could 
actually provide a cover to Russia's own more assertive behaviour. Similarly, a willingness 
to accept international monitoring and approval of peacekeeping operations in the FSS 
does not necessarily reflect a non-imperialist policy. Although institutional backing and 
international monitoring of peacekeeping operations can certainly provide a constraint to 
imperialist behaviour, they might also grant additional legitimacy to a neo-imperialist 
presence, thus making it more effective. Russia's efforts to obtain an international mandate 
for its operations can be interpreted under this light. Likewise, the conduct of peacekeeping 
operations not in accordance with the standard principles of international law might attest 
to neo-imperialist behaviour, especially if such operations involve enforcement actions and 
a high level of force, and if there is a lack of impartiality and dubious consent from the 
warring parties. However, a more reliable indication in attempts to determine neo- 
imperialist behaviour is the question of intent. Where this can be clearly demonstrated, the 
hypothesis is strong. What is most important, in other words, is to determine whether the 
operations are seen as fulfilling a major strategic role and thus enhancing Russia's 
influence in the region, or whether they are mainly intended as an instrument for preventing 
a resumption of violence. 
I. Russia's Policy Orientations Towards Conflicts in the Former Soviet Space 
During the winter of 1991-1992, the Russian Foreign Ministry (MFA) devoted very little 
attention to the violent ethnic conflicts that erupted in the republics of the former Soviet 
Union, except for the short and unsuccessful mediation efforts conducted by Foreign 
Minister Kozyrev to solve the dispute over Nagorno-Karabagh in mid-February 1992. 
Russian foreign policy priorities were focused on developing relations with Western 
countries and transforming the previous confrontation into real partnership. Although at 
this early stage, relations with the FSS were certainly not neglected, as is often asserted, 
most of Russia's foreign policy activity towards the FSS was centred on preserving a 
common economic and military space, and dividing the former Soviet assets. But as 
conflicts in the near abroad escalated and violence intensified in the spring of 1992, 
especially in South Ossetia, Moldova and 
Nagorno-Karabagh, the Russian Foreign 
151 
Ministry turned its attention to the affected regions, and offered its mediation services. 
Endowed with a strong `anti-imperialist' view, the Foreign Ministry favoured the resolution 
of these conflicts through peaceful negotiations, and vehemently opposed the use of force to 
restore peace. Russian officials in the Foreign Ministry, as well as high-ranking CIS 
military officers, including CIS Commander-in-Chief Marshal Evgeny Shaposhnikov, 
sought to disengage CIS troops from the zones of tension . 
498 `The resolution of these 
conflicts is complex, slow and should not be carried out by forceful means, as some in 
Russia would like, ' Kozyrev remarked in an interview with Nezavisimava gazeta, on 1 
April 1992,499 and categorically ruled out the change of international borders by force. `If 
Russia admits this right to itself, then other countries will insist on doing likewise, ' he 
noted. 50° However, many Russian nationalists such as Vice-President Aleksandr Rutskoi 
and Supreme Soviet Chairman Ruslan Khasbulatov believed instead that Russia had the 
duty to defend the rights of the Russian-speaking population living abroad, if necessary by 
force, especially when Russians found themselves entangled in ethnic conflicts. But 
Kozyrev insisted that force had to be used only in accordance with international law, in 
other words, within the framework of UN peacekeeping operations, and with the support of 
the UN Security Council. 50' Kozyrev's views reflected those of President Yeltsin, who in 
an interview with Komsomol 'skava pravda, on 27 May 1992, strictly ruled out the `violent 
use of troops' to protect ethnic Russians and to solve ethnic conflicts. He made it clear that 
Russia should avoid interfering in the internal affairs of another state. 502 
These views were not shared by the Russian Defence Ministry. As conflicts escalated in the 
FSS in the Spring of 1992, and local Russian armed forces found themselves involved in 
the conflict, often against their own will, the Russian Defence Ministry increasingly 
supported the intervention of Russian forces to bring violence to an end. The Russian 
military did not intend to perpetuate its presence in the former Soviet space for ever, 
Grachev argued. However, Russia could not just stand idly by while fighting erupted along 
its borders. so3 Russia's participation, according to Grachev, followed the legitimate state 
498 Radio Moscow, 25 February 1992, in FBIS-SOU 92-038,26 February 1992, p. 17. 
499 Andrei Kozyrev, `Soiuz ostavil Rossii plokhoe vneshnepoliticheskoe nasledstvo', 
Nezavisimaya gazeta, 1 April 1992, p-3- 
500 ibid. 
501 ibid. Similar views expressed by Kozyrev in an intereview with Izvestiya, `Andrei Kozyrev: 
"Partiya voiny nastupaet -iv Moldove, iv Gruzii, iv Rossii" ', Izvestiya, 30 June 1992, p. 2. 
502 Interview with Yeltsin: `Ya ne skryvaiu trudnostei i khochu, chtoby narod eto ponimal', 
Komsomol 'skaya pravda, 27 May 1992, p. 2. 
503 Nikolai Burbyga and Albert Plutnik, `Pavel Grachev: Rossiiskuiu armiiu, po suti, nado 
sozdavat' s nulya', Izvestiya, 1 June 1992, p. 1. 
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interest of countering instability along Russia's southern borders. Grachev's views 
coincided with those of the former Soviet General Staff, as reflected in the draft Military 
Doctrine published in May 1992. The Doctrine identified territorial, religious and ethnic 
disputes as the new threats to Russia's security and called for active military intervention if 
Russian mediation efforts failed. 504 The document expressed the fear that 'disputes might 
give rise to armed conflicts and wars directly touching upon Russia's security interests. '505 
However, the Doctrine made no reference to the need to act in accordance with 
international law and on the basis of a UN or CIS mandate. Moreover, CIS Commander in 
Chief Shaposhnikov and Russian first deputy chief of the General Staff, Mikhail 
Kolesnikov openly expressed their opposition to the involvement of foreign, in particular 
NATO troops, even under UN mandate, as peacekeepers in the CIS, thus attesting to a 
clear neo-imperialist posture. Kolesnikov was particularly concerned that NATO might 
intervene in the former Soviet space, 'under the pretext of guaranteeing `international 
control' over the nuclear potential of the former USSR. '506 Shaposhnikov rejected the 
introduction of UN peacekeeping forces in the CIS on the grounds that the CIS was an area 
where disputes were resolved 'internally'. `I am categorically opposed. I think the CIS is 
quite capable of dealing with all issues that arise within the CIS. Are we to allow foreign 
peacemakers make peace between us? ' Shaposhnikov replied to a journalist when asked 
whether the UN would be requested to participate in settling the Transdniester and 
Karabagh conflicts. 507 These views very much reflected the overall position of the military 
which tended to regard the CIS as an area of exclusive Russian military influence, and as 
essential for Russia's security. 508 It can therefore be concluded that although the CIS and 
Russian military were acting according to what they considered were Russia's legitimate 
state interests, they also adopted a neo-imperialist attitude. 
The Defence Ministry's active involvement in stopping the violence, as well as the 
controversial participation of local officers in support for secessionist movements, brought 
the military into direct confrontation with the Foreign Ministry. Kozyrev talked openly 
about the existence of a `party of war', eager to support secessionist movements and ready 
504 I%oennava Nlysl ', Special Edition, May 1992. 
505 ibid. 
506 Pavel Felgengauer, `Voennye ozhidaiut vmeshatel'stva zapada', Nezavisimaya gazeta, 1 
August, 1992, p. 1. 
507 `Russia' TV Channel, 11 July 1992, in BBC SWB SU/1431 C4/1,13 July 1993. Although 
Shaposhnikov was speaking in a CIS capacity, his views coincided with those of the Russian 
general staff. 
508 See Chapter 2. 
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to use force to solve ethnic conflicts, before diplomatic channels were exhausted. However, 
Kozvrev's diplomatic efforts failed to settle the conflicts peacefully. As conflicts in South 
Ossetia and Transdniestria turned into bloody fighting in the Summer of 1992, provoking 
victims also among the local ethnic Russian population, the Foreign Ministry's diplomatic 
approach became the subject of strong criticism from both nationalists and previous allies 
in the democratic camp. 509 In August 1992, the Council for Defence and Foreign Policy, in 
its document A Strategy for Russia, identified inter-ethnic conflicts in the periphery of the 
Russian Federation as a major threat to Russia's security, and called for an active policy, 
which should envisage the use of force, to bring violence to an end. The document 
expressed concern over the potential escalation of 'low-intensity conflicts', leading to 
locals wars involving Russia. Russia should not exclude the use of forces in order to stop 
the violence, even if such actions were not sanctioned by the international community, the 
authors argued. Russia carried a special responsibility for handling developments in the 
former Soviet space, and this justified its intervention. 510 Similar views were expressed by 
Political Scientist Andranik Migranyan and Supreme Soviet member Evgenii 
Ambartsumov, who insisted that Russia should strive to achieve recognition from the world 
community for its role as the political and military guarantor of stability in the former 
Soviet space. l '' 
In view of these attacks and confronted with a growing escalation of violence beyond 
Russia's borders, the Foreign Ministry and the Russian President himself began conducting 
more assertive mediation efforts which, together with the increased military involvement of 
the Russian military, eventually resulted in a cessation of violence and the introduction of 
Russian peacekeepers in Transdniestria and South Ossetia. The Foreign Ministry's 
growing support for a pro-active policy was reflected in Kozyrev's Draft Foreign Policy 
Guidelines, presented to the Russian parliament in December 1992.512 The document 
envisaged the `carefully considered application of economic and military force' to protect 
the lives of Russians threatened by ethnic conflicts in the near abroad. However, according 
to the Foreign Minister, these practices had to be carried out `not in the Yugoslav version, 
509 Sergei Stankevich, `Yavienie derzhavy', Rossiiskaya gazeta, 23 June 1992, p. 1. 
510 'Strategiya dlya Rossii: Tezisy Soveta po Vneshnei i Oboronnoi Politike', (hereafter, 
`Strategiya dlya Rossii'), Nezavisimaya gazeta, 19 August 1992, p. 4. For more details on the 
document see Chapter 1. 
s1' Andranik Migranyan, `Podlinnye i mnimiye orientiry vo vneshnei politike', Rossiiskaya 
gazeta, 4 August 1992 p. 4, Evgenii Ambartsumov, `Sami sebya sagnali v ugol, samim iz nego i 
vykhodit', Rossiiskaya gazeta, 13 April 1992, p. 7. 
512 For details of the document see Chapter 1. 
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but within the framework of international law. 'S13 The CIS was regarded as the only 
institution capable of settling and preventing conflicts in the CIS space. However, the 
Foreign Ministry showed a readiness to involve the UN and the CSCE in mediation 
activities in the FSS, the former being actively involved in Abkhazia and the latter in 
Nagorno-Karabagh, attesting in this case to the absence of a clearly designed neo- 
imperialist policy. 
In late February 1993, a major turning point in Russian foreign policy occurred when, 
speaking at the Civic Union Forum, President Yeltsin made clear Russia's special 
responsibility in putting an end to violence in the former Soviet space, and demanded that 
the UN grant Russia special powers to become the guarantor of peace and stability in the 
regions of the former USSR. 514 Although such assertive language was primarily motivated 
by Yeltsin's desire to win the support of centrist deputies in the forthcoming VIII Congress 
of People's Deputies, it indicated a change of policy within the Russian leadership. In the 
Spring of 1993, the Russian military became directly involved in Abkhazia, Russia 
developed close military ties with the Rakhmonov regime in Tajikistan, and in the Summer 
of 1993, the MFA conducted active diplomatic efforts to bring about a settlement in 
Nagorno-Karabagh, by appointing Vladimir Kazimirov as special envoy to the region. 
Moreover, Russia also tried to create an effective peacekeeping force within the CIS and to 
obtain UN and CSCE mandate for its operations. "' The Basic Provisions of the Russian 
Federation 's Foreign Policy Concept, which was approved in April 1993, and which 
identified armed conflicts in states adjacent to the Russian Federation as a major threat to 
Russia's security, attached particular importance to the development and improvement of a 
peacekeeping mechanism within the CIS framework. 516 The Russian Foreign Ministry also 
engaged in active diplomatic efforts aimed at obtaining UN and CSCE mandates for 
Russian peacekeeping operations in the CIS. In March 1993, the Russian government 
presented a document to the UN which discussed Moscow's role in peacekeeping 
operations in the former Soviet Union, as well as a draft declaration which claimed that the 
UN should use regional organisations such as the CIS to manage peacekeeping operations. 
513 `Vneshnyaya politika Rossii: MID predlagaet i otstaivaet', Rossiiskie vesti, 3 December 1992, 
p. 2. 
514 Russian Television, 28 February, 1993, in FBIS-SOV-93-038,1 March 1993, p. 21. 
515 In mid March 1993, in an appeal to CIS leaders, Yeltsin expressed the need to create effective 
instruments, within the CIS framework, capable of eliminating existing and potential `hot spots' 
in the CIS. ('El'tsin obratilsya k lideram SNG', Nezavisimayagazeta, 18 March 1993, p. 1). 
516 Vladislav Chernov, `Natsional'nye interesy Rossii i ugrozy dlya ee bezopasnosti', 
Nezavisimaya gazeta, 29 April 1993, p. 1,3. 
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Russia also tried to have the CIS recognised internationally as the authoritative 
organisation responsible for carrying out peacekeeping operations on CIS territory. 517 
Furthermore, in the summer of 1993, Kozyrev asked the CSCE to grant Russian forces 
CSCE status. 5" However, Russian diplomats failed both to obtain either a UN or CSCE 
mandate for Russia's peacekeeping operations in the CIS, and to have the CIS recognised 
as the sole organisation responsible for CIS peacekeeping. In view of these results, the 
Russian Foreign and Defence Ministries began focusing primarily on obtaining UN 
financial support for Russia's peacekeeping operations, and tried to downplay the 
importance of an international mandate. They insisted that they regarded the UN or CSCE 
mandate as adding to the efficiency of Russian operations rather than to their legitimacy. 519 
Russian diplomats insisted that Russia did not need international legitimacy because its 
peacekeeping operations were being conducted both at the request of the parties and with a 
CIS mandate, on the basis of Chapter VIII of the UNI Charter which proclaimed the 
legitimacy of the regional organisations to maintain peace and stability in their areas. 520 
However, only the Tajik and Abkhaz operations had a CIS mandate. 
The Summer of 1993 saw a substantial escalation of military violence in former Soviet 
space. This led to the increased involvement of Russian peacekeeping forces in Tajikistan 
and the intensification of mediation efforts in Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabagh. By the 
Autumn of 1993 keeping the peace in the hot-spots of the former Soviet Union had become 
the first priority of Russia's foreign policy. In his speech to the UN General Assembly, 
Kozyrev expressed concern over the eruption of bloody conflicts in the former Soviet 
Union and. stated clearly Russia's particular responsibility for maintaining peace in the 
area. 521 Conducting peacekeeping operations in the near abroad not only became the 
necessary response to solve conflicts in the near abroad, it also developed into the exclusive 
s" Lena Jonson, `In Search of a Doctrine: Russian Interventionism in Conflicts in Its "Near 
Abroad" ', Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement, 5, Winter 1996,3, p. 448; Suzanne 
Crow, 'Russia Seeks Leadership in Regional Peacekeeping', RFE/Research Report, 9 April 1993, 
15, p. 29. 
518 Roy Allison, The Military Background and Context to Russian Peacekeeping', in 
Peacekeeping and the Role of Russia in Eurasia, eds. Lena Jonson and Clive Archer, Boulder, 
Co. and Oxford, 1996, p. 10. 
519 `Joint Statement by the Russian Foreign Ministry and Defence Ministry: Actions not 
Declarations are What is Needed', Rossiiskie vesti, 5 April 1994, p. 3, in FBIS-SOV-94-065,5 
April 1994, p. 1. 
520 Therese Raphael, Claudia Rosett, and Suzanne Crow, `An Interview with Russian Foreign 
Minister Andrei Kozyrev', RFE/RL Research Report, 15 July 1994, p. 40; Vladimir Abarinov, 
`Sergei Lavrov: "My budem dobivat'sya mezhdunarodnoi podderzhki nashikh mirotvorcheskikh 
operatsii" ', Segodnya, 16 September 
1993, p. 1. 
521 ITAR-TASS News agency, 28 September 1993, in BBC SWB SU/1807 B/3,1993. 
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prerogative of the Russian state. Writing in Nezavisimnya gazeta on 22 September 1993, 
Kozyrev mentioned Russia's historical duty to provide stability to the areas of the former 
Soviet Union. 'This is not a `neo-imperialistic' space, he wrote, but a unique geopolitical 
one in which no one is going to keep the peace for Russia, ' and added that 'owing to the 
close historical, political and cultural ties that bound the CIS countries together, Russia 
could not, nor did it have the moral right, to remain indifferent to their requests for help in 
ensuring peace. '' In a subsequent article in Nezcrvisimaya gazetcr, on 13 October 1993, 
Kozyrev again expressed Russia's special responsibility for preserving the peace in the 
FSS, and noted that peacekeeping operations were aimed not only at stopping the violence 
but also at keeping Russia's influence in those areas, and at making sure that the vacuum 
created by the wars was not filled by `hostile' powers. '523 Kozyrev recognised the 
important role played by the UN and the CSCE in resolution of these conflicts, but 
emphasised the leading role of Russia. it would be a mistake to ignore the role of the UN 
and the CSCE [in this sphere], but the other extreme would be to totally hand in this sphere 
into the hands of these organisations. This is an area of Russian interests. Moreover, the 
UN and the CSCE do not have today, either the strength, or the means to carry out these 
X 524 operations. 
Russia's efforts to lead the peacekeeping operations were primarily intended to avoid 
Western, Turkish, or Iranian military intervention in the FSS, under the guise of 
peacekeeping. 525 Russian peacekeeping operations, particularly in the Transcaucasus 
region, were increasingly conceived by Russian leaders, particularly by the Russian 
Defence Ministry, as fulfilling military-strategic aims and allowing for the preservation of 
a sphere of influence over the FSS. However, Russian peacekeeping efforts also reflected a 
genuine desire by the Russian government to bring peace to the unstable areas, and thus to 
protect Russia's own security interests, as well as an awareness that Russia alone was 
willing and capable of conducting such operations. As noted by President Yeltsin in his 
52 Andrei Kozyrev, `Rossiya fakticheski v odnochku neset bremya real'nogo mirotvorchestva v 
konfliktakh po perimetru svoikh granits', Nezavisimaya gazeta, 22 September 1993, p. 1. 
523 Andrei Kozyrev, `Demokratiya i mirotvorchestvo - dve storony odnoi medali', Nezavisimaya 
gazeta, 13 October 1993, p. 1; Similar views were expressed by Andrei Kozyrev in an interview 
with Izvestiya: Maksim Yusin, `Polgoda nazad Rutskoi skazal mne: "ya ikh nenavizhu, etikh 
krasno-korichnevykh', Izvestiya, 8 October 1993, p. 3. 
524 Igor Rotar, `Voennye dolzhny obladet' iskusstvom mirotvorchestva', Nezavisimaya gazeta, 24 
November 1993, p. 1-2. 
525 Pavel Felgengauer, `Voennye ozhidaiut vmeshatel'stva zapada', Nezavisimaya gazeta, 1 
August, 1992, p. l; `Speech by Shaposhnikov', Russia's Radio, 11 December 1992, in BBC SWB, 
SU/1563 C2/3,14 December 1992. 
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speech to the Federation Council in February 1994, conflicts in the near abroad 'are a real 
threat to Russia's security, and no one, except Russia, is ready to carry the burden of 
peacemaking in the territory of the Former Soviet Union. '526 These views reflected the 
position of the Ministry of Defence (MOD), which had regularly advocated an active role 
in solving inter-ethnic conflicts. The Basic Provisions of the Military Doctrine, which 
were published in November 1993, identified local wars and armed conflicts in the direct 
proximity of the Russian borders as one of the main threats posed to Russian Federation. 
The doctrine foresaw the intervention of Russian armed forces to stop the hostilities at the 
earliest possible stage, in order to create the conditions for a peaceful settlement of the 
conflict, which would suit the interests of the Russian Federation. ' 527 However, reduced 
financial resources and the impact of the unsuccessful Chechen campaign, undermined the 
528 of ongoing operations during 1994-1996. '`8 
Russia's active mediation efforts coupled with its assertive peacekeeping operations 
resulted in the introduction of extremely fragile, but nevertheless enduring, cease-fires in all 
ethnic conflicts in the FSS, except for Tajikistan. Russia's involvement, although initially 
most probably not intended to create a neo-empire over the FSS, eventually resulted in 
Russia partially restoring a sphere of influence over those FSS affected by war. The 
ambiguous character of Russian peacekeeping operations resulted from the modalities of 
such operations, and their dissimilarity with both traditional and 'second generation' UN 
peacekeeping operations, such as the United Nations Protection Force in Yugoslavia 
(UNPROFOR) and the second United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II). 529 The 
initial Foreign Ministry concept of peacekeeping, and the first CIS peacekeeping 
526 =Strategicheskaya tsel' - sozdat' protsvetaiushchiu stranu', Rossiisikaya gazeta, 25 February 
1994, p. 5 
521 `Osnovnye polozheniya voennoi doktriny Rossiiskoi Federatsii', Izvestiya, 18 November 1993, 
p. 3. 
'zs Pavel Baev, The Russian Army in a Time of Troubles, PRIO, London, 1996, p. 109. 
529 Although UNOSOM II was entrused with enforcement powers under Chapter VII to ensure 
that the process of disarmament was 'continuous and irreversible' - the mandate permitted 
'forceful action' to protect UN facilities, disarm organised factions, sieze small arms and assume 
control of all heavy weapons - its operations were carefully monitored by the UN. Similarly, 
although UNPROFOR was entrusted in February 1992 with the use of force, in order to `create 
the conditions of peace and security required for the negotiation of an overall settlement of the 
Yugoslav crisis', and its mandate was further expanded to include such aspects as delivering 
humanitarian assistance and protecting Sarajevo airport, its actions were still not as assertive as 
envisaged by the mandate, at least not until 1995, when the rapid reaction force was introduced as 
part of UNPROFOR. (Spyros Economides and Paul Taylor, `Former Yugoslavia', loan Lewis and 
James Mayall, `Somalia', in The New Interventionism 1991-1994, ed. James Mayall, Cambridge, 
1996, pp. 66-78 and 106-116 ; Mats R. Berdal, Whither UN Peacekeeping?, Adelphi Paper, no. 
281,1993, pp. 21-39. ) 
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documents adopted in March and July 1992, presented peacekeeping operations in terms 
very similar to international practice. Forces were to be established for a limited period of 
time upon request of the belligerent parties. Peacekeepers were to be deployed only after a 
cease-fire agreement was reached and they were not permitted to participate in combat 
operations. Force could only be used for self-defence, and peacekeepers were required to 
stay impartial and neutral. However, events on the ground, particularly in Tajikistan, led to 
a much more assertive behaviour, which was reflected in a much broader mandate granted 
to peacekeepers. The Agreement on Collective Peacekeeping forces of 24 September 
1993, which was designed for the Tajik operation, although no reference to a particular 
conflict was made in the document, envisaged that the peacekeeping forces commander 
would implement the CIS heads of states' decisions on the use of force, conduct 
negotiations with the belligerent parties and independently take decisions on the conduct of 
extraordinary situations. The possible use of force, without prior authorisation was implied 
in an extraordinary situation. In other words, the mandate and the rules of engagement 
were significantly broad. 
The 1996 CIS documents, however, indicated again a certain restraint in the operations. 
They did not imply a return to traditional UN peacekeeping, but instead very much 
resembled 'second generation' UN peacekeeping. Peacekeeping operations were referred to 
as `operatsii po podderzhaniiu mira', and were expected to take place after a cease-fire was 
reached. It was clearly noted that operations would cover a limited time period and would 
be neutral and unbiased. Forces would not take part in the hostilities but would use above 
all peaceful means to assist in the creation of conditions for the holding of negotiations. 
Enforced action required UN approval. However, military means to settle disputes were 
envisaged and the use of force was also considered, primarily within the sphere of self- 
defence. Nevertheless, the documents contained many ambiguities, and did not really reflect 
the conduct of operations on the ground, especially if the Tajik case is considered. 
Consequently, Russia's more assertive peacekeeping operations, usually referred to as 
'mirotvorchekie operatsii' (peace-creation) instead of `operatsii po podderzhaniiu mira' 
(operations in support of peace), often resembled low-intensity conflicts, rather than 
traditional peacekeeping operations. 
53o Russian `peacekeepers' were ready forcefully to 
530 `Kontseptsiya predotvrashcheniya i uregulirovaniya konfliktov na territorii gosudarsty- 
uchastnikov SNG', (hereafter, `Kontseptsiya') and `Polozhenie o Kollektivnykh silakh po 
podderzhaniiu mira v SNG' (hereafter `Polozhenie'), Diplomaticheskii vestnik, February 1996, 
2, pp. 38-42 and 47-52; `Soglashenie o Gruppakh voennykh nabliudatelei i Kollektivnykh silakh 
po podderzhaniiu mica v SNG', 20 March 1992, 
in Sodruzhestvo, Informatsionnyi Vestnik Soveta 
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intervene in a conflict and separate the opposing sides before a cease-fire had come into 
effect. Consequently, peacekeeping operations were characterised by the potential use of a 
high level of forces, the pre-eminence of Russian forces within multinational operations, 
the lack of impartiality, and the absence of any constraints besides the means available and 
the resolve of the command in Moscow. 531 
The almost total absence of political control over the operations resulted in military goals - 
putting an end to violence - taking precedence over political aims - reaching a negotiated 
settlement. Peace-keeping operations often froze the situation in the ground, allowing 
secessionist regions to almost totally fulfil their goals. As a result, operations lost 
impartiality, given that they could easily lead to a `legalised' form of intervention or 
occupation, especially given the dubious consent of the parties to the introduction of 
peacekeepers. '', Most peacekeeping operations, Abkhazia probably being the only 
exception, were conducted in the absence of a clearly specified mandate from the 
international community, thus raising the issue of their legitimacy. The CIS, therefore, was 
seen as instrumental in legalising at least some of Russia's interventions, in Abkhazia and 
in Tajikistan. Yeltsin's Strategic Course of Russia towards the CIS, approved in 
September 1995, made it clear that efforts had to be directed towards ensuring that 
peacekeeping activity became the fruit of collective efforts by CIS member states. 533 The 
January 1996 CIS peacekeeping documents Concept on the Prevention and Settlement of 
Conflicts in the Territory of the CIS Member States and the Status of the CIS Collective 
Peacekeeping Forces were aimed at developing a legitimate basis for CIS peacekeeping, 
and at the same time, keep as much power as possible in the CIS. The documents gave the 
CIS responsibility and authority for maintaining peace on the CIS territory by referring to 
Chapter VIII of the UN Charter on regional organisations. 534 `Peace enforcement 
operations' - those with no consent by the parties - however were left to the domain of the 
Glav Gosudarstv i Soveta Glav Pravitelsty SNG (hereafter Sodruzhetsvo), 1992,4, pp. 9-10; 
' Soglashenie o Kollektivnykh mirotvorcheskikh silakh i sovmestnykh merakh po ikh materialno- 
tekhnicheskomu obespecheniiu', 24 September 1993, Sodruzhestvo, 1993,7, pp. 54-58. 
531 A. Raevsky and I. N. Vorobev, Russian Approaches to Peacekeeping Operations, UNIDIR 
Research Paper, 28, United Nations, New York and Geneva, 1994, p. 6; Andrei Kozyrev, 'OON: 
tregovi i nadezhdy mira', Rossiiskaya gazeta', 30 October 1993, p. 1. 
532 Pavel Baev, The Russian Army in a Time of Troubles, p. 135. 
533 Strategicheskii Kurs Rossii s Gosudarstvami - Uchastnikami Sodruzhestva Nezavisimykh 
Gosudarstv, (hereafter, Strategicheskii Kurs), 14 September 1995, p. 3. 
534 'Kontsepsiya', p. 39; `Polozhenie' pp. 40-41. 
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UN Security Council. 535 Despite Russia's efforts to give peacekeeping operations a CIS 
mandate, their legitimacy and neutrality remained under question. 
II. Moldova and the Transdniester Separatists 
The Transdniester struggle for independence from Moldova, which developed into violent 
clashes in the Spring of 1992, represented a serious challenge to the Russian authorities. 536 
For the first time after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russian and Russian-speaking 
minorities became the main parties to a conflict which resulted in major losses of lives and 
which entailed an alleged violation of Russian civic and cultural rights. Russian politicians 
and analysts tended to interpret the conflict as a struggle of the Russian-speaking minority 
in Transdniester against the ' Romanising' policies of the Moldovan authorities in Kishinev, 
on the basis of claims made by Transdniester leaders. Russian Presidential Advisor Sergei 
Stankevich talked about Russian minorities being the victims of Moldova's ethnocratic 
regime, and Political Scientist Andranik Migranyan referred to the ethnocultural origins of 
the crisis as reflected in Kishinev's attempts to incorporate the Slavic populations of 
Transdniester into Romania. 53' However, as Charles King clearly demonstrated, the 
conflict was less the result of legitimate ethnic grievances and more the product of a long- 
term contest between two different political elites, one represented by a new generation of 
non-Transdniestrian cadres replacing another, the Transdniester nomenklatura, in the 
538 republic's transition from Soviet republic to independent state. 
535 ibid. 
536 The most relevant literature on the Transdniester conflict falls into several categories: Anneli 
Ute Gabanyi supported the neo-imperialist argument by claiming that some Russian nationalist 
officers with experience in Aghanistan, in alliance with the Military-Industrial Complex and 
Communist Party members in Parliament, tried to restore the old Soviet system by exacerbating 
the Transdniester conflict. (Anneli Ute Gabanyi, `Moldova between Russia, Romania and 
Ukraine', Aussenpolitik, 44,1993,1, pp. 98-107. ) Charles King, instead took a more moderate 
view, and argued that Russia asserted its role in Moldova for reasons of security and stability. 
(Charles King, `Eurasia Letter: Moldova with a Russian Face', Foreign Policy, Winter 1994- 
1995,97, pp. 116) Edward Ozhiganov, almost totally dismissed the neo-imperialist argument, and 
asserted that Russia's involvement was determined by the concern that Russia would lose control 
of the 14th Army and its huge stores of military supplies. (Edward Ozhiganov, `The Republic of 
Moldova: Transdniester and the 14th Army', p. 148. ) 
537 Sergei Stankevich, `Yavlenie derzhavy', p. 1; Andranik Migranyan, `Rossiya i blizhnee 
zarubezh'e', Nezavisimaya gazeta, 18 January 1994, p. 5. 
538 Charles King, Post-Soviet Moldova: A Borderland in Transition, Post Soviet Business Forum, 
1995, pp. 21-22; Vladimir Socor, `Creeping Putsch in Eastern Moldova', RFE/RL Research 
Report, 17 January 1992, pp. 8-9. This view is not shared by Russian analyst A. Miklus, who 
argued that the Transdniester struggle was `a confrontation between two national ideas, two 
economic and political orientations, which are diametrically opposed both ideologically and 
geographically, one is Romanian oriented, the other is Russian oriented. ' (A. Milkus, `Bereg levy. 
A kto zhe pravy? ', Komsomol'skaya pravda, 13 September 1991, p. 1). 
161 
I. Origins of the Conflict 
Before the collapse of the Soviet Union, the left bank of the Dniester was inhabited by a 
mixed population. Moldovans accounted for roughly 40 percent of the population, while 
Ukrainians represented 28 percent and Russians around 25.5 percent. 539 The vast majority 
of Moldova's ethnic Russians and Ukrainians actually lived outside this thin strip of land 
located between the left bank of the Dniester and the Ukrainian state, and displayed little 
affinity for the aims of the Trans-dniestria leadership, making it more difficult for the 
Transdniestrians to argue that they formed an ethnic enclave representing exclusively 
Russian and Russian-speaking interests. 540 However, the left bank of the Dniester had 
never formed part of an independent Moldovan state or of Moldova in any sense before its 
incorporation into the Moldavian SSR in 1944. During 1918-1940, when Bessarabia, as 
Moldova «-as called at the time, became reunited with Romania, the left bank of the 
Dniester river stayed under Soviet control and became part of the Ukrainian SSR, as the 
Moldavian ASSR. When Moldova was reincorporated into the Soviet Union, the 
Moldavian ASSR joined the Moldavian lands and formed the Moldavian SSR. 54' 
During the Soviet era, the left bank hosted important military-related industries which 
produced a strong Russian political and administrative apparatus. The latter became the 
dominant force in the Moldavian Communist Party, as well as an anti-reform stronghold 
within the Soviet Communist Party until the Communists' demise with the August 1991 
putsch. The Transdniester leadership worked closely with hard-line party and military 
circles in Moscow, the Soiuz group of Peoples' Deputies and the command of the Odessa 
Military District. 54' Transdniester separatism was used by hard-line leaders in Moscow as 
a bargaining chip to force Moldova into signing the Union treaty. 54' During the years of 
539 Vladimir Socor, `Creeping Putsch in Eastern Moldova', p. 8. 
540 Charles King, Post-Soviet Moldova: A Borderland in Transition, p. 22. 
541 Bohdan Nahaylo, `Ukraine and Moldova: The View from Kiev', RFE/RL Research Report, 1 
May 1992,18, p. 40. 
542 Vladimir Durnov, `V Rossii skladyvaetsya nevernoe predstavlenie o sobytiyakh v Moldove', 
Izvestiya, 12 June 1992 p. 5. See also Jonathan Aves, `The Evolution of Independent Political 
Movements after 1988', in Geoffrey Hosking, Jonathan Aves and Peter J. S. Duncan, The Road to 
Post-Communism, Independent Political Movements in the Soviet Union 1985-1991, London and 
New York, 1992, pp. 45-46. 
543 Moldovan Minister of the Interior, Ion Costas, Rompres, 10 September 1991, in FBIS-SOV- 
91-176,11 September 1991, p. 74. V. Zagryadskii, deputy chairman of the Dniester Supreme 
Soviet was quoted as saying, `The centre has taken virtually no interest in us, it only needed us 
for political games. By exploiting us, it put pressure on Moldova, saying `You will have problems 
162 
perestroika, when Moldovan nationalist sentiments flourished among the population, the 
local Russian apparatus succeeded in holding on to power in the Transdniester region. 
Faced with the possibility of losing control in favour of the new authorities in Kishinev, 
Transdniester deputies proclaimed a `Dniester Soviet Socialist Republic' in September 
1990. But the August 1991 coup dealt a severe blow to Transdniester leaders, as they lost 
their allies in Moscow's ruling circles. When Moldova declared its independence from the 
Soviet Union on 27 August 1991, Transdniester leaders immediately declared the creation 
of the `Dniester Moldovan Republic', and expressed their desire to join the USSR. 
Violence erupted in September 1991 when Moldovan authorities arrested various 
Transdniester deputies, including Transdniester President Igor Smirnov, because of their 
open support for the August 1991 coup. Although tension was defused thanks to the 
mediation of a group of Russian Supreme Soviet deputies, conflict resumed in early March 
1992 when the Transdniester militia supported by a group of voluntary Russian Cossacks 
opened fire on a police station near the town of Dubossary on the left bank, and blocked 
the bridges and roads leading to Dubossary with heavy equipment. "" These events turned 
out to be the beginning of a three months fierce struggle between the Dniester separatists 
and the Moldovan forces along the Dniester river. Hostilities reached a high peak during 
20-28 June 1992, when Moldovan forces occupied the right-bank city of Bendery, 
prompting the intervention of the Russian 14th Army in support of the Transdniester 
militia. 
2. Russia's Involvement 
a. Motivations 
Why did Russia become actively involved in the Transdniester conflict and what were 
Russia's interests in the region? The Russian authorities were particularly concerned about 
the negative impact that the various violent conflicts erupting along the perimeter of the 
Russian Federation, such as South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Transdniestria, might have on 
Russia itself. Centrifugal tendencies in the former Soviet states were perceived as seriously 
with all these republics unless you sign the Union treaty. ' (A. Milkus, `Bereg levy. A kto zhe 
pravy? ', p. I). 
544 TASS, 30 September 1991, in FBIS-SOV-91-190,1 October 1991, p. 63; N. Mulyar, 
`Podpisano soglashenie', Krasnaya zvezda, 3 October 1991, p. 3; Eduard Kondratov, `Dubossary: 
politsiya srazhaetsya s militsiei', Izvestiya, 2 March 1992 p. 1. 
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threatening Russia's own territorial integrity, particularly in the Caucasus. 545 Moreover, 
the development of permanent areas of instability along Russia's borders represented a 
menace to Russia's own security, in terms of the massive flow of refugees, the transit of 
illegal trade, and the smuggling of weapons and narcotics, given that inter-state border 
posts among the former Soviet states had not then been set up. 5`6Transit throughout the 
former Soviet space remained devoid of control. Furthermore, it became increasingly clear 
that the international community, burdened by a multitude of problems in Yugoslavia, 
Africa and other parts of the globe, had no burning desire to take an active part in resolving 
conflicts in the former Soviet Union, as shown by its limited involvement. Russia was the 
only state capable of solving these conflicts and providing stability to the various affected 
areas. However, during 1993 and 1994 elements within the Russian Ministry of Defence 
began pursuing broader geopolitical aims in the Transdniester region. Russia's military 
presence, secured either by the preservation of the Russian 14th Army or a Russian- 
dominated peacekeeping force, was seen as providing Russia with an advanced base in the 
strategically important area of the Balkans and the Mediterranean . 
14' Russia's willingness 
to keep a military presence in the area was best shown by Russia's reluctance to withdraw 
the 14th Army from Moldova and Grachev's proposal in November 1995 that the Army be 
given a peacekeeping status. 548 
Russian leaders also felt compelled to intervene because of the involvement of an ethnic 
Russian minority in the conflict. In spite of the ambiguous `ethnic' character of the 
conflict, the mere fact that ethnic Russians were involved in a war could not leave Russian 
leaders indifferent. Although Transdniestria was not located in such a highly sensitive area 
as the Transcaucasus, and was not even next to Russia's borders, the presence of a large 
community of ethnic Russians, which claimed to be discriminated against by a Moldovan 
majority, obliged Russian leaders to pay particular attention to developments in the area. 
As Sergei Stankevich explained, `Why are events in Moldova's Dniester region so 
important for Russia, and what is it seeking hundreds of kilometres away from its own 
borders? It needs clear guarantees of a tranquil existence, with equal rights, for a 
545 Andranik Migranyan, `Rossiya i blizhnee zarubezh'e', Nezavisimya gazeta, 12 January 1994, 
p. 4; Andranik Migranyan, `Podlinnye i mnimiye orientiry vo vneshnei politike', 
Rossiiskaya 
gazeta, 4 August 1992 p . 
4. 
546 Sergei Stankevich, `Rossiya uzhe sdelala antimperskii vybor', Nezavisimaya gazeta, 6 
November 1992, p. 2. 
541 Yurii Selivanov, `Kishinev nastaivaet na vyvode rossiiskikh voisk', Segodnya, 24 March 1994, 
p. 5. 
548 Chisinau Infotag, 13 November 1995, in FBIS-SO V-95-220,15 November 1995, p. 31. 
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spiritually and historically kindred population. '549 As early as September 1991, a few days 
after violence broke out in the Transdniester region, President Yeltsin issued a statement, 
which clearly stated Russia's intention to protect ethnic Russian populations living outside 
its borders, although explicit mention of Moldova was avoided. `The Russian Federation 
intends to use all legal means and methods within the norms of international law' the 
statement read, to defend the rights, lives, honour, and dignity of citizens of Russian 
extraction or of other nationalities living outside its frontiers. ýsso Yeltsin thereby defined 
Russia's overall policy towards ethnic Russians living in the near abroad, and although 
practices changed according to the circumstances, the overall policy regarding Russians 
outside Russia had been set. 
b. Russia's Mediation 
During the early phases of the Transdniester conflict, from the Autumn of 1991 to the early 
Spring of 1992, the Russian leadership did not become actively involved in its resolution. 
Russian Supreme Soviet deputies successfully mediated an end to the Moldovan blockade 
in October 1991, but such initiatives took place at a time when Russian foreign policy 
towards the other Soviet republics was only semi-developed. Although no major outbursts 
of violence occurred during the early months of 1992, the situation in the region remained 
tense. Russian leaders, however, did not conduct any diplomatic actions aimed at solving 
the dispute, and instead engaged in negotiations with the Moldovan authorities on the 
division of Soviet military assets located on Moldovan territory. During this stage, 
Russia's policies towards the former Soviet states were primarily conducted by the Russian 
Foreign Ministry - the Russian Ministry of Defence was only created in May 1992 - which 
tended to emphasise a non-interventionist policy in the former Soviet states, in an effort to 
reverse Moscow's previous imperialist policies. 
When fierce fighting erupted in early March 1992, and Russian Cossack volunteers 
became involved on the separatists' side, the Russian authorities became automatically 
drawn into the conflict. Russian leaders however, did not conduct any efforts to try to stop 
Cossack involvement, nor did they express an official condemnation of these actions. 551 
sag Sergei Stankevich, `Yavlenie derzhavy', p. 1. 
550 Reuters, 30 September 1991, cited by Suzanne Crow, `Russian Moderates Walk a Tightrope in 
Moldova', RFE/RL Research Report, 15 May 1992, p. 9. 
551 Eduard Kondratov, `Kazaki usugublyaiut krizis v Pridnestrov'e', Izvestiya, 5 March 1992, p. 1; 
Moscow Radio, 17 March 1992, in FBIS-SOV-92-053,18 March 1992, p. 58. 
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Russia's behaviour could be interpreted as providing covert support for the Transdniester 
separatists. In reality, Russia's inaction reflected a lack of preparedness to handle such 
situations as well as the absence of a clearly defined policy towards Russian minorities 
living beyond Russia's borders and towards the violent conflicts emerging in the former 
Soviet Union. Although Russia had placed itself as the defender of the rights of ethnic 
Russians living in the near abroad, its government had not yet defined a clear and effective 
policy in the specifics it was confronted with. The Russian government, in fact, faced a 
serious dilemma. Supporting Russians in the Transdniester region meant strong 
confrontation with Moldova, and the risk of pushing the latter towards unification with 
Romania. On the other hand, taking Kishinev's side provoked the indignation of the 
opposition at home and of the Russian-speaking population in other CIS states. From April 
1992 until violence was brought to an end in August 1992, Russian leaders decided to 
balance these two options, both backing Moldovan integrity but at the same time providing 
official support for Transdniester demands for a special status, and closing an eye to the 
14th Army's military involvement in support of the Transdniester militia. This seemingly 
incoherent policy, which in many ways was a result of the internal power struggle taking 
place in Moscow, eventually proved quite successful since it put an end to violence and 
allowed Russia to keep a military and political presence in the area. 
The escalation of violence in the region of Dubossary in late March 1992 led to an 
assertive response from the Russian opposition in the Supreme Soviet, the Congress of 
People's Deputies (CPD) and from Vice-President Rutksoi, all of whom sympathised with 
the Transdniester separatists, and insisted on the recognition of their special rights. On 5 
April 1992, Rutskoi visited the Transdniester region and gave his open support to the 
Dniester Moldovan republic. `The Dniester republic did and will exist' he told a crowd 
gathered in Tiraspol, 552 and called for the Russian 14th Army located in the area to play a 
peacekeeping role `so that the people of the Dniester region can gain their independence 
and hold it. '553 Rutskoi also proposed that the CPD recognise the Dniester Moldovan 
republic and called for the adoption of an overall programme aimed at providing real 
protection for Russian citizens living in the CIS. 554 The Russian parliament's reaction, 
however, although supportive of Transdniester demands, was much milder. On 20 March 
1992, the Supreme Soviet adopted a statement appealing to the Moldovan authorities to 
552 Interfax, 6 April 1992, in FBIS-SOV-92-066,6 April 1992, p. 65. 
553 Eduard Kondratov, `Vizit A. Rutskogo v Pridnestrov'e vlasti Moldovy otsenivaiut kak vyzov 
statusu nezavisirnogo gosudarstva', Izvestiya, 6 April 1992, p. 1. 
554 'Sobytiyam v Pridnestrov'e', Rossiiskaya gazeta, 8 April 1992 p. 7. 
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grant the Transdniester region an appropriate political status that would guarantee the 
latter's right of self-determination in case of Moldova's reunification with Romania. "' The 
Supreme Soviet however, stressed that any settlement of the dispute should respect 
Moldova's territorial integrity and guarantee of rights of minorities. "' In order to put an 
end to violence, the Russian parliament proposed that the 14th Army separate the forces in 
the conflict, and that the UN and the CSCE take part in efforts aimed at settling the 
conflict. 557 Support for international participation indicated that, at this early stage, the 
Supreme Soviet as a whole also had taken an anti-imperialist attitude, despite the fact that 
elements within it were supportive of a more neo-imperialist behaviour which would see 
Moldova brought back into Russia's sphere of influence. The Russian Foreign Ministry 
responded to the escalation of violence by launching quadripartite diplomatic negotiations, 
involving representatives not only from Moldova and Ukraine, but also from Romania, a 
non Soviet state, thus indicating the absence of a neo-imperialist attitude among Russian 
diplomatic circles. Negotiators tried to find a solution to the conflict within the framework 
of Moldova's territorial integrity and the respect of national minorities. No special status 
was envisaged for the Transdniester region. 558 However, these initial efforts proved 
unsuccessful, if only because of the exclusion of the Transdniester leadership from the 
talks, and because of the absence of mechanisms for enforcing a settlement. 559 Further 
attempts by Kozyrev to use the 14th Army as a peacekeeping force failed. A series of other 
quadripartite meetings followed in April 1992 and June 1992, but they did not succeed in 
solving the conflict, nor in bringing about an end to hostilities. By the end of June 1992, a 
massive Moldovan offensive brought the talks to an end. 
Moldova's massive attack on the right-bank city of Bendery on 19-20 June 1992, which 
resulted in 270 deaths and over 400 wounded, compelled the Russian leadership to adopt a 
much more assertive stance. Yeltsin immediately condemned Moldovan actions, called on 
Moldovan leaders to put an end to violence, and threatened to take strong measures if the 
bloodshed continued. 560 A cease-fire agreement under the aegis of the quadripartite group 
was reached within the framework of the Black Sea Summit in Istanbul on 25 June 1992, 
555 Tass, 20 March 1992, in FBIS-SOV-92-056,23 March 1992, p. 47. 
556 Itar-tass, 3 April 1992, in FBIS-SOV-92-065,3 April 1992, p. 40; `Zayavlenie Verkhovnogo 
Soveta Rossiiskoi Federatsii ', Rossiiskaya gazeta, 6 April 1992 p. 1. 
557 ibid. 
558 Eduard Kondratov, `Moldovan Parliament Assesses Events in Dniester Region', Izvestiya, 26 
March 1992, p. 1, in FBIS-SO V-92-060,27 March 1992, p. 57. 
559 'Pridnestrov'e: voina idet svoim cheredom', Nezavisimaya gazeta, 21 April 1992, p. 1 
560 `Voina stuchitsya v vorota kremlya', Nezavisimaya gazeta, 23 June 1992, p. 1 
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but it was soon violated by both sides. The continuation of the violence promoted Russia to 
take over the negotiating process and to put strong economic, military and diplomatic 
pressure on Moldova. On the one hand, Russia imposed restrictions on the deliveries of 
Russian freight to Moldova, and Transdniester leaders cut off Moldova's supplies of gas 
and electricity. 56' On the other hand, President Yeltsin made the withdrawal of the 14th 
Army conditional upon a cessation of violence. Moreover, during late June and early July 
1992, Major General Aleksandr Lebed, the new commander of the 14th Army, carried out 
several demonstrations of force in the form of manoeuvres and deployment of heavy 
weapons, in order to prevent further Moldovan attacks. 562 Additional pressure was also 
placed by the Russian Supreme Soviet, which on 9 July 1992 threatened Moldova with the 
use of force if a cease-fire was not reached. Some deputies even threatened to submit for 
consideration by Parliament the recognition of Transdniester and its integration into the 
'63 Russian Federation. 
Russia's pressure brought violence to an end. President Yeltsin and his Moldovan 
counterpart, President Snegur, met at the Kremlin on 21 July 1992 and agreed on the 
imposition of a cease-fire and the establishment of a joint control commission composed of 
representatives from Russia, Moldova and the Transdniester to oversee implementation of 
the measures adopted. Snegur and Yeltsin also agreed that peacekeeping forces made up of 
contingents belonging to the three sides involved in the settlement of the conflict were to be 
sent to the region in order to help separate the conflicting armies. The role of the 14th 
Army as a peacekeeping force was ruled out. Instead, it was agreed that the Army would 
keep strict neutrality and that Russia and Moldova would engage in negotiations to 
determine its status and the terms of its withdrawal. 54The Transdniester region was to be 
granted a special status within Moldova, to be determined in future negotiations. 
Moldova's territorial integrity thus was to be respected, but Moldovan leaders also agreed 
to grant the Transdniester population the right to determine the region's status in the event 
of Moldova's reunification with Romania. 565 This agreement, which received the support of 
the Transdniester authorities, represented a victory for Russia's diplomacy. Russia 
561 Svetlana Gamota and Eduard Kondratov, `Mircea Snegur: Nachalas' ekonomicheskaya 
blokada Moldovy', Izvestiya, 29 June 1992, p. 1; Radio Romania, 3 July 1992, in FBIS-SOV-092- 
129,6 July 1992, p. 68. 
562 Edward Ozhiganov, `The Republic of Moldova: Transdniester and the 14th Army', p. 182. 
563 Sergei Chugaev, `The Russian Parliament has Authorised the Use of the 14th Army as a 
Peacemaking Force', Izvestiya, 9 July 1992, p. 1-2, in CDPSP, XLIV, 1992,27, p. 14. 
564 Radio Chisinau, 21 July 1992, in FBIS-SOU 92-142,23 July 1992, pp. 9-10. 
565 Valerii Vyzhutovich, `Mirotvorcheskaya diplomatiya beret verkh: snachala -v Iuzhnoi Osetii, 
teper -v Pridnestrov'e', Izvestiya, 
22 July 1992, p. 1. 
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succeeded in putting an end to violence, thus saving the lives of Russians and Russian- 
speakers, to guarantee a special status for the Transdniester and to introduce a Russian 
peacekeeping force to disengage the warring sides. 566 During the first week of August 
1992, Moldovan, Transdniester and Russian battalions moved into the region and 
successfully separated the warring sides, establishing a 10-km safety zone along the 
Dniester river. Shootings stopped and a precarious peace was restored. 56' Although the 
14th Army was requested to stay neutral, its presence played a major role in stopping the 
violence and in deterring any further attacks by the Moldovan forces. 568 
Russia's successful peacemaking efforts, its dominant position in the mediation process, 
which resulted in the introduction of Russian peacekeeping forces, and its support for 
Transdniester's demands to be granted a `special status' might be interpreted as `neo- 
imperial. ' However, the exact nature of Russia's motivations, as far as Moldova is 
concerned, is difficult to discern. Although attempts to keep Moldova within Russia's 
sphere of influence were probably influencing policy-making, Russian policies appear to 
have been primarily aimed at putting an end to violence. It seems highly unlikely that in the 
Summer of 1992, the Russian President and the Russian Foreign Ministry were motivated 
in their behaviour by 'neo-imperial' ambitions and attempts to set up an informal empire in 
Moldova. The evidence available suggests that there was no desire to preserve a foothold in 
Moldova through the existence. of a Russian-oriented Transdniester political entity nor to 
try to keep Moldova within Russia's sphere of influence, despite the fact that Russian 
nationalist circles and some Russian military officers were in favour of keeping this area 
under Russia's sway. President Yeltsin and Foreign Minister Kozyrev were primarily 
interested in bringing violence to and end, above all through peaceful means, and in 
protecting the lives of Russians in the area. Both were adamant in their support for a 
solution which respected Moldova's territorial integrity. The Russian Ministry of Defence 
on the other hand, was mainly concerned with the safety of Russian servicemen in the area, 
as well as with the protection of local Russian inhabitants. Like the Foreign Ministry, it 
was eager to put an end to violence, although it seemed more prone to use force in order to 
achieve peace. The Defence Ministry, however, was also eager to keep the 14th Army 
566 Russian forces were predominant in terms of manpower and resources. (Pavel Felgengauer, 
`Rossiiskie "Mirotvortsy" v zapadne', Nezavisimaya gazeta, 11 August 1992, p. 2. ) 
567 Aleksandr Tago, `Bufernaya zona v Pridnestrov'e sozdana', Nezavisimaya gazeta, 4 August 
1992, p. 1; Svetlana Gamova, `V Moldove otmeneno chrezvychainoe polozhenie', Izvestiya, 19 
August 1992, p. 2 
568 Pavel Felgengauer, `Rossiiskie "Mirotvortsy" v zapadne', p. 2. 
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permanently based in Moldova. Not only was the army perceived as fulfilling strategic 
tasks, such as protecting the Russian state, enhancing regional stability and precluding any 
`hostile' presence in the area, but its withdrawal presented serious logistic difficulties. 
Russia's mediation efforts and peacekeeping activities were not primarily aimed at bringing 
Moldova back into Russia's sphere of influence. However, they actually resulted in Russia 
keeping an important military and political foothold in that country, which led to the 
creation, to a certain extent, of a Russian neo-empire in Moldova, particularly in 
Transdniestria. Although Russia supported the territorial integrity of Moldova, Kishinev 
never managed to restore control over the Transdniester region and the 14th Army 
remained in the area. Russia sponsored, together with the CSCE/OSCE, various rounds of 
negotiations between 1992 and 1996, but little was achieved in terms of reaching a lasting 
political settlement. The victory of the Communist Party and Zhirinovsky's LDPR in the 
Russian Duma 1995 elections, and their open display of support for the Transdniester 
cause gave additional impetus to the Transdniester leadership, making it increasingly hard 
for both sides to reach a compromise. In December 1995, the State Duma issued a 
declaration recommending Yeltsin to declare Transdniestria a zone of special strategic 
interests for Russia, and Communist Party leader Gennady Zyuganov sent an open letter to 
the Transdniester inhabitants, expressing the support of the party for their cause. 569 
However, Yeltsin and the Foreign Ministry did not modify their positions. Moscow's 
official line remained in support of Moldova's territorial integrity and of granting a special 
status to Transdniestria. The record of neo-imperialism, therefore, remains mixed. On the 
one hand, Yeltsin and Kozyrev supported Moldova's territorial integrity, sponsored 
political negotiations, and welcomed the mediating role of international organisations, such 
as the CSCE, and neighbouring countries, such as Romania, and Ukraine, which joined the 
negotiations in January 1996. On the other hand, the Russian Defence Ministry tried to 
obtain a peacekeeping mandate for the 14th Army, and objected to Ukraine's willingness to 
send in peacekeepers to the region - an indication that it conceived its peacekeeping 
operation not just as a means of avoiding a resumption of violence, but also as a military 
instrument fulfilling strategic goals, above all ensuring Russia's presence in the area and 
preventing other states in the region from getting a military foothold in Moldova. 
570 The 
Transdniestria conflict therefore brought to light the conflicting agendas of the Russian 
569 Svetlana Gamova, `Nepriznanaya respublika progolosovala za svoiu nezavisimost' i 
samostayatel'noe vkhozhdenie v SNG', Izvestiya, 26 December 1995, p. 2. 
570 Yulia Kapustina, `Calm Before Elections', Kommersant-daily, 19 January 1996, p. 4, in 
CDPSP, XLVIII, 1996,3, p. 28; FBIS-SOV-95-220,15 November 1995. 
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Foreign and Defence Ministries, which led to the conduct of seemingly contradictory 
policies, a result of Yeltsin's attempts to reach broad compromises in order to satisfy 
domestic constituencies. 
c. The Role of the 14th Army 
When the Soviet Union collapsed, most Soviet Armed Forces in the FSS, including the 
14th Army located in Moldova, were placed under CIS command. However their status 
remained unclear. Negotiations between the CIS Command and the Moldovan leadership 
led to the signing of an agreement on 14 February 1992, which provided for the transfer of 
former Soviet troops stationed on the right bank of Moldova, to Moldovan jurisdiction on 
1 March 1992. '" On 20 March 1992, President Snegur signed a decree on the transfer to 
Moldovan jurisdiction of the military units of the Soviet army stationed on its territory. The 
peaceful transfer of weapons to Moldovan jurisdiction followed thereafter. 572 The armed 
forces located on the left bank of the Dniester, which accounted for the bulk of the 14th 
Army, were initially placed under CIS jurisdiction. These forces had been politically and 
militarily involved in the Transdniester conflict, providing assistance to the Transdniester 
militia and giving open support to the separatist cause. Moreover, 14th Army officers 
refused to be subordinated to Moldovan authority and preferred to be transferred to 
Transdniester jurisdiction. They expressed their `readiness, at the request of the people, to 
come to the defence of the population of the Dniester republic and of legitimate local 
bodies of power against any armed formations. '573 Furthermore, most officers and 
reservists were local inhabitants and their transfer to Russia meant uprooting them from 
their homes. In view of this situation, Moldova agreed to renounce the 14th Army on 
condition that it be withdrawn from the country within a year. The 14th Army was directly 
subordinated to the CIS JAF Supreme Command for a transitional period until its complete 
withdrawal back to Russia. 574 However, as conflict in the Dniester region escalated in the 
Spring of 1992, Yeltsin unilaterally placed all military facilities and army units in the left 
bank under the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation. 575 The aim was to prevent further 
5' Radio Romania, 17 February 1992, in FBIS-SOV-92-032,18 February 1992, p. 63. 
572 Tass, 20 March 1992, in FBIS-SOV-92-056,23 March 1992, p. 47; `Pridnestrov'e mezhdu 
voinoi i mirom', Nezavisimaya gazeta, 3 April 1992 p. 1. Apparently, 155 tanks, 102 armoured 
personnel carriers and 248 artillery pieces were concentrated in Moldova in June 1992. (Vladimir 
Mukhin, `Voina v Zakavkaz'e i Pridnestrov'e tol'ko nachinaetsya', Nezavisimaya gazeta, 26 June 
1992, p. 2. ) 
573 Tass, 23 September 1991, in FBIS-SO V-91-185,24 September 1991, p. 77. 
574 Tass, 9 February 1992, in FBIS-SOV-92-027,10 February 1992, p. 95. 
575 Interfax, 2 April 1992, in FBIS-SOV-92-064, p. 74. 
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involvement of the 14th Army in the conflict. 57' Although Moldova initially opposed the 
move, it finally decided to open negotiations with the Russian government in order to settle 
the question of the status of the army in Moldova, and its withdrawal back to Russia. "' 
i) The 14th Army's Involvement 
How did the 14th Army become increasingly involved in the conflict? Was the army's 
involvement part of a strategy to exacerbate the Transdniester conflict in order to intervene 
militarily and thus, bring Moldova under Russia's sphere of influence? Given the 
contradictory data available, it is difficult to determine the exact role played by the 14th 
Army during the early stages of the conflict. Although it is clear that the left-bank 14th 
Army provided covert support to the separatists in the form of weapons, equipment, 
training and personnel in the Autumn of 1991, it is harder to determine whether army 
officers acted independently or, whether instead, they were receiving orders from 
Moscow. 57' The evidence available, however, suggests that during the Autumn of 1991, a 
split occurred among the 14th Army's officer corps, some detachments actively 
participating in the conflict, some units even switching to the jurisdiction of the 
Transdniester leadership, while others attempting to keep a semblance of neutrality. 579 
Officially, however, the Army was ordered by the leadership of the Odessa Military 
District, to remain neutral. 58° Although neutrality was systematically violated, the initiative 
seems to have come from local officers. The USSR General Staff regularly dismissed 
accusations by the Moldovan government of covert support by the army to the separatists 
and Lt. Col. G. Yakovlev, the commander of the 14th Army, was immediately dismissed in 
December 1991, when he agreed to become head of the Transdniester Security Council. 58' 
When fighting intensified in early March 1992, the new leadership of the 14th Army 
resisted attempts by the Transdniester leaders to drag the army into fighting on their side. 
576 A. Krayny, `Marshal Shaposhnikov ob obstanovke v Pridnestrov'e', Komsomol 'skaya pravda, 
4 April 1992, p. 3. 
57 Interfax, 22 April 1992, in FBIS-SOU 92-079,23 April 1992, p. 42. 
578 Lebed admitted the transfer of weapons and the involvement of officers. (Radio Chisinau, 29 
June 1992, in FBIS-SOV-92-126,30 June 1992, p. 44. ) 
579 Moscow Radio, 27 September 1991, in FBIS-SO V-91-189,30 September 1991, p. 73; Vladimir 
Durnov, `V Rossii skladyvaetsya nevernoe predstavlenie o sobytiyakh v Moldove', Izvestiya, 12 
June 1992, p. 5 
580 N. Mulyar, `Troop Withdrawal Question Postponed', Krasnaya zvezda, 28 September 1991, 
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Maj. -Gen. Netkachev, Commander of the 14th Army, several times reaffirmed the army's 
non-involvement in the conflict and its exclusive subordination to the CIS Commander in 
Chief '82 However, in early April, as the situation on the ground deteriorated, the army 
issued an ultimatum to the warring sides demanding an immediate cease-fire and the 
holding of peaceful negotiations. Otherwise, `units of the 14th Army [would] be placed on 
full alert. 583 The officers also voiced their readiness to participate in peacekeeping 
operations, and went as far as calling for a recognition of the Dniester Moldova 
Republic. 584 When the ultimatum expired, the army began mobilising and occupying ke YggY 
positions in Bendery, and proceeded to establish a cease-fire line between the Moldovan 
and Dniester armed formations, not without getting involved in the fighting on the 
Transdniester side. 5 'A month later, on 20 May 1992, the 14th Army extended its 
occupation of the left-bank districts. Its tanks and infantry vehicles appeared in the city of 
Dubossary, which was subjected to mortar attack from Moldovan forces. 586 Maj. -Gen. 
Netkachev confirmed and justified the mobilisation of the army on the grounds that 
populated areas had been under attack. 587 There seems, therefore, to be compelling 
evidence suggesting the direct and open involvement of the 14th army on the Transdniester 
side. However, it is not clear whether or not officers were following orders from Moscow. 
The evidence available suggests that Maj. -Gen. Netkachev had lost control over units of 
the 14th Army, and that the army as whole was not responding to Moscow's orders. In 
other words, the army remained out of Moscow's control. In defiance to Grachev's orders 
of neutrality, the army got progressively involved in the fighting. Although Grachev 
admitted the involvement of the army, he insisted that officers and soldiers had done so on 
a personal basis, out of their own initiative. He noted, however, that servicemen were 
probably being dragged against their own will into the conflict by the local population. 588 
The involvement of the 14th Army in the conflict, in fact, was not officially condemned by 
582 Interfax, 4 March 1992, in FBIS-SOV-92-043,4 March 1992, p. 70; Radio Romania, 5 March 
1992, in FBIS-SOV-92-045,6 March 1992, p. 52. 
583 Svetlana Gamova and Nikolai Burbyga, '14-ya Armiya pereshla pod iurisdiktsiiu Rossii i 
vydvinula ultimatum Kishinevu i Tiraspoliu', Izvestiya, 2 April 1992 p. 1; 
584 ibid.; Interfax, 2 April 1992, in FBIS-SOV-92-064, p. 74. 
585 ibid.; Russian TV, 5 April 1992, in FBIS-SOV-92-066,6 April 1992, p. 66; Interfax, 10 April 
1992, in FBIS-SOV-92-070, p. 43 
586 'Russia's 14th Army Moves into Combat Positions in the Dniester Region', Nezavisimaya 
gazeta, 21 May 1992, p. 1 in CDPSP, XLIV, 1992,20, pp. 20-21. 
Natalya Prikhodko, `Zasedanie shona otlozheno', Nezavisimaya gazeta, 21 May 1993, p. 1 
587 Viktor Volodin, `V Dubossarakh prifrontovom gorode', Izvestiya, 21 May 1992, p. 2. 
588 Interfax, 3 June 1992, in FBIS-SO V-92-108,4 June 1992, p. 21. Lebed admitted participation 
of officers on a personal basis. (Radio Chisinau, 29 June 1992, in FBIS-SOV-92-126,30 June 
1992, p. 44. ). President Yeltsin also acknoweldged the existence of supporters of the Dniester 
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the Russian military leadership and the CIS High Command. 589 On the contrary, both 
institutions took an understanding view regarding the army's participation and became 
increasingly sympathetic with the position of the 14th Army officers. 59o Despite the 
understanding shown by the Defence Ministry, Grachev seemed eager to put an end to 
violence and anarchy among his forces, and this probably explains why General Lebed was 
sent to take charge of the explosive situation. It can therefore be argued that despite the 
active involvement of the 14th Army at local level, the Defence Ministry did not follow a 
clearly defined strategy of exacerbating the conflict in order to intervene. 
The arrival of Lebed brought violence to an end. Lebed significantly enhanced the combat 
capabilities of the 14th Army with elite unit reinforcements, deployed air defence and long 
range artillery systems, and conducted a series of exercises with his troops, which managed 
to put an end to Moldova's attacks on the Transdniester region and pacified the region. 59' 
In order to enhance security, Lebed also conducted joint peacekeeping activities with 
Moldovan forces in the town of Bendery . 
592 Moreover, he successfully confiscated the 
weapons distributed among the Transdniester militia and the population, and properly 
safeguarded the vast amounts of equipment belonging to the 14th Army, which were 
coveted by both sides. In addition, Lebed also managed to restore discipline among the 
14th Army and the Transdniester units. 593 Lebed's successes, however, came at a price as 
he became increasingly involved in the political developments of the region. In July 1992, 
he openly condemned the Moldovan authorities in Kishinev, calling them `fascists', and 
refused to recognise the elected Moldovan government. Moreover, Lebed openly supported 
the integration of the Transdniester region into Russia, and the attachment of the town of 
Bendery to Transdniestria. 594 In September 1993, he even got elected to the Transdniester 
parliament. 595 Lebed's open support for the Transdniester cause, however, does not seem to 
cause among the officers corps of the 14th Army. ('Ya ne skryvaiu trudnostei i khochu, chtoby 
narod eto ponimal', Komsomol 'skaya pravda, 27 May 1992, p. 2. ) 
589 Svetlana Gamova and Nikolai Burbyga, '14-ya Armiya pereshla pod iurisdiktsiiu Rossii i 
vydvinula ultimatum Kishinevu i Tiraspoliu', p. 1. 
590 A. Krayny, `Marshal Shaposhnikov ob obstanovke v Pridnestrov'e', p. 3. 
591 A. Kakotkin, `Lull for the Time Being on the Fronts', ! vfoskovskie novosti, 5 July 1992, p. 4 in 
FBIS-SOV-92-131,8 July 1992, p. 20. 
592 Russian Television, 24 July 1992, in FBIS-SOV-92-144,27 July 1992, p. 57. 
593 Radio Rossii, 17 July 1992, in FBIS-SOV-92-138,17 July 1992, p. 55. 
594 Itar-tass, 4 July 1992, in FBIS-SO V-92-129,6 July 1992, p. 71; Radio Chisinau, 29 June 1992, 
in FBIS-SOV-92-126,30 June 1992, p. 44. 
595 In spite of his sympathies for the Transdniester cause, in 1993, Lebed became extremely 
critical of the Transdniester leadership, and openly accused it of corruption. (Evgenii Strigunov, 
`General Lebed as the Scalpel of Russian Diplomacy', Novaya ezhednevnaya gazeta, 3 February 
1994, p. 4 in CDPSP, XLVI, 1994,4, p. 25) 
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have reflected the official position of the authorities in Moscow, especially of the Foreign 
Ministry which was supportive of Moldova's territorial integrity. It seems that Moscow 
was ready to keep him in his post, at least until his removal in 1995, because of his 
successful peacekeeping operations and the support that his policies received among 
military and nationalist circles. Lebed's role, therefore, remains controversial, making it 
difficult to determine how his actions fitted with Russia's policies and aims in the region. 
In fact, the complexities of the situation in the ground and the unstable domestic situation 
within Russia, resulted in the absence of a clear cut Russian strategy towards the region. 
Despite the absence of a clearly devised neo-imperialist strategy, the independent 
involvement of the 14th Army and the active peacekeeping activities of Lebed resulted, to 
all intents and purposes, in Russia prolonging its military presence in the region. As 
negotiations on the withdrawal of the 14th Army failed to make any progress, Russia's 
military presence in Moldova acquired an increasingly neo-imperialistic character. 
ii) The 14th Army's Withdrawal 
Negotiations between Russia and Moldova on the withdrawal of the 14th Army began as 
early as August 1992. However, progress was hindered by a series of factors which 
complicated the retreat of the army. First, the Russian MOD feared that if Russia removed 
the army Transdniester leaders would place it under Transdniester jurisdiction, prompting 
14th Army officers, most of whom strongly sympathised with the Transdniester cause, to 
join the Transdniester military formations. 596 Second, the possibility also existed that the 
local population would physically block the withdrawal of Russian personnel and 
equipment. When President Yeltsin first announced the withdrawal of the Army in late 
May 1992, groups of women and elderly people had held a sit-in in protest against the 
Army's withdrawal. 59' Third, serious problems of resettlement in Russia argued in favour 
of a delay in the retreat of the army back to Russia. 598 Fourth, the Russian leadership was 
extremely concerned about the safety of the vast amounts of ammunition and weapons 
belonging to the 14th Army. 599 The risk that all these weapons might end up in the hands of 
Transdniester forces, looted or smuggled into Russia or other FSS, if the Army withdrew, 
596 Interfax, 8 June 1992, in FBIS-SOV-92-111,9 June 1992, p. 22; Svetlana Gamova, 
`Pridnestrov'e ostaetsya bez 14-i Armii, General Lebed - bez raboty', Izvestiya, 5 August 1994, 
pp. 1-2. 
597 Interfax, 8 June 1992, in FBIS-SOU 92-111,9 June 1992, p. 22; Lyudmila Feliksova, `Dolzhna 
pritupit'sya bol' ', Rossiiskaya gazeta, 7 September 1994, p. 1. 
598 Interfax, 8 June 1992, in FBIS-SOU 92-111,9 June 1992, p. 22. 
599 Mikhail Leontyev, `Kapriznye deti generala Gracheva', Segonya, 11 May, 1995, p. 1. 
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remained very high. 60° Moreover, the removal of equipment was also constrained by 
financial reasons. 601 The cost of withdrawing the army was estimated to be equivalent to 
that of keeping it in the Dniester region for 30 years. 
Aware of the difficulties involved in the withdrawal of forces, Russian military leaders 
tried to delay the retreat of the 14th Army as long as possible. Besides the obstacles 
mentioned above, the Russian MOD, in particular General Lebed, was convinced that the 
presence of the 14th Army was preventing a re-emergence of violence in Transdniestria. 6o2 
Defence Minister Grachev argued that only after a cease-fire had been reached, and 
Russian lives would be safe, would the Army retreat. 6o3 Russian leaders in fact insisted on 
linking the withdrawal of the Army to the reaching of a political settlement and to the 
granting of a special status to Transdniestria. However, the Russian MOD also became 
eager to keep a military base in Moldova on the basis of the 14th Army, and during 1993 
and most of 1994 tried to persuade Kishinev to accept such a Russian presence. 604 But 
Moldovan leaders refused, and on 21 October 1994 managed to reach an agreement with 
the Russian leadership on the withdrawal of the 14th Army within a three year period. 
Although the agreement did not specifically link the withdrawal of the army to the 
settlement of the status of Transdniestria, Moldovan leaders committed themselves to 
resolve the issue. In other words, the withdrawal of the army was `synchronised' with the 
reaching of a political settlement. 605 During 1993-1995, significant parts of the 14th 
Army's equipment and weapons were removed back to Russia, but by early 1996, Russia 
still retained an important presence in the area. 606 On the one hand, the Russian State 
Duma delayed the ratification of the October 1994 agreement, and on the other hand, by 
600 Moscow and Kishinev agreed in August 1994 that Moldova would get 35 percent of the 
army's equipment and Russia 65 percent. However, on 3 February 1995, Transdniester leader 
Igor Smirnov issued a decree which forbade the removal of all assets belonging to the 14th Army 
from the region. (Mikhail Leontev, `Podpishet li Prezident proshenie Lebedya ob otstavke? ', 
Segodnya, 7 June 1995, p. 22; Natalya Prikhodko, `Tiraspol' protiv soglashenii Moskvy i 
Kishineva', Nezavisimaya gazeta, 7 February 1995, p. 1. ) 
601 Mikhail Leontyev, `Kapriznye deti generala Gracheva', p. 1. 
602 Interfax, 8 June 1992, in FBIS' SOV-92-111,9 June 1992, p. 22. 
603 `General Grachev: 9 iiunya posleduiut novye naznacheniya v ministerstve oborony iv armii', 
Nezavisimaya gazeta, 9 June 1992, p. 1; Similar views were held by Lebed, see Svetlana Gamova, 
`A. Lebed: "v den, kogda mirotvorcheskie sily uidut iz Pridnestrov'ya, is nachnu ser'ezno 
gotovit'sya k voine" ', Izvestiya, 26 February 1993, p. 5. 
604 Igor Rotar, `Krym - Abkhaziya - Pridnestrov'e', Nezavisimaya gazeta, 2 March 1994, p. 3. 
605 Interfax, 12 August 1994, in FBIS-SOV-094-157,15 August 1994, p. 46; Svetlana Gamova, 
`Moskva i Kishinev reshili vyvesti 14-iu Armiiu. Tiraspol' soglasiya ne daval', Izvestiya, 12 
August 1994, p. 2- 
606 Ilya Bulavinov, `Fate of the 14th Army: Referendum Results Might Yet Come In Handy', 
Kommersant-daily, 29 March 1995, p. 4, in CDPSP, XLVII, 1995,13, p. 21. 
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late 1994, some elements within the Russian military, in particular Gen. Vladimir 
Semyonov, commander of Russia's ground forces, again began toying with the idea of 
keeping a small well-trained, well-organised military group in Transdniestria. 607 But the 
idea was dismissed in 1995, the Russian Defence Ministry arguing that Russia did not need 
the 14th Army as an operational formation in the Dniester region. 608 However, Russia 
delayed the total withdrawal of the army, and in November 1995, Grachev proposed that 
the army be granted peacekeeping status - an indication that, besides the difficulties 
involved in the retreat, Russia, and in particular the Defence Ministry, was eager to keep a 
military presence in Moldova. 
3. Assessment of Russia's Participation 
The outburst of violence in Transdniestria confronted the Russian leadership with a very 
complex dilemma. The involvement of Russian minorities in a struggle for secession from 
Moldova, to a great extent, compelled the Russian government to react. Open support for 
the Transdniestrian cause, however, entailed the risks of creating a precedent and boosting 
secessionist movements at home. On the other hand, remaining indifferent to the fate of 
Russian minorities was bound to lead to strong criticism from the domestic opposition. The 
situation was further complicated by the direct involvement of the Russian 14th Army in 
support of the local secessionists. There seems to be little indication that Russian leaders in 
Moscow exacerbated the conflict in order to intervene and preserve a military presence in 
the area. The intervention by local officers and soldiers of the 14th Army was most 
probably the result of personal initiatives, and reflected a break in the military chain of 
command. It is therefore difficult to sustain the hypothesis that Russia tried to provoke the 
conflict in the region in order to destabilise Moldova and thus bring it back into Russia's 
sphere of influence. However, it must be acknowledged that the Transdniester cause found 
many sympathisers among the Russian military, including the commander of the 14th 
Army, General Lebed. But despite their desire to bring Transdniestria under Russia's 
control, the Russian military did not manage to impose their views. 
Russia's initial efforts to find a political settlement to the conflict attested to the original 
view of the Foreign Ministry, that inter-ethnic conflicts had to be solved in a peaceful 
607 Igor Rotar, ` Krym - Abkhaziya - Pridnestrov'e', Nezavisimaya gazeta, 2 March 1994, p. 3. 
608 Viktor Litovkin, `Posle uvol'neniya Lebedya drugoi stanet vsya Armiya', Izvestiya, 16 June 
1995, p. 1. 
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manner. However, once violence escalated, the Russian Defence Ministry took the upper 
hand, and used force to stop the violence. Was Russia motivated in its behaviour by an 
attempt to keep Moldova into its sphere of influence? The evidence available seems to 
indicate that the Defence Ministry's and Foreign Ministry's active involvement was 
primarily motivated by a desire to put an end to violence, impose peace and stability, and - 
last but not least - avoid that the Transdniester militias take over control of the 14th Army 
and huge military stockpiles. Nevertheless, Russia's participation resulted in Russia 
keeping an important military force in the region and creating, to a certain extent, a neo- 
empire in Moldova. Although agreement on the withdrawal of the Russian 14th Army was 
reached in August 1994, Russia delayed the retreat, showing a reluctance to bring the 
Army back to Russia. Various factors explain Russia's decision. First, delay in the 
withdrawal reflected a desire by certain elements within the military to keep military bases 
in the near abroad, as part of a strategy of `forward basing'. In this particular case, the 
base could allow for the projection of power in the Balkan region. Second, delays were 
caused by the technical difficulties involved in the retreat. However, the Defence Ministry's 
refusal to allow Ukrainian peacekeepers to intervene indicated that the Russian military 
tended to perceive Moldova as an area of exclusive Russian military influence. The Foreign 
Ministry instead was more concerned with finding a political settlement, with the 
participation of international organisations such as the OSCE, and neighbouring FSS such 
as Ukraine. As such, they tended to adopt a less neo-imperialist view. However, both the 
MOD and the MFA considered Moldova an area of vital interest to Russia, not only 
because of the presence of a large Russian minority in the area, which was involved in a 
violent conflict, but also because of the potentially negative repercussions that the conflict 
could have on Russia's internal security and stability. Russia's involvement in the 
Moldovan-Transdniester conflict thus corresponded to the regular pattern of Russian active 
participation in the former Soviet space during 1992-1996, which to a great extent 
reflected a reluctance by Russian leaders to distance themselves from the former Soviet 
space and to completely discard Russia's imperial legacy. 
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III . Georgia and the War in Abkhazia 
1. Origins of the Conflict 
Since the early days of the Soviet Union, Tbilisi's relations with Abkhazia, an autonomous 
entity which was part of the Georgian SSR, were characterised by tension as a result of the 
latter's desire to secede from Georgia and join the Russian SFSR. 60' After 1917, Abkhazia 
maintained a relationship of treaty association with Georgia until it was incorporated as an 
autonomous republic within Georgia in 1931. Since then, the Abkhaz have attempted 
repeatedly either to regain independent status or to join the Russian Federation altogether. 
In August 1990, the Abkhaz Supreme Soviet passed a vote in favour of independence, 
which was immediately annulled by the Georgian Supreme Soviet. In February 1992, after 
Georgia became an independent state, the Georgian Military Council decided to rescind the 
1978 Soviet Constitution, which granted the Abkhaz significant cultural freedom and a 
disproportionate share of government posts within Abkhazia, and to restore the 1921 
Constitution in which Abkhazia was referred not as an autonomous republic but simply as 
the Sukhumi region. 61° This prompted a sharp reaction from Abkhazia. On 23 July 1992, 
609 Current literature on the Abkhaz war reveals the following arguments: Stephen Blank 
embraced the neo-imperialist argument completely by arguing that Russia's policies in the region 
were aimed primarily at restoring a sphere of political and economic influence. (Stephen Blank, 
`Russia's Real Drive to the South', Orbis, 29, Summer 1995,2, pp. 369-386. ) Edmund Herzig, 
adopted a more moderate tone and recognised the incoherent character of Russia's behaviour. 
However, he did not totally dismiss the neo-imperialist argument, and instead claimed that Russia 
exploited Georgia's conflicts and internal weaknesses in order to pressure its leadership to accept 
the joint defence of the external CIS borders, the maintenance of Russian bases on Georgian 
territory, and the deployment of Russian peacekeepers. In other words, Russia tried to keep 
Georgia and the entire Transcaucaus within its sphere of influence. (Edmund Herzig, The New 
Caucasus: Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, p. 49. ) Similarly, Oles M. Smolansky argued that 
Russia asserted its influence over Georgia and Azerbaijan by exacerbating regional conflicts. 
(Oles M. Smolansky, `Russia and Transcaucasia: The Case of Nagorno-Karabagh, in Regional 
Power Rivalries in the New Eurasia: Russia, Turkey and Iran, eds., Alvin Z. Rubinstein and Oles 
M. Smolansky, London, 1995, pp. 201-230. ) Dmitri Trenin also argued that Russia's policies in 
Transcaucasia were aimed at restoring Russia's influence throughout the region in order to 
prevent developments from slipping out of control and thus opening the door to outside 
interference. (Dmitri Trenin, `Russia's Security interests and Policies in the Caucasus Region', p. 
99) Dov Lynch argued that Russian peacekeeping in Georgia was an instrument of a wider 
strategy aimed at advancing Russia's interests in Georgia, using means short of war. (Dov Lynch, 
The Conflict in Abkhazia: Dilemmas in Russian Peacekeeping' Policy, p. 3. ) Edward Ozhiganov 
insitead stressed the existence of differences of opinion and policy within the Russian 
government, and dismissed the imperialist argument. (Eward Ozhiganov, `The Republic of 
Georgia: Conflict in Abkhazia and South Ossetia', p. 385. ) 
610 In 1989, the ethnic Abkhaz constituted 17.8 per cent of the population of Abkhazia, (while the 
Georgians constituted 45.7 percent) but formed 41 percent of the Abkhaz Supreme Soviet 
deputies, 67 percent of the republican ministries and 50 percent of the rayon and city communist 
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thirty-five Abkhaz Supreme Soviet deputies voted to return to the Abkhaz Constitution of 
1925, according to which Abkhazia was a Union republic, until another constitution was 
adopted. 61 ` The Abkhaz leadership intended to conduct bilateral negotiations with the 
authorities in Tbilisi on the basis of a draft treaty between the Republic of Abkhazia and 
the Republic of Georgia for creation of an Abkhaz-Georgian Federal state. Abkhazia's 
Supreme Soviet Chairman Vladislav Ardzinba made it clear that Abkhazia did not intend 
to secede from Georgia. 61' Still, the move was denounced as separatism by the Georgian 
State Council, which proceeded to declare invalid the Abkhaz Supreme Soviet's 
611 decision. Within weeks, hostilities erupted in Abkhazia. 
On 14 August 1992, the Georgian National Guard, supported by armoured cars and battle 
aircraft, and under the command of the Georgian Minister of Defence, Tengiz Kitovani, 
entered Abkhazia. 614 Under the pretext of freeing a number of Georgian leaders, including 
the Minister of the Interior, who had been taken hostage by supporters of former President 
Zviad Gamsakhurdia, and in order to restore control over transportation lines in Abkhazia 
and Western Georgia, Kitovani advanced towards Sukhumi. 615 Apparently no agreement 
had been obtained from the Abkhaz authorities, and the Abkhaz guardsmen opened fire on 
the Georgians. 61' A cease-fire was agreed between the sides on 17 August 1992, but the 
following day, the Georgian Defence Minister ordered the Georgian National Guard to 
storm Sukhumi, the Abkhaz capital, apparently in violation of Shevardnadze's orders. The 
Abkhaz leadership was forced to retreat to the region of Gudauta. 617 Simultaneously, 
Georgian forces landed on the northern territory of Abkhazia and occupied the areas of 
Leselidze, Gantiadi and Gagra. However, the Georgian forces were not able to advance 
north beyond the Gumista river, nor were they able to close the gap by advancing 
party first secretaries. (Catherine Dale, `Turmoil in Abkhazia: Russian Responses', RFE/RL 
Research Report, 27 August 1993, p. 49). 
611 Tengiz Pachkoriya, `Federativnoe gruzino-abkhazskoe gosudarstvo? ' Nezavisimaya gazeta, 25 
July 1992, p. 1. 
612 ibid. 
613 Tengiz Pachkoriya, `V Abkhazii mozhet byt' khuzhe, chem v Iozhnoi Osetii', Nezavisimaya 
gazeta, 28 July 1992 p. 1. 
614 Nodar Broladze, `Novyi konflikt na zapade Gruzii', Nezavisimaya gazeta, 15 August 1992, 
p. 1. 
615 ibid.; Akaky Mikadze, `Abkhazia: Another South Ossetia? ', Moscow News, 34,1992, p. 5; 
Konstantin Litvinov and Oleg Odnokolenko, `V Sukhumi strelyaiut, grabyat i zhdut nachala 
partizanskoi voiny', Krasnaya zvezda, 21 August 1992, p. 1. 
616 Nodar Broladze, `Novyi konflikt na zapade Gruzii', p. 1. 
617 Akaky Mikadze, `A Tragic August in Abkhazia', Moscow News, 35,1992, p. 4. 
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southward from Gagra. 618 Therefore, despite being able to take control of Sukhumi and of 
most of the Abkhaz territory, the Georgian forces were incapable of achieving their most 
important objective - crushing the resistance and securing rail and road communications. 6'9 
Abkhaz leaders found a safe haven in the area of Gudauta where a Russian military base 
was located. From there they conducted their counter-offensive to dislodge the Georgians 
from Abkhazia during the Autumn of 1992 and most of 1993. 
2. Russia's involvement 
a. Motivations 
Whv did Russia become involved in the Abkhaz conflict and what were Russia's interests 
in the region? Located in the vicinity of the turbulent Northern Caucasian region, the 
Transcaucasian republics represented one of the most sensitive areas of the post-Soviet 
space. Russian leaders were aware that conflicts and instabilities in the Transcaucasus 
were bound to have a negative impact on developments in the unstable Russian Northern 
Caucasus, since both areas were closely linked by geographical, cultural and economic ties. 
Control over developments in the Transcaucasus was, therefore, considered essential for 
control over the Northern Caucasus. 62° Russia's involvement in the region was also 
motivated by the concern that Abkhaz demands for independence and secession from 
Georgia might lead to similar requests by the Russian North Caucasian republics, thus 
threatening the territorial integrity of Russia. Moreover, the development of ethnic conflicts 
not only in Georgia but also in Azerbaijan boosted the illegal traffic of drugs and weapons, 
thus significantly contributing to the general instability of the entire Caucasian area. 
Furthermore, the collapse of the Soviet Union dealt a severe blow to Russia's forward 
defence strategy and significantly reduced Russia's presence in the shores of the Black Sea. 
Although, during the Spring and Summer of 1992, the MFA and the MOD favoured the 
withdrawal of Russian forces from areas of conflict, the Russian MOD still wished to keep 
a military presence in Georgia, as a counter to a potential NATO threat coming from 
618 Dodge Billingsley, `Georgian-Abkhazian security issues', Jane's Intelligence Review, 
February 1996, pp. 65-66. 
619 Besik Urigashvili, `Shevardnadze obvinyaet Abkhazskuiu storonu v sryve dogovorennostei', 
Izvestiya, 9 September 1992, p. ' . 620 Andranik Migranyan, `Podlinnye i mnimiye orientiry vo vneshnei politike', Rossiiskaya 
gazeta, 4 August 1992, p. 4. 
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Turkey. 621 Col. Gen. Patrikeyev, commander of the Transcaucasian Military District 
(TCMD), suggested that Russia take the troops under its control and legalise their stay on 
Transcaucasian territory with inter-republican agreements. 622 In the Autumn of 1992, as 
conflict erupted in Abkhazia, Georgia became increasingly identified as strategically vital 
to Russia's security, and the desire to retain a significant military presence in that country 
grew. On 22 February 1993, Grachev clearly stated the strategic importance that Russia 
attached to the Black Sea coast and declared that Russia should take all the necessary steps 
to ensure that Russian troops remained in the area. Otherwise, Russia would lose control 
over the Black Sea. 623 
In addition, Russia was particularly worried that other countries might intervene in Georgia 
in order to stop the violence, and thus dislodge Russia from a traditional sphere of Russia's 
influence. 6 Georgia's increasingly pro-Western orientation, especially after 1993, created 
additional concerns among the Russian elite regarding Russia's loss of economic and 
military influence in the area. Economic support from the West, and Georgia's 
participation in the projects transporting Caspian fuel to the West and Turkey, led to a 
tendency to view the entire Transcaucasus region as an area of rivalry between Russia and 
the West. 625 Last but not least, the presence of a large Russian-speaking community in 
Abkhazia, including a large number of Russian citizens spending their holidays in 
Abkhazia when the conflict erupted, also called in favour of Russia participating actively 
in order to find a resolution to the conflict. This question had a significant impact on a 
Russian national consciousness shattered by the psychological effects of Russia's recent 
loss of empire. 
621 For Grachev's comments on the need to keep a presence in Georgia, see Moscow Mayak 
Radio, 29 May 1992, in FBIS-SOV-92-105,1 June 1992, p. 65. For the Ministry of Defence's 
policy on military withdrawal from the FSS see: Pavel Grachev, `Pri formirovanii armii Rossii 
nuzhen chetkii raschet i zdravyi smysl', Krasnaya zvezda, 21 July 1992, p. 1. 
622 Postfactum, 18 March 1992, in FBIS-SOV-92-054,19 March 1992, p. 19. 
623 Russian TV Network, 22 February 1993 in FBIS-SOU 93-035,24 February 1993 p. 36. 
624 Andrei Kozyrev, `Rossiya fakticheski v odnochku neset bremya real'nogo mirotvorchestva v 
konfliktakh po perimetru svoikh granits', p. 1; Andrei Kozyrev, `Demokratiya i mirotvorchestvo - 
dve storony odnoi medali', p. 1. 
625 Georgy Dvali, `Edvard Shevardnadze on a Quest for Geopolitical balance', Kommersant-daily, 
22 May 1996, p. 4 in CDPSP, XLVIII, 1996,21, p. 22. 
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b. Russian Military Support to the Sides in the Conflict 
The current section will examine whether Russia deliberately exacerbated the Abkhaz 
conflict, by providing military support to either side involved in the fighting, in order to 
impose its military presence in the region, and thus bring Georgia back into Russia's 
sphere of influence. In order to provide an accurate assessment of Russia's involvement in 
the conflict, it is necessary first to examine Russia's participation in the formation of the 
Georgian army, especially in terms of transfer of military equipment and material, and to 
analyse the legal basis of Russia's military presence in Georgia. When the Soviet Union 
collapsed, the armed forces located in Georgia, as well as all other forces belonging to the 
TCMD, were initially placed under the control of CIS Commander in Chief, Marshal 
Shaposhnikov. During the early months of 1992, the Russian and CIS leadership seemed 
eager to withdraw all TCMD troops back to Russia, especially from Armenia and 
Azerbaijan, where army barracks were constantly assaulted by local Armenian and Azeri 
formations in order to obtain military equipment . 
626 In Georgia, however, the Russian 
MOD seemed more favourable to keep a Russian military presence for various reasons. 
First, the advent of a new government in Georgia, headed by Eduard Shevardnadze, led to 
a significant improvement in relations between the local authorities and the CIS armed 
forces 
. 
627 Attacks on military installations aimed at seizing weapons significantly 
diminished. 628 Second, the Georgian leadership also seemed supportive of a CIS military 
presence in the country. On 11 March 1992, Shevardnadze officially requested the 
presence of CIS troops in Georgia and gave assurances to local officers that servicemen 
would be protected. 629 On the one hand, Shevardnadze believed that Russian troops could 
provide significant help in the setting up of the new Georgian army, and on the other, he 
probably saw the troops as an internal guarantee of security against any return of 
Gamsakhurdia's forces 
. 
6'0 Third, Russia was experiencing serious difficulties in resettling 
all the former Soviet troops that were returning from Eastern Europe, and other former 
626 For Rutskoi's comments on the need to withdraw all CIS troops from Transcaucasia, see Radio 
Moscow World Service, 10 March 1992, in FBIS-SOV-92-048,11 March 1992 p. 10; For CIS 
Commander Shaposhnikov's comments, see Radio Moscow, 24 February 1992, in FBIS-SOV-92- 
038,26 February 1992, p. 17. 
627 Interview with Lt. -Gen. Suffian Beppayev, Commander of the TCMD, Interfax, 6 March 1992 
in FBIS-SOV-092-045,6 March 1992, p. 70. 
628 This was confirmed by Grachev in an interview with Mayak Radio on 29 May 1992. (FBIS- 
SOV-92-105,1 June 1992, pp. 65-66. ) 
629 Russian TV, 11 March 1992, FBIS-SOV 92-049,12 March 1992, p. 10. 
630 Georgian Defence Minister Lt. Levan Sharashenidze stated that Georgia sought support from 
the TCMD for the creation of the Georgian army. (Besik Urigashvili, `Georgia is Forming its 
Own Army', Izvestiya, 30 April 1992 p. 2, in FBIS-SOV92-085,1 May 1992 p. 57. ) 
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Soviet states, and therefore was happy to delay the return of those troops which were not 
subjected to daily attacks. Last, but not least, the Russian MOD had already, at this early 
stage, given Georgia special priority in Russia's new geo-strategic map. Interviewed by 
Radio Mayak, on 29 May 1992, Grachev said that 'strategically speaking, Georgia's 
territory is a zone of interests for Russia. 'ti3' Therefore, after placing under its temporary 
jurisdiction all forces belonging to the TCMD on 19 March 1992, Russia engaged in 
negotiations with Georgian government to reach an agreement that would legalise the 
presence of these forces on Georgian soil. These negotiations lasted for almost two years 
until a first agreement on a Russian presence was reached in February 1994. 
Although Georgia was ready to accept a Russian military presence on its territory, its 
leaders still intended to claim what they considered was Georgia's legitimate share of the 
former Soviet Army material. At the end of April 1992, Shevardnadze officially demanded 
the transfer to Georgia's jurisdiction of part of the arms and equipment belonging to the 
TCMD deployed on Georgian territory, as well as the transfer of part of the Black Sea 
Fleet located along the Georgian coast . 
ö32 Russia agreed to the division of the former Soviet 
Armed forces, and negotiations on the allocation of material began in May 1992. Russia's 
decision was part of an overall strategy of restructuring and reducing the size of the 
Russian armed forces, as well as of an awareness that nothing could be done to stop the 
formation of national armies. As Grachev clearly explained, denial of equipment to the 
Georgian side most certainly would have resulted in the illegal capture of material from 
Russian military installations, thus endangering the lives of Russian servicemen, as was 
happening in Azerbaijan. On 15 May 1992, agreement was reached on the transfer of 
military equipment to Georgia on the basis of the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe 
(CFE), 633 and on 27 May 1992, Grachev instructed the TCMD to give Georgia 100 
artillery guns and combat infantry vehicles, 30 tanks, 10,000 Kalashnikov submachine 
guns and 2,000 Makarov pistols. However, Grachev made it clear to Georgian leaders that 
material would be transferred only if it was not used in ethnic conflicts, thus indicating that 
the Russian MOD did not intend to supply weapons to Georgia in order to exacerbate 
potential conflicts in the region. 634 On the contrary, the perpetuation of the conflict in South 
631 Radio Mayak, 29 May 1992, in FBIS-SOV-92-105,1 June 1992, pp. 65-66. 
632 Besik Urigashvili, `Georgia is Forming its Own Army', p. 2. 
633 According to this agreement, Georgia was to receive 220 tanks, 220 APC, 135 artillery pieces, 
100 planes and 50 helicopters. ('Dokument: Dogovor po obychnym vooruzheniyam: posledstvia 
dlya Rossii', Nezavisimaya gazeta, 29 July 1992 p. 1,3). 
634 Moscow Mayak Radio, 29 May 1992, in FB1S-SOV 92-105,1 June 1992, p. 35. 
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Ossetia, and the emergence of instability in Abkhazia delayed the transfer of equipment for 
a couple of months. 635 Only in July 1992, did Russia finally proceed with the transfer of all 
allotted weapons to Georgia. 
When fighting initially broke out in August 1992, Georgia found itself in a clearly 
advantageous military position. During the initial offensive, Georgia used part of the 
material received from the TCMD, including 30 battle tanks, and a similar number of 
infantry fighting vehicles, to crush the Abkhaz resistance. 636 The Abkhaz soldiers in 
contrast, were simply fighting with shot-guns and sticks, and only had seven or eight tanks 
and armoured personnel carriers, and about 3,000 pieces of firearms. 637 These development 
led to a reassessment of Russia's military policies towards Georgia and a hardening of the 
position of the Russian MOD. Immediately after violence erupted, Grachev sent an 
airborne division to the Russian base in Gudauta in order to protect the Russian Army 
units stationed in Abkhazia and to help evacuate Russian citizens trapped there . 
638 
Although the main aim was to protect the local civilian population, Russian paratroopers 
apparently made it clear from the start that any attempt to cross the Gumista river and 
advance on Gudauta would be perceived as a hostile attack, thus effectively sealing off 
Kitovani's vanguard in Gagra from Georgian supplies. 639 Moreover, on 31 August 1992, 
the Russian Chief of the General Staff, Col. -Gen. Viktor Dubynin threatened to intervene 
in order to stop actions which endangered the lives of Russian citizens or the security of 
the region. '640 Russia's menacing statements and its growing involvement in the crisis 
resulted in an exacerbation of Georgian-Russian relations, within the background of an 
extremely explosive situation in Abkhazia. During the Autumn of 1992, the Georgian 
leadership increasingly perceived Russia as the main enemy in its confrontation with the 
Abkhaz and thus began pressing for the withdrawal of Russian troops initially from 
Abkhazia and eventually from the whole of Georgia. The Russian MOD, in turn, became 
635 Pavel Felgengauer, `General Grachev: 9 iunya posleduiut novye naznacheniya v Ministerstve 
Oborony iv Armii', p. 2; Lt. -Col. Vladimir Mukhin, `Voina v Zakavkaz'e i Pridnestrov'e tol'ko 
nachinaetsya', Nezavismaya gazeta, 26 June 1992, p. 2. 
636 Akaky Mikadze, 'Abkhazia: Another South Ossetia? ', Moscow News, 1992,34, p. 5. 
63' Akaky Mikadze, `A Tragic August in Abkhazia', Moscow News, 1992,35, p. 4. 
638 Interfax, 17 August, 1992, in FBIS-SOV-92-160,18 August 1992, p. 9. 
639 Pavel Baev, Russia's Policies in the Caucasus, p. 45. 
640 Itar-tass, 31 August 1992, in Catherine Dale, `Turmoil in Abkhazia: Russian Responses', p. 
53. 
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more and more supportive of the Abkhaz cause and favourable of keeping a military 
presence in Georgia at any cost»' 
In early October 1992, Abkhaz military formations, with the support of North Caucasian 
volunteers, heavy armoured equipment, including T-72 tanks, and rockets from Grad and 
Alazan launchers, conducted a successful offensive in northern Abkhazia and dislodged the 
Georgians from the Gagra region .° 
`' The Abkhaz offensive led to a string of Georgian 
accusations that Russia had supplied the Abkhaz with military equipment from the Russian 
base at Bombora. The Russian MOD systematically denied these accusations, and insisted 
that Russian troops had maintained strict neutrality. "3 Whether or not Russia provided 
military help to Abkhazia, at this early stage of the conflict, is difficult to know, given that 
hard evidence regarding Russia's participation in the transfer of material is lacking. Some 
early reports suggest that only Russia could have provided the Abkhaz with the military 
equipment, since T-72 and T-80 tanks were neither produced in Gudauta nor in the North 
Caucasus. Consequently, they could only have reached Abkhazia by sea or by air, with the 
tacit approval of Russia. 644However, no hard evidence seems to have been found yet to 
sustain the hypothesis that Moscow ordered the transfer of these weapons to the Abkhaz. It 
seems more plausible that Russian forces in Abkhazia acted independently, either in 
support of the Abkhaz cause or simply, in order to obtain financial profits. The 
development of a profitable local weapons trade was acknowledged not only by respectable 
645 journalists, but also by the deputy commander of the TCMD, General Sufian Beppayev. 
Moreover, the Abkhaz themselves, like the Georgians, conducted regular attacks against 
Russian military installations in Gudauta in order to obtain military equipment. 
Apparently, shortly after the Georgian attack in August 1992, the Abkhaz assaulted an air 
defence regiment deployed in Gudauta, and a substantial number of machine guns were 
641 Yurii Gladkevich, `Chem zapratit "tret'ya sila"? ', Krasnaya zvezda, 15 September 1992, p. 1; 
Yurii Gladkevich, 'Prolog k bol'shoi voine? ', Krasnaya zvezda, 7 October 1992, pp. 1,3; Yurii 
Gladkevich, `Russkie v Abkhazii s nadezhdoi smotryat oni segodnya na Rossiiu', Krasnaya 
zvezda, 16 October 1992, p. 1. 
642 Besik Urigashvili, `Ataka na Gagru: ranenye i ubitie ischislyaiutsya desyatkami', Izvestiya, 2 
October 1992, p. 2; Besik Urigashvili, `Politicheskii kompromiss obernulsya dlya Gruzii voennym 
porazheniem v Gagrakh', Izvestiya, 5 October 1992, pp. 1-2. 
643 Nodar Broladze, `Voina v Abkhazii: otnosheniya mezhdu Gruziei I Rossiei stremitel'no 
ukhudshaiutsya', Nezavisimaya gazeta, 6 October 1992, p. 3. 
644 Besik Urigashvili, `Ataka na Gagru: ranenye i ubitie ischislyaiutsya desyatkami', p. 2. 
645 Personal interview with Aleksandr Zhilin, A'Ioskovksie novosti military correspondent, 
Moscow, November 1996; General Suffian Beppayev, interviewed by L'Unita', 22 October 1992 
p. 12, in FBIS-SOV-92-211,30 October 1992 p. 68. 
186 
captured. 646 Whether weapons were handed by Russian servicemen or whether they were 
actually stolen is difficult to determine. However, the evidence seems to indicate that 
during August-October 1992, the Abkhaz received a substantial part of their weapons from 
local Russian troops, most probably without Moscow's approval. 
In the Winter of 1992-1993, the strategy of the Russian MOD acquired a new dimension, 
as the Russian military got progressively more involved in the conflict, and began 
providing direct military support to the Abkhaz. Local journalists reported that, on 21 
February 1993, the Russian MOD sent an SU-25 fighter plane to bomb Sukhumi -a report 
never denied by the Russian MOD. `' In early March 1993, as Abkhaz bombings on 
Sukhumi intensified, a deserter, who was a regular officer in the Russian special forces, 
stated that the Abkhaz side had received large amounts of fuel from Russia as well as 20 
state-of-the-art T-72 tanks. Moreover, Russian military specialists apparently arrived in 
Gudauta to advise the Abkhaz side. The deserter also affirmed that soldiers from a Russian 
army landing-force battalion stationed in Nizhnie Eshery were directly involved in combat 
operations on the side of the Abkhaz. 648 Furthermore, on 11 March 1993, Interfax reported 
that a team of Russian officers was helping the Abkhaz to plan the recapture of Abkhazia. 
On 12 March 1993, an SU-25 fighter plane with Russian identification marks dropped 
bombs on the village of Tsagera in the Ochamchira region. 649 Although Grachev stated that 
it was a Georgian SU-25 aircraft, with painted Russian emblems, that was bombing 
Sukhumi and other populated areas in Abkhazia, such an interpretation is hard to accept. 650 
Apparently, the Russian airborne assault unit at the Bombora airfield in Abkhazia also 
took a direct part in the assaults of Sukhumi both in March, July and September 1993.65' 
The Russian Ministry of Defence regularly denied the involvement of Russian forces in the 
attack on Sukhumi and insisted that all Russian units in Abkhazia were maintaining strict 
neutrality, a position also upheld by Russian officers in Gudauta. 652 However, these claims 
seem very hard to sustain on the basis of the available evidence. 
646 Yekaterina Glebova, An Ordinary War', A'Ioscow News, 1992,42, p. 4. 
647 Sergei Taranov and Besik Urigashvili, `Bombardirovka Sukhumi rezko oslozhnila otnosheniya 
Rossii s Gruziei', Izvestiya, 23 February 1993, p. 1. Georgia accused Russia of bombing the 
residential quarters of Sukhumi. The Russian Ministry of Defence did not deny the attack, it 
simply affirmed that the raid was against military installations and not against the civilian 
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648 Besik Urigashvili, `Abkhazkie voiska shturmuiut Sukhumi', 17 March 1993, p. 1. 
649 Interfax, 11 and 13 March 1993, FB1S-SOU 93-048,15 March 1993, pp. 15-16. 
650 Interfax, 18 March 1993, FBIS-SOV 93-052,19 March 1993, p. 10. 
65) Tbilisi 7 DGHE, 22-28 September 1995, in FBIS-SOU 95-194,6 October 1995, p. 73. 
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What were Russia's aims in providing help to the Abkhaz'? Was the N10D trying to put 
pressure on Georgia in order to bring it back into Russia's sphere of influence? The 
available evidence seems to indicate that the Russian MOD decided to support the Abkhaz 
in order to secure a Russian military presence in the country. In mid-December 1992, the 
Georgian parliament had demanded the withdrawal of Russian troops from Abkhazia, and 
had threatened to demand the withdrawal of all Russian troops from Georgia. 653 The 
Russian MOD, however, was eager to keep a military presence in Abkhazia and the rest of 
Georgia. In February 1993, Grachev openly declared that Russia considered Georgia and 
area of key strategic importance, and made it clear that Russia wanted to keep a military 
presence in that country. During the last Abkhaz offensive on Sukhumi, in September 
1993, Grachev put strong pressure on Georgia in order to obtain a military presence in that 
country and, after the dislodging of the Georgians from Abkhazia, Russia finally succeeded 
in obtaining the consent of the Georgian government for the presence of Russian forces on 
Georgian soil. Although agreement on the issue had been reached during the visit of 
Grachev to Tbilisi on 1 September 1993, the final offensive wiped out the last doubts, 
since the Georgian leadership became aware that without Russia's support it could not set 
up its own army, repel any eventual attack and restore its authority over Abkhazia. 
Russia's military presence in Georgia was legalised in the Friendship and Co-operation 
treaty signed on 3 February 1994 which stipulated the presence of three Russian military 
bases in Georgia - Batumi, Akhalkalaki, and Vaziani, near Tbilisi - and the joint border 
protection of the Georgian-Turkish border. The agreement also envisaged Russian support 
for the creation of the Georgian army. Russia's military bases in Georgia were intended to 
fulfil three purposes. First, Russian forces were seen as part of a unified system of military 
bases in Transcaucasia, aimed at deterring a large-scale foreign intervention in the internal 
conflicts of the region. Second, the bases were intended to guarantee the isolation and 
containment of the explosive North Caucasian region. Finally, they were aimed at ensuring 
stability inside Georgia. 654 On the basis of this evidence, it can therefore be argued with 
almost total certainty that the Russian Defence Ministry used covert military support to 
introduce a military presence in Georgia, and thus keep this area under Russia's sphere of 
influence. 
653 Itar-tass, 25 December 1992, cited by Catherine Dale, `Turmoil in Abkhazia: Russian 
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c. Russian Mediation Activities 
When fighting broke out in Abkhazia in the summer of 1992, the Russian leadership, in 
particular President Yeltsin and Foreign Minister Kozyrev decided, after some initial 
hesitation, to conduct an active policy aimed at bringing about a negotiated and peaceful 
settlement of the conflict. Although Russia made it clear that it regarded events in 
Abkhazia as an internal Georgian affair, and officially supported the unity and territorial 
integrity of Georgia, Russian leaders also showed concern for the fate of Abkhazians and 
Russians, inhabiting the area. Kozyrev emphasised that Russia would not 'stand idly by if 
the lives of Russian citizens were endangered, ' and Yeltsin stressed the need to put an end 
to hostilities and protect the human rights and legitimate interests of the Abkhaz and other 
peoples of Georgia. '655 In an effort to protect its nationals and defuse tension, Russia 
immediately sent a regiment of paratroopers to Abkhazia to evacuate Russian citizens, and 
introduced measures to reinforce the Russian-Georgian border along the Psou river in order 
to prevent the penetration of armed formations into Georgian territory . 
656 In addition, it 
conducted active mediation efforts aimed at stopping the violence, which soon bore fruits. 
On 3 September 1992, Yeltsin brokered the first cease-fire agreement, which temporarily 
put an end to violence. The agreement envisaged the establishment of a trilateral 
commission made up of representatives of Georgia, Abkhazia and Russia, responsible for 
monitoring the cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of forces. 
657 The cease-fire, 
however, collapsed in early October 1992, when the Abkhaz launched their offensive on 
151 Gagra. 
The Abkhaz attack on Gagra and the growing perception that Russia was supporting the 
Abkhaz campaign substantially eroded Russia's mediation capabilities, and significantly 
worsened relations between Moscow and Tbilisi. Georgia placed all military property of 
the TCMD located on Georgian territory under Georgian jurisdiction, causing great uproar 
among the Russian MOD. 659 Moreover, during October-November 1992, as 
fighting 
intensified around Sukhumi, Georgian forces conducted regular attacks against 
TCMD 
655 Russian TV, `Vesti', 17 August, 1992 , 
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installations, which often led to artillery duels. 66° Russian-Georgian relations reached a low 
ebb during the Winter and early Spring of 1993, as Russian-supported Abkhaz attacks 
against Sukhumi intensified, and the Russian military issued increasingly assertive policy 
statements concerning Russia's interests in the region - an indication that control over 
Russia's policies towards Abkhazia was slipping away from the Foreign Ministry into the 
hands of the Ministry of Defence. In January 1993, the Georgian leader, mistrustful of 
Russian mediation, asked the UN to mediate in the conflict, and requested that a UN 
peacekeeping force be sent to the conflict zone, but UN involvement took too long to 
arrive. 66' In May 1993, the UN Secretary General appointed Eduard Brunner as his Special 
Envoy for Georgia, but his mediation efforts proved unsuccessfu1.662 
Despite the reverses of Russian diplomacy, and Georgia's perception that Russia was not a 
neutral party to the conflict, Yeltsin and the Russian MFA resumed their negotiating 
efforts, during the Spring and Summer of 1993. The two cease-fires brokered by Yeltsin 
and the MFA on 14 May and on 27 July 1993 showed that Russia remained the only 
external mediator both willing to and capable of negotiating a halt in the violence, mainly 
because it alone possessed the political, military and economic clout to force the sides to a 
compromise. Besides being the dominant economic power, Russia retained a dominant 
military presence in the region, whereas the conflicting sides' had limited military 
capabilities. The 27 July cease-fire represented a major success for Russian diplomacy, 
since it envisaged the participation of Russian forces, subject to UN approval, in the 
implementation of the cease-fire and the maintenance of law and order. 663 Moreover, in the 
summer of 1993, the UN agreed to the establishment of a UN Observer Mission in Georgia 
(UNOMIG) with a strength of 88 military observers, responsible for verifying compliance 
with the cease-fire agreement . 
66`` The conditions for a lasting settlement seemed to have 
been achieved. However, soon after the arrival of the first UNOMIG personnel, in mid- 
September 1993, the Abkhaz launched a final offensive on Sukhumi and managed to 
restore control over the rest of Abkhazia. 
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The Abkhaz offensive dealt a severe blow to Russia's efforts aimed at reaching a lasting 
settlement of the conflict and brought to light the limitations of Russia's diplomacy. During 
most of 1992 and 1993, Russia's mediation efforts had been negatively affected by the 
contradictory policies conducted by the MOD and the MFA. Whereas Kozvrev and other 
senior members of the Russian government, such as Deputy Prime Minister Sergei 
Shakhrai, attempted to find a settlement of the conflict which would involve a recognition 
of Georgia's territorial integrity and a respect for Abkhazia's autonomous status, the MOD 
openly sympathised with the Abkhaz, provided the latter with covert military support, and 
made every effort to legalise Russia's military presence in Georgia. The MOD's pro- 
Abkhaz stance was shared by most members of the Russian parliament, as indicated by the 
resolution adopted by the Supreme Soviet on 25 September 1992. In direct contradiction 
with the official policy of the Russian government, the resolution condemned the policies of 
the Georgian government and recommended that Russia both abstain from signing 
economic agreements with Georgia and refuse to provide Shevardnadze with arms and 
military equipment. Moreover, a point on Georgia's territorial integrity and Russia's 
respect of Georgia's state sovereignty was removed from the text. 665 Although the 
statement did not directly affect the policies of the Russian MFA, it brought to light the 
different approaches of the Russian parliament and the government, towards the Abkhaz 
and most other military conflicts in the FSS. Most Supreme Soviet deputies favoured more 
assertive policies in support of pro-Russian minorities within the former Soviet states. 
They tended to favour the right of self-determination of those entities eager to join Russia, 
to the detriment of the territorial integrity of the new states, attesting to an `imperial' 
thinking. Similar views were held by the Russian military, most of whom found it very 
difficult to accept Russia's newly acquired borders, as well as the independence of the 
FSS, in particular Georgia, Ukraine and Belarus. They tended to believe that the map of 
Russia could easily be changed, and therefore were eager to take and protect as many 
territories loyal to Russia as possible. 666 Yeltsin and Kozyrev, instead, were supportive of 
the territorial integrity of the newly independent states, and of abiding with the principles of 
international law regulating inter-state relations, enshrined in the UN Charter and the 
CSCE Paris Declaration of 1990, which upheld the respect for the territorial integrity of 
66' 
states and refused to accept forcible changes of borders. 
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Immediate reactions to the Abkhaz offensive again brought to light the conflicting agendas 
of the Foreign and Defence Ministries. Whereas the MFA condemned the Abkhaz 
offensive, accused the Abkhaz side of violating the truce and imposed an economic 
blockade on Abkhazia'66' Defence Minister Grachev laid the blame primarily on the 
Georgians, and declared that there had been serious violations of the cease-fire agreement 
on both sides . 
669 Moreover, Grachev turned down Shevardnadze's request that Russian 
troops in the region help restore the previous positions of the warring parties. When 
Shevardnadze eventually agreed to the immediate dispatch of a Russian peacemaking force 
as requested by Grachev, the latter refused to send such forces, arguing that it was too 
late. 670 The MOD's apparent covert support for the Abkhaz and Grachev's refusal to come 
to Shevardnadze's help attested to a desire to put maximum pressure on Georgia so that it 
agree to the presence of Russian troops in Georgia, and join the CIS and the Collective 
Security Treaty (CST). In exchange for military support in his struggle against 
Gamsakhurdia's followers - in early November 1993, a Russian marine battalion landed on 
the Georgian coast in order to protect the Transcaucasian lines of communication - 
Shevardnadze was forced to agree to the presence of three Russian military bases on 
Georgian territory and to bring Georgia into the CIS and the CST. 6 ' It can therefore be 
argued that the Defence Ministry clearly followed a neo-imperialist policy aimed at 
enhancing Russia's military-strategic position in the region and thus bring Georgia back 
into Russia's sphere of influence. The MFA, instead, aimed its policy at reaching a 
peaceful settlement of the conflict which respected the territorial integrity of Georgia and 
granted Abkhazia a special status, thus attesting to a non-imperialist behaviour. Its 
involvement was primarily motivated by a desire to avoid the spread of violence and 
instability along Russia's southern borders, and reflected a concern for the potential 
negative repercussions that secessionists movements could have on the fragile internal 
structure of Russia itself. However, the MFA's views as far as peacekeeping is concerned, 
increasingly adopted a neo-imperialist character during the Autumn of 1993 and the whole 
of 1994. 
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d. The Introduction of Russian Peacekeepers 
The total dislodging of Georgian forces from Abkhazia in the Autumn of 1993 opened up a 
new phase in the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict, which lasted until the Spring of 1994, and 
which was characterised by intensive UN and Russian mediation efforts, aimed at securing 
a lasting cease-fire agreement and at preparing the ground for the deployment of 
international peacekeeping forces. The Russian NIFA proved supportive of an agreement 
which respected Georgia's territorial integrity, and seemed eager to work in strict 
collaboration with the UN, not only because Shervardnadze insisted on the involvement of 
international organisations, but also because UN participation provided additional 
legitimacy to Russian mediation and peacekeeping operations. At the UN-sponsored first 
round of negotiations held in Geneva during 30 November-I December 1993, Georgians 
and Abkhaz committed themselves to renounce the use of force, and asked for an increase 
in the number of military observers and the presence of an international peacekeeping force 
to monitor the cessation of violence. 67` The agreement also envisaged the creation of a 
group of experts, made up of representatives of the UN, the CSCE, Russia and the warring 
parties, and responsible for preparing recommendations on Abkhazia's future political 
status 673 
At the second round of UN-sponsored talks in Geneva in mid-January 1994, Georgia and 
Abkhazia again expressed their support for the deployment of UN peacekeeping forces, 
and this time agreed to the participation of Russian military contingents as part of the 
forces 674 The sides also asked the UN Security Council to expand the UNOMIG mandate 
and to entrust it with the verification of the cease-fire. 675 In view of these requests, the UN 
suggested that a UN peacekeeping force, under UN command, and including a contingent 
of Russian soldiers not exceeding one third of the force, be dispatched to the area to 
monitor the cease-fire and the withdrawal of force, and to create the conditions for the safe 
return of refugees. The UN also examined the possibility of the Security Council 
authorising a multinational military force involving primarily Russian contingents not 
672 I NSC, S/26875,15 December 1993, pp. 3-4. 
673 ibid. In addition, the parties agreed to create the necessary conditions for the safe return of 
refugees. The September-October 1993 Abkhaz offensive had resulted in the displacement of 
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under UN command, but monitored by UNOMIG. b76 Although both the Abkhaz and the 
Georgians showed preference for the first option, UN forces failed to materialise. On the 
one hand, disagreements existed between the Georgians and the Abkhaz, regarding the 
exact mandate of the forces. 67 On the other hand, the UN Secretary General refused to 
recommend to the Security Council the dispatch of a force, because he considered that the 
conditions were not ripe for such a deployment. The reservations raised by the Abkhaz as 
far as the peacekeeping mandate was concerned, the lack of acceptance by both sides of the 
Uzt proposals for the mandate and deployment of UN forces, as well as the lack of 
progress in the negotiations, made the UN operation highly risky. 678 But the main reason 
why UN forces were never sent was, as Boutros-Ghali explained, the absence of financial 
resources and the lack of political will by the international community to send forces to the 
region. 679 UN forces were broadly over-stretched at the time, concurrently conducting 
operations in many parts of the globe, and heavily engaged in the former Yugoslavia. 
On 4 April 1994, Russia finally managed to broker a lasting cease-fire agreement, which 
again envisaged the introduction of UN peacekeeping forces, involving a Russian 
contingent. However, the UN failed to assemble a force. In view of this, Russia decided to 
take the initiative, and on 14 May 1994 agreed with the Georgian and Abkhaz leadership to 
a Russian peacekeeping operation along the Inguri river with a CIS mandate and UN 
observation. The forces were to oversee the implementation of the cease-fire agreement, 
monitor the withdrawal of forces from a 12km-wide zone along the Inguri river, and 
promote the safe return of refugees to their homes in Abkhazia . 
6'0 Although this agreement 
legalised the Russian peacekeeping presence in Abkhazia, CIS approval of the operation 
arrived only in October 1994, five months after Russian forces took up their positions in 
Abkhazia. At the CIS summit on 21 October, CIS leaders granted the CIS forces a six 
month mandate aimed at promoting a full-scale settlement of the conflict and furthering the 
return of refugees. 681 Six months later, on 26 May 1995, CIS states expanded the CIS 
peacekeeping mandate, allowing the forces to fulfil other tasks aimed at the restoration of 
peace, in accordance with the decision of the commander of the forces and in co-ordination 
676 UNSC, S/1994180,25 January 1994, pp. 5-6. The force would monitor the disarmament and 
withdrawal of armed units along the demarcation line set by the Inguri and Psou rivers, and 
would also help create the conditions for the safe return of refugees to the Gali region. 
677 UNSC, S/1994/312,18 March 1994, p. 2. 
678 1 NSCE, S/1994/253,3 March 1994, p. 2; UNSC, S/1994/529,3 May 1994. 
679 Moscow NTV, 3 April 1994, in FBIS-SOU 94-064,4 April 1994, pp. 6-7. 
680 SSC, S/1994/583,21 May 1994, pp. 2-3. 
681 `Mandat na provedenie operatsii po podderzhaniiu mira v zone gruzino-abkhazskogo 
konflikta', 21 October 1994, Sodreahestvo, 1994,11, pp. 70-73. 
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with the warring sides. '68` The force's mandate however, remained quite limited, given that 
peacekeepers were expected to comply with the 20 March 1992 CIS peacekeeping 
agreement, which regulated peacekeeping activities very much in accordance with the 
traditional concept of monitoring a cease-fire and the separation of forces. 683 
In an attempt to justify Russia's actions, Foreign Minister Kozyrev wrote a letter to the 
UN Secretary General on 21 June 1994, in which he explained that the deployment of a 
CIS peacekeeping force was the only way to prevent a resumption of hostilities. Aware that 
the UN would not send troops in the immediate future Russia had decided to immediately 
deploy an advanced contingent based on the Russian troops already present in Abkhazia. 
The troops were to be part of a CIS collective force, and were to be deployed for a six 
months period, on the basis of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. 684 Kozyrev made it clear 
that the CIS did not intend to replace the UN, but instead wanted to help the UN in its 
efforts to restore peace. The CIS, according to Kozyrev, was willing to co-operate closely 
with UNOMIG. 68' In view of this situation, the UN resigned itself to approve the 
deployment of Russian peacekeeping forces, and modified the UNOMIG mandate so as to 
accommodate its activities with those of the Russian peacekeeping forces. Although 
Russian peacekeepers were not granted a UN mandate, their presence was `legalised' by 
the UN, whose military observers were asked to co-operate with CIS peacekeepers in the 
fulfilment of their mandate However, UN observers were also made responsible for the 
'[observation of] the operations of the peacekeeping forces', in other words they were 
entrusted with the of monitoring of Russian peacekeeping actions. 686 
e. Assessment of Russian Mediation and Peacekeeping 
The introduction of Russian peacekeeping forces and the ability of the Russian MOD to 
impose a Russian military presence in Georgia, seems to indicate that Russia intended to 
restore a neo-empire in the region, and this most probably was the aim of the Russian 
MOD. However, the motivations behind the Russian MFA's policies are harder to discern. 
682 `Mandat kollektivnykh sil po podderzhaniiu mira v zone konflikta v Abkhazii, Respublika 
Gruziya', 26 May 1995, Sodruzhestvo, 1995,6, p. 77. 
683 ibid., p. 78; `Soglashenie o Gruppakh voennikh nabliudatel'ei i kollektivnykh silakh Po 
podderzhaniiu mira v Sodruzhestve Nezavisimykh Gosudarstv', 20 March 1992, 
Sodruzhestvo, 1992,4, pp. 9-10. 
684 UNSC, S/1994/732,21 June 1994, pp. 2-3. 
685 ibid. 
686 UNSC Resolution 937, S/RES/937,21 July 1994, p. 2 
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During 1992 and most of 1993, Kozyrev worked hard to bring about a cessation of 
violence and a lasting settlement of the dispute which respected Georgia's territorial 
integrity and Abkhazia's autonomy. However, the last Abkhaz offensive which dislodged 
Georgian forces from Abkhazia, dealt a severe blow to the MFA and brought to light the 
predominance of the MOD over the MFA in policy-making towards Abkhazia. After these 
events, Kozyrev adopted a more assertive stance and his discourse became clearly neo- 
imperialistic. `[Abkhazia] is vital to Russia's interests' Kozyrev stated in an interview with 
Izvestiva on 8 October 1993, if Russia abandons its positions [in Abkhazia], other forces 
might replace it, leading to the destabilisation of the Northern Caucasus, the disintegration 
of Georgia, and eventually of Russia as well. '687 Although, according to Kozyrev, Russia 
was eager to collaborate with the UN, it did not want other regional players or Western 
countries to replace its predominant peacekeeping role in the area. 68' Neither did Russia 
689 want the UN or the CSCE to play a predominant role. 
Despite Kozyrev's assertive rhetoric, during the Winter and Spring of 1994 the MFA 
collaborated closely with the UN in order to reach a lasting settlement, and did not block 
the sending of a UN force. When UN forces failed to materialise, and a Russian 
peacekeeping force was introduced, Kozyrev tried hard to get a UN mandate for such an 
operation. Moreover, Russia agreed to UN monitoring of its operations and strictly 
collaborated with UNOMIG on the ground. Russia's readiness to provide at least some 
semblance of international legitimacy to its peacekeeping forces and its willingness to 
collaborate with the international community in negotiations and peacekeeping, might 
indicate that the Russian government, in particular the MFA, was not conducting a neo- 
imperialist policy. However, international participation provided additional legitimacy, and 
consequently further strength to Russia's military presence. Therefore, it is difficult to tell 
on the basis of this evidence whether or not Russian policies in the peacekeeping field were 
neo-imperialist. Most probably, the MOD saw Russian peacekeepers as part of its 
forward-basing strategy, whereas the MFA saw them as an instrument of regional stability. 
Whether or not Russia's policies were neo-imperial they actually resulted in Russia 
keeping an important military presence in Georgia, and this led to the establishment, to a 
certain extent, of a Russian neo-empire in Georgia. Although Russia regularly supported a 
687 Maksim Yusin, `Polgoda nazad Rutskoi skazal mne: "ya ikh nenavizhu, etikh krasn- 
korichnevykh" ', p. l 
688 ibid. 
689 Igor Rotar, Voennye dolzhny obladet' iskusstvom mirotvorchestva', pp. 1-2. 
196 
settlement which envisaged the territorial integrity of Georgia, Tbilisi never managed to 
restore control over Abkhazia, and Russian military forces remained in the area. 690 
Moreover, the various rounds of negotiations conducted under UN and Russian co- 
chairmanship between April 1994 and July 1996 did not manage to bring the position of 
the parties any closer together. However, after the signing of the Treaty of Friendship and 
Co-operation in February 1994, which legalised Russia's military presence in Georgia, 
bilateral relations improved, as both the MFA and the MOD began adopting a clearly pro- 
Georgian stance. The outbreak of the Chechen war in December 1994, and the risk that 
Georgia might become a rear base for Chechen operations, a possibility all the more likely 
given the close ties that existed between the Chechens and the Abkhaz, further increased 
the strategic importance of Georgia. In March 1995, Russia managed to obtain Georgia's 
approval for the stationing of Russian military forces in Georgia for a 25 year period. 
Russia not only obtained the basis of Vaziani, Akhalkalaki and Batumi, but also acquired 
the entire coastal infrastructure between the ports of Poti and Gudauta, including the ports 
of Poti and Ochamchira. However, Shevardnadze made it clear that he would not sign the 
treaty unless Georgia's jurisdiction was re-established over Abkhazia, and Georgian 
refugees were allowed to return to their homes in Abkhazia. Shevardnadze's conditions and 
Russia's own concern over the potential negative impact of Abkhaz separatism on 
Chechnya prompted Russia to put growing pressure on the Abkhaz. In December 1994, 
Russia closed its border with Abkhazia, dealing a significant blow to its economy, and in 
January 1996 it blockaded the port of Sukhumi to foreign ships. 691 Moreover, at the 19 
January 1996 CIS summit, Russia pressed for the adoption of a document on 'Measures to 
Settle the Conflict in Abkhazia', which imposed economic sanctions on Abkhazia. 692 
Russia's efforts, however, failed to bring the Abkhaz and the Georgians any closer to a 
political settlement, and as a result, Russia's military presence in Georgia remained shaky. 
690 In their 13 January 1994 joint communique, the UN, the CSCE and Russia called upon the 
parties to proceed from the need to observe the territorial integrity of Georgia. (UNSC, S11994/32, 
14 January 1994, p. 4). Most UN Security Council Resolutions on Abkahzia affirmed the respect 
for Georgia's sovereignty and territorial integrity (S/RES/876,19 October 1993; S/RES/896,31 
January 1994; SIRES/906,25 March 1994; S/RES/937,21 July 1994) The Russian-Georgian 
Friendship and Cooperation treaty signed on 3 February 1994 stipulated the respect for Georgia's 
and Russia's territorial integrity. ('Dogovor mezhdu Rossiiskoi Federatsiei i Respublikoi Gruziya 
o druzhbe, dobrososedsvte i sotrudnichestve', Svobodnaya Gruziia, 4 February 1994, p. 1. ) In 
early January 1996, Primakov stated that Russia's policies towards Abkhazia were based on the 
recognition of Georgia's territorial integrity and the need to agree on a status for Abkhazia within 
Georgia. ('Primakov nachinaet s SNG', Nloskovskie novosti, 14-21 January 1996, p. 13. ) 
691 Alla Barakhova, `Obostroilis' otnosheniya v treugol'nike "Rossiya - Gruziya - Abkhaziya" ', 
Nezavisimaya gazeta, 11 January 1996, p. 3. 
692 Mikhail Globachev, `Presidents Fail to Resolve Abkhaz Issue', Nezavisimaya gazeta, 24 
January 1996, p. 3, in CDPSP, XLVIII, 1996,4, p. 19. 
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3. Conclusion 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian military and diplomatic establishment 
considered Georgia a key country in strategic terms, both in terms of Russia's defence 
against Turkey in the south, and in terms of Russia's control over the north Caucasian 
republics. During the first half of 1992, with the advent of Shevardnadze to power in 
Tbilisi. Georgian-Russian relations improved significantly, and the Russian military 
became confident that they could preserve a military presence, albeit reduced, in that 
country. However, when the war erupted in Abkhazia, the position of the Russian Ministry 
of Defence towards the Georgian leadership hardened. What initially began as open 
'sympathies' for the Abkhaz cause, ended up in covert military support for the Abkhaz 
separatists, in view of the deterioration of Russia's relations with Tbilisi, and the demands 
of the latter that Russian troops withdraw from Georgia. By the end of 1992, the Russian 
Ministry of Defence managed to obtain the agreement of the Georgian government for the 
stationing of Russian forces in Georgia, and succeeded in sending a Russian-dominated 
peacekeeping force to the zone of conflict. The pro-Abkhaz stance however was not 
entirely shared by the Russian MFA which adopted a more balanced approach. Although it 
put pressure on Georgia to grant Abkhazia regional autonomy, the MFA as well as 
President Yeltsin always came up in support of Georgia's territorial integrity. The Abkhaz 
war thus brought to light the inconsistencies of Russian government polices in the near 
abroad, a result mainly of the different agendas of the Ministry of Defence and the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the upper hand acquired by the Ministry of Defence in 
resolving conflicts in the near abroad. Kozyrev's weak position prevented him from 
imposing his views on the rest of the government. 
Russia's active policies in Abkhazia did bring about Georgia's return into Russia's sphere 
of influence. However, Russia's initial involvement resulted from an exacerbation of the 
situation in the ground, provoked, by the way, by the Georgians themselves after 
Kitovani's storming of Sukhumi in August 1992, and not by a desire of Russia to create 
tension in order to intervene. Russia's actions in the initial phase of the conflict, from 
August to December 1992, responded to legitimate state interests, in this case, putting an 
end to instability and war along its southern borders. However, the evidence available 
seems to indicate that the Russian military eventually took an active role in support of the 
Abkhaz during the Winter and Spring of 1993. Thus, the case of intervention in support for 
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legitimate state interests does not really stand up to scrutiny after the Autumn of 1992. The 
Russian military clearly wanted to keep a military presence in Georgia and the Russian 
Foreign Ministry had made it clear it did not want other powers present in the region. 
Although no other country seemed ready to send troops to the area, except for Russia, this 
situation very much fitted Russia's desires. Russia allowed other foreign organisations to 
participate, in particular the UN, but it still managed to keep the dominant role. Above all, 
it managed to get UN support for its peacekeeping operations. Russian policies in Georgia 
therefore very much fitted the pattern of 'informal empire building. ' 
IV. The War in Nagorno-Karabagh 
1. Historical Background 
Nagorno-Karabagh, a predominantly Armenian-populated region in Azerbaijan, was 
granted the status of an autonomous oblast within the Azerbaijani Soviet Socialist republic 
in 1923.693 Starting in the 1940s, the Armenians systematically put forward the demand 
that the Nagorno-Karabagh enclave be re-attached to the Armenian republic, but with little 
success. As the Soviet system relaxed into the era of glasnost and perestroika, the 
Karabagh issue re-emerged. In February 1988, the Nagorno-Karabagh Soviet officially 
appealed to the Supreme Soviets of Armenia, Azerbaijan and the Soviet Union, to endorse 
the transfer of Nagorno-Karabagh to Armenia, but the pleas went unheard. During the 
Spring of 1998, Karabagh Armenians organised huge demonstrations both in Yerevan and 
Stepanakert, the Karabagh capital. This led to Azeri counter-demonstrations which 
eventually turned into riots and pogroms against large Armenian minorities in the cities of 
Sumgait and Baku. An attempt to administer the region directly from Moscow failed to 
stop the violence, and in November 1989 control over Karabagh was handed back to 
Azerbaijan. The Armenian Supreme Soviet retaliated by unilaterally declaring Karabagh's 
annexation to Armenia. In 1990-91, Soviet Army troops reportedly in co-operation with the 
693 The literature on the war in Nagorno-Karabagh reveals the following positions: Edmund 
Herzig and Oles M. Smolansky argued that Russia's tried to keep Azerbaijan within Russia's 
sphere of influence by exploiting the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict. (Edmund Herzig, The New 
Caucasus: Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, pp. 49,106; Oles M. Smolansky, `Russia and 
Transcaucasia: The Case of Nagorno-Karabagh', pp. 201-230) Pavel Baev, in turn, claimed that 
Russia was not interested in a peaceful resolution of the Karabagh conflict, because regional 
peace would devalue Russia's military assets and leave it with few political levers. (Pavel Baev, 
Russia's Policies in the Caucaus, p. 43. ) Alex Zverev instead raised the multi-faceted character of 
Russia's policies in the region. (Alexei Zverev, `Ethnic Conflicts in the Caucasus', pp. 32-35) 
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Azerbaijani ONION security troops conducted systematic deportations of Armenians from 
Nagorno-Karabagh, leading to several waves of fighting 
After the August 1991 coup, Azerbaijan immediately declared its independence from the 
Soviet Union, leading to Nagorno-Karabagh's declaration of independence from 
Azerbaijan in September 1991. Nagorno-Karabagh's initiative seriously complicated 
relations between its leaders and the Armenian government in Yerevan. Under the terms of 
a cease-fire agreement signed in late September 1991, and mediated by President Yeltsin 
and his Kazakh counterpart, Nursultan Nazarbaev, Armenia abjured all territorial claims 
on Nagorno-Karabagh, although it continued to insist that the oblast had a right of 
autonomy. On 20 November 1991, the cease-fire agreement collapsed when a helicopter 
carrying Azeri and Russian officials on their way to Stepanakert, for talks on a cease-fire 
agreement, crashed. Azerbaijan put the blame on Armenia and retaliated by abolishing 
Nagorno-Karabagh's autonomous status within Azerbaijan. The situation became 
increasingly exacerbated when a referendum held on 10 December 1991 confirmed 
Nagorno-Karabagh's desire for independence. Two days later, the Nagorno-Karabagh 
authorities demanded to accede to the CIS. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the 
conflict which had already reached a violent stage acquired a new international status. 
2. Russia's Involvement 
a. Russia's Motivations 
What were Russia's interests in the region, and why did Russia get involved in the conflict? 
The development of the war in Nagorno-Karabagh represented another serious threat to 
Russia's security interests in Transcaucasia, especially in terms of the negative 
repercussions that the conflict could have on the unstable North Caucasian region, as far as 
weapons' smuggling, drug trafficking, exodus of refugees, and overall instability were 
concerned. Moreover, the Transcaucasian region as a whole was perceived by Russian 
leaders, in particular the military, as an area of key military-strategic importance, primarily 
in terms of countering a potential threat from Turkey. 694 Armenia and Georgia were 
considered the two main pillars of Russia's security in the southern flank. Azerbaijan, 
although not directly bordering Turkey, except for an eleven-km section along the 
694 Postfactum, 18 March 1992, in FBIS-SOV-92-054,19 March 1992, p. 18. 
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Nakhichevan border, still retained crucial importance, not least because of its valuable 
energy resources. Control over the rich Azerbaijani oil resources and over the pipeline 
routes which transported the oil from the Caspian sea to the West very much determined 
Russia's strategy towards the area. Some Russian scholars even argued that Russia tried to 
keep the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict constantly simmering, in order to prevent the transit 
of Azeri oil from the Caspian Sea through Turkey, thus securing its passage through 
Russia. 695 However, enough hard proof to sustain such a hypothesis is lacking. Russian 
leaders were also very much concerned that other regional powers, such as Iran and 
Turkey, might displace Russia from what they considered was Russia's natural sphere of 
influence . 
696 Moreover, the Russian military were particularly worried that an exacerbation 
of the conflict might lead to the stationing of foreign troops, especially NATO troops, in 
the area. In June 1992, CIS Commander-in-Chief Marshal Shaposhnikov openly stated his 
opposition to NATO forces conducting peacekeeping operations in the former Soviet space 
under the aegis of the CSCE. 697 All these factors most probably explain Russia's readiness 
to conduct an active policy in the region in order to reach a negotiated settlement, and 
Russia's desire to be the dominant force in any eventual peace-keeping operation in the 
area. 
b. Russian Military Support to the Warring Sides 
The current section will examine whether Russia deliberately exacerbated the Nagorno- 
Karabagh conflict, by providing military support to either side involved in the fighting, in 
order to impose its military presence in the region, and thus bring both Armenia and 
Azerbaijan back into Russia's sphere of influence. In order to correctly evaluate Russia's 
military policies in Nagorno-Karabagh, it is necessary first to examine the developments of 
Russia's military presence in Armenia and Azerbaijan. When the Soviet Union collapsed, 
Soviet military forces in the region - the 7th Army in Armenia, the 4th Army in Azerbaijan, 
and the 366th Motorised Infantry Division (MID) in Nagorno-Karabagh - were placed 
under CIS jurisdiction. Only when Russia created its own armed forces in May 1992, were 
695 Personal interview with Sergei Solodovnik, Scholar at the Moscow State Institute for 
International Relations, MGIMO, Moscow, November 1997. 
696 Andranik Migranyan, `Podlinnye i mnimiye orientiry vo vneshnei politike', p. 4. 
697 Colonel O. Falichev, `Ya protiv togo, chtoby voiska NATO ispoizovalis' dlya uregulirovaniya 
nashikh vnutrennikh konfliktov', Krasnaya Zvezda, 23 June 1992, p. 3. Similar views were taken 
by First Deputy of the Russian Chief of the General Staff, Col. Gen. Mikhail Kolesnikov. (Pavel 
Felgengauer, `Voennye ozhidayut vmeshatel'stva zapada' Nezavisimaya gazeta, 1 August 1992, 
p. 1. ) 
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these forces put under Russia's control. Their status for a while, therefore, remained 
unclear, and as conflict in Nagorno-Karabagh exacerbated, the CIS forces soon found 
themselves involved in the fighting, often against their own will. From late 1991 until the 
mid-1992, armed detachments in Armenia, and especially in Azerbaijan, conducted regular 
attacks on CIS/Russian military installations in order to obtain military hardware for the 
war in Nagorno-Karabagh, thus putting the lives of local servicemen in danger. 698 In 
Nagorno-Karabagh, Azen forces carried out intensive shelling campaigns against the 366th 
MID based in Stepanakert. In response to attacks on Stepanakert, Karabagh Armenians 
stormed and captured the town of Khodzhaly in late February 1992, allegedly with the 
699 support of the CIS 366th MID, causing the death of over a thousand civilians. 
What role did the 366th MID play in the fighting? Accusations that the 366th MID was 
siding with the Karabagh Armenians were regularly denied by CIS military commanders, 
and were never confirmed by an independent inquiry. However, Interfax reported that the 
366th MID did take part in military operations in the village of Khodzhaly, following 
orders from the Commander of the TCMD, and acting in self-defence. 70° Moreover, there is 
substantial circumstantial evidence indicating that CIS officers and servicemen from the 
366th regiment decided, on a voluntary basis, to help the Karabagh Armenians. Many 
officers and soldiers belonging to the CIS armed forces in Nagorno- Karabagh were of 
Armenian nationality and therefore strongly sympathised with the Karabagh cause. 
Moreover, lucrative profits could be obtained both from the illegal sale of weapons and 
from mercenary participation. Izvestiya journalist Viktor Litovkin reported that individual 
officers and soldiers from the 366th MID participated, on a voluntary basis, in military 
actions on both sides. Apparently, when the 366th division was ordered to withdraw form 
the zone of armed conflict, Major Oganyan, commander of the second Motorised Infantry 
Battalion,. along with several Armenian officers and soldiers under his command, seized a 
tank, three infantry fighting vehicles and two artillery pieces, and occupied commanding 
positions to the south of the village of Balydzha. 70' However, after the events in 
Khodzhaly, the 366th MID, as well as the other armed forces located along the Armenian- 
698 Postfactum, 20 March 1992, in FBIS-SOV-92-056,23 March 1992, p. 19. 
699 For attacks against 366th MID, see Viktor Litovkin, `Nagornii Karabakh: Armiya - god 
pritsel'nym ognem', Izvestiya, 24 February 1992, p. '; Moscow TV, 18 February 1992 in FBIS- 
SOV-92-034,20 February 1992, p. 89; Interfax, 26 February 1992, in FBIS-SOV-92-039, p. 77. 
700 Interfax, 27 February 1992, in FBIS-SOV-92-040,28 February 1992, p. 61. 
701 Viktor Litovkin, `Nagornii Karabakh: Armiya - god pritsel'nym ognem', Izvestiya, 4 March 
1992, pp. 1-2. 
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Azerbaijani border, were immediately withdrawn to Russia, and no more Russian forces 
were left in the area. 702 
The withdrawal of the 366th MID clearly indicated that CIS and Russian commanders did 
not want Russian forces to get involved in the conflict. During 1992 and most of 1993, the 
Russian government, in agreement with the MOD, conducted a policy of disengagement 
and retreat from the region, rather than increased involvement. In 1992, Russia began 
withdrawing its forces from Azerbaijan, and by the end of May 1993, the last units of the 
Russian army left the military base of Gyandzha. 703 Only a small Russian military presence 
guarding the Gabala radar station was retained. Russia also significantly decreased its 
military presence in Armenia - the number of troops fell from 20,000 in October 1992 to 
5,000 in October 1994.70 Moreover, in the Spring of 1992, the Russian MOD proceeded 
with the synchronous transfer of combat equipment and weapons from the TCMD both to 
Azerbaijan and to Armenia, in accordance with the CFE Treaty. In Azerbaijan, where more 
than 4,000 weapons from the Russian Army had already been privatised during 1991- 
1992, the transfer was often only registered on paper. 70' Armenia `privatised' a smaller 
quantity of combat equipment and weapons from the TCMD, only about 200 items. It 
therefore found itself initially in a less advantageous position. 706 However, once it received 
its own share of the weapons, the situation on the ground was reversed, especially after 
Karabagh Armenian forces opened the Lachin corridor to Armenia in mid-May 1992. It 
can therefore be argued that during 1992 and most of 1993, Russia did not try to 
702 Moscow Mayak Radio, 28 February 1992, in FBIS-SOV 92-040,28 Feb. 1992 p. 60. Georgian 
journalist sources also describe large amounts of firearms and ammunition from the Russian 
147th Motorised Division based in Akhalkalaki (Georgia) being transferred to Karabagh 
Armenian fighters during the Spring of 1992, and of Russian T-72 tanks from the same division, 
with Russian crew, launching successful offensive actions against Susha and Lachin. However, 
these reports must be treated with caution. On the one hand, it is difficult to explain how these 
forces reached Nagorno-Karabagh given that the corridors to Armenia were not open then. 
However, it might be possible that the forces intervened from the Armenian side. On the other 
hand, if Russian forces did intervene, it is more likely that they were acting on a voluntary basis, 
given that in the Spring of 1992, Russia was actually withdrawing its forces from Nagorno- 
Karabagh. (Thilissi, 7 DGHE , 
22-28 Sept. 1995, in FBIS-SO V-95-194,6 October 1995, p. 74. ) 
703 Stephen Foye, `Russia's Defence Establishment in Disarray', RFE/RL Research Report, 2, 
1993,10 September 1993, pp. 49-54. 
704 Pavel Baev, Russia's Policies in the Caucaus, p. 24. 
705 The Russian army was accused of helping Azerbaijan in the military operations in Nagorno- 
Karabagh. But this was not the case. Under existing agreements, the personnel of units 
transferred to the republic's jurisdiction could serve in Azerbaijan's army. According to data from 
the republic's Defence Ministry, almost 10 percent of servicemen of Slavic nationality exercised 
this right. (Lt. Col. Vladimir Mukhin, `Voina v Zakavkaz'e i Pridnestrov'e tol'ko nachinaetsya', 
Nezavisimaya gazeta, 26 June 1992, p. 2. ) 
706 ibid. 
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exacerbate the conflict in order to keep or introduce a military presence in the region. This 
does not mean however, that Russian-made weapons did not reach both sides involved in 
the conflict. During 1992-1993, the armies stationed in Armenia and Azerbaijan 
independently engaged in the sale of military weapons and equipment to both sides of the 
conflict. 707 Eye-witness accounts describe the emergence of a regular pipeline of weapons' 
supplies from Russia in 1992.708 However, this cannot be equated with a deliberate policy 
by the Russian government and the MOD in Moscow to keep the conflict simmering in 
order to preserve a stalemate and intervene militarily. It seems more likely that such 
weapons' flows resulted from personal and corporate initiatives - the military, the military 
industrial complex, individuals within the MOD - aimed at making profits, rather than 
from a well-orchestrated policy designed by Moscow to further exacerbate the conflict in 
order to bring the region under Russia's sway. 
In the Autumn of 1993, however, Russia's attitude towards Armenia and Azerbaijan 
changed. First, Russian leaders increasingly identified Armenia as their key strategic ally in 
the region, and negotiations began with Yerevan on the preservation of a military presence 
in that country . 
709 In March 1994, Moscow and Yerevan agreed on the joint protection of 
Armenia's borders with Turkey, and on 16 April 1995, final agreement on the location of 
two Russian military bases, at Gyumri and Yerevan, for a 25 year period was reached. "o 
Moreover, several agreements on joint air defence were signed by Moscow and Yerevan 
between March 1994 and December 1995. "' Russia's efforts were facilitated by the 
eagerness of the Armenians themselves to keep a Russian military presence in their 
country. Russian forces were seen as a major deterrent against a potential attack from 
Turkey, Armenia's historical enemy. 712 Russia had openly supported Armenia when it was 
threatened by Turkey in the Spring of 1992, after Karabagh forces advanced into 
707 Personal interview with Aleksandr Zhilin, Moscow, November 1996; Dmitrii Trenin and 
Vadim Makarenko, `Chto delat' armii, kogda krugom idet voina', Novoe vremya, Moscow, 1992, 
21, p. 21. 
708 Felix Corley, `Nagorno-Karabagh: An Eyewitness Account', Jane 's Intelligence Review, 6, 
April 1994,4, p. 164. 
709 Personal interview with Galina Starovoitova, Moscow, November 1996; Elizabeth Fuller, 
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Azerbaijani territory. 713 Moreover, Russian military aid and expertise was needed in order 
to successfully support the Karabagh Armenian war effort. As opposed to Georgia and 
Azerbaijan, Armenia and Russia found a common understanding in military terms in the 
spring of 1992. Armenia became from the very beginning an enthusiastic supporter of the 
CIS, and joined the CST when it was set up in May 1992. 
Second, the Russian MOD started taking an actively pro-Armenian stance, and began 
providing military help to Armenia, which had become, to all intents and purposes a party 
to the conflict . 
714 Human Rights Watch/Helsinki documentation reported that during the 
height of the Azerbaijani offensive in December 1993-January 1994, individuals from the 
Russian Ministry of Defence regularly called the Karabagh authorities to inquire about the 
military situation and weapons' needs, and sent large weapons' shipments through the 
Lachin corridor. 715 Moreover, in 1993, the Russian MOD began illegally to provide arms 
to Armenia. A Russian parliamentary inquiry conducted in the Spring of 1997 proved that 
a major flow of illegal Russian heavy and light weapons into Armenia developed during 
1993-1996, for a total value of $1 billion. According to Lev Rokhlin, Chairman of the 
Russian Duma Defence Committee (1993-1996), Russian forces in the Caucasus 
transferred to Armenia vast amounts of heavy equipment, including 32 SS-1 Scud B 
missiles, 349 SA-4 Ganef missiles, 84 T-72 battle tanks, and 50 armoured combat 
vehicles. Russian forces also transferred a large number of small arms, ammunition and 
non-lethal equipment, including 26 mortars, 306 submachine guns, and 7,910 assault 
rifles . 
716 These transfers, which according to Rokhlin could not have occurred without the 
knowledge of Defence Minister Grachev and the approval of Chief of Staff Mikhail 
Kolesnikov, were confirmed by Aman Tuleev, Russian Minister for CIS Affairs (1995- 
1997) and Igor Rodionov, Russian Defence Minister (1996-1998). Apparently during the 
713 The Guardian, 25 May 1992, cited by Jonathan Aves, `The Caucasus states: the regional 
security complex', in Security Dilemmas in Russia and Eurasia, eds. Roy Allison and Christoph 
Bluth, London, 1998, p. 182. 
714 Personal Interview with Galina Starovoitova, Moscow, November 1996. Human Rights Watch/ 
Helsinki gathered plenty of material showing that Armenia provided substantial military and 
economic support to the Karabagh Armenians in 1992 after the Lachin corridor was opened, and 
especially after the first months of 1993, in terms of personnel, equipment and supplies. Although 
the Armenian government regularly denied such participation, and limited itself to claim that 
only volunteers were participating in the war, there seems to be overwhelming evidence proving 
that Armenia did provide support to Nagorno-Karabagh's struggle against Azerbaijan. (Seven 
Years of Conflict in Nagorno-Karabagh, Human Rights Watch/ Helsinki, New York, 
Washington, Los Angeles, London, Brussles, 1994, pp. 67-73. ) 
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716 Sovetskaya Rossiya, 3 April 1997, FBIS-SOV-97-967,3 April 1997; Liz Fuller `Yerevangate 
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entire war, damaged military equipment belonging to the Alkhalkalaki division and to 
Armenia was regularly brought by train to the Russian Ministry of Defence tank repair 
factory in Tbilisi. '" 
Although Russia never openly expressed its support for the Armenian war effort, the 
evidence clearly indicates that Russian leaders, or at least the Russian MOD, provided 
military equipment and expertise to Armenia. What were the MOD's motives for such 
behaviour? Besides the potential lucrative profits involved, Russian leaders, in particular 
the Russian MOD, seemed ready to support the Armenian war effort, most probably 
because Armenia was considered a key strategic ally in the region. Military co-operation 
with Azerbaijan remained quite insignificant throughout 1992-1996.78 However, Russian 
weapons also reached Azerbaijan. Throughout 1993 and 1994, a lucrative, seemingly 
illegal, arms trade developed with Russia, which supplied both sides with weapons, 
reportedly on easy term credits. 7' Both sides received a wide range of Russian-made 
weapons, from AK-47s and RPG-7s to heavy weapons like Grad rocket launchers. 
Apparently, weapons were regularly loaded onto cargo planes in Moscow, something that 
could hardly take place without the approval, if not the sponsoring of the Russian 
government. 720 Whether this was part of a clearly-devised policy by the Russian 
government and the Russian military, or whether it simply was part of an illegal lucrative 
business is difficult to tell. It seems more likely that in the chaotic atmosphere that reigned 
after the collapse of the Soviet Union, policies were conducted independently from the 
President's orders, leading to inconsistencies which often played against Russia's interests. 
This is especially true, if we considered the efforts being conducted by the Russian MFA to 
bring about a negotiated settlement to the conflict. 
The inconsistencies and incoherences of Russia's policies towards the Karabagh conflict 
become all the more evident if we consider the following additional points. During mid 
1992-mid 1993, when Azerbaijan was ruled by the pro-Turkish Azerbaijani Popular Front 
led by Abulfaz Elchibey, and the country adopted a strongly anti-Russian stance - the 
717 ibid. 
718 Alexander A. Sergounin, `Military-technical cooperation between the CIS member states', in 
Russia and the Arms Trade, ed. Ian Anthony, SIPRI, Oxford, 1998, pp. 167-171. 
79 Felix Corley, `Nagorno-Karabagh: An Eyewitness Account', p. 165. 
720 Gerard Libaridian, adviser of the Armenian President Ter-Petrosyan, and Defence Minister 
Grachev both admitted the existence of a flourishing illegal weapons market involving both CIS 
and non-CIS states `We Must not Permit Genocide', Der Spiegel, 23 March 1992, p. 144, in 
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Azeri parliament rejected CIS membership in October 1992, and Elchibey refused to sign 
the CST - Russia leaders did not provide substantial covert military help to Armenia, and 
instead conducted an even-handed policy towards the conflict. Moreover, in the Spring of 
1992, the Russian MOD transferred the allotted Soviet military equipment to the 
Azerbaijani government, and withdrew all its forces from Azerbaijan. On the other hand, 
when Geidar Aliev replaced Elchibey in the Summer of 1993, and relations with Russia 
improved - Aliev re-established close ties with Russia, re-negotiated the Caspian oil deal 
granting Russia an important share, brought Azerbaijan back into the CIS and signed the 
CST - Russia increased its military aid to Armenia, and did not provide Azerbaijan with 
the support it expected in its war in Nagorno-Karabagh. After Aliev took power, 
Azerbaijan continued to suffer major losses on the ground, partly attributed to Russian 
supplies to Armenia. Agdam was lost in late July 1993, Dzhebrail and Fizuli at end of 
August 1993, and Goradiz and Zanglean in October 1993. Moreover, when Azerbaijan 
began conducting a major offensive in December 1993, Russia put great pressure on the 
Azerbaijani leadership to put an end to the fighting, and provided Armenia with substantial 
military help . 
721 Russia's help to Armenia after October 1993, was most probably part of 
an effort by Russia to put pressure on Azerbaijan in order to obtain a military presence in 
that country, given that after October 1993, Russia began pressing hard for a military base 
in Azerbaijan. 
Furthermore, the MOD's policy line contrasted sharply with the position adopted by the 
Russian Ministry of Fuel and Energy (MFE). In November 1993, the MFE had managed to 
strike a deal with the Azerbaijani government which granted the Russian oil company 
Lukoil a 10 percent share in the `oil deal of the century' to develop the Azeri and Chirag 
fields in the Caspian Sea. Apparently, Fuel and Energy Minister, Yurii Shafranik, had 
assured Aliev that the signing of the deal would have a positive impact on Azerbaijan's 
position in Nagorno-Karabagh. 722 However, no major Azeri break-through was achieved. 
Instead, in late 1993-1994, the Russian Defence Ministry began putting pressure on 
Azerbaijan so as to re-introduce military forces in that country, both as peacekeepers and 
in the form of a military base - thus attesting to a clear conflict of interests between the 
Russian MOD and the Russian MFE. Starting in late 1993, and especially throughout 
721 Aidyn Mekhtiev, `Voennye uspekhi Baku bespokoyat Rossiiu', Nezavisimaya gazeta, 29 
January 1994, p. 1. 
722 See Chapter 4. 
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1994, the MOD, as well the MFA, showed an interest in having a military base in 
Azerbaijan and in introducing Russian-led peacekeeping forces into Nagorno-Karabagh. 723 
The available evidence, therefore, does not seem to sustain the hypothesis that leaders in 
Moscow carefully devised a plan to intervene militarily in the conflict, by providing covert 
support to both warring parties, in order to perpetuate the fight, become the main peace- 
broker of the Karabagh conflict and thus bring Armenia and Azerbaijan within Russia's 
sphere of influence. Policies towards Nagorno-Karabagh were very much a result of 
improvisation, rather than cautious planning, and more often than not chaos reigned 
supreme. There is, however, significant circumstantial evidence pointing to local Russian 
military support in favour of the Karabagh Armenians, as well as substantial hard evidence 
attesting to direct military support provided by the Russian Ministry of Defence to 
Armenia, which had become, to all intents and purposes, a direct party in the conflict. This 
military support was probably motivated by the big lucrative profits involved as well as by 
the close military ties that had developed between Russia and Armenia. It also is quite 
possible that, after the Summer of 1993, military support was intended to put pressure on 
Azerbaijan so that it accept the presence of Russian military bases and peacekeeping forces 
on its territory, and in order to get control over oil resources and oil transportation routes, 
thus attesting to a neo-imperialist behaviour. 
c. Russian Mediation in the Nagorno-Karabagh War 
When the Soviet Union collapsed, the Nagorno-Karabagh war developed into an 
international conflict which involved two sovereign independent states, and this opened the 
door to regional participation in the mediation efforts. No other conflict in the former 
Soviet Union saw such an active participation both by regional powers and by the 
international community, in terms of mediation and conciliatory activities, as the war in 
Nagorno-Karabagh. As opposed to the other conflicts that erupted beyond Russia's 
borders, where Russia quite quickly acquired a central role in the negotiating process, in 
the Nagorno-Karabagh conflict, Russia was compelled to co-ordinate its mediation efforts 
with other regional players, such as Iran and Turkey, and with international organisations, 
particularly with the CSCE. The first diplomatic efforts conducted by Foreign Minister 
Kozyrev in mid-February and April 1992 proved unsuccessful, and Russia was forced to 
723 Sokhbet Mamedov, `Azerbaidzhan protiv sozdaniya rossiiskikh voennykh baz na svoei 
territorii', Izvestiya, 7 April 1994, p. 3. 
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leave the initiative to the Iranian government. Russia's mediation efforts failed for various 
reasons. First, Russia proved unable to influence events, largely because of its image of 
the `imperial state. ' Its mediation activities did not enjoy the complete trust of the warring 
parties . 
'2 4 Second, Russia's mediation did not involve representatives of Nagorno- 
Karabagh, and consequently was bound to have little effect on developments on the ground, 
and was unlikely to produce any significant breakthroughs in the negotiations. 72' Third, no 
agreement was reached on an enforcement mechanism. In February 1992, Marshal 
Shaposhnikov proposed the introduction of a CIS peacekeeping force in Nagorno- 
Karabagh, but the proposal was rejected by Azerbaijan. 726 Fourth, Kozyrev's negotiating 
plan was based on respect of the principle of territorial integrity and inviolability of 
borders, and although Kozyrev also insisted on the need to respect human and minority 
rights, his position was interpreted by the Karabagh Armenians as being biased against 
them, since it closed the door to any eventual Karabagh independence or regional 
autonomy. 727 On the other hand, the signing by Russia and Armenia of a Friendship Treaty 
in early April 1992, which included provisions for military assistance, was unlikely to be 
welcomed by Azerbaijan. Iran, however, seemed initially to enjoy the support of both 
Armenia and Azerbaijan. Armenia saw Iran as a counterbalance to Turkish influence in the 
region, and Azerbaijan probably thought that Moslem Iran was the most preferable of all 
possible mediators, since it was likely to take the interests of Azerbaijan more into 
account. 728 In the Spring of 1992, Turkey also offered its mediation offices, but its 
participation in the resolution of the conflict was hindered by its bad relations with 
Armenia. Armenia's insistence that Turkey officially recognise the 1915 Armenian 
genocide, and Turkish demands that Armenia reject territorial claims on Turkey, prevented 
the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries. 729 
724 Konstantin Eggert, `Missiya Velayati v Nagornom Karabakhe', Izvestiya, 26 February 1992, 
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Ludmila Khanbabyan, `Stepanakert otkazyvaetsya of posrednichestva Rossii. Emy bolshe 
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726 TASS, 19 February 1992, in FBIS-SOV-92-034,20 February 1992, p. 21. Galina Starovoitova 
supported the idea of sending UN `blue helmets' prior to the setting up of CIS peacekeeping 
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position see Interfax, 21 February 1992, in FBIS-SOV-92-036,24 February 1992, p. 24. 
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The possibility that Iran or Turkey might obtain a dominant role in the Nagorno-Karabagh 
negotiations, and thus displace Russia from the Transcaucasus, created great concern 
among the Russian elite. Iran's active diplomatic efforts prompted Russian leaders to insist 
on the sending of a Russian representative to any further negotiations on Nagorno- 
Karabagh that might be held in Tehran. 730 However, Iran did not prove any more 
successful than Russia in reaching a lasting cessation of hostilities. The two cease-fires it 
brokered in late February 1992 and early May 1992 were immediately violated and 
followed by successful Karabagh Armenian offensives on Khodzhaly and Shusha. The 
month of May 1992 saw a further exacerbation of the situation on the ground, as Karabagh 
forces captured the key strategic town of Shusha, and the city of Lachin, located in 
Azerbaijani territory. Armenian advances beyond the Nagorno-Karabagh enclave prompted 
a strong reaction from the international community. The European Union, Turkey and Iran 
strongly condemned Armenian aggression, and Turkish President Turgut Ozal even 
threatened to intervene militarily on Azerbaijan's side. These threats - later denied by 
Turkish Prime Minster Suleyman Demirel - caused great uproar among Russian and CIS 
military circles. On 20 May, Marshal Shaposhnikov warned Turkey against direct 
intervention in the conflict, arguing that such actions could lead to another world war - an 
indication of Russia's increasing sensitivities regarding Turkey's growing influence in the 
region. 731 Tension between both countries was defused a couple of days later when Yeltsin 
and Demirel issued a joint statement, which condemned the acquisition of territory by 
force, and offered Turkish-Russian mediation services. However, the advent to power of 
the Azerbaijani Popular Front in June 1992 characterised by its pro-Turkish and anti- 
Russian orientation, precluded Russia, as well as Iran, from any further negotiating 
initiatives. 732 The Russian representative at the UN, Yuli Vorontsov, proposed that joint 
peacekeeping forces made up of UN 'blue helmet' forces, CSCE troops and special units of 
the CIS Armed Forces be sent to the region, but his initiative received little support. 
733 
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riskuem okazatsya na grani mirovoi voiny" ', Izvestiya, 21 May 1992, p. 2. 
732 Aidyn Mekhtiev, `Baku i Tegeran stremyatsya k ekonomicheskomu sotrudnichestvu', 
Nezavisimaya gazeta, 30 July 1992 p. 3. 
733 Konstantin Eggert, `Evropeiskoe soobshchestvo obvinilo Armeniiu v agressii protiv 
Azerbaidzhana', p. 1 
210 
Instead, during the Summer of 1992, mediating efforts were confined to the CSCE `Minsk 
1734 
group. 
On 23 March 1992, the CSCE Council of Ministers had decided to set up an international 
conference under the auspices of the CSCE aimed at providing a permanent forum for 
negotiations on a peaceful settlement of the conflict. The conference, to be held in Minsk, 
was meant to include representatives of eleven countries: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Russia, 
Turkey, France, Italy, Czechoslovakia, Germany, Sweden, Belarus and the US. Elected 
representatives of Nagorno-Karabagh, primarily Armenians, as well as representatives of 
the Azerbaijani community in Nagorno-Karabagh were invited to participate in the 
conference as interested parties. 735 The CSCE initiative represented a major break-through 
in terms of conflict resolution in the area. For the first time ever, an international 
organisation became primarily responsible for regulating an inter-ethnic conflict in the 
former Soviet space. However, its chances of success remained quite slim, given that the 
CSCE lacked the necessary political or diplomatic clout to enforce a decision or to induce 
the parties to reach a settlement. Its effectiveness depended on the willingness of the CSCE 
members to enforce a decision. Moreover, the CSCE did not have any military 
infrastructure to conduct effective peacekeeping operations. It was, therefore, no surprise 
that after five rounds of preliminary talks, held in Rome between June and September 
1992, attempts to convene the Minsk conference failed. Disagreements among Armenia and 
Azerbaijan regarding the official status of the Karabagh Armenian delegation, and disputes 
over the responsibility of the Armenian government for the actions of Karabagh Armenians 
blocked any advancement. 736 
In September 1992, in view of the CSCE ineffectiveness, Russia managed to re-take the 
initiative, this time in the form of a cease-fire brokered by the Russian Defence Minister 
Pavel Grachev. 737 The direct involvement of the Russian MOD in the resolution of the 
Nagorno-Karabagh conflict represented a major turning point in Russian mediation efforts. 
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Osler Hampson and Pamela Aall, USIP, Washington DC, 1996, p. 259. 
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By placing itself at the forefront of the negotiations, the MOD not only displaced the MFA, 
but also began acquiring a major role in the resolution of conflicts in the former Soviet 
space. The cease-fire agreement, which envisaged a withdrawal of the warring parties from 
the zones of conflict and the introduction of CIS observers, also foresaw the deployment of 
peacekeeping (mirotvorcheskie sily) in case of violations to the cease-fire. Grachev also 
stated that if no lasting agreement was reached between Armenia and Azerbaijan on 
Nagorno-Karabagh, the only remaining variant was the introduction of UN or UN plus CIS 
peacekeeping forces in the zone of conflict. 738 The cease-fire however did not hold. In 
February 1993, Nagorno-Karabagh Armenians launched a major offensive in the area of 
Mardakert and recaptured numerous villages in the region. These attacks were the first of a 
series of major Karabagh offensives which left little room for either Russian or other 
negotiating initiatives. In early April 1993, the Karabagh Armenian forces occupied the 
Kelbadzhar district, in Azerbaijan, completing the defacto annexation of Nagorno- 
Karabagh to Armenia. 739 In April 1993, Karabagh Armenians continued their offensive, 
this time against the southern district of Fizuli, close to the Iranian border, causing great 
alarm among Azerbaijan's southern neighbours, Turkey and Iran, and resulting in 
condemnation by the international community. 740 On 30 April 1993, the UN Security 
Council approved Resolution 822, which called for the withdrawal of foreign and local 
Armenian forces from occupied territory, a halt to hostilities in and around Nagorno- 
Karabagh, and the resumption of peace negotiations. On the basis of this resolution, a 
tripartite US-Turkish-Russian peace plan was unveiled three days later. Intended as a basis 
for galvanising the stalled CSCE talks, it contained a detailed timetable for the 
implementation of a sixty-day cease-fire, the withdrawal of troops, and the resumption of 
negotiations. Both this plan and a modified version of it were endorsed by Armenia and 
Azerbaijan, but were rejected by the Armenian Karabagh leadership in Stepanakert, on the 
grounds that neither plan provided adequate security guarantees for the Armenian 
population of Karabagh. 741 
In June 1993, an internal rebellion in Azerbaijan created another opportunity for a further 
Armenian offensive against the Agdam, Agdary and Agdzhbedi districts, east of Nagorno- 
738 ibid. 
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Karabagh. Agdam was occupied at the end of July 1993 after heavy fighting that lasted for 
over a month. The fall of Dzhebrail and Fizuli at the end of August 1993 and the capture 
of Goradiz and Zangelan in late October 1993 resulted in the occupation of large swathes 
of territory between the southern border of Nagorno-Karabagh and the Azeri-Iranian 
frontier, and precipitated a massive exodus of refugees across the Iranian border. Iran 
reacted sharply to Armenian advances by reinforcing its border with Armenia and 
Azerbaijan and conducting incursions into Azerbaijani territory . 
'`ý2 This prompted a strong 
response from Russia. During a visit to Yerevan, Col. Gen. Andrei Nikolayev, commander 
of the Russian border forces, let it be understood that the borders of Armenia were 
simultaneously the borders of the CIS, and that no one would be permitted to violate 
them .73 
The Russian MFA also condemned the incursion of Iranian troops into the 
territory of Azerbaijan, although in a milder tone, and expressed concern that it might lead 
to an escalation of violence and an internationalisation of the . 
744 Tension was 
diffused when Russian special envoy Vladimir Kazimirov brokered a cease-fire on 31 
August 1993, which envisaged a partial pullback of Karabagh Armenian forces. 
The Karabagh Armenian offensive coincided with an increasingly pro-Armenian stance 
adopted by the Russian Minister of Defence. During a visit to Turkey in mid-May 1993, 
Grachev blamed both Armenia and Azerbaijan for developments in Karabagh, but let it be 
known that he understood the need of Karabagh Armenians to establish life-corridors with 
the outside world, thus vindicating Yerevan . 
745 Moreover, during the Summer of 1993, the 
Russian government adopted an increasingly assertive position towards the Karabagh 
mediation process, manifested by attempts to play the key role in the resolution of the 
conflict and to gradually displace the CSCE Minsk group from the negotiations. On the one 
hand, separate unilateral Russian proposals began to surface in stark contradiction to the 
joint work of the group. These proposals were based on the concept of a Russian or 
Russian-controlled CIS `separation force', which would be inserted between the warring 
sides and would be authorised to use force to suppress any violations of an accompanying 
cease-fire. On the other hand, the newly appointed special negotiator for Nagorno- '` 
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Karabagh, Vladimir Kazimirov, openly expressed Russia's dissatisfaction with the 
peacemaking activity of the CSCE Minsk Group, and affirmed Russia's intentions to 
continue its mediating efforts not only as part of the CSCE Minsk group but also as an 
independent mediator and member of the UN Security Council. 747 Russia's position 
regarding the CSCE mediation efforts was mainly determined by its strategic interests - 
preventing other countries from gaining influence in the region, especially by conducting 
peacekeeping activities - but was also a result of the unwillingness of the CSCE member 
states to make the necessary efforts in terms of peacekeepers and observers. Western 
countries were ready to dispatch only 30 out of the 150-200 observers initially expected to 
' be sent to the region . 
``s 
Russia's detachment from the CSCE process coincided with a similar position being 
adopted by Azerbaijan's new President Geidar Aliev, who was eager to improve relations 
with Russia, as indicated by his decision to bring Azerbaijan back into the CIS and into the 
CST in September 1993. '-9 Aliev openly criticised the CSCE Minsk process, expressed his 
dissatisfaction with the tripartite US-Russian-Turkish mediation effort, and stated his 
support for a Russian peacemaking mission. 75° Aliev agreed to meet with the Karabagh 
Armenians, and on 13 September 1993, the first bilateral Azerbaijani-Karabagh talks were 
held in Moscow under the aegis of the Russian Foreign Ministry. 75' The most important 
result of the negotiations was the prolongation of the August cease-fire for another month. 
Russia's successful mediating efforts were followed by attempts to introduce Russian 
peacekeeping forces in Nagorno-Karabagh. At a meeting in early September 1993 between 
Turkish Prime Minister Tansu Ciller, Aliev and Yeltsin, Russia proposed the introduction 
of Russian peacekeepers to monitor the cease-fire. 752 Aliev proved reluctant to accept the 
deployment of Russian peacekeeping troops, and insisted that CSCE monitors would be 
enough. Turkey also remained adamant in its opposition to a Russian-only peacekeeping 
force, and, instead, showed its support for a multinational monitoring mission made up of 
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contingents from Russia, Turkey, the US and other CIS states. 753 A further setback to 
Moscow's efforts aimed at introducing Russian peacekeepers came in early October 1993 
at the meeting of Transcaucasian heads of state in Moscow. Russia asked for the return of 
Russian troops to Azerbaijan, in the form of a paratroop division, and the deployment of 
Russian border guards along the Azerbaijani-Iranian frontier, but Aliev refused. Russia's 
displeasure with Aliev's refusal was made clear when Karabagh Armenian troops launched 
a new offensive in late October 1993. While Iran and Turkey both called on the UN 
Security Council to condemn the Armenian aggression, there was deafening silence from 
Russia. Previously, Russia had shown support for Azerbaijan's demands `that Armenia 
withdraw its forces from occupied Azerbaijani territory' and had supported the UN 
Security Council statement of 18 August 1993 which condemned the Karabagh Armenian 
attack on the Fizuli region. 754 Moreover, the Russian MOD provided substantial military 
support to Karabagh Armenians through the Lachm corridor during the Winter 1993-1994 
Azerbaijani offensive. 
Russia's efforts to obtain Azerbaijan's approval for the introduction of Russian 
peacekeepers in Nagorno-Karabagh were complemented by a vigorous diplomatic 
campaign launched at international level by Foreign Minister Kozyrev aimed at obtaining 
the recognition by the UN and the CSCE of Russia's special right to conduct peacekeeping 
activities in the former Soviet space. In late November 1993, at the CSCE Foreign 
Ministers meeting in Rome, Kozyrev demanded that Russia be formally granted a special 
role as a peacekeeper in those areas of the former USSR where `aggressive nationalism has 
led to bloodshed', and that the cost of such peacekeeping operations be shared among 
CSCE members states. 755 Russia was trying to accomplish several tasks at once. First, to 
obtain legitimacy for its military presence in the near abroad. Second, to obtain political 
and, if possible, financial support for conducting peacekeeping operations there. Third, to 
share with the international community responsibility for the failures that frequently 
accompanied Moscow's efforts to avert bloodshed in neighbouring states. But the reaction 
to Kozyrev's proposals was one of mistrust, given that Russian peacekeeping operations 
did not conform with the UN peacekeeping practices and were perceived as neo-imperialist. 
753 Reuters and Itar-tass, 21 September 1993, cited by Elizabeth Fuller, `Russia, Turkey, Iran, and 
the Karabagh Mediation Process', p. 33. 
754 Konstantin Eggert, `Moskva i Ankara pytaiutsya preodolet' vzaimnoe okhlazhdenie', 
Izvestiya, 20 August 1993 p. 3; Seven Years of Conflict in Nagorno-Karabagh, p. 37. 
Iss Maskim Yusin, `Rossiya ne smozhet provodit' mirotvorcheskie operatsii pod flagom SBSE', 
Izvestiya, 3 December 1993, p. 2. 
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Not only did the Baltic states, Ukraine and several east European countries reject the 
proposal, but also Turkey, Canada and Norway opposed the motion. 756 The CSCE Minsk 
Group instead was putting forward proposals for an internationally controlled monitoring 
force not authorised to use force. 75' 
The first months of 1994 saw a sudden increase in parallel mediation efforts aimed at 
reaching a lasting cease-fire. In January, Russian envoy Kazimirov, in co-operation with 
the Iranian leadership, introduced a proposal which envisaged the disengagement of forces 
and the creation of a buffer zone in which international observers, in conjunction with 
Russian peacekeepers, would be deployed. Karabagh Armenian forces would be withdrawn 
from occupied territory, and negotiations on a political settlement would begin thereafter. 
Whereas the plan was approved by Yerevan and Stepanakert, the Azerbaijani leadership 
objected to the proposal, arguing that any cease-fire had to be preceded by an Armenian 
withdrawal, and that peacekeeping forces had to be multinational. 758 On the other hand, on 
18 February, while the MFA continued its negotiations, Defence Minister Grachev, and his 
Armenian and Azerbaijani counterparts, signed a draft protocol on a cease-fire in Nagorno- 
Karabagh, to be followed by the disengagement and withdrawal of troops from all occupied 
territories. The cease-fire, however, was violated when heavy fighting broke out near 
Agdam and Markakert, in mid-April 1994. Furthermore, during February-April 1994, the 
CSCE Minsk group renewed its mediation efforts and tried to persuade Russia to co- 
ordinate its Karabagh diplomacy with the Minsk group. These three parallel diplomatic 
efforts brought to light the lack of co-ordination not only between Russia and the CSCE, 
but also within the Russian government, particularly due to the rivalry existing between the 
MOD and the MFA. In mid-May 1994, when Kazimirov seemed ready to co-ordinate its 
efforts with the CSCE, and the CSCE apparently managed to obtain Aliev's agreement on 
an alternative deal, Grachev independently brokered another cease-fire agreement with the 
Defence Ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan, and the head of the Nagorno-Karabagh 
armed forces. 
Grachev's plan envisaged the deployment of military observers from Russia, the warring 
sides and possibly from the CIS and CSCE countries, at forty-nine observer posts. Russian 
officers would head all forty nine posts, thus thwarting the CSCE proposal that observers 
756 ibid. 
757 John Maresca, `Resolving the Conflict over Nagorno-Karabagh', p. 263. 
758 Aidyn Mekhtiev, `Baku poka ne gotov odobrit' Rossiiskii proekt resheniya Karabakhskoi 
problemy', Nezavisimaya gazeta, 14 January 1994 p. 3. 
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monitor not only the movement of combatants but also those of the peacekeeping forces. 
The agreement also envisaged the introduction of 1,800 CIS peacekeeping troops, 
primarily Russian, under the command of Deputy Defence Minister Gen. Kondratyev, to 
separate the hostile forces. 75' Although the cease-fire was respected by all sides in the 
conflict, besides some minor skirmishes occurring regularly along the front-line, the 
Azerbaijani side rejected the introduction of a Russian-led peacekeeping force. Instead, on 
27 July 1994, Armenia and Azerbaijan signed an agreement which foresaw the introduction 
of a multi-national peacekeeping force and CSCE observers. However, the forces did not 
materialise, and the rest of 1994 was characterised by a diplomatic struggle between 
Russia and the CSCE, Russia insisting that its troops dominate the peacekeeping forces - 
Russia wanted the peacekeeping forces to consist solely of its own military units under its 
own command - and that it be recognised as the chief negotiator in the Nagorno-Karabagh 
710 settlement, and the CSCE rejecting Russia's proposals. 
The Russian leadership increasingly perceived peacekeeping forces as a means of 
preserving influence in the region and of preventing other `rival powers' from removing 
Russia from the area. There was growing concern in Russia over the erosion of Russian 
power and influence in the region, especially in Azerbaijan. Russia had no military 
presence in that country, was being marginalised from the lucrative Caspian oil deals, and 
was losing control over the oil transportation lines. Russian diplomats believed that 
influence in the region would be determined by those countries whose troops made up the 
backbone of future peacekeeping forces. 76' After a series of tough high level negotiations 
among Russia and the CSCE Minsk Group, CSCE leaders agreed at the Budapest summit 
in December 1994, that a 3,300 strong `multinational CSCE peacekeeping force' would be 
sent to Nagorno-Karabagh, but only after a political agreement on a cessation of the armed 
conflict would be reached among the parties. The exact composition of the force was not 
spelled out, but it was agreed that no state would contribute more than 30 percent of the 
troops. This represented a defeat for Russia, given that the CSCE would oversee Russia's 
peacekeeping operations and international forces would be operating in the former Soviet 
space. Russia, however, achieved a major victory on the mediation front, as agreement was 
759 Itar-tass, 16 May 1994, cited by Elizabeth Fuller, `The Karabagh Mediation Process: Grachev 
versus the CSCE? ', RFE/RL Research Report, 10 June 1994, p. 13. 
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reached on the merging of the parallel Russian and CSCE efforts. Russia was appointed 
permanent co-chair in the Minsk group of the Nagorno-Karabagh peace efforts. 
Despite the general accord on a combined peacekeeping force reached at the CSCE summit 
in Budapest, the force failed to materialise. According to American negotiator, John 
Maresca, final agreement was blocked because of disagreements regarding the leadership 
of the force and the percentage of the forces to be provided by Russia. 76' However, the 
main reason why multinational forces failed to materialise, was the lack of determination of 
the CSCE member-states, with the probable exception of Turkey, to provide the necessary 
contingents in order to create an international peacekeeping force. The absence of an 
immediately available international peacekeeping force, in fact, permitted Russia to argue 
that it was the only country capable of sending a force to oversee the cease-fire. However, 
the CSCE-Russian negotiations had brought to light Russia's opposition to an international 
peacekeeping presence, when the international community seemed ready to send one. In 
other words, Russia refused to accept the presence of foreign troops in Azerbaijan, as well 
as in the entire Transcaucasian region, because it saw these areas as being part of Russia's 
exclusive area of influence. According to John Maresca, the negotiations had clearly 
brought to light Russia's eagerness to regain control over Azerbaijan's frontier with Iran 
and Turkey, and Russia's wishes to participate in the major oil concessions being 
developed by Western companies. 
3. Conclusion 
The complexities of the Nagorno-Karabagh war, in which two former Soviet states were to 
all intents and purposes fighting each other, precluded any clear-cut policy from the 
Russian government. Support for one country automatically put the other in antagonism to 
Russia. This explains why initially Russia attempted to take a balanced approach in order 
to reach a settlement of the conflict. Although it supported Azerbaijan's territorial 
integrity, it still established close relations with Armenia, making it its key ally in the 
region. A Friendship Treaty was signed with Armenia in the Summer of 1992, and close 
military-cooperation was established, resulting in the stationing of two Russian military 
bases in Armenia and the joint protection of Armenia's borders with Turkey. However, as 
the conflict developed and the Russian MOD took away the initiative from the Ministry of 
162 John Maresca, `Resolving the Conflict over Nagorno-Karabagh', p. 268. 
218 
Foreign Affairs, Russia adopted a pro-Armenian stance, providing it with substantial 
military support, and putting increasing pressure on Azerbaijan to accept Russian military 
bases and Russian peacekeepers on its soil. By mid-1993, Russia also began taking a much 
more pro-active policy in term of mediation. Such behaviour most probably can be 
attributed to an effort by the Russian leadership to find a solution to the conflict. However, 
it also very much reflected an attempt to settle the conflict in Russia's favour, and keep 
other regional actors such as Iran and Turkey, or the CSCE, out of the mediation process. 
Iran, Turkey and the CSCE lacked the necessary political and military clout to impose a 
cease-fire. Russia, however, was able to act more decisively, not least because of the strong 
economic leverage it could exert on the parties. The involvement of Western companies in 
the Azerbaijani oil industry created great hopes among the Azerbaijani elite that the 
country had a new ally in the form of the Western community. However, Azerbaijani hopes 
proved wrong since Western countries, although diplomatically supporting the Azerbaijani 
position, proved unwilling to get too deeply involved in resolving the conflict, least of all in 
sending troops to the region. This situation allowed Russia to take over the dominant role 
in the mediation. The CSCE-Russian negotiations during 1994-1995, however, brought to 
light Russia's eagerness to become the main negotiator and the only peacekeeper in the 
region. Despite the Budapest 1994 agreement on a joint multinational peacekeeping forces, 
Russia remained adamant in its opposition to foreign peacekeeping troops, particularly 
Turkish troops, on Azerbaijani soil. A Russian military presence in Azerbaijan was 
considered essential for the preservation of Russia's influence in that country, and the 
exercise of control over oil flows and the participation in oil deals. Caspian oil had 
increased the strategic importance of Azerbaijan, and Russian leaders, both in the Foreign 
Ministry and the Defence Ministry, remained eager to bring Azerbaijan back into Russia's 
exclusive sphere of influence. However, Russia's policies often lacked coherence, as covert 
military support and illegal weapons flew into the region, and contradictory policies were 
conducted by the MOD and the MFE, the former supporting the Armenians, and the latter 
trying to make major inroads into the lucrative Azerbaijani oil business. 
V. The Civil War in Tajikistan 
1. The Roots of the Conflict 
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The civil war that erupted in Tajikistan in 1992 and continued throughout the entire period 
under examination (1992-1996), differs to a certain extent from the previously analysed 
conflicts. 763 Whereas in Georgia, Azerbaijan and Moldova, a particular region or regions of 
the country were struggling for secession, in Tajikistan the various factions, although 
having strong allegiances with the different regions of the country, were not fighting for 
secession but for a role in the central government structures. The struggle for power, 
however, resulted in the complete fragmentation of the country. By 1996, the Rakhmonov 
regime retained control only of the Dushanbe and Kulyab areas, while the rest of the 
country remained in the hands of either the Tajik opposition fighters, which held the areas 
of Gorno-Badakhsan, Krazhikin, Tavil-Daria and Garm, or of pro-Uzbek warlords in 
control of the northern Leninabad oblast. '` 
The Tajik war has often been portrayed either as a war between Communists and Islamic 
fundamentalists or as inter-clan conflict. While both of these interpretations contain 
elements of truth, they misinterpret the very complex web of alliances and loyalties 
underlying the war. Ideology and family connections certainly played a role, but the main 
factors provoking the conflict appear to have been economically- and politically-based 
perceptions of regional identity. Since the creation of the Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic in 
1929, the northern Leninabad Oblast dominated the republic's politics, providing all the 
Tajik Communist Party first secretaries from 1943 until the end of Soviet rule. 765 Moreover 
this region was the most economically advanced in the republic. By contrast, the three 
southern regions, the Kulyab and Kurgan-Tyube oblasts, and Gorno-Badakhshan 
763 The literature on the Tajik war falls into several categories: Alvin Z. Rubinstein totally 
dismissed standard claims that the `empire [was] striking back' in Central Asia. Instead, he 
argued that Russia's involvement in Tajikistan was motivated by legitimate state interest such 
concern over both the spread of Islamic fundamentalism and the increasing cross-border attacks 
from Tajik fundamentalists in Afghanistan. (Alvin Z. Rubinstein, `The Asian Interior: The 
Geopolitical Pull on Russia', Orbis, 28, Autumn 1994,4, pp. 573. ) Sergei Gretsky and Barnett R. 
Rubin, instead, argued that the main motivation behind Russia's behaviour was the restoration of 
a sphere of influence in Tajikistan. (Sergei Gretsky, `Russia and Tajikistan', in Regional Power 
Rivalries in the New Eurasia, eds. Alvin Z. Rubinstein and Oles M. Smolansky, London, 1995, 
pp. 231-251; Barnett R. Rubin, 'Tajikistan: From Soviet Repulic to Russian-Uzbek Protectorate', 
in Central Asia and the World, ed. Michael Mandelbaum, Council on Foreign Relations, New 
York, 1994, pp. 218-223. ) Lena Jonson took a more moderate view, and described Russia's 
involvement in Tajikistan as an effort to impose peace by force in what was initially regarded as a 
form of counter-insurgency. Russia's policies, in her view, were driven by two partly 
contradictory objectives: to establish a presence and gain influence, and to end the conflict. (Lena 
Jonson, The Tajik War: A Challenge to Russian Policy, Discussion Paper 74, The Royal Institute 
of International Affairs, London, 1998, pp. 6-7. ) 
764 Personal Interview with Sergei Solodovnik, Moscow, November 1996. 
765 This faction held political control over the Communist Party and the Supreme Soviet for forty 
years. 
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Autonomous Oblast, remained relatively underdeveloped. 766 It is precisely in these regions 
that the main opposition parties first emerged, such as the nationalist Democratic Party, 
the Islamic Renaissance Party, the Rastokhez (Rebirth) movement, which was favoured by 
the intelligentsia and contained a mixture of nationalist and religious elements, and the Lale 
Badakhshon movement, which wanted greater autonomy for Gorno-Badakhshon and its 
Pamiri population. 
Tension in the republic began in November 1991, after the victory of former Communist 
Party First Secretary Rakhmon Nabiev in the Tajik presidential elections. The victory of 
Nabiev, which was never recognised by the opposition parties, signified a return of the old 
Leninabad-based Communist nomenklatura and a defeat of those forces which supported 
Islam, democracy and economic reform, and which represented the interests of the poorest 
regions of the country - Karotegin, Garm and Gorno-Badakhshan. The first challenges to 
the official authorities began in February 1992, when the opposition organised a mass rally 
in Dushanbe, and demanded political and economic reforms . 
767 As the demanded changes 
were not forthcoming, the demonstrators conducted a continuous siege of government 
buildings during the months of April and early May 1992, which resulted in some minor 
concessions. Supreme Soviet Chairman Safarli Kendzhayev was dismissed from office and 
the Supreme Soviet promised to hold new parliamentary elections. 768 However, the victory 
of the opposition was short-lived. Two days after the forced resignation of Kendzhayev, 
supporters of the government organised a rally in front of the Supreme Soviet demanding 
the return of Kendzhayev to the post of Chairman of the Supreme Soviet. 769 In early May 
1992, the situation began to deteriorate as both factions started arming themselves. 
President Nabiev signed a decree creating a National Guard and Kendzhayev 
indiscriminately began distributing large quantities of arms and ammunition to pro- 
government demonstrators . 
770 The opposition in turn, created its own people's militia 
comprising about 20,000 men. When fighting finally broke out on 5 May 1992 between "' 
166 Keith Martin, `Tajikistan: Civil War without end? ', RFE/RL Research Report, 20 August 
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221 
supporters and opponents of the government, President Nabiev decided to set up a 
government of national reconciliation, which included eight members of the opposition. 
Several key posts, such as Chairman of the Defence Committee, Chairman of the State 
Television an the Radio Committee and the Minister of Education, were handed to 
members of the Islamic/Democratic coalition, and the vice-Chairman of the Islamic 
Revival Party, Davlat Usom, was appointed to the post of deputy Prime Minister. 772 
The creation of the new coalition government significantly reduced the violence in 
Dushanbe. However, it did not bring about an end to confrontation. The leadership of the 
Leninabad and Kulyab provinces refused to submit to the new authorities in Dushanbe. 
This triggered an escalation of violence in the Kulyab and Kurgan-Tyube provinces, which 
by the month of June 1992 had developed into open civil war. 73 By the end of August 
1992, the situation had become extremely tense as the country plunged into total anarchy. 
Neither the president nor the government managed to bring the situation under control, nor 
to introduce the much demanded economic or political reforms. 74 In early September 1992, 
President Nabiev was forced to resign under increasing pressure from the 
Islamic/Democratic forces, and power passed to the chairman of the Supreme Soviet, 
Akbarsho Iskandarov who had been elected to that position in mid-August 1992. Nabiev's 
forced resignation triggered another wave of violence in the Kurgan-Tyube and Kulyab 
provinces which lasted for several months. On 24 October 1992, a pro-Communist faction 
unsuccessfully attempted to take control of Dushanbe by military means . 
775 Unable to put 
an end to the war, President Iskandarov and the government resigned on 10 November 
1992. On 16 November, the communist-dominated parliament, in session in Khojand, 
elected Imomali Rakhmonov as Chairman of the Supreme Soviet, and under pressure from 
Sangak Safarov, the leader of the Kulyab armed units, formed a new pro-Communist 
government dominated by Kulyabites. 7' The confirmation of Abudumalik 
Abdulladzhanov, a Leninabadi, as Prime Minister of the new government signified a return 
of the old Leninabad-Kulyab alliance to power in Dushanbe. 
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In December 1992, the new government forces, assisted by Uzbekistan and by forces of the 
Russian 201st Motorised Infantry Division (MID) stationed in Tajikistan seized control of 
the capital and began conducting punitive actions against the opposition which was forced 
to retreat to the Garm and Pamir mountainous regions and to neighbouring Afghanistan, 
where it began training for a major offensive with the support of the Afghan Mujahideen. 
The advance of government forces resulted in a massive exodus of refugees across the 
southern Tajik borders into northern Afghanistan. In February 1993, the first attacks took 
place against border posts along the Tajik-Afghan border, patrolled by Russian border 
guards. A major Tajik opposition offensive against the border guards, with the 
participation of Afghan guerrillas, occurred in July 1993 in which as many as 30 Russian 
soldiers were killed. This triggered a sharp reaction from the Russian government which 
decided to become actively involved not only in the protection of the Tajik-Afghan border 
and the support of the Tajik authorities in Dushanbe, but in fostering a dialogue among the 
two factions in order to bring about a lasting settlement in the country. 
2. Russia's Involvement 
During the first year of Tajik independence, the Russian government was unable to develop 
a clearly-defined policy regarding events in that country. This was to be expected, given 
that the Russian leadership was confronted with a new situation whose complexities were 
difficult to grasp, and Russian diplomats lacked the expertise and the experience to deal 
with this new kind of inter-ethnic conflict. The Tajik situation was in constant flux, thus 
preventing Russian leaders from adopting a straight-forward approach to the crisis. The 
Russian MOD and the Russian MFA initially reacted more than acted to shape events, as 
was the case with other conflicts in the former Soviet space. Only by the end of 1992, as 
power in Tajikistan collapsed completely, did the Russian government adopt a more clearly 
defined policy-line and threw its lot behind the pro-Communist government. It provided 
military support to the new Rakhmonov leadership, decided to keep an active military 
presence in the country, and assisted the government in building-up of its own armed 
forces. 
a. Motivations 
Russia's military and diplomatic involvement in the Tajik conflict was determined by a 
series of factors. Strategic considerations most probably played the determinant role. 
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Stability and security along the CIS southern borders, in particular the Tajik-Afghan 
border, were considered essential for Russia's own security. "' The war in Tajikistan 
created great regional instability and resulted in the development of a flourishing illegal 
trade of weapons, narcotics and other valuable goods into Russia. In 1992-1993, Russian 
leaders ruled out the establishment of a new defence infrastructure along Russia's new 
borders, and instead decided to use the old Soviet border installations to protect Russia's 
own borders . 
778 Moreover, the growing involvement of Afghan mujahideen and the 
potential `Afghanisation' of Tajikistan, in other words, the total collapse of state authority 
and the division of the country among warlords endlessly fighting against each other, 
created the spectre of instability spreading all across Central Asia and into Russia. Russian 
leaders were also very much concerned about the fate of the Russian-speaking population 
in Tajikistan, and the possibility that it might become the target of violence and reprisals. 779 
Last but not least, Russian political analysts raised the spectre of `Islamic fundamentalism' 
reaching the gates of Russia, if the civil war in Tajikistan was not contained. 780 At the 
height of the fighting along the Tajik-Afghan border in the Summer of 1993, Segodnya 
correspondent Mikhail Leontiev expressed the concern, shared by many in Russia, that 
Islamic fundamentalism might spread from Tajikistan, to Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and 
eventually even to Russia. 781 
b. Russia's Initial `Neutrality' 
When violence first erupted in Dushanbe in the Spring of 1992, the 201st MID did not get 
immediately involved in the fighting, not least because local army officers feared that their 
families and other Russians could be the subject of violence if they took sides in the 
conflict. Former Soviet Ministry of Interior troops under Tajik command, however, played 
a major role in guaranteeing security in the streets of Dushanbe. 782 Later reports however, 
seem to indicate that the Tajik leadership, President Nabiev in particular, having in the past 
established very close ties with officers of the 201st MID, succeeded in obtaining the 
7" Kozyrev on the need to secure borders: Igor Rotar, `Moskva pytaetsya pogasit' tadzhikskuiu 
mezhdousobitsu', Nezavisimaya gazeta, 11 November 1992, p. 1. 
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latter's support in order to put an end to violence. Col. Vyacheslav Zabolotny, commander 
of the 20 1 st MID Dushanbe garrison, admitted that after some hesitation, and under strong 
pressure from President Nabiev, the 201 st division eventually got involved in suppressing 
the fighting on 10 May 1992, when eleven people died and dozens were wounded in the 
streets of Dushanbe. 7S' The available evidence, however, suggests that the intervention of 
the 201st MID at that time was not the result of an order coming from Moscow. In May 
1992, Russian leaders had ordered the army to stay neutral and avoid getting involved in 
the conflict. The actions of the army officers seemed to have been the result of an attempt 
to suppress the fighting in view of the escalation of violence, rather than an effort to prop 
up a regime that could establish close ties with Russia. Reports also suggest that officers 
belonging to the 201st MID, acting on an independent basis, provided weapons and 
equipment to Nabiev supporters during the Spring of 1992.78 These arms transfers, 
however, were most probably the result of independent decisions taken by local 
commanders, who were either supportive of a particular faction, or interested in obtaining 
785 lucrative financial profits, without Moscow's approval. 
During the Summer of 1992, as violence throughout the country continued and the new 
coalition government proved unable to control the situation and effectively protect the 
Tajik-Afghan border, Russia decided to conduct a more active policy in order to stop the 
violence. On 21 July 1992, the former Soviet border troops patrolling Tajikistan's external 
borders were placed under Russia's jurisdiction, and Russia took over the protection of the 
Taj ik-Afghan border, with the consent of the Taj ik leadership. 786 Moreover, in August 
1992, Yeltsin discussed with the Tajik government the possibility of introducing CIS 
peacekeeping forces to act as `buffer forces' in the conflict ridden areas of Kurgan-Tyube 
and Kulyab. However, as major demonstrations were held in Dushanbe in early September 
against President Nabiev and against the introduction of CIS peacekeepers, the initiative 
was abandoned. 78' Threats by President Yeltsin and his Kazakh, Kyrgyz and Uzbek 
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gazeta, 22 August 1992, p. 3. 
784 Oleg Panfilov, `Tadzhikistan: protivoborstvuiushchie storony otkryli vtoroi front', 
Nezavisimaya gazeta, 22 September 1992, p. 3. 
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counterparts to intervene militarily, unless violence was brought to an end, also proved 
ineffective. "' On 7 September 1992, President Nabiev was forced to resign and the country 
plunged into anarchy. In an attempt to bring the situation under control, on 10 September 
1992, Russia sent an additional one thousand border guards to the Tajik-Afghan border, 
thus raising the total number of troops deployed along the Amu-Darya to about 2,500 
men. 'S9 In mid-September 1992, the Russian 201st MID, which so far had kept at least 
some semblance of neutrality, began openly to help the Iskandarov regime, which enjoyed 
the support of Democratic/Islamist parties, in its efforts to impose order throughout the 
country. On 16 September, units of 201st MID moved into the conflict areas, as a result of 
a personal order from Tajikistan's acting President Iskandarov, and took control of the 
Nurek Hydroelectric Station and the Chermozak Pass. 79° In late September 1992, the 
command of the 201st MID organised joint patrols with the local police in cities and 
communities with a high level of illegal weapons' possession. 791 Finally, in late October 
1992, during Safarli Kendzhayev's attempt to overthrow Tajikistan's government of 
national reconciliation, tanks of the Russian 201st division protected the television centre, 
the airport and the train station. 112 Although hard evidence to prove that the 201st MID 
was following Moscow's orders is lacking, it is highly likely that the Defence Ministry 
ordered the army to intervene, given Yeltsin's intentions to use the 201st MID as 
peacekeeping forces and his readiness to send additional troops in late September 1992 to 
guard Russia and CIS installations. Tajikistan was seen as an area of vital interest for 
Russia, if only because no physical frontiers had been set up between Russia and the 
Central Asian states. The awareness that Russia alone would be capable of stopping the 
bloodshed, and the presence of Russian troops in the area, which came regularly under 
attack by the various Tajik factions eager to get hold of additional weapons, prompted 
Russia to intervene. 
The evidence available so far, does not allow us to determine with certainty whether local 
officers voluntarily turned over weapons to the warring factions or whether instead they 
were forced by Tajik fighters to surrender them. For example, in late September 1992, 
788 'Nazarbaev, Akaev, Karimov, i E1'tsin pishut rukovodstvu Tadzhikistana', Nezavisimaya 
gazeta, 5 September 1992, p. l. 
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791 Aleskandr Karpov, `I. 0. Prezidenta Tadzhikistana pytaetsya viast' upotrebit' ', Izvestiya, 24 
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three tanks and an armoured personnel carrier were driven away from a regiment of the 
201st Russian division in Kurgan-Tyube. According to Komsomol 'skava pravda 
correspondent U. Babakhanov, the combat vehicles were turned over to armed Kulyab 
units based in the city of Kalininabad, who used this equipment to force their way into 
Kurgan-Tyube. 793 The Russian Ministry of Defence, however, reported that the equipment 
had not been turned over, but stolen by officers and warrant officers who were from the 
area. 7' Incidents of this type and regular attacks on Russian military installations 
prompted the Russian government to bring units of the 201st MID up to full strength. The 
troops were ordered to act decisively to stop seizures of weapons and illegal actions against 
servicemen and members of their families. Both sides in the Tajik conflict were trying hard 
to drag Russian troops into the fighting. 795 As a result, local commanders found themselves 
in a very difficult situation, given that they often belonged to local communities. The 201st 
MID was not really a Russian army. As many as ninety-five percent of the soldiers and 
sergeants were local residents. Consequently, it was difficult for them just to remain 
neutral. 
b. Russia Takes an Active Involvement 
As the situation in Tajikistan deteriorated in October and early November 1992, Russia 
decided to get increasingly involved in the conflict. On 5 November 1992, at Russia's 
insistence, the leaders of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Russia 
agreed to grant the 201st division peace-making functions, thus opening the door to 
Russia's direct military involvement in the conflict. The 201st MID was entrusted not only 
with the task of helping in the protection of civilians, but also of assisting the Tajik 
government in restoring peace and order throughout the country. 796 It was also decided that 
the 201st MID was to form the basis of a collective peace-making (mirotvorcheskii) force 
involving other CIS countries. Moreover, it was agreed that additional joint measures 
would be taken to strengthen security along Tajikistan's border with Afghanistan . 
797 
Russia's peace-making role was formally legalised in an agreement signed on 6 November 
1992, between Tajik President Iskandarov and Eduard Vorobyov, deputy commander of 
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the Russian army in Tajikistan. The agreement spelled out the details of a significantly 
broad peacekeeping mandate. Russian troops were put in charge not only of restoring and 
maintaining law and order, but also of disarming 'terrorist groups and criminal armed 
formations', as well as monitoring freight, confiscating illegal equipment, and facilitating 
the delivery of humanitarian aid. 798 Troops belonging to the 201st MID were allowed to use 
force in order to repulse armed attacks against servicemen and their families, against 
attempts to seize armaments and military equipment, and against attacks on the civilian 
population. Although it was clearly stipulated that the 201st MID was not allowed to get 
involved in the political struggle or in open hostilities, the broad provisions spelled out in 
the agreement, in effect, legalised and opened the way to the direct intervention of the 
Russian army in the Tajik war. After the capture of Dushanbe by Safarov's forces in mid- 
November 1992, the 201st MID helped to provide security to the streets of Dushanbe and 
799 soon became the main guarantor of security in key strategic areas of the country . 
Russia's increased military involvement in the Tajik civil war during the Autumn and 
Winter of 1992 seems to have resulted above all from a deterioration of the situation on the 
ground and a willingness to bring violence to an end, rather than from an attempt to bring 
Tajikistan under Russia's sphere of influence, despite the fact that Russia's involvement 
eventually brought Tajikistan under Russia's sway. Although Russia could have opted for 
a complete retreat from the region, Russian leaders refused to envisage this option, 
considering it too dangerous for Russia's own security. Russian leaders, in fact, 
increasingly perceived the deterioration of the situation in Tajikistan as representing a real 
threat to Russia's own security. As Foreign Minister Kozyrev explained, 'Russia's total 
withdrawal from Tajikistan would be detrimental to Russia's national interests..... The 
protection of Russia's borders requires that political stability be achieved in the states of 
Central Asia. '80° Kozyrev tried to make it clear that Russia was acting as a peacemaker, 
not in order to create a sphere of influence, but in order to protect its own borders. 
80' 
However, the line between neutral peacemaking and direct intervention proved to be a very 
thin one, and a month later, the Russian army got directly involved in the war by providing 
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military support not to Iskandarov, with whom Russia had signed the agreement, but to the 
new pro-Communist, Leninabad-Kulyab oriented Rakhmonov regime. 
Russia's decision to support Raklimonov was most probably a result of the belief that the 
latter had better chances than the Democratic/Islamic parties of imposing peace and 
stability in the country. The Nabiev and Iskandarov pseudo-democratic governments had 
been unable to unify and pacify the country, allowing Tajikistan to plunge into chaos. The 
Rakhmonov regime was also considered more pro-Russian than the opposition, besides the 
fact that it enjoyed the overt political military support of Uzbekistan. 802 The Uzbek 
leadership had cast its lot with the Uzbek pro-Communist faction, mainly because it feared 
the spread of Islamic and Democratic ideas from Tajikistan into Uzbekistan, given the 
presence of a large Tajik community in Uzbekistan. Russia's intervention in support of 
Rakhmonov opened a new phase in Russia's policies towards the region based on Russia's 
almost unconditional backing of the Rakhmonov regime, not only in military terms, but 
also in financial and economic terms. 
c. Russia's Open Support for Rakhmonov's Regime 
During the Spring of 1993, Russia strengthened its ties with the Rakhmonov regime. On 25 
May 1993, Presidents Yeltsin and Rakhmonov signed a series of documents on assistance 
and military co-operation, officially sealing Russia's alliance with the Tajik regime and 
laying the grounds for further Russian military involvement in the region. 803 However, this 
did not produce the desired effect on the ground. In July 1993, the opposition launched a 
major attack along the Tajik-Afghan border, in which over 30 Russian soldiers were killed, 
precipitating a sharp reaction from the Russian leadership, especially from the Russian 
MOD. Defence Minister Grachev demanded that the Russian Parliament approve an 
increase in the number of Russian troops in Tajikistan and requested that the forces of the 
201st MID be granted the right to provide full-scale assistance to the Russian border 
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guards along the Tajik-Afghan border. 804 The Russian parliament, for once, sided 
completely with the government and immediately approved the additional sending of 
troops, and ratified the Friendship Treaty with Tajikistan. The Russian leadership justified 
its increased involvement in Tajikistan on the grounds that Russia's vital interests were at 
stake in the region. Attacks by Tajik mujahideen along the border and Afghanistan's 
inability to restore control over the common border, were considered a threat to Russia's 
own security. Moreover, Russian leaders felt it was their duty to protect the local Russian- 
speaking population. 105 
The exacerbation of the situation in Tajikistan and the increased involvement of Russian 
forces in the area lead to a heated debate in Russia. On the one hand, leading democrat 
figures, such as Gavriil Popov, Elena Bonner and Konstantin Borovoi, condemned 
Russia's extended participation in the region, expressing fears that Russia would get 
bogged down in another 'Afghan quagmire'. They argued that Russia lacked the adequate 
experience and capacity, as well as the appropriate mandate from the international 
community, to conduct such an operation. 806 They also criticised the fact that Russia was 
supporting an authoritarian regime which was very critical of the democratic leadership in 
Moscow. 807 Military commentators, in turn, highlighted the flaws of Russia's military 
involvement, and pointed out the difficulties faced by Russia in stabilising the country and 
effectively protecting the Tajik-Afghan borders from guerrilla attacks. 808 On the other 
hand, journalists close to government circles argued that control over the Tajik border was 
essential, since an open Tajik border would lead to a stream of refugees, weapons and 
narcotics, a flood of crime pouring into other CIS countries and Russia. The alternative, 
building a new border along Russia's new external borders, was considered too costly. 809 
The Russian leadership, in fact, faced a serious dilemma. Although it was clear that Russia 
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was getting dragged into a new war, retreat from Tajikistan meant the opening of a great 
gap along Russia's southern borders. The options available were therefore quite limited. 
Either Russia retreated and built up a new border -a very expensive enterprise with no 
total guarantee of success- or it stayed and ran the risk of getting increasingly involved in 
the fighting. Although support from other CIS countries was also a possibility, it did not 
really represent a realistic option, since these countries proved unable to provide any 
significant support. 310 
Russian leaders opted for an increased military involvement, and in the Summer of 1993, 
progressively increased the number of Russian border troops and peacekeeping forces. By 
August 1994 Russia's presence in Tajikistan totalled over 20,000 men. "" Moreover, in 
September 1993, Russia obtained the backing from the other CIS states to form joint CIS 
peace-making forces (mirotvorcheskie sily) on the basis of Russian, Kazakh, Uzbek, 
Kvrgyz and Tajik forces, to be sent to Tajikistan for a six-months period. 812 The 
agreement, however, remained very vague. No particular areas of deployment nor mandate 
were specified. In fact, Russia's initial intention had been to establish collective defence 
forces (kollektivnye sily oboronv), probably within the framework of the Collective 
Security Treaty, to defend the border from attacks originating in Afghanistan. But, on 
Kazakhstan's insistence, the troops were named `peacemaking forces. ' A CIS agreement 
signed in April 1994 finally detailed the mandate of the troops and extended their presence 
for another six months. Besides assisting in the delivery of humanitarian aid, the troops 
were assigned the task of stabilising the situation along the Tajik-Afghan border and 
creating the conditions for dialogue in order to reach a political settlement of the conflict. 813 
Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan eventually sent battalions to reinforce Russia's 
forces, but their small numbers - each national contingent did not surpass 350 men - 
resulted in Russia carrying the bulk of the burden of the peacekeeping operation. '``` 
The absence of truly multinational peacekeeping forces as well as the broad nature of the 
peacemaking mandate, led many Russian and Western analysts to view Russia's 
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peacemaking activities in Tajikistan as a fig-leaf for the operations of the Russian army 
and the Ministry of Defence, and even as a mantle for Russia's neo-imperialist 
aspirations. 8 There is little doubt that Russia was eager to obtain a CIS mandate for its 
troops in order to obtain additional legitimacy and to establish the CIS as a regional 
partner of the UN in peace operations. However, Russia's desire to create CIS 
peacekeeping forces in Tajikistan was also driven by Russia's willingness to obtain 
additional military support from other CIS neighbouring countries. For example, at a 
meeting of CIS Defence Ministers in July 1994, Russian Defence Minister Grachev reacted 
angrily when other CIS states refused to contribute military personnel and funds to CIS 
peacekeeping operations . 
816 P As opposed to the relatively small peacekeeping operations 
conducted by Russia in other areas of the CIS, the Tajik operation was of a large scale, 
involving a far higher number of Russian troops. Moreover, it could also be argued that 
Russia did not need an additional mandate for its presence, given that the November 1992 
agreement, to a great extent, legalised the presence and the operation of its troops in 
Tajikistan. However, Russia's operations did not fall within the traditional concept of 
peacekeeping, even of an extended type, given that the forces actively supported one side of 
the conflict. The Tajik operation tended in fact to resemble counter-insurgency or low- 
intensity warfare, rather than traditional peacekeeping, and this explains, to a great extent, 
why it was perceived as neo-imperial. By 1993, Russia was most probably not just 
motivated by a desire to put an end to violence, but also by an eagerness to keep a military 
presence in what it considered was an area of key strategic significance. Nevertheless, it 
seems that the CIS peacekeeping agreements were not primarily intended to provide a 
mantle for Russia's operations, but were conceived above all as a means of obtaining 
military support from the CIS states. 
Russia complemented its military involvement with an active diplomatic campaign aimed at 
reaching a political settlement. In July 1993, Foreign Minister Kozyrev insisted that 
diplomatic efforts be conducted and pressure be put on President Rakhmonov so that he 
opened dialogue with the moderate Tajik opposition. 8 ' Kozyrev and his deputy Anatolii 
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Adamishin held various meetings with both the Tajik government and the opposition in 
September 1993 and March 1994, which prepared the ground for a series of five rounds of 
talks held between April 1994 and July 1996, between the Tajik government and the 
opposition, under both Russian and UN aegis. Although Russia launched the talks, it 
showed from the very beginning a readiness to actively involve the UN as well as other 
regional countries, such as Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan in 
the negotiations. After the first round held in Moscow, the following meetings were held in 
Tehran, Islamabad, Alma-Ata and Ashgabat respectively, and all meetings were co-chaired 
by Russia and the UN. Moreover, at the 9 August 1993 summit in Moscow, between 
Russia and Central Asian leaders, Adamishin clearly asked the UN for assistance in terms 
of humanitarian aid, observers and peacekeeping forces, and suggested that the CIS forces 
protecting the Tajik border be granted UN status, if a UN force failed to materialise. 
Russia's willingness to co-operate with the UN did not prevent it from becoming deeply 
involved militarily in the conflict during 1994-1995. As fighting extended to the Gorno- 
Badakhshan section of the Tajik-Afghan border and to the internal regions of Garm, 
Tavildaria and Gorno-Badakhshan, the Russian 201st MID and border troops intervened 
on the side of the Tajik government. Not only did the Russian border troops repel attacks 
along the Tajik-Afghan border throughout 1994 and 1995, they also actively participated 
in several military operations conducted by the Tajik government, particularly during the 
Khorogh offensive of April 1995. Moreover, Russian troops belonging to the 201st MID 
helped the Tajik regime to neutralise the opposition inside Tajikistan during 1993-1995, 
and provided the government with substantial support in the Tavildaria offensive in late 
November 1995.818 Russia's open support for Rakhmonov and its regular condemnation of 
the opposition's military attacks, significantly discredited Russia's ability to act as a 
neutral and effective negotiator. Therefore, in April 1995, the leading role in the intra-Tajik 
negotiations was taken over by the UN, whose special representative Roberto Piriz Ballon 
brokered an extension of the cease-fire in August 1995, and conducted intensive diplomatic 
efforts aimed at advancing dialogue among the parties. However, very little was achieved. 
Regular violations of a cease-fire agreement reduced the chances of brokering a lasting 
political settlement. 
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The arrival of Evgenv Primakov to the leadership of the Russian Foreign Ministry did not 
significantly modify Russia's policies towards Tajikistan. In spite of the diplomatic set- 
backs, Russia remained the dominant player, because of the military and economic support 
it provided to the Rakhmonov regime. Although at the CIS summit on 19 January 1996, 
Yeltsin for the first time made it clear that 'Russia was not ready to carry Tajikistan in its 
arms for ever, ' Russia's policies essentially did not change; they simply acquired a new 
impetus. s'Q Primakov emphasised that Russia's own security interests and regional 
stability required an active military presence in Tajikistan, which had to be combined with 
effective mediation efforts. As violence escalated during December 1995-January 1996, 
Russia decided to put increasing pressure on Rakhmonov so that he make the necessary 
concessions to the opposition. 82° However, by July 1996 the situation on the ground 
remained highly volatile. Although the UN negotiated a cease-fire in early March 1996, it 
was violated in late May 1996. Russia's military presence and its diplomatic efforts did not 
manage to settle the conflict. Although Tajikistan remained well-anchored in Russia's 
sphere of influence, Russia had not succeeded in fulfilling its main objective: securing 
peace in the region. 
3. Assessment of Russia's Policies 
Russia's military participation in support of the Rakhmonov regime, its assistance in the 
creation of the Tajik Army, as well as its economic and political backing of the Tajik 
government, transformed the Tajik regime into a sort of `vassal' of Moscow. 821 By the end 
of 1993, it had become clear that the Tajik government was able to survive only thanks to 
Russia's military and economic support. The perpetuation of hostilities and the difficulties 
Russia experienced in putting an end to the violence prolonged Russia's presence in 
Tajikistan, making it increasingly difficult for Russia to extricate itself from the region. 
Russia's continued presence in Tajikistan and its military and economic backing of the 
Rakhmonov regime, resulted in Tajikistan falling under Russia's sphere of influence, 
whether or not this had been the initial intention of policy-makers in Moscow. In 1992 
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Russia had intervened in Tajikistan mainly to put an end to violence; by 1993-1994, the 
Russian leadership, both military and diplomatic circles alike, increasingly perceived 
developments in Tajikistan as vital to Russia's own security. The Russian military, 
although over-stretched, still seemed eager to preserve a military presence in that country, 
not only to protect Russia, but also to prevent the spread of regional instability. Although 
Russia had not instigated the violence in order to perpetuate its presence - on the contrary, 
its efforts had been aimed at putting an end to the conflict - its active involvement on the 
government's side, to a great extent, exacerbated the situation. However, Russian leaders 
also seemed eager to involve international organisations in peacemaking activities. In May 
1996, Russia urged the UN Security Council to undertake a peacekeeping operation in 
Tajikistan under UN auspices. However, the UN reacted coolly, concerned about the 
potential losses of lives and the lack of financial resources. 8`2 Although imperialist motives 
were probably not behind Russia's initial behaviour, once Russia got deeply involved, its 
behaviour acquired an increasingly neo-imperialist character, despite its willingness to 
work in collaboration with the UN. 
4. Conclusion 
The Tajik war represents the only case of the four ethnic conflicts analysed, where Russian 
forces in the ground became massively involved in the fighting in support of one of the 
factions of the war, with the probable exception of the 14th Army in Transdniestria during 
the Spring and Summer of 1992. Russia's involvement however, should not be attributed 
only to an attempt to keep the country under Russia's sphere of influence at any cost, but 
should also be seen as a response to the escalation of violence on the ground. Russia did 
not actively participate in the exacerbation of the violence, on the contrary, it had every 
reason to want it to stop. The war in Tajikistan was having an extremely negative effect on 
Russia and on the Central Asian region: spread of weapons, illegal trade, refugees, and 
general instability which prevented the development of the economy. Russia, 
however, 
could have decided to retreat from the region and set up its own border in order to protect 
itself from the negative impact of the Tajik war. This was a very expensive option, and 
there was no guarantee that the effects of the war would not have filtered 
into Russia 
anyway. However, the fact that the Russian leadership did not even consider the possibility 
of retreating from the region shows that Tajikistan was considered an 
`natural sphere' of 
822 `Boris Vinogradov, `Neitralitet do pervogo vystrela? ', Izvestiya, 24 May, 1996, p. 3. 
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Russia's interest and therefore that no one but Russia would be able to impose peace. 
Moreover, as Russia got deeply involved in Tajikistan, the conviction increasingly gained 
ground that Tajikistan represented a sphere of vital Russian interests and that Russia 
should not retreat from the area. In other words, as with Abkhazia and Transdniestria, once 
Russia got involved in the conflict, the perception that these areas were vital to Russia 
grew, and the efforts to keep an `informal empire' increased. 
VI. General Conclusion 
Russia's policies regarding the ethnic conflicts in Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabagh and 
Tajikistan show that Russia was ready to take an active role, either in terms of mediation 
or peacekeeping in order to bring about an end to violence. Russia considered these areas 
as its own sphere of influence and was determined that no other country play a dominant 
role in the region, least of all introduce its armed forces as peacekeepers. However, Russia 
also had a legitimate interest in finding a solution to these conflicts, since instability along 
its southern borders, however far they were, was seen as having a negative impact on 
Russia, in terms of refugees and illegal trade. Moreover, Russia was the country the best 
placed to persuade the warring factions to reach an agreement, and the most willing to take 
an active role and send in its own forces. These factors determined that Russia ended up 
being the chief negotiator and the main peacekeeper in the region. The Russian Ministry of 
Defence on the other hand, was willing to keep a military presence in the former Soviet 
states, and therefore tried to take advantage of the wars in Abkhazia, Transdniestria, 
Tajikistan and Nagorno-Karabagh in order to impose its own agenda. It succeeded very 
well in Georgia where Russia managed to keep key military bases, but it failed in Nagorno- 
Karabagh. In Transdniestria it managed to perpetuate its presence despite the opposition of 
the Moldovan government. In Tajikistan, Russia managed to keep a military presence, but 
at a very high cost, since its troops were constantly involved in the fighting, and thus 
suffering many casualties. Moreover, in Tajikistan, Russia's military presence proved the 
least effective in bringing an end to violence. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
although displaced from most of the negotiations by the Ministry of Defence, still managed 
to impose the view that the territorial integrity and inviolability of borders of the new 
independent states had to be respected, and that the secessionist movement should only 
strive for some sort of regional autonomy. This shows that although Russia was willing to 
keep these areas under its influence, it still regarded these countries as sovereign and 
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independent, not least because any change of borders in the former Soviet states could 
trigger similar demands among its own autonomous units. 
Although Russia pursued quite legitimate state interests in its intervention in the conflicts, 
in many occasions its involvement had 'Informal empire building' aspirations. In fact a 
very fine line divided security-building from neo-imperial building, and most often than 
not, Russian leaders found themselves conducting assertive actions which fitted the neo- 
imperialist pattern. This resulted to a great extent from the difficulties Russian leaders had 
in totally discarding Russia's imperial legacy, and from the lack of experience of both the 
military and the diplomats on conflict resolution. The Russian military adopted quite 
heavy-handed tactics in their settlement of the conflicts, tactics which very much resembled 
intervention in low intensity conflicts. The Foreign Ministry's inability to settle the 
conflicts by mediation only resulted in their eventual support for more assertive methods. 
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Chapter 4: Russia's Energy Trade with the Former Soviet States 
The current chapter will examine Russia's policies towards the former Soviet states in the 
energy sector. During the period under examination, Russia remained the biggest producer 
and the main supplier of energy to those former Soviet states that had insufficient energy 
resources to cover their own needs, in particular the Baltic states, Moldova, Ukraine and 
Belarus. It also controlled the export lines of those republics with abundant energy 
resources, such as Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, which wanted to export 
their energy supplies to world markets. The chapter will attempt to determine whether 
Russia's advantageous position as the main producer and supplier of energy, and as the 
centre of the post-Soviet energy export network, allowed it to exert substantial pressure on 
FSS states in order to bring them into Russia's sphere of influence; or whether instead, 
Russia's energy policies towards the FSS followed purely economic interests. In other 
words, whether policies reflected an attempt to correct the artificially unfavourable terms 
of trade inherited from the Soviet era, and to follow the natural trend of internationalisation 
and expansion, or whether instead, Russia's policies were primarily motivated by 
geopolitical considerations. 
The energy trade was chosen as a topic of examination for various reasons. First, because 
of the significance of energy inputs in a country's economy in general, and in the former 
Soviet Union in particular, given the energy-intensive character of Soviet industry -a result 
of the availability of plentiful energy resources at heavily subsidised prices. Second, 
because of Russia's disproportionately high share of oil and gas exports in intra-republican 
and CIS trade. In this respect, the energy trade is particularly enlightening because a 
country's control over energy resources and energy flows allows it, if so desired, to exert 
strong influence over those countries that are dependent on its resources. Third, because of 
the dominant role played by the energy sector within the Russian economy itself. During 
most of the period under examination, tax revenues from the energy complex covered more 
than half of the Russian state budget, and the energy industry's foreign-exchange receipts 
accounted for more than 70 percent of Russia's total export earnings . 
113 Such high 
dependence by the Russian economy on the energy complex implied that its interest could 
not always be ignored. In fact, very close links developed between Russian energy 
industries and the government, as reflected in the appointment of Viktor Chernomyrdin, 
823 Aleksandr Bekker, `TEK zadavien gruzom neplatezhei', Segodnya, 21 January 1993, p. 2. 
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previously head of the Soviet gas conglomerate, as Russian Prime Minister, and of Yurii 
Shafranik, who had directed a major oil-production association, as Minister of Fuel and 
Energy. 
After examining the main traits of the Russian energy complex and its relations with the 
Russian govemment, the chapter will analyse Russia's energy policies towards those states 
with insufficient energy resources and highly dependent on Russia, such as Ukraine and 
Belarus. Then it will proceed to examine Russia's policies towards those republics with 
significant energy resources. such as Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan in the Caspian region. 
I. The Russian Energy Complex 
The Russian energy complex comprises the natural gas monopoly Gazprom -a joint-stock 
company with 40 percent state participation - and about a dozen oil conglomerates, Lukoil, 
Surgutneflegas, Yukos and Rosneft being the largest. Lukoil and Rosneft were privatised 
between 1992 and 1995, but the ownership structure of the oil industry remained murky, 
given that companies regularly swapped shares, and formed subsidiary companies. In 
1995, two major Russian banks, ONEKSIMbank and Menatep bank, obtained majority 
shares in Sidanco and Yukos respectively, and Imperial bank acquired a5 percent share of 
Lukoil. 824 The close ties between the energy complex and the highest echelons of power in 
Russia raised two major inter-linked questions. On the one hand, whether or not Russian 
leaders used the energy industry as an instrument of foreign policy, especially within the 
former Soviet space. On the other hand, to what extent did the policies of the Russian 
government actually reflect the particular interests of the energy lobby. The fusion of 
government structures and semi-independent private entities, which characterised the 
Russian energy sector during this transitional period, resulted in both entities mutually 
influencing each other. The energy companies, in particular Gazprom, 40 percent of which 
belonged to the state, were not purely commercial enterprises. The companies' behaviour 
often reflected the policies of the Russian govemment, which set the broad lines and 
conducted the overall energy policy of Russia towards the FSS. On more than one 
occasion, the interest of the government and of the energy companies coincided, especially 
as far as the expansion of the energy sector in the FSS is concerned. However, as the 
process of privatisation gathered speed, the views of the energy companies and those of the 
824 Peter Rutland, `Russia's Energy Empire Under Strain', Transition, 3 May 1996, p. 7. 
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government tended to diverge. Gazprom, Lukoil and Yukos increasingly became 
independent actors, often approaching the development of the Russian gas and oil markets 
exclusively from the point of view of corporate gain. 825 As energy companies became more 
powerfid, their influence over foreign policy in a way consistent with their own economic 
interests grew. The companies' ability to earn vast amount of much needed hard currency 
and their ability to act as powerful players beyond Russia's borders resulted in an 
increasingly influential behaviour. Efforts were conducted by the Russian leadership, 
especially after 1994, to ensure that the operations of the energy companies coincided with 
the interest of the Russian state. To that effect, Chernomyrdin was charged in 1995 with 
the task of making the activity of the oil and gas companies consistent with `Russia's state 
interests. '826 The relations between the government and the energy industry were, therefore, 
extremely complex. As the chapter will show, certain decisions followed primarily the 
interests of the energy companies, whereas others tended to reflect the predominance of 
state interests over those of the energy conglomerates. 
II. Ukraine and Belarus 
Both Ukraine and Belarus were very much dependent on Russia's energy supplies when the 
Soviet Union collapsed in 1991.82' Belarus drew all of its gas supplies from Russia and 
825 Igor Khuripunov and Mary Matthews, `Russia's Oil and Gas Interest Group and Its Foreign 
Policy Agenda', Problems of Post-Communism, May-June 1996, p. 40. 
826 ANI Report, 'Premier to Make Decision on Oil Companies' Structure', Segodnya, 5 July 1995, 
in ibid. p. 40. 
827 The literature on Russia's energy trade with Ukraine reveals the following arguments: 
Margarita Mercedes de Balmaceda and Oles M. Somlansky argued that Ukraine's economic 
dependency on Russia significantly reduced Kiev's ability to conduct an independent foreign 
policy, and opened Ukraine to Russian blackmail. According to Balmaceda and Smolansky, 
Russia took advantage of its dominant position to obtain political concessions, as far as CIS 
integration and the Black Sea Fleet are concerned. However, Balmaceda noted that divergent 
interests coexisted within the energy sector and that the positions of the Russian government and 
the energy companies did not always coincide. Although not explicitly supporting the neo- 
imperialist argument, Balmaceda and Smolansky tend to disregard the `national interest' 
elements which was usually present in Russian behaviour in this field. (Margarita Mercedes 
Balmaceda, `Gas, Oil and the Linkages between Domestic and Foreign Policies: The Case of 
Ukraine', Europe-Asia Studies, 50,1998,2, pp. 257-286; Smolansky, Oles M., `Ukraine's Quest 
for Independence: The Fuel Factor', Europa Asia Studies, 47,1995,1, pp. 67-90) Igor Khripunov 
and Mary M. Matthews similarly argued that the oil and gas industries were viewed by the 
Russian government as a major tool to reintegrate the former Soviet republics. (Igor Khripunov 
and Mary M. Matthews, `Russia's Oil and Gas Interest Group and its Foreign Policy Agenda', 
Problems of Post-Communism, 43, May-June 1996,3, p. 41. ) Gwendolyn Sasse instead, argued 
that despite Russia's considerable potential leverage over Ukraine, Moscow did not manage to 
achieve any concrete foreign policy goals, because of Russia's dependency on Ukraine for the 
transport of its energy resources to European markets. (Gwendolyn Sasse, `Fuelling Nation-State- 
Building. Ukraine's Energy Dependence on Russia', Central Asian and Caucasian Prospects, 
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imported most of its electricity from both Lithuania and Russia. It only produced 10 
percent of its oil consumption, the rest being imported from Russia. 82' Ukraine found itself 
in a slightly better position. Although it depended on Russia for 60 percent of its gas and 
almost 90 percent of its oil, it produced some 20 percent of its own gas needs, and obtained 
another 20 percent from Turkmenistan. 829 Its five nuclear power stations produced about 
one-third of the country's electricity. Ukraine also had a large coal mining industry in the 
Donbass. In all, Ukraine provided approximately one-third of its own energy needs. 830 
1. Russia's Energy Trade with Ukraine 
a. Facing up to Higher Prices and Reduced Supplies 
After the end of the USSR, Russia sharply cut down oil supplies to Ukraine and 
progressively increased oil and gas prices. Whereas on average, Russia had supplied 
Ukraine with 57 million tons of oil a year, in 1991 it only provided Ukraine with 41 million 
tons, and in 1992 supplies dropped even further to. 33. E million tons. 83i During 1992, 
Russia's oil and gas prices to Ukraine remained heavily subsidised - 35 percent of the 
world market price for oil and 12 percent for gas. However, the bill was still up from 
previous years, making it extremely hard for Ukraine to meet payments on time. Delays in 
payments prompted Russia to reduce the amount of gas supplied in October 1992, 
decreasing Ukraine's meagre energy reserves even further. 832 The situation worsened in the 
winter of 1992, when President Yeltsin announced that those former Soviet states that 
withdrew from the ruble zone - Ukraine being one of them - would be charged world prices 
for energy and would be required to pay in hard currency. 833 Tough negotiations followed 
Briefing Paper, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 17 April 1998, p. 7) A 
similar point has been raised by Peter Rutland, who argued that although certain elements in 
Russia were keen to use the energy factor to restore a sphere of influence over the FSS, mutual 
dependency limited Russia's ability to extract concessions. (Peter Rutland, Lost Opportunities: 
Energy and Politics in Russia, p. 26-27. ) 
82S Ustina Markus, 'Heading off an Energy Disaster', Transition, 14 April 1995, p. 10. 
329 'Ukraine: Deal with Iran Poses Market-sharing Questions', Petroleum Economist, March 
1992, p. 55; Isabel Gorst, `Neighbours Tussle over Energy Matters', Petroleum Economist, April 
1993, p. 16. 
830 Ustina Markus, `Energy Crisis Spurs Ukraine and Belarus To Seek Help Abroad', Transition, 
3 May 1996, p. 14. 
831 Vladimir Mikheev, `Ukraina vybiraet vneshne-ekonomicheskikh partnerov po printsipu 
nadezhnosti', Izvestiya, 11 February 1992, p. 5. 
832 Moscow Radio, 19 October 1992, in FBIS-SOV-92,21 October 1992, p. 35 and Moscow 
Radio, 21 October 1992, in FBIS-SOU 92,22 October 1992, pp. 40-41. 
833 Oles M. Smolansky, `Ukraine's Quest for Independence: The Fuel Factor', Europa-Asia 
Studies, 47,1995,1, pp. 72-73. 
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in 1993, as Russian leaders became committed to raising progressively energy prices to 
world levels. In June 1993, it was agreed that Russia would provide Ukraine with a 
substantially reduced supply of oil for the rest of 1993 - 15 million tons - at double the 
price previously charged - $80 per ton. As far as gas is concerned, Russia agreed to supply 
a total of 60 billion cubic metres of gas for the whole of 1993, at $40 per 1,000 cubic 
metres, a fivefold increase from the previous price. 834 Such high prices and reduced 
volumes, especially as far as oil was concerned, severely hit Ukraine's already collapsing 
industrial production, thus further reducing its capacity to cover energy costs. 
Ukraine's inability to pay for the agreed deliveries at the prices stipulated prompted Russia 
to temporarily suspend oil supplies in July 1993 and to substantially reduce gas supplies in 
late August 1993. By the end of the summer, the energy situation in Ukraine had become 
so critical - the total energy debt to Russia reached $2.5 billion - that at the Russian- 
Ukrainian summit in Massandra on 3 September Ukrainian President Kravchuk seemed 
ready to transfer half of the entire Black Sea Fleet to Russia as payment for Ukraine's 
outstanding debts. But pressure from the Ukrainian opposition forced Kravchuk to 
immediately revise his position, and the proposal was immediately shelved. Ukraine's 
potential 'economic capitulation' to Russia, was not only the result of Ukraine's scarce 
energy resources, it was also very much related to the collapse of the overall Ukrainian 
economy. The total absence of macroeconomic stabilisation, the lack of structural 
economic reform, and the external terms of trade shock had provoked a sharp fall in 
industrial output, a serious deterioration of Ukraine's balance of payments, an upsurge of 
hyperinflation and a severe decline in living standards. 83' In 1993, real GDP fell by 15 
percent, bringing the cumulative fall in output since 1989 to 40 percent. 83' By the end of 
the summer of 1993, the Ukrainian economy was in a shambles. 
834 Erik Whitlock, `Ukrainian-Russian Trade: The Economics of Dependency', RFE/RL Research 
Report, 29 October 1993, p. 39; Ustina Markus, `Debt and Desperation', Transition, 14 April 
1995, p. 15. 
835 Francoise Le Gall, `Ukraine: A Trade and Exchange System Still Seeking Direction', in Trade 
in the New Independent States, eds. Constantine Michalopoulos and David G. Tarr, IMF, 
Washington DC, 1994, p. 66. 
836 ibid.; Vladimir Mikheev, `Ukraina vybiraet vneshne-ekonomicheskikh partnerov po printsipu 
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b. Negotiations on Ukraine's Gas Debt 
Despite Ukraine's difficulties in meeting payments, Russia resumed energy supplies. In 
December 1993, a new agreement was reached, whereby Russia committed itself to supply 
its western neighbour with 60 billion cubic metres of gas, at $60 per 1,000 cubic metres - 
$20 less than initially stipulated - and 25 million tons of oil at $75-$80 per ton, also down 
$20. '3' However, prices were still extremely high for a Ukrainian economy on the verge of 
collapse. Aware of Ukraine's inability to pay, Russian Deputy Premier Aleksandr Shokhin 
expressed Russia's preference for 'non-traditional' methods of payment, `including the 
participation of Russian enterprises, primarily Gazprom in the privatisation of Ukrainian 
production capacities. '83' Russia was specifically interested in obtaining a `30-40 percent 
share' in the Kremenchuh refinery as well as the Khartzyzsk pipe-making plant. 83' The 
Ukrainian leadership initially refused to hand over state property. But faced with an 
exorbitant energy debt, which in March 1994 reached $3.2 billion, the Ukrainian 
government granted Gazprom a 51 percentage of the authorised capital in Ukraine's gas 
transport infrastructure and a 50 percent share in a number of factories of interest to 
Gazprom. These included gas pipelines across Ukraine to Europe, underground storage 
facilities and the Odessa port installations. 840 However, the Ukrainian parliament refused to 
approve the agreement, arguing that the earmarked facilities be excluded from privatisation 
because of their national strategic significance. 841 
As agreements were only partially implemented, Ukraine's gas debt continued to rise, 
reaching $1.5 billion in June 1994.842 Aware that Ukraine faced serious difficulties in 
settling debts, Gazprom's chairman, Rem Vyakhirev, demanded a share in Ukrainian state 
property and exemptions from licenses, quotas, and taxation on exports whose earnings 
went towards gas payment. In June 1994, the Ukrainian government agreed to sign over to 
Gazprom 15 to 30 percent of Odessa's port facilities. However, as before, opposition 
831 Ustina Markus, `Debt and Desperation', p. 15. 
838 Moscow Radio, 18 November 1993, in FBIS-SOV-93-, 19 November 1993, p. 7. 
839 Maria Starozhitskaya, `Svobodnye profsoiuzy Ukrainy prizivaiut podderzhat' 
predstoyashchuiu zabastovku', Izvestiya, 25 December 1993, p. 3. 
840 Rustam Narzikulov, `Ukraina soglasilas' pogasit' dolgi "Gazpromu" ', Segodnya, 11 March 
1994, p. 1. 
841 Reuters, 16 August 1994 and Interfax, 14 April 1994, cited in Ustina Markus, `Debt and 
Desperation', p. 17. 
842 Ustina Markus, `Debt and Desperation', p. 18 
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within the legislature, effectively nullified the transfer. 843 Other debt-rescheduling 
agreements followed in July and September 1994, but as before, they were never 
implemented because of their unrealistic payment schedules. As the winter approached, and 
new threats of supply cuts resurfaced, Ukraine's new leader, President Leonid Kuchma, 
approached the international community for support. The G-7 leaders agreed in October 
1994 to grant Ukraine $1.2 billion in assistance, on condition that Russia and 
Turkmenistan defer Ukraine's gas debt, to which they agreed. 844 
Despite the agreement, Gazprom again cut deliveries in November 1994, as arrears 
continued to accumulate, reaching a peak of $1.48 billion by the end of the year. 141 In 
January 1995, the IMF helped to broker another agreement which rescheduled Ukraine's 
debts and softened payment terms. Ukraine would repay up to 50 percent of its debt and 
interest accrued in the form of goods, and the other half in freely convertible currency. 846 
Moreover Russia granted Ukraine another deferment on payments on its main debt and on 
state credits. The agreement also foresaw the establishment of joint Russian-Ukrainian oil- 
refining and timber-processing complexes, the creation of joint financial groups and 
companies, and the conversion of enterprises of mutual interest into joint-stock companies. 
However, the Ukrainian government once again prevented the swaps, concerned that 
Ukraine's sovereignty would otherwise be undermined. Throughout 1995, Ukraine made 
semi-regular payments to Gazprom largely through its foreign credits. Still, in September it 
was reportedly $160 million in arrears for the year to Gazprom, besides its $150 million 
debt to Turkmenistan. The situation worsened when in November 1995, Gazprom raised 
gas prices from $50 per 1,000 cubic metres to $80 for 1996, which was roughly equal to 
prevailing world prices. 847 
c. Oil Supplies and Transit Fees 
Russia's external oil prices had reached world levels as early as January 1994, when 
Russia started charging $100 per ton for its oil deliveries. Despite the price increases 
Ukraine's oil debt never reached the levels of its gas debt, partly because Russia could 
843 'Dolgi za gaz Ukraina budet vozvrashchat' kvartirami', Izvestiya, 9 June 1994, p. '; Ustina 
Markus, `Energy Crisis Spurs Ukraine and Belarus To Seek Help Abroad', p. 15. 
844 ibid., p. 16. 
845 IEA, Energy Policies of Ukraine. 1996 Survey, Paris, p. 155. 
846 Leonid Velekhov, `Rossiya i Ukraina reshali, kak by-t' s dolgami', Segondya, 26 January 1995, 
p. '. 
847 TTctina Markus, `Energy Crisis Spurs Ukraine and Belarus To Seek Help Abroad', p. 16. 
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more easily cut off oil deliveries. Ukraine paid its oil debt by a combination of barter deals 
and promises of shares in oil production facilities, as well as with transit fees for the 
pumping of 28 million tons of Russian oil to Central Europe across Ukraine via the 
Druzhba pipeline. Throughout 1993-1995, Ukraine charged Russia lower than world 
market prices for the transit of both Russian oil and gas across Ukrainian territory. Russia 
paid $0.75 for one ton of oil per 100 km, and $0.75 for 1,000 cubic metres of gas per 100 
km. World prices fluctuated between $1.30 and $3.00 per 100 km. However, in November 
1995, the gas transit fee was raised to $1.75 per 1,000 cubic metres, 848 and in January 
1996, the oil transit fee was increased by 75 cents to $1.5 0. Although no formal agreement 
was reached, many Russian companies started to pay the Ukrainian fee. s49 
d. Russian Subsidies to Ukraine 
Despite the low fares and the progressive increases in energy prices, Russia effectively 
subsidised Ukraine during 1992-1995, not only through reduced gas prices, but also 
through lower interest rates on Russian loans to cover Ukraine's energy debts, which by 
the end of 1995 amounted to $5 billion. Despite Russia's own shortage of funds, its loans 
to Ukraine carried interest rates lower than the alternative costs of borrowing to the 
Russian or Ukrainian governments. The 1991-92,1993 and 1994 energy debts, carried 
interest rates ranging from 0.5 to 1 percent. Russia instead was borrowing capital at 10 
percent in the world market. 850 Moreover, in March 1995, a major rescheduling of the gas 
debt took place, under pressure from the IMF. 851 A 12-year schedule of repayment based 
on the LIBOR rate plus 1.5 percent was devised for $1.14 billion of Ukraine's debt to 
852 Russia, with a grace period of two years. 
848 Viktor Zubanyuk, `Ukraine will have gas, but not Gaztransit', Kommersant-daily, 9 November 
1995, p. 9, in CDPSP, XLVII, 1995, p. 18. 
8139 Margarita Mercedes Balmaceda, 'Gas, Oil and the Linkages between Domestic and Foreign 
Policies: The Case of Ukraine', Europe-Asia Studies, 50,1998,2, p. 269. 
850 Gregory V. Krasnov and Josef C. Brada, `Implicit Subsidies in Russian-Ukrainian Energy 
Trade', Europa-Asia Studies, 49,1997,5, pp. 834-836. 
851 Vladimir Abarinov, `MVF budet posrednikom mezhdu Ukrainoi i Rossiei', Segodnya, 14 
March 1995, p. 2; Natalya Kalashnikova, `Ukraine and International Financial Organisations: 
IMF Promises to help Kiev settle accounts with Moscow', Kommersant-daily, 14 March 1995, 
p. 4, in CDPSP, XLVII, 1995,11, p. 23. 
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Analysts Gregory Krasnov and Joseph Brada estimated that total Russian subsidies for 
t992-1995 amounted to about S9.2 billion, if Ukraine subsidies for low transit fees, 
Russia's subsidies for oil and gas prices, and Russia's credit subsidies are taken into 
account. 853 Bilateral subsidies in terms of prices and transit fees were brought to an end in 
early 1996. Russia began selling both oil and gas at world prices, and Ukraine imposed 
world prices for transit fees across its pipelines. As far as credit subsidies were concerned, 
the Ukrainian government stopped centralised gas imports for industrial consumers, 
importing gas only for the general population and state organisations. It granted eight 
independent wholesale importers regional monopolies to buy gas from Russia directly with 
suppliers. 
2. Assessment of Russia's Energy Trade with Ukraine 
During 1992-1995, Russia's energy trade with Ukraine was characterised by a substantial 
reduction in Russian oil supplies when compared to Soviet times, as well as regular 
disruptions and cut offs in both oil and gas supplies. Moreover, Russia progressively 
increased oil and gas prices, which reached world levels in 1994 and 1996 respectively. 
Was Russia's behaviour an attempt to put pressure on Ukraine in order to bring it under 
Russia's sphere of influence? The evidence available seems to indicate that Russia's 
decision to raise energy prices was linked above all to a desire by the Russian energy sector 
to correct the artificially unfavourable terms of trade inherited from the Soviet era. Before 
the end of the USSR, Russia sold its energy to the other Soviet republics at an average 5 
percent of world market prices. The lack of credit to finance new investments in the gas 
sector and the sharp fall in Russia's oil production most probably determined Russia's 
efforts to divert exports to more profitable markets and to raise energy prices. During 
1991-1996, the Russian government tried to achieve a measure of stability in the economy 
and to successfully conduct market reforms, and this argued in favour of ending subsidised 
prices. Moreover, Russia lacked a political incentive to sell energy at preferential prices to 
Ukraine. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Russia's relations with Ukraine 
sharply deteriorated as the latter adopted a strongly anti-Russian stance, reading imperial 
intent in each Russian effort to deepen CIS integration. Ukrainian leaders adhered to the 
CIS Economic Union only as associate members and refused to join the Customs Union. 
Ukraine also ruled out participation in the Collective Security Treaty and constitutionalised 
853 ibid. 
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its commitment to the concept of an all-European collective security by declaring itself a 
neutral country staying outside blocs. 854 Its leaders continually rejected the notion of joint 
military border protection and refused to provide CIS troops with military bases in 
Ukraine. Throughout 1992-1996, relations were exacerbated by the lack of progress on the 
dispute over the Black Sea Fleet, and its basing at Sevastopol. It therefore can be argued 
that Russia had economic reasons for charging higher prices and no political incentive for 
providing a preferential treatment. 
Similarly, Russia's decision to reduce the supply of oil and gas also followed primarily 
economic interests. During 1991-1996, the Russian energy sector underwent a major crisis, 
as oil production fell by 10 percent in 1991, by a further 13 percent in 1992, by 11 percent 
in 1993, and by 8 percent in 1994, and gas production stagnated. The substantial decline in 
Russia's oil output and the fall in energy world market prices, which had been taking place 
since the late 1980s, forced Russian leaders to reassess the cost of exporting energy to the 
former Soviet states. Russian leaders decided to re-orient oil and gas exports away from 
the CIS to hard-currency markets. Although the total amount of Russian oil exports did not 
fall, exports to CIS countries decreased substantially during 1991-1996.855 By late 1995, 
non-CIS countries accounted for 79 percent of Russia's total oil exports. Similarly, the 
CIS share of Russian gas exports shrank to 37 percent. 856 Despite the re-orientation of 
trade to hard currency markets, the situation of the Russian oil companies did not improve 
substantially. Although oil and gas industries generated huge revenues, they suffered from 
what Peter Rutland described `poverty amid plenty. '857 The energy industry owned vast 
reserves of fuel and supplied high volumes of produce. Still, it lacked much needed capital 
investment. The government hardly provided the companies with capital, and imposed 
periodic price freezes on energy producers. Domestic energy prices were still between 20 
and 35 percent of world market levels in 1994. Moreover, domestic consumers had 
accumulated large arrears. In fact, they were Gazprom's largest debtors, owing the 
company $1.6 billion in May 1994.858 These factors most probably explain Russia's 
decision to reduce oil supplies to Ukraine. 
854 Interfax, 16 October 1995, in FBIS-SOV-95-200,17 October 1995, p. 53. 
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There seems to be little hard evidence indicating that Russia increased energy prices and 
cut off supplies in order to force Ukraine into joining the CST or become closely allied to 
Russia, despite the fact that Russian leaders were strongly favourable of a rapprochement 
between the two countries, for historical, emotional and economic reasons. Ukraine's 
support for the May 1993 CIS declaration of intent to form an economic union, its 
participation in the 'Slavic' Economic Union and its associate membership in the 
September 1993 CIS Economic Union, resulted primarily from Ukraine's desire to join a 
union with Russia, which, it was hoped, would guarantee cheap energy supplies, and not 
from open pressure from Russia. Ukraine's rapprochement with Russia indicated an 
awareness by Ukrainian leaders that Ukraine had no choice but to try and develop an 
accommodating relation with Russia, based on co-operation instead of confrontation. As 
Kravchuk put it in June 1993, if we take the road of confrontation, this means an end to 
our prospects. 859 When it became clear that the economic union was not intended by 
Russia as a means of providing cheap energy to its members, support from Ukraine and 
other CIS states dwindled. Only Belarus continued to press for a political solution to its 
severe energy crisis by expressing strong support for economic and political unification 
with Russia. 
Oles Smolansky argued, however, that in 1995 Moscow put pressure on Ukraine so that it 
join the Russian-Belarussian-Kazakh customs union by imposing an oil excise duty. 86° But 
a close examination of the sources reveals that, first, export taxes had been in place long 
before Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan signed the customs union. 161 Moreover, export 
taxes on crude oil were actually lowered in February 1995 from 30 to 23 Ecu per tonne, 
and again from 23 to 20 in April 1995.862 In April 1996, Russia's export tax on oil was 
again reduced from 20 to 10 Ecu per tonne, and on 1 July 1996, the taxes were eliminated 
altogether. 863 Second, Russia reduced export taxes with Belarus and Kazakhstan after they 
859 Kiev Radio, 17 June 1993, in FBIS-SOV-93-116,18 June 1993, p. 40. 
860 Oles Smolansky, '"Ukraine and the Fuel Problem: Recent Developments', The Ukrainian 
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imposed an export duty of 30 Ecu on every ton of oil exported from Russia. (Kiev Ukrinform, 21 
March 1995 in FBIS-SOV-95-055,22 March 1995, p. 53). However, a close examination at 
Russia's export tax system reveals that Russia actually lowered export taxes during the first 
quarter of 1995. (Russian Economic Trends (RET), 3,1994,4, p. 71, RET, 4,1995,1, pp. 77-78. ) 
861 See Chapter 2. 
862 RET, 3,1994,4, p. 71; RET, 4,1995,1, pp. 77-78. Taxes were also reduced on petroleum 
products. 
863 RFT 5 1996.1.1). 82; RET, 5,1996,2, p. 93. 
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joined the customs union, in accordance with the agreements reached, and in order to give 
effect to the union. 864 Third, it would be hard to imagine that Russia would have eliminated 
its export duties unless Ukraine joined the customs union, given that such an action could 
have nullified the benefits of the union. It created the risk of the emergence of another 
'corridor', besides the Belarussian one, where goods, in particular fuel, could flow out of 
the customs union without any tax payment. Strong pressure on Ukraine to join the union 
was exerted not by Russia, but by the Ukrainian enterprises located in Eastern Ukraine, 
which were strongly dependent on Russian supplies of fuel. Ukrainian leaders apparently 
hoped that Russia would lift customs duties without Ukraine joining the union, but such 
865 expectations were in vain. 
The evidence strongly suggests that disruptions in the energy trade were mostly related to 
the accumulation of large arrears, and were often used as leverage in negotiations over 
prices and volumes. The overall reduction in oil supplies was directly linked to the fall of 
oil production in Russia. Russian Economics Minister Andrei Nechaev explained the sharp 
cuts in terms of the continuing decrease in oil drilled in Russia. '866 Russian gas, instead, 
continued to be supplied at usual volumes. Nevertheless, the use of the `energy weapon' for 
the extraction of political, economic or military concessions cannot be totally ruled out, 
given that Ukraine had valuable assets coveted by Moscow, such as the Black Sea Fleet, 
the naval installations and support facilities situated mainly in Crimea, and the enterprises 
engaged in the transport and processing of fuel and gas. Although hard evidence is 
lacking, there is substantial circumstantial evidence indicating that Russia put economic 
pressure on Ukraine in order to obtain a major share of the Black Sea Fleet. In the Spring 
of 1993, then Prime Minister Kuchma explained Moscow's intractability in the 
negotiations on prices for fuel and energy in terms of Russia's determination to extract 
`practical political concessions' with respect to the Black Sea Fleet and Sevastopol. 
867 At 
the September 1993 summit in Massandra, Yeltsin almost managed to get the approval of 
Ukrainian leader Kravchuk for a transfer to Russia of the fleet in exchange for Ukraine's 
debt. A week before the summit, Gazprom reduced gas supplies to Ukraine by 25 percent 
citing non-payments as a reason. Eventually, vessels of the Black Sea Fleet were indeed 
864 Border controls with Belarus were removed on 15 July 1995, and the border with Kazkahstan 
was opened in the summer of 1996. (RET, 4,1995,3, p. 72; ibid., 5,1996,1, p. 84. ) 
865 Konstantin Levin, 'CIS Economic Problems', Kommersant-daily, 26 July 1995, p. 3, in FBIS- 
SOV95-14-1,27 July 1995, p. 5. 
866 Moscow Radio, 31 August 1992, in FBIS-SOV 92-170,1 September 1992, p. 8. 
867 Moscow Radio, 21 March 1993, in FBIS-SOV-93-053,22 March 1993, p. 80. 
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used as payment for debts. The June 1995 agreement on the Black Sea Fleet initially 
divided the fleet on a 50 percent basis. But the November 1995 final agreement on the 
division of the fleet, granted 81.7 percent of the vessels to Russia and 18.3 percent to 
Ukraine. Some of the vessels that went to Russia were in fact written off against the 
Ukrainian debt to Russia. 868 
Similarly, Russia used Ukraine's energy dependency and large accumulation of debts to 
obtain economic concessions. However it did not prove very successful. Gazprom pressed 
hard to obtain valuable energy assets which would have allowed it to obtain control over 
the Ukrainian gas supply system, but Ukraine refused to sign over its energy assets. 
Gazprom's strategy of obtaining assets in exchange for debts was primarily dictated by 
economic factors, namely acquiring ownership of local companies, which would allowed it 
to control the distribution and the transit of its products. Gazprom had an interest in 
acquiring control over the industry's facilities it had lost as a result of the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, and therefore was eager to 'restore' the former Soviet energy complex. These 
objectives coincided with those of the Russian government which saw the energy industry 
as an adequate instrument for the reintegration of the CIS states. The 1993 restructuring 
programme Fuel and Energy envisaged the expansion of oil and gas exports in 1996-2000, 
and the use of these products as mechanisms of integration within the CIS. 369 Similarly, the 
document Energy Strategy of Russia approved by the government on 7 December 1994, 
promoted the use [ofJ energy systems as the most important means of integration of the 
regions of Russia and countries of the CIS. 1870 Russia's energy policy, according to the 
document, was aimed at developing CIS integration in the energy sector, which was 
understood as the joint exploitation of the energy production systems and control over the 
export routes. 871 Yeltsin's May 1995 decree no. 472 on The Main Lines of Development of 
Energy Policy until 2010 also stated that Russia's energy policies were to promote `mutual 
co-operation of the Russian Federation and the CIS states. '872 In January 1996, a new 
368 James Sherr, Russia and Ukraine: Towards Compromise or Convergence?, Conflict Studies 
Research Centre, August 1997, Tor Bukkovoll, Ukraine and European Security, London, The 
Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1997, pp. 67-68. 
869 Delovoi 1Vfir, 27 January 1996, p. 1, cited by Gwendolyn Sasse, `Fuelling 
Nation-State- 
Building: Ukraine's Energy Dependence on Russia', Central Asian and Caucasian Prospects, 
Briefing Paper, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 17 April 1998, p. 6. 
870 'Energy Strategy of Russia', Moscow, 1995, in Energy Policies of the Russian Federation, 
1995 Survey, IEA, Paris, p. 278. 
871 ibid., p. 305. This was understood as `the exploitation of the objective benefits of the joint work 
of energy production systems, ' and `the improvement of the reliability of transport systems 
linking Russia with Europe and crossing the CIS and the Baltic States. ' 
872 ibid., p. 266. 
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government decree again called for the energy and fuel to foster `good-neighbourly 
relations with CIS states. '873 In other words, integration of the CIS energy sector was seen 
as a step towards further CIS integration. It can therefore be argued that both elements - 
the internationalisation and expansion of the energy sector - as well as the desire to achieve 
deeper CIS integration played a role in Russia's attempts to acquire energy assets in 
Ukraine. However, to equate such policies with neo-imperialism would probably be an 
exaggeration, especially since there is hardly any indication that Russia prevented other 
foreign companies from acquiring assets in Ukrainian companies. Although neo-imperialist 
intent might have influenced the government's policies, pragmatic considerations seemed to 
have played a predominant role in Russia's decisions. The policies seem to rather to fit the 
pattern of 'economic interdependence' which characterises economic blocks. 
Despite Russia's decision to increase energy prices and to reduce energy supplies to 
Ukraine, Russia still continued to provide energy, particularly gas, at subsidised prices, 
despite the accumulation of such a high energy debt. The evidence available seems to 
suggest that Russia's decision was not motivated by a desire to keep Ukraine in Russia's 
sphere of influence. Instead, extremely pragmatic factors seem to have determined such 
decisions. First, Ukraine hosted the major export pipelines which carried 95 percent of 
Russia's oil and gas to hard currency markets in Europe, and this gave it significant 
leverages74 A complete energy cut-off to Ukraine meant cutting deliveries to Russia's 
European clients as well. Natural gas exports to Europe accounted for 6 to 8 percent of 
Russia's annual GDP, 25 percent of the federal budget and 60 percent of state export 
revenues. 875 Any major interruptions, therefore, would have provoked severely negative 
repercussions on Russia's already fragile economic and financial situation. Several times 
Ukraine stopped the flow of gas to obtain better supply conditions, or as a result of a 
dispute over transit fees, thus bringing to light Russia's dependence on transit routes across 
Ukraine. 876 Moreover, Ukraine often siphoned off gas, which was destined to Europe, to 
Ukrainian industrial consumers, especially when shortages of energy from Russia 
873 Delovoi Alfir, 27 January 1996, p. 1, cited by Gwendolyn Sasse, `Fuelling Nation-State- 
Building: Ukraine's Energy Dependence on Russia', p. 6. 
874 Ukraine's pipelines included the Soyuz system, which transported gas from the Urals region, 
the Urengoi-Uzhgood system, which carried gas from Siberia, and the southern branch of the 
Druzhba oil pipeline. 
875 Financial Times, 10 June 1997. 
876 Ukraine's interruptions of oil deliveries to Hungary and Czechoslovakia in 1992 and of gas 
supplies to Bulgaria, Turkey and Romania in 1994, were aimed at obtaining 
better supply 
conditions. 
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occurred. "' Cut-offs in supplies to Europe compelled Russia to pay fines to its Western 
clients and also created the risk of losing key lucrative markets. 87' Therefore, in order not 
to disrupt its supplies to the West, Moscow kept pumping gas through Ukraine, 
guaranteeing Ukraine some 50 to 80 million cubic metres of gas daily as payment for its 
transit fee. 
Second, Ukraine was also the main producer of oil field equipment, which was essential for 
Russia's oil industry, as long as the country remained unable to afford Western technology. 
Interviewed by Komsomol 'skaya pravda, on 22 September 1992, Chernomyrdin explained 
why Russia was not ready to cut off supplies to Ukraine completely. 'Making such a step 
is even more senseless given the fact that a large number of machine-building plants are 
located outside Russia - [particularly] in Ukraine and Azerbaijan. Economic warfare does 
not give us or them anything - co-operation is more fruitful. '379 In fact, the inter-linkage of 
both economies in general, and of the former Soviet energy sector in particular, compelled 
Russia to reach some sort of compromise. Russia had a vested interest in Ukrainian 
economic stability, and in avoiding a total collapse of its economy. A sharp decline in 
economic conditions in Ukraine would most probably have resulted in an exacerbation of 
regional tensions and a potential break up of the country along an east-west divide. Russian 
leaders were particularly eager to preserve stability along Russia's periphery and to protect 
Russian minorities. In November 1995, Chernomyrdin stated that there were no plans to 
cut off energy supplies to Russia's neighbours. `We will not abandon anyone, we will 
support them all. After all, there are 11 million Russians in Ukraine, and in Kazakhstan 
half of the population consists of Russians. '880 
g" In October 1992, Ukraine diverted to its domestic industries part of the gas that Russia had 
earmarked for export to Germany. As a result, Germany was suddenly confronted with a 
reduction of almost 50 percent in deliveries of natural gas from Russia. (Elmar Guseinov, `Sryv 
postavok rossiiskogo gaza v Germaniiu', Izvestiya, 20 October 1992, p. 1; 'Gaz vnov' poshel v 
Evropu. Odnako ugroza sryva postavok sokhranyaetsya', Izvestiya, 22 October 1992, p. 5. ) 
37 i Similarly, in March 1994, Ukraine retaliated to Russian shortages by diverting to its own 
industries gas supplies that were destined for Western Europe. Mikhail Leontiev, `Gazprom 
prekrashchaet postavki gaza na Ukrainu', Segodnya, March 3,1994 p. 1. 
878 ibid. 
379 E. Anisimov, `Tseny - na mirovoi uroven', a nas po miru? ', Komsomol 'skaya pravda, 22 
September 1992 p. 1. In January 1993, Chernomyrdin suggested that if Ukraine was prepared to 
invest directly in developing Russian oil resources more oil might be made available. (Isabel 
Gorst, `Neighbours Tussle over Energy Matters, Petroleum Economist, April 1993 p. 16. ) 
880 Itar-tass, 23 November 1995, cited by Peter Rutland, `Russia's Energy Empire Under Strain', 
n in 
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Third, Russian leaders decided to keep subsidising Ukraine in order to maintain inter- 
republican trade and thereby support domestic industry. As Mikhail Berger correctly 
pointed out, an excessively high price for gas would have led, not to an increase in export 
revenues, but to a reduction in purchases, which combined with the equally excessive 
transit rate for Russia that Ukraine would have imposed in response, would have resulted 
in very great losses for the Russian economy. 381 Moreover, the Russian energy companies 
had much to gain from an economic improvement in the CIS states. As Rem Vyakhirev, 
Gazprom's chairman, noted -Economic recovery, stabilisation and growth in the CIS will 
boost future demand for Russian gas. Natural gas based energy conservation will help CIS 
countries resolve their social and economic problems. '882 Last but not least, Russia found 
itself under increasing pressure from the international community to continue supplying 
Ukraine's energy needs. Ukraine had managed to summon Western support on the issue of 
Russian energy deliveries in return for a promise to surrender strategic missiles to Russia. 
Moreover, the international community had made its aid to Russia conditional upon a re- 
scheduling of Ukraine's energy debts. It can therefore be concluded that Russia's policies 
did not really follow a clear neo-imperialist pattern, and seemed to have been motivated 
primarily by pragmatic state interests. 
3. Russia's Energy Trade with Belarus: 
a. Dealing with the `Energy Shock' 
Like Ukraine, Belarus was severely hit by shortages in Russian energy supplies and 
dramatic price increases throughout 1992-1996. Although in 1992, Belarus received 20.6 
million tons of oil from Russia, which represented almost 94 percent of Belarus' yearly 
quota, Russia progressively increased oil prices, from 2,816 rubles per ton in the first half 
of 1992, to 20,000 rubles per ton in late 1992. In 1993, Russia began insisting on the 
payment of oil and gas at prices closer to world market levels. 
883 In July 1993, Minsk paid 
15,600 rubles per 1,000 cubic metres of gas, and in August 1993, the price went up to 
42,000 rubles. 884 Although energy prices in 1993 were raised substantially, they were still 
881 Mikhail Berger, `Ukraina budet poluchat' Rossiiskii gaz po samym nizkim tselam', Izvestiya, 
18 March 1993 p. 1. 
882 `Planning the Rebuilding of the Russian Gas Industry', Petroleum Economist, March 1996, 
p. 5. 
883 Belarus: Country Report, Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), 2nd Quarter, 1993, p. 32. 
384 T_. __c_, QQ rtPmher 1993. cited by Ustina Markus, `Heading off an Energy Disaster', p. 12. 
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lower than market levels. Nevertheless, Belarus' inability to pay outstanding energy debts 
resulted in severe oil and gas shortages in the summer of 1993. Russian supplier Gazprom 
cut off natural gas deliveries for nine days in August 1993 paralysing much of Belarussian 
industry, already severely hit by chronic oil shortages. For two months in a row, fuel 
supplies from Russia were just 60 percent of the promised delivery volumes. Belarus' two 
oil refineries - Mozyr and Novopolotsk - were forced to operate at 20 percent of their 
capacity. 885 Unable to cover its debts, Belarus removed customs fees on oil imports from 
Russia, and promised to soften oil import-export laws as a concession to Russia. The 
government also promised to settle part of its gas debt by signing over shares in 
Beltranshaz, the company which operated Belarus' gas transport facilities, to Gazprom. 
The agreement on Beltranshaz, however, failed to win the support of nationalists and hard- 
line conservatives in the Belarussian parliament. 
Belarus's energy situation was slightly alleviated in the second half of 1993, when the 
country received a $98 million IMF credit for economic reform, which Belarussian leaders 
mostly used to pay the country's energy debt. But, in November 1993, Belarus again 
experienced severe difficulties in obtaining oil supplies from Russia, because of delays in 
payments. By the end of 1993, Belarus' debt to Russia amounted to 150 billion rubles for 
gas and 200 billion rubles for oil. 386 The situation severely deteriorated in early March 
1994, when strikes by gas workers in Siberia over unpaid wages led Gazprom to cut off 
supplies to both Ukraine and Belarus, in an effort to obtain prompt payment of debts, 
which, in the case of Belarus, amounted to $240 million. Part of the bill was immediately 
settled with cash and manufactured goods. Another part of the debt was cancelled, by 
granting Gazprom ownership of shares held by Belarussian debtor enterprises in authorised 
funds of private business and joint-stock companies. Belarussian leaders also managed to 
negotiate a lower gas price - from $80 per 1,000 cubic metres down to $50, and to reduce 
Belarussian debt by 46 billion rubles in exchange for the construction of homes for Russian 
gas industry workers. 83' 
885 Mikhail Shimanskii, `10 tysyach rublei za litr benzina', Izvestiya, 27 August, 1993 p. 2. 
886 Belarus: Country Report, EIU, Ist Quarter 1994, p. 32. 
887 Itar-tass, 4 March 1994; Reuters, 5 March 1994. 
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b. Efforts to Find a Political Solution to Belarus' Energy Shortages 
The lack of transformation in the economy, as in the case of Ukraine, significantly 
curtailed Belarus' ability to pay for its energy supplies and diversify its energy sources. As 
a result, the country became more and more dependent economically on Russia, and in the 
spring of 1994, Belarussian leaders opted for economic integration with Russia as a means 
of ensuring cheap energy supplies. At the discussions on monetary union, between January 
and April 1994, Belarus insisted on paying the same energy prices as Russian consumers, 
that is, well below world market prices. The preliminary agreement on monetary union, 
signed in mid-April 1994, did envisage reduced prices for Russian oil and gas supplies in 
exchange for the free transit of Russian goods, including oil and gas, across Belarus, and 
the free stationing of Russian troops in Belarus. However, the monetary union never saw 
the light of day. Although export-import procedures between Russia and Belarus were 
simplified, and Russian duties on oil exports to Belarus were abolished in 1994, Belarus' 
energy prices remained relatively high, reaching approximately 70 percent of world 
prices. 888 
By the end of 1994, as oil arrears continued to accumulate, and supplies faltered, Belarus' 
new President Aleksandr Lukashenko reached a new agreement with the Russian oil 
companies Lukoil and Rosneft. In exchange for oil supplies, the companies were granted 
shares in Belarussian oil refineries and petrochemical enterprises. Furthermore, in May 
1995, a joint stock-company - Slavneft - was set up to supply crude oil to the Mozyr 
refineries in Belarus. The debt situation in the gas sector looked much grimmer. In July 
1994, as debts to Gazprom amounted to $335 million, the company reduced supplies and 
threatened further cut-offs if debts were not promptly paid. In August 1994, a new 
agreement on debt payment was signed with Gazprom, but Belarus proved unable to meet 
the unrealistic payment schedules. s89 Unable to solve an essentially structural problem, 
President Lukashenko again sought political integration with Russia as means of obtaining 
cheaper energy, by joining Russia and Kazakhstan in a Customs Union in January 1995. 
Belarus hoped that the agreement would guarantee Russia's domestic rates for energy 
supplies, but the hopes soon turned out to be unfounded. In the spring of 1995, Russia 
888 Belarus: Country Report, EIU, 3rd Quarter 1994, p. 36. 
889 Interfax, 1 February 1995, cited by Ustina Markus, `Energy Crisis Spurs Ukraine and Belarus 
to Seek Help Abroad', p. 15. 
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increased its oil prices from $75 to $112 per ton, which amounted roughly to the world 
890 
price. 
In an further effort to clear its energy bill, in February 1996, Lukashenko signed a `zero 
option' deal with Russia, whereby the latter agreed to cancel Belarus' $800 million energy 
debt, as well as another $400 million owned for credit received. Belarus, in turn, declined 
to claim compensation for plutonium and other valuable materials contained in the nuclear 
missiles removed from Belarus to Russia, agreed not to demand compensation for 
ecological damage caused by Russian troops, and not to charge for the stationing of these 
troops. "' Three months later, Lukashenko signed two other integration agreements with 
Russia. Although the Treaty on Deepening Economic Integration did envisage the 
establishment of common energy and transport systems, it did not address the question of 
energy supplies. Neither did the second treaty, which set up a Community of Sovereign 
States between Russia and Belarus, envisage any special energy treatment for Belarus. By 
mid-1996, therefore, Belarus had failed to find a lasting solution to its chronic energy 
dependence on Russia. Swapping assets for debts remained the only realistic short-term 
option available. In early 1996, Lukoil and Yukos signed an agreement on taking control of 
the Naftan company, formerly the Novopalatosk oil refinery. Two joint ventures were to be 
set up, with Lukoil, Yukos, Naftan and Belneflenproduct, the Belarus state-owned 
petroleum product suppliers, as co-founders. Russia obtained a 75 percent stake in the first 
company and a 51 percent in the second. Russia companies were to supply 7 million tons 
of oil a year to Naflan, whose products would be sold both in Belarus and abroad. Belarus 
would benefit from guaranteed oil supplies, and Russian companies would control a major 
oil refinery, located close to Western markets. 892 
4. Assessment of Russia's Energy Trade with Belarus 
Russia's energy trade with Belarus very much resembled that with Ukraine. Throughout 
1992-1996, Russia progressively raised energy prices until they reached world levels, 
resulting in Belarus accumulating large arrears, especially towards Gazprom. Although 
Belarus experienced frequent disruptions in supplies, Russia did not totally cut off its 
energy supplies to Belarus, and continued subsidising Belarus' energy purchases by 
890 Belarus, Country Report, EIU, 3rd Quarter 1995, p. 13. 
891 Itar-tass, 1 January 1996. 
892 Belarus, Country Report, EIU, 1st Quarter 1996, p. 12. 
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providing easy-term credits and lower than world market prices. In an effort to pay for its 
astronomical energy bills, and to obtain 'preferential treatment' for energy supplies, 
Belanis opted for economic and political unification with Russia. However, Lukashenko's 
strategy of reunification with Russia did not prove very effective, as Russian leaders raised 
energy prices and procrastinated over economic unification. Still, they did not cut off 
supplies completely. Russia's decision to subsidise Belarus' energy purchases and to 
continue providing energy resources, at prices lower than the world market, despite the 
accumulation of arrears, and the decline in Russia's own energy production, was 
determined by various factors. First, Russia's unwillingness to let Belarus' economy 
collapse completely. Very close industrial links existed between Belarus and Russia, and a 
collapse of Belarus' economy would have entailed losses for the Russian industry. Second, 
Belarus was considered a key strategic ally on Russia's western borders, both in terms of 
economic as well as military co-operation, especially in view of the deteriorating relations 
with Ukraine, and the pro-western orientation of the Baltic countries. Belarus hosted the 
pipelines carrying gas deliveries to the Baltic states and Poland, as well as the Northern 
Lights pipeline carrying gas to Ukraine. 893 Repeated arguments between Moscow and Kiev 
about gas transit fees, which more than once had driven Ukraine to cut off supplies to 
European customers, encouraged Gazprom to plan a new export pipeline corridor through 
Belarus to Poland. The `Yamal pipeline' project was intended to carry Russian gas from 
the new developments in western Siberia's Yamal Peninsula to consumers in Europe. An 
agreement to that effect was signed by Gazprom and the Polish Industry Ministry in March 
I993. ß94 Belarus thus became a key transit area for the future transport of Russian energy 
supplies to the West. 
Belarus also became Russia's key military ally in the region. Belarus was Russia's only 
western neighbour to have signed the Collective Security Treaty. Moreover, Belarus 
allowed Russia to jointly patrol its western borders with Lithuania, Latvia and Poland, and 
to operate Belarus' air defence system. 895 Furthermore, in December 1995, a major 
agreement on military co-operation was reached between the two countries, subsequently 
expanded in May 1996.896 Last but not least, as part of the `zero option' deal reached in 
893 David Cameron Wilson, `Remote Gas resources evolve into world's biggest gas industry', 
Petroleum Economist, September 1993, p. 8. 
894 Isabel Gorst, `Pipeline Plans Proliferate', Petroleum Economist, June 1993, pp. 6-8. 
895 Anna Ostapchuk, `Boris El'tsin otdaet Belorusii prioritet', Nezavisimaya gazeta, 23 February 
1995, p. 1. 
396 see Chapter 2. 
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February 1996, Russia was allowed to station Russia troops in Belarus for free. These 
close military ties, most probably argued in favour of keeping Belarus economically afloat. 
Still. Russian energy companies were eager to charge world prices for its products, and to 
have energy supplies paid back. This explains why efforts were conducted to obtain shares 
in Belarus' major energy assets, such as the Novopalatosk and Mozyr oil refinery, and the 
Beltranshaz gas distribution company. Although in 1993 the Belarussian parliament vetoed 
the transfers, in late 1995 and early 1996, the situation changed and Russian companies 
were able to strike major deals with the Belanissian leadership, which allowed them to 
obtain stakes in Belarus's energy complex. Lukoil and Yukos took control of Novopalatosk 
refinery, and Lukoil and Rosneft obtained shares in the Mozyr refineries and other 
petrochemical companies. 
The evidence available seems to indicate that Russia's efforts to obtain shares in the 
Belarussian energy complex were primarily motivated by economic factors. Russian oil 
and gas companies had vested economic interests in controlling the major export pipelines, 
not only because of the financial advantages involved, but also because they wanted to 
secure a reliable export route. Moreover, the energy companies had an interest in acquiring 
control over the industry's facilities which they had lost as a result of the collapse of the 
USSR, and therefore were eager to restore the former Soviet energy complex. Such moves 
fitted more the pattern of 'economic interdependence' than the model of `economic neo- 
imperialism. ' The Russian government, in turn, saw the energy industry as an adequate 
instrument for the reintegration of the CIS states. Such an approach, however, was not 
aimed at brining Belarus back into Russia's sphere of influence. When Belarus' leaders 
tried resolve the energy question by joining in an economic and political union with Russia, 
they did not get much support from Russian leaders. Although Belarussian moves were 
often perceived as being part of a Russian neo-imperialist strategy, in reality, Russian 
leaders remained wary of becoming entangled in a tight economic relationship with 
Belarus. Russia itself was struggling with a deep economic crisis, and therefore was not 
eager to have to deal with Belarus' own economic difficulties. Russia's reluctance to unite 
with Belarus provides an additional proof that Russia was not pursuing a neo-imperialist 
strategy. When the occasion of creating a neo-empire in Belarus presented 
itself, the 
Russian leadership did not embrace it. 
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III. Russia and the Caspian Sea Oil 
The energy-rich states of the Caspian region, namely Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and 
Turkmenistan, had sufficient resources not only to eliminate their dependence on Russian 
deliveries of oil and gas but also to become major exporters of oil and gas to the world 
markets . 
897 However, at the time of independence, all these countries had some major 
handicaps which limited their room for manoeuvre. On the one hand, they lacked the 
necessary infrastructure and capital investment to exploit and export their own resources, 
and on the other hand, being land-locked countries, they were dependent on their closest 
neighbours for the export of their energy supplies. Moreover, all the export routes crossed 
Russian territory, which was not only very costly in terms of transport and transit fees, but 
also very inconvenient in the sense that these countries were left very much at Russia's 
mercy. When Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan began negotiations with major Western oil 
89' The main literature on Russia's policies in the Caspian region reveal the following viewpoints: 
Stephen J. Blank, Suha Bolukbasi, Robert V. Barylski and Rosemarie Forsythe claimed that 
Russia was primarily interested in maintaining a sphere of influence over the Caspian region, 
thus clearly suporting the neo-imperialist argument. Forsythe also highlighted the existence of 
divisions within the Russian government, primarily between Primakov and Kozyrev on the one 
hand, and Chernomyrdin and the oil-industry officials on the other - the first group viewing oil 
as a central instrument for maintaining influence, whereas the second openly supporting Western 
involvement in the region. However, according to Forsythe, the general trend of Russian policy 
has been to strengthen its influence in the region. (Stephen J. Blank, Energy, Economics and 
Security in Central Asia: Russia and its Rivals, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War 
College, 10 May 1995; Suha Bolukbasi, `The Controversy over the Caspian Sea Mineral 
Resources: Conflicting Perceptions, Clashing Interests', Europe-Asia Studies, 50,1998,3, 
pp. 397-414; Robert V. Barylski, `Russia, the West, and the Caspian Energy Hub', I'Iiddle East 
Journal, 49, Spring 1995,2, pp. 217-232: Rosemarie Forsythe, The Politics of Oil in the 
Caucasus and Central Asia, Adelphi Paper, 300, London, 1996, pp. 13-17) Peter Rutland, 
instead, argued that the differences of opinion within the Russian government resulted in weak 
coordination of policies, therefore making it difficult for Russia to restore its influence over the 
region. (Peter Rutland, Lost Opportunities: Energy and Politics in Russia, The National Bureau 
of Asian Research, NBR Analysis, 8,1997,5, pp. 26-27) Similarly, Pavel Baev argued that the 
contradictory and confused character of Russia's policies in the region were not a disguise to 
support long-term strategic interests. Instead, confusion reflected the 'dynamic mixture of various 
interests, bureacratic lobbying and personal ambitions'. (Pavel Baev, Russia's Policies in the 
Caucasus, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1997, pp. 33-34) Vladimir 
Razuvaev also stressed the different positions of the various actors involved in policy making 
in 
the region, and concluded that this resulted in the absence of an agreed policy. 
He argued that 
although some officials - especially within diplomatic circles - thought that 
Russia should enjoy 
unquestionable dominace over the Caspian region, Lukoil was motivated solely 
by economic 
interests. (Vladimir Razuvaev, Russian Interests in the Caspian Region, Stiftung Wissenschaft 
und Politik, Ebehnausen, May 1996. ) Rajan Menon instead argued that the contradiction of 
policies and views within the Russian government was only apparent. According to 
Menon, 
policies reflected a desire by the Russian leadership to assert Russia's 
interests whenever 
considered necessary, while at the same time participating in the energy 
deals whenever possible. 
(Menon, Rajan, Treacherous Terrain: The Political and Security Dimensions of Energy 
Development in the Caspian Sea Zone, The National Bureau of Asian Research, NBR Analysis, 
8,1997,7, pp. 10-11). 
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consortiums on the exploitation of their oil and gas resources, Russia became extremely 
concerned with the prospect of being left aside and of losing its dominant economic and 
political position in the region. Hence, Russian leaders began exerting major pressure on 
the countries concerned in order to obtain shares in the lucrative oil and gas deals that were 
under negotiation, and also to ensure that Caspian oil and gas was exported through the 
Russian pipeline network system. 
1. Azerbaijan 
a. The Azerbaijani Consortium and the Caspian Legal dispute 
In 1991, a group of foreign energy companies - Amoco, British Petroleum, McDermott, 
Pennzoil, Ramco, Unocal, TPAO of Turkey and Statoil of Norway - began negotiating 
with Azerbaijan for the development of the Azeri, Chirag and Guneshli fields off the Azen 
coast in the Caspian sea, with estimated 4 billion barrels of reserves. 
s98 The companies 
were about to sign an agreement with Azerbaijani President Abulfaz Elchibey in June 
1993, whereby Azerbaijan's state oil company (SOCAR) retained a 30 percent share of the 
consortium project, when Elchibey was suddenly overthrown from power. As a result, the 
companies found themselves back at the negotiating table with a new government headed 
by Geidar Aliev. s99 The renewed negotiations were painful and slow, not only because the 
Azeri government was keen to obtain a higher share of the profits but also because Russia 
put pressure on Azerbaijan for a share in the consortium. 900 Apparently, Russian pressure 
had persuaded Baku to dissolve its contract with the Western consortium in the first place, 
and to show a readiness to change the direction of the pipeline to run through Russia, 
hoping that Russia would broker a settlement of the Karabagh conflict in Azerbaijan's 
favour. 90' 
898 Aidyn Mekhtiev and Valekh Rzaev, `Zakavkaz'e: energetichskii golod', Nezavisimaya gazeta, 
10 September 1992, p. 1. 
899 Hugh Pope, `Russians claw back control of unstable Transcaucasus', The Independent, 1 July 
1993, p. 5; Steve LeVine, `Azerbaijan cancels big oil contract', Financial Times, 28 
June 1993, 
p. 2. 
900 Hugh Pope, `Returning to Russia's fold? ', Middle East International, 24 September 1993, 
p. 13. 
901 Vladimir Yemelyanenko, `Nagorno Karabagh: On the eve of tough measures', Moscow News, 
28 November, 1993, p. 11. 
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i) Agreement is Reached 
In October 1993, a preliminary agreement was finally reached between the Western oil 
companies and Azerbaijan, which stipulated the exploitation of the Azeri and Chirag fields 
in the Azeri sector of the Caspian sea but which excluded the Guneshli field, which had 
been part of previous arrangements. The new deal substantially improved the Azeri 
position - the proceeds were to be split with the Azeri authorities on a 20: 80 production- 
sharing basis - but it still did not include Russia's participation. 902 In November 1993, 
Russia began intensive negotiations with the Azerbaijani government for a share in the 
exploitation of the Azeri Caspian off-shore deposits. Russian threats to block the transport 
of already-extracted Azerbaijani oil most probably determined Azerbaijan's decision to 
bring Russia into the deal. 9o3 In mid-November, Russian Minister for Fuel and Energy, 
Yurii Shafranik, travelled to Baku and reached an agreement on co-operation in the oil 
sector with SOCAR. Both sides agreed to work together in the development of oil and gas 
resources in and around the Caspian sea, and to export Azeri oil via the Russian pipeline 
network. 904 As a result of this visit, the Russian oil company Lukoil not only obtained the 
license from the Azeri government for the development of the Guneshli fields, but in early 
January 1994, it also succeeded in obtaining a 10 percent share in the Western-led Azeri 
and Chirag deal, without bringing in any capital. 905 
By opening the door to Russian participation in the lucrative energy deals Aliev hoped that 
Russia would facilitate the export of Azeri oil to world markets and above all, that Russian 
leaders would put pressure on Armenia in order to reach a settlement of the Nagorno- 
Karabagh conflict, favourable to Azerbaijan's interests in the region. During his visit to 
Baku, Shafranik had apparently promised that the signing of the treaty on co-operation in 
the energy sector would have a positive effect on the settlement of the conflict. 906 However 
in December 1993-January 1994, Azerbaijan failed to achieve any significant breakthrough 
902 John Murray, 'Azerbaijan in Caspian Sea Oilfields Deal', Financial Times, 2 November 1993, 
p. 2. 
903 Rustam Narzikulov, `Neftyanye zalozhniki Kaspiya', Segodnya, 22 September 1994, p. 1. 
904 Apparently, the editor of the opposition newspaper Muhalesef argued that Moscow requested 
permission to station Russian troops along Azerbaijani border with Iran and to establish new 
military bases on Azerbaijani territory. (Amalia van Gent, `Azerbaijan: Oil, Armenians, Russians 
and Refugees', Swiss Review of World Affairs, February 1994, pp. 22-24. ) 
905 Steve LeVine and Robert Corzine, `Russians Muscle in on Oil deals', Financial Times, 21 
January 1994, p. 3 ; Mekhman Gafarly, `Rossiya snova vykhodit k azerbaidzhanskoi nefti', 
Segodnya, 25 November 1993, p. 3. 
906 Mekhman Gafarly, `Rossiya snova vykhodit k azerbaidzhanskoi nefti', p. 3; Jonathan 
n-- ---,.,., 'n; i Pries Russian plan for Karabagh peace', The Guardian, 22 February 1994, p. 10. 
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in the war in Nagorno-Karabagh, partly because of the military support provided by the 
Russian Ministry of Defence (MOD) to the Armenians. 907 Russian military support to 
Armenia brought to light the contradictory agendas of the Russian MOD and the MFE, and 
resulted in an increasing alienation of Azerbaijan from Russia. As progress in the 
Nagorno-Karabagh settlement stalled in the winter of 1994, Aliev decided to array the 
support of those Western governments whose companies were involved in the Caspian oil 
deal, in particular Great Britain, to the detriment of Russia's interests. 908 
ii) The Caspian Legal Dispute 
As negotiations progressed towards a final agreement which would also include a Russian 
participation, a series of incidents occurred which threatened to delay the signing of a final 
agreement. In June 1994, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs delivered a note to the 
British Ambassador in Moscow questioning the legality of the Azeri oil deal, on the 
grounds that the Caspian sea was not divided into sectors, but instead, was to be exploited 
as a 'condominium'. In other words, the Caspian Sea was a landlocked body of water, and 
therefore all issues related to development, exploration and use of the Caspian sea 
resources had to be decided with the participation of all Caspian coastal states, namely 
Russia, Azerbaijan, Iran, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, and not by each country 
individually. 909 The Foreign Ministry seemed to have been pursuing a double objective: to 
ensure Russia's access to all Caspian Sea energy resources - the Russian sector did not 
have much reserves - and to avoid foreign, particularly Western and Turkish, involvement 
in the exploitation of Caspian energy resources. Although this latter aim was never 
explicitly acknowledged, there are grounds to believe that it most probably played a role in 
the Ministry's behaviour. The Foreign Ministry saw with great concern Western growing 
involvement in the resolution of conflicts in the region, especially the Nagorno-Karabagh - 
an involvement which resulted to a great extent from the growing Western economic 
interests in the region. The Foreign Ministry, moreover, seemed to be very much concerned 
with the potential ecological damage that might have been caused to the Caspian 
Sea 
ecosystem as a result of the exploitation of oil resources. 
907 see Chapter 3. 
908 Aidyn Mekhtiev, `Velikobritaniya obeshchaet podderzhku Geidaru Alievu', Nezavisirnaya 
gazeta, 2 March 1994 p. 1. In March 1994, Aliev agreed to grant British Petroleum a priority 
right to develop the oil deposits in the Caspian. In response the British government apparently 
agreed to guarantee full support for Azerbaijan's position in the international arena. 
909 Gennadii Charodeev, `Moskva ne soglasna s peredelom Kaspiiskogo morya', Izvestiya, 7 June 
1994, p. 3. 
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With the break-up of the Soviet Union the legal status of the Caspian Sea had been thrown 
into confusion. Previously, only two states - the USSR and Iran - had bordered the sea, 
now there were five: Iran, the Russian Federation, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and 
Turkmenistan. Whereas Russia insisted that the five littoral states should jointly own and 
share the development of the bulk of the Caspian resources, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and 
especially Azerbaijan insisted that the Caspian Sea should have its own waters divided up 
between the five littoral states according to the `lake principle. ' Russia based its claim on 
the Iranian-Soviet treaties of 1921 and 1940 which had determined the legal status of the 
Caspian Sea during the Soviet era. Russia insisted that the Caspian sea had been in the 
past an object of common use by all Caspian countries and that, unless an agreement on 
the contrary was reached by all littoral states, it should remain an international territory of 
water, all Caspian states having equal right as to the use of its resources. 91° However, 
independent legal expert Rodman R. Bundy, from Frere Cholmeley, showed that although 
the 1940 treaty stipulated for equal access to the fishing fleets of both countries, no 
provisions existed for equal access to oil and gas exploitation. Moreover, the practice of 
both Iran and the USSR with respect to petroleum activities in the Caspian did not point to 
a condominium-type arrangement either. Petroleum activities in the Caspian had not been 
conducted on the basis of prior consultation and joint sharing. Nor did Iran or the Soviet 
Union protest over the other's petroleum activities in the past or demand a share in the 
proceeds. "' 
In the Summer of 1994, the position of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs hardened. 
On 21 July, Foreign Minister Kozyrev and Foreign Intelligence Service (FIS) Director 
Evgeny Primakov, convinced Yeltsin to sign the secret Directive 396 `On protecting the 
interests of the Russian Federation in the Caspian Sea', which called for the imposition of 
economic sanctions on Baku, if implementation of the oil project went ahead. Kozyrev also 
sent a letter to Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, in which he proposed taking measures 
`of 
commercial, economic and financial nature that would impel Azerbaijan to respect 
910 Alexander G. Khodakov, Director of the Legal Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Russian Federation, Legal Framework for Regional Co-operation in the Caspian Sea, Conference 
on Oil and Caviar in the Caspian, London, 23-24 February 1995, unpublished paper, p. 
3. 
911 Rodman R. Bundy, The Caspian: Sea or Lake? Consequences in International Law, 
Conference on Oil and Caviar in the Caspian, London, 23-24 February 1995, unpublished paper, 
p. 8. According to Nezavisimaya gazeta correspondent Aidyn Mekhtiyev, neither the 
1921 nor the 
1940 Iranian-Soviet treaties mentioned either oil or commercial minerals. (Aidyn Mekhtiyev, `U 
Chernomyrdina pretenzii k "Kontraktu Veka" net', Nezavisimaya gazeta, 15 October 1994, 
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Russia's interests as well as the provisions of international law. )912 Kozyrev suggested 
forbidding vessels flying the Azerbaijani flag from using Russia's internal waters. In other 
words, a blockade of Azerbaijan. However, Chernomyrdin refused to impose economic 
sanctions, and President Yeltsin, under pressure from the oil industry, also suspended the 
secret Directive 396.913 These events brought to light the different approaches taken by 
Kozyrev and Primakov on the one hand, and Chernomyrdin on the other, towards Caspian 
energy sources. The first group, especially Primakov, tended to view oil as a central 
instrument in maintaining influence over the former Soviet states. Primakov warned against 
new Western joint ventures in the non-Russian parts of the former Soviet Union, and saw 
the involvement of Turkey, the USA, Great Britain and other Western countries in the 
Caucasus and Central Asia as a potential erosion of Russia's influence. Apparently, in July 
1994, Primakov told Yeltsin that the oil contract posed a threat to Russia's national 
security interests. 914 Chernomyrdin and other oil-industry officials instead welcomed 
Western participation in the development of Caspian oil, as a means of ensuring access to 
capital and advanced technology. They worked for Russian inclusion in Western consortia 
in order to improve their own technology, to establish a foot in world oil markets, and to 
share in the profits available on those markets. These last positions were reflected in the 
overall energy policy of the Russian government. The document Energy Strategy for 
Russia, approved by the Russian government in December 1994, envisaged the 
collaboration between Russia and the CIS states in the exploitation of the rich energy 
reserves of the Caspian Sea, `including the participation of third countries. '9`5 
iii) The Final Deal is Signed 
Although the summer incidents threatened to further delay the signing of the deal, 
negotiations went ahead and on 20 September 1994, after four years of complex 
bargaining, a final deal was reached. The contract provided for the development and 
exploitation, for a 30-year period, of the Chirag and Azeri fields and the deep-water wells 
of the Guneshli field on the Caspian shelf. 
916 The Russian company Lukoil obtained a 10 
percent stake in the exploitation of the Azeri and Chirag fields, and was also granted a 
912 Aidyn Mekhtiyev, `Chernomyrdin i Kozyrev sporyat o Kaspiiskoi nefti', Nezavisimaya gazeta, 
27 October 1994, p. 3. 
913 ibid. 
914 Aidyn Mekhtiyev, `Chernomyrdin i Kozyrev sporyat o Kaspiiskoi nefti', Nezavisimaya 
gazeta, 27 October, 1994 p. 3. 
915 `Energy Strategy of Russia', 1995, in Energy Policies of the Russian Federation, p. 305. 
916 Arif Useinov, ' "Kontrakt veka" predstavlen na podpis' ', Segodnya, 20 September 1994, p. 5. 
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primary role in developing the adjacent Guneshli oil field. 917 The reactions in Russia were 
mixed. Whereas the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs refused to recognise the $8 billion 
deal on the grounds that the legal status of the Caspian had not been defined9", Stanislav 
Pugach, Chief of the Main Department of the Russian MFE, attended the signing ceremony 
in Baku, suggesting a clash of interests between the MFE and the Foreign Affairs 
Ministry. 91' The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs sustained the view that, in signing the 
contract for developing the major fields, Azerbaijan carried out a de facto demarcation of 
the Caspian shelf according to the `lake' principle, which holds that coastal states' shares 
are determined by the length of their coastal borders. 920 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
spokesman G. Karasin, threatened 'serious international political consequences' if the 
project was implemented in its present form. This view had the support of Aleskandr 
Shokhin, Russian Deputy Prime Minister for the Economy, who maintained that the deal 
would cause ecological damage to the Caspian sea environment. He insisted that Russia 
was entitled to a share in the lucrative oil deals because of the investment in the region 
conducted during the Soviet era. 92` 
The sharp words of Foreign Ministry officials surprised the MFE which considered 
Lukoil's 10 percent share in the project highly satisfactory given the fact that British 
Petroleum's share, which was bearing the main burden of financial investments in the 
project (S7.5 billion) amounted to 17 percent, and that Lukoil was not expected to make 
any major investment. Lukoil officials in turn reported that Lukoil was acting on the basis 
of a Russian-Azerbaijani intergovernmental agreement signed on 23 October 1993, which 
spelled out Lukoil's right to operate on the Azerbaijani shelf and even mentioned Lukoil's 
future share in the consortium (10 percent) . 
12 As of 1994, the MFE was, in practice, 
accepting the principle of division of the Caspian when it put forward a set of maritime 
boundary lines concerning waters off the Russian and Azerbaijani coasts. Prime Minister 
Chernomyrdin sided with the MFE. In the aftermath of the 1994 agreement between 
SOCAR and the government of Azerbaijan, Chernomyrdin apparently told Aliev he saw no 
problems with the signing of the oil contract, although he also stressed the need to `jointly 
91 Steve LeVine, -Oil Companies to sign Azerbaijan Extraction Deal', Financial Times, 19 
September 1994, p. 4. 
918 Gennadii Charodeev, `Bakinsky kontrakt veka', Izvestiya, 22 September 1994, p. 2. 
919 John Lloyd and Robert Corzine, `Azerbaijan Oil Deal is Signed in Face of Russian Protests', 
Financial Times, 21 September 1994, p. 2. 
920 Rustam Narzikulov, `Neftyanye zalozhniki Kaspiya', Segodnya, 22 September 1994, p. 1. 
921 `Russian Proposal for Caspian', Financial Times, 27 September 1994, p. 2. 
922 Elmar Guseinov, `Skhvatka vokrug Kaspiiskogo shelfa', Izvestiya, 29 September 1994, p. 4. 
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address the ecological problems of the Caspian Sea. 123 The signing of the deal represented 
a triumph of Chernomyrdin's and the MFE's position over that of the Foreign Ministry, 
which became increasingly marginalised over the issue. It indicated that the main aim of 
Russia's policy in this sector was not to restore influence over the Caspian region, but to 
make economic profits. Russia allowed Western and Turkish companies to become 
involved in the deal, thus reducing Russia's economic influence in the region. Lukoil also 
succeeded in obtaining a major participation in the Caspian International Operating 
Company (CIOC) which was set up in 1995 to develop the Karabagh off-shore field in 
Azerbaijan's sector of the Caspian sea. CIOC represented a partnership between Pennzoil 
(30 percent), Lukoil (12.5 percent) a Lukoil-Agip partnership (45.4 percent) and SOCAR. 
b. The Pipeline Routes 
Russia's attempts to enhance its economic position in the Caspian region, or to limit the 
economic losses caused by the collapse of the Soviet Union, by acquiring shares in the 
major oil and gas deals in the Caspian Sea basin were complemented by efforts to ensure 
that the main flow of Caspian oil and gas to Western markets used the Russian pipeline 
system. In its attempt to ensure continued control over the transport of Caspian oil, Russia 
was confronted with Turkish competition. In March 1993, President Elchibey had signed 
an agreement with Turkey to build an oil pipeline which would transport Azeri oil from the 
Caspian fields across northern Iran, Nakhichevan (Azerbaijan), Erzurum (Turkey) up to 
the Ceyhan terminal on the Turkish Mediterranean coast. 924 However the ousting of 
President Elchibey the following June, raised serious doubts over the realisation of the 
Turkish export route. The new Azeri President, Geidar Aliev, felt more inclined to support 
a northern route across Russian territory to the Black Sea. 925 Russia in fact had insisted 
that the oil pipeline pass through southern Russia to the Black Sea port of Novorossiysk. 926 
In November 1993, during the visit of Shafranik to Baku, discussions were held on the 
923 Aidyn Mekhtiev, `U Chernomyrdina pretenzii k "kontrakt veka" net', Nezavisimaya gazeta, 
15 October 1994, p. 1. 
92' '$ 1.4 bn Deal for Pipeline', The Independent, 10 March 1993, p. 11. 
925 Carl Morsihed, `Raising the stakes to gain a better oil deal for Azerbaijan', The Times, I 
September 1993, p. 4. 
926 Aliev, however, did not rule out an Iranian route either. At a meeting with Iranian president 
Rasfanjani in October 1993, discussions were held on an eventual route across Iranian territory to 
the Persian gulf. (Mekhman Gafarly, `Vizit Prezidenta Irana v Azerbaidzhan', Segodnya, 30 
October 1993, p. 4. ) 
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possibility of transporting Azeri Caspian oil through the Russian pipeline network. 12' A 
pipeline connecting the northern Caspian sea with the Russian port of Novorossiysk was 
already in place. All that was needed, was a short stretch of pipeline from Baku to the 
northern Caspian Sea. This new project provoked a strong Turkish reaction. In retaliation, 
the Turkish government unilaterally imposed restrictions on the passage of supertankers 
through the Bosphorus straits in July 1994, citing the need to improve safety and 
environmental controls following the disastrous collision of two Greek-owned tankers in 
the straits the previous March. 12' Russia tried to circumvent the problem by signing a deal 
with Greece and Bulgaria for the construction of a Trans-Balkan pipeline to carry crude oil 
from Burgas in Bulgaria to Alexandropolis in north-eastern Greece. 929 The participation in 
the Trans-Balkan pipeline of Gazprom with an equity stake of up to 50 percent ensured 
that Russia would still maintain its grip on oil export routes from the former Soviet Union 
930 if the Russian route to Novorossiysk was confirmed. 
The final signing of the Azeri oil deal in September 1994 did not specify the exact route for 
the transportation of the oil and consequently negotiations began between Azerbaijan and 
all other countries interested in having oil transported across their territory, namely Russia, 
Turkey and Iran. Although a variety of routes were considered, the proposals could 
essentially be limited to three options, all of which had a number of variants. 93' The 
Northern or Russian option would transport Kazakh oil, particularly from the giant Tengiz 
field, through southern Russia to the Russian Black Sea port of Novorossiysk. A spur from 
Azerbaijan could be established so that Azerbaijani crude oil could also reach external 
markets via Novorossiysk. The Central - or Caucasian - option would take crude oil 
from 
Azerbaijan to either the Black Sea via Georgia, or to Turkey via either Georgia or Armenia 
or both, and thence to a Turkish terminal on the Mediterranean. A line across the Caspian 
from Kazakhstan could be plugged into this option. The southern or Iranian option would 
927 Mekham Gafarly, 'Rossiya snova vykhodit k azerbaidzhankoi nefti', Segodnya, 25 November 
1993, p. 3. 
9`8 Navigation across the Bosphorous was regulated by the Montreux Convention, signed 
in 1936 
by twelve countries including the USSR and Turkey. The Convention provided for the unhindered 
passage of all countries' merchant vessels through the straits and established procedures 
for the 
passage of warships belonging to the Black Sea and non-Black Sea countries. (Professor 
Ilya 
Mogilevkin, `Transportnye svyazi Rossii pod ugrozoi', Nezavisimaya gazeta, 1 April 1994, p. 4. ) 
929 Kerin Hope, `Balkan oil pipeline will be a boost for Russians', Financial Times, 30 September 
1994, p. 3. 
930 ibid. 
931 John Roberts, Caspian Pipelines, Former Soviet South Projects, Royal Institute of 
International Affairs, London, 1996, pp. 8-12. Roberts provided an extremely detailed and 
valuable account of the various pipeline options discussed for the export of 
Caspian oil. 
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take crude oil from Azerbaijan into Iran, perhaps only for a very short distance, and thence 
to Turkey. Again, Kazakh oil could be plugged into this option, either via a Transcaspian 
pipeline or via Turkmenistan and northern Iran. 932 
All routes had serious disadvantages which made any choice particularly risky. The Iranian 
option was opposed by Western governments, mainly because of the strained relations that 
existed between Washington and Tehran. The Caucasian route, which was favoured by 
Turkey, passed through areas that were highly unstable. Georgia faced two secessionist 
movements - Abkhazia and South Ossetia -, and the war in Nagorno-Karabagh excluded 
the possibility of a route that crossed either Nagorno-Karabagh or Armenian territory. 
Moreover, in Turkey, the pipeline most probably had to cross the areas inhabited by the 
Kurdish people, who were struggling for secession from Turkey. The Russian option was 
certainly the cheapest, given that a 40-inch pipeline structure was already in place for most 
of the section from the Tengiz oil fields in Kazakhstan to the port of Novorossiysk. 
However, exporting oil and gas through the Russian pipeline system again made the 
Caspian states dependent on Russia. Moreover, the war in Chechnya had created additional 
insecurities. Russia was extremely keen on having the route cross Russian territory. In fact, 
a Transcaucasian option meant the reorientation of the entire flow of oil and gas from the 
Caspian region and Central Asia away from Russia and to Transcaucasian-Turkish transit, 
which in turn entailed a substantial reduction of Russia's economic presence and political 
influence in the region and the re-orientation of the three Transcaucasian republics - 
Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan - towards the West. 
933 Turkey was also pushing hard for 
a route that crossed its own territory. If agreement was reached on having the main oil 
pipeline running along the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan route, the chances were high that Kazakh 
oil from the Tengiz deposit would also be transported through the same system. In such a 
case, not only Caspian but also Kazakh oil would flow through Turkey, and Ankara would 
receive transit fees of at least $ 500 million a year. Moreover, Turkey would manage to 
sharply reduce its oil imports bill, by at least $3 billion, and would gain control over 
regional energy-resource transportation routes. 934 Eventually, a compromise solution was 
found. On 9 October 1995, the committee managing the Caspian oil deal agreed that the 
`early oil' - about 80,000 barrels per day - would be exported simultaneously through 
932 ibid. 
933 Azer Mursaliev, `Russian Government at Odds With Itself Over Oil Deal', ivIoscow News, 30 
September, 1994, p-3- 
934 Georgy Bovt, `Caspian Oil: Not Everyone Wants What is Cheapest, Everyone Wants What is 
Pact for Themselves', Kommersant-daily, 13 July 1995 p. 14, in CDPSP, XLVII, 1995, p. 22. 
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Russia to the Black Sea port of Novorossiysk and via Georgia to the Black Sea port of 
Supsa. The decision on the transport of the 'main oil' was deferred. Oil experts in Baku 
said there were indications that most of the early oil from the Caspian, expected to reach 
80,000 b/d by 1999, would run through Russia. Despite the Chechen war, the Russian 
route was nearer completition by late 1995, requiring about $50 million worth of repairs 
compared with just under $200 million for the Georgian option. 935 
Russia's efforts to control the export of Azerbaijani oil were motivated, as in the case of 
Kazakh oil, by the desire to obtain lucrative profits out of transit fees, as well as by the 
intent to control the export flows. Control of flows would allow Russia to hold substantial 
leverage over an extremely sensitive region. Despite the development of other alternative 
routes by-passing Russia, Russia succeeded in having part of the early oil from Azerbaijan 
transported through Russia, allowing for a partial dependence of Azerbaijan on Russia. 
Were Russia's policies aimed at bringing Azerbaijan under Russia's exclusive sphere of 
influence? Foreign Minister Kozyrev, FIS Director Primakov and the Russian Ministry of 
Foreign Economic Relations tended to view control over Caspian energy export routes as a 
means of maintaining a sphere of influence in the region. The Russian Foreign Ministry 
showed great concern over the erosion of Russia's influence in the Caucasus, due to the 
presence of foreign companies. However, the Fuel and Energy Ministry as well as Prime 
Minister Chernomyrdin tended to view control over transit routes as a means of obtaining 
profits, and restoring control over the former Soviet energy complex. The interests of both 
groups coincided in their efforts to ensure Russia's control over pipeline routes. It can 
therefore be argued that both elements were present in Russia's efforts to control export 
routes, and consequently that Russia's policies were partially neo-imperialist. 
2. Kazakhstan 
a. The Tengiz Deal 
On 7 May 1992, the government of Kazakhstan and America's Chevron Corporation 
signed a preliminary agreement which set up a joint-venture - Tengizchevroil - to develop 
and exploit the Tengiz oil field in western Kazakhstan, whose reserves were estimated at 
about 25 billion barrels, of which 6bn-9bn barrels were presumably recoverable. Financing 
935 Steve LeVine and Bruce Clark, `Turkish Port to Gain From Deal', Financial Times, 10 
October 1995, p. 6. 
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of the oil-field's development was to be shared equally by Kazakhstan and Chevron, while 
80 percent of the profits were to go to Kazakhstan. In April 1993, as a final agreement was 
reached on the details of the future Tengizchevroil joint venture, Russia became 
particularly concerned with the prospect of losing control over vast energy resources and 
energy export flows. 936 The Tengiz-Chevron energy deal brought to light the decreasing 
economic influence of Russia in the region, and the gradual replacement of Russia's 
presence by Western economic interests. 
Besides Western penetration, Russia was also very much concerned over the inroads that 
its Turkish neighbour was making in the Caspian energy market. In an article in 
Nezavisimava gazeta, on 13 May 1993, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Economic 
Relations, openly expressed its concern over the creation of the Central Asian Regional 
Union - an intergovernmental coalition created in January 1993, uniting all Central Asian 
states. The Russian Ministry viewed the Union as a Turkish-sponsored organisation aimed 
at bringing these states out of the Russian and into the Turkish sphere of influence, by 
creating a 'Great Turkestan'. This would deal a serious blow to Russia's vital interests in 
Central Asia and the Middle East, especially in Iran. According to the authors, 
the formation of the Central Asian Union has partially fulfilled the long-nurtured 
strategy of Turkey, the US and Saudi Arabia of creating a 'Turkic belt' of Muslim 
states along Russia's southern border, with a view of completely tearing Central 
Asia away from Russia, in order to then direct the primary flow of energy 
resources from the region to the West via Azerbaijan and Turkey, [consequently] 
' 937 
circumventing Russia. 
Worries were also expressed about the recently signed agreement between Turkey and 
Turkmenistan to build a gas pipeline that would transport Turkmenistan's gas to Western 
Europe via Turkey. 'A portion of the 85 billion cubic metres of gas that Ashgabat extracts 
will flow west rather than south, ' the article read, `as will the surplus gas from Uzbekistan 
and Kazakhstan, casting doubt over the implementation of the Russian-Iranian gas and oil 
projects and thereby infringing upon Russia's economic interests. '938 The authors believed 
that the main objective of this neo-pan-Turkic strategy was `to deprive Russia of profitable 
commercial and economic partners and access to world markets for goods and raw 
materials and to international shipping lines. '939 
936 Sergei Kozlov, `Kazakhstan: pravo pervoi nefti', Nezavisimaya gazeta, 10 April 1993, p. 3. 
937 Vladimir Iuratev and Anatoly Shestakov, Russian Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, 
'Aziatskii gaz poidet na zapad', Nezavisimaya gazeta, 13 May 1993, p. 4. 
938 ibid. 
939 ibid. 
270 
In the Spring of 1994, Russia increased its pressure on Kazakhstan and its Western oil 
partners, in order to obtain a share of the deal, by restricting the exports of Tengiz to just 
over 20,000 barrels a day, claiming that the presence of corrosive contaminant mercoptan 
made larger shipments unacceptable. 94° In June 1994, Russia went as far as cutting off 
most of Kazakhstan's oil exports, thus paralysing the latter's most lucrative industry. 
Although Russia claimed that the export of Kazakh oil reduced the amount of oil Russia 
itself could export, entailing a loss of 5300 million a year, 94' Russia's underlying aim was 
to obtain an equity share in the contract rather than being paid a tariff. 942 In September 
1994, Russia allowed for exports to reach 50,000-60,000 barrels a day, but this was still 
half of the 130,000 b/d capacity which Chevron was able to export in 1994, and well 
below the peak of 700,000 b/d expected for the year 2010.943 Apparently in the winter of 
1994, Russia also sharply reduced the supply of oil refined products to Kazakh suppliers 
of crude oi1.944 As a result of this pressure, Lukoil was able to reach a preliminary 
agreement in April 1996 with the Kazakh government for the purchase of a stake in the 
Tengizchevroil joint-venture. 945 
b. The Karachaganak Deal 
In July 1992, British Gas and the Italian oil company Agip concluded an agreement with 
the Kazakh government for the exploitation of the Karachaganak oil and gas fields, 
estimated to yield more than 20 trillion cubic metres of gas, and 2 billion barrels of oil and 
gas condensate. 946Further attempts by British Gas and Agip to conclude a longer-term deal 
were plagued by complications, arising not only from Kazakhstan's desire that foreign 
partners conduct substantial investment into local infrastructure, but also from the lack of 
a reliable export route, and above all from Russia's pressure to obtain equity shares in the 
940 Steve LeVine, `Moscow Fights for Kazakh Oil Share', Financial Times, 18 March 1994, p. 2. 
941 Steve LeVine, `Russia Blocking Oil, Say Kazakhs', Financial Times, 28 June 1994, p. 3. 
942 Chrystia Freeland, `Prospects in the Pipeline' Financial Times, 25 March 1994, p. 3. 
943 Robert Corzine, `Chevron Upbeat on Tengiz project', Financial Times, 27 September, 1994, 
p. 27; Azer Mursaliev, `Politicheskii fontan iz neftyanoi skvazhiny', ! 
VIoskovskie novosti, 25 
September -2 October 1994, p. 4. 
944 Chrystia Freeland, `Prospects in the Pipeline', p. 3. 
945 Sander Thoenes, `Mobil to Buy 25% of Big Asian Oilfield', Financial Times, 18 April 1996, 
p. 3. 
946 'British Gas and Agip in Kazakhstan Deal', International Herald Tribune, 2 July 1992, p. 2. 
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deal, without providing any capital investment. 9` 7 In early 1994, only weeks after it 
succeeded in obtaining a share in the British Petroleum-led consortium to develop off-shore 
Caspian Sea fields in Azerbaijan, Lukoil, increased its economic and political pressure on 
the Kazakh government for a share in the Karachaganak field. 948 As with the Chevron deal, 
Russia exerted substantial pressure through its control of the export route, which from 
Samara crossed the Russian mainland through to the Black-Sea port of Novorossiysk. 
In the autumn of 1994, Gazprom replaced Lukoil as the main contender for a share in the 
Karachaganak deal. Gazprom based its claim on the principle that it had discovered and 
partially developed the Karachaganak gas field during the Soviet era. Moreover, Gazprom 
controlled a large gas treatment centre outside the nearby Russian city of Orenburg, which 
had been built mainly to process Karachaganak gas. 949 By late 1994, as it became 
increasingly clear that including Gazprom in the deal would most probably persuade the 
company to agree to ship Karachaganak's production through Russia's pipeline system to 
markets in the West, the Kazakh government put pressure on its Western partners so that 
they grant Gazprom a 15 percent share of their stake in the Karachaganak field. 9s0 Finally, 
on 10 February 1995, after Russia apparently threatened to block exports of 
Karachaganak's oil and gas, and to purchase the field's output at no more than 15 percent 
of world prices unless Gazprom was included in the project, Kazakhstan agreed to 
95' Gazprom's participation in the deal. 
What was the motivation behind Russia's behaviour? The evidence seems to indicate that 
Russia's attempts to obtain shares in the lucrative Tengiz and Karachaganak deals were 
primarily motivated by the desire to make economic profits. Lukoil and Gazprom had every 
interest in participating in projects which would have resulted in substantial earnings. The 
lack of capital and of modern technology prevented these companies from competing fairly 
with Western consortia. The Russian government therefore, decided to resort to rather 
harsh methods, such as the reduction and cut off of Kazakh exports through Russia, in 
947 Mikhail Ustigov, `Big Oil Moves in', The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, October 1993, p. 44; 
Steve LeVine, and Robert Corzine, `Russians Muscle in on Oil Deals', Financial Times, 21 
January 1994, p. 2. 
948 Steve LeVine, `Moscow Fights for Kazakh Oil Share', Financial Times, 18 March 1994, p. 3; 
Chrystia Freeland, `Prospects in the Pipeline', Financial Times, 25 March 1994, p. 3. 
949 Steve LeVine and Robert Corzine, `Russia's Set to Get Share of Kazakhstan's largest Gas 
Field', Financial Times, 8 November 1994, p. 3. 
950 ibid. 
951 Steve LeVine, `Asian Gas Exporters Try to Bypass Russia', New York Times, 9 September 
1995, p. 1. 
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order to obtain shares in the deals. Although it has often been argued that Russia was 
primarily motivated in its assertive behaviour by the desire to keep Kazakhstan under its 
sphere of influence, enough evidence to sustain such a hypothesis is lacking. 952 Elements 
within the Russian government, such as the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, 
interpreted foreign, particularly Turkish participation in Caspian energy deals, as threat to 
Russia's influence in the region. However, the Russian leadership eventually proved ready 
to allow other foreign companies participate in the deal, as long as Russian companies was 
granted a share. This indicated that those sectors of the Russian government involved in 
energy policy - the Ministry of Fuel and Energy (MFE) and the Prime Minister - were not 
too worried about a potential loss of Russian influence, as long as Russian companies were 
involved in the energy deals. 
c. The Pipeline Route 
Kazakhstan's dependence on Russian export routes and the resulting pressure that Russia 
exerted on Kazakhstan persuaded Kazakh leaders to discuss alternative pipelines for the 
export of oil and gas. In 1992, Russia, Kazakhstan and Oman had set up the Caspian 
Pipeline Consortium (CPC) to build a pipeline to transport oil from the Caspian region to 
the Black Sea. The CPC original plan was to take advantage of existing infrastructure by 
finishing a 1,600 km pipeline that had been partially completed during the Soviet period. 
This pipeline would link both the Caucasian and Central Asian fields with expanded port 
facilities at Novorossiysk. The northern arm of the pipeline would extend from Tengiz 
around the northern curve of the Caspian and then continue straight across to Tikhoretsk 
and on to Novorossiysk. The southern arm would link up with a pipeline from Baku at the 
Russia- Azerbaijani border, passing through Grozny to Tikhoresk. This would involve 
reversing the line from Baku to Grozny. 913 Although this plan entailed transporting Kazakh 
oil through Russian territory, and consequently, continued dependence on Russia's 
goodwill to transport the oil, Kazakh leaders still decided to give it priority, at least for the 
transport of the first oil, mainly in order not to alienate Russia, and to secure the 
continuous transport of Kazakh oil from the already functioning Tengiz field. In early 
952 Bibliography arguing the neo-imperialist case: Stephen J. Blank, Energy, Economics and 
Security in Central Asia: Russia and its Rivals, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War 
College, 10 May 1995; Suha Bolukbasi, `The Controversy over the Caspian Sea Mineral 
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pp. 3 97-414. 
953 Rosemarie Forsythe, The Politics of Oil in the Caucasus and Central Asia, Adelphi Paper, 
300,1996, p. 49. 
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1994, however, President Nazarbaev also considered the use of three alternative routes for 
a new pipeline to carry oil from the new fields in western Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. 
Two of the three potential routes would transit through Iran, one to reach the 
Mediterranean sea in Turkey, the other the Persian Gulf. A third route would go across the 
9s Caspian and the Caucasus, via Georgia, to the Turkish Mediterranean. `` 
Russia put a lot of pressure on Kazakhstan to follow the route of existing pipelines to the 
Black Sea port of Novorossiysk, a route that would allow Moscow to retain its monopoly 
grip on the region's oil supplies. 955 But the Russian route, which was the one proposed by 
the CPC, required substantial investment. From 1992 to late 1994, the CPC tried to 
persuade Chevron to provide most of the financing for a 25 percent non-decision-making 
equity share. Chevron refused to accept those terms, and in the absence of alternative 
finance, the deal stagnated. New proposals involving Western energy companies surfaced 
during 1994 and 1995, but they failed to get the necessary funding. Eventually, after 
protracted negotiations among the original CPC shareholders and Western companies, a 
major agreement was reached in April 1996 on the restructuring of the CPC. The deal 
envisaged the construction of a $1.5 billion pipeline from western Kazakhstan to the 
Russian port of Novorossiysk. Oman agreed to reduce its share from 25 to 7 percent. The 
Russian government obtained 24 percent of the shares while Kazakhstan obtained 19 
percent, reflecting the existing assets. The remaining 50 percent was held by foreign 
investors (Chevron, Mobil, Oryx, British Gas, Agip), Russian companies (Lukoil (12.5 
percent) and Rosneft (7.5 percent) ), as well as Munaigaz from Kazakhstan (1.75 percent). 
Commentators believed that this agreement would not allow Russia to behave with 
Kazakhstan as it did in the past, because foreign investors carried significant weight. 151 
However, Russia obtained a major stake in the deal. It obtained a 24 percent state share, 
plus another 20 percent held by the Russian companies Lukoil and Rosneft. In addition, it 
obtained tariff revenues for the pipeline's Russian operator Transneft. Diplomats argued 
that the Kremlin went along for fear that Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan might otherwise 
speed up plans for a pipeline to Turkey that would bypass Russia altogether. 
957 
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Russia's efforts to control the export of Kazakh energy products seem to have been 
primarily motivated by the desire to obtain lucrative profits out of transit fees, as well as 
by the intent to control the export flows. Control of flows, would allow Russia to earn 
substantial revenues, and also to hold significant leverage over Kazakhstan. Although 
Kazakhstan attempted to develop alternative routes in order to break its dependence on 
Russia, Russia put great pressure over Kazakhstan in order to have Kazakh oil transported 
through Russia. Despite the participation of foreign companies in the project, the transport 
of Kazakh oil through Russia, resulted in Kazakhstan's continued dependence on Russia. 
Did this represent an attempt to bring Kazakhstan under Russia's exclusive sphere of 
influence? The Russian Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, as well as the Foreign 
Ministry, tended to view control over Caspian energy export routes as a means of 
maintaining a sphere of influence over the region. They showed great concern over the 
erosion of Russia's influence in the region due to the presence of foreign companies. The 
MFE as well as Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, on the other hand, tended to view control 
over transit routes as a means of obtaining profits, and restoring control over the former 
Soviet energy complex. For different reasons, therefore, both groups had an interest in 
Russia's control over pipeline routes. It can therefore be argued that both elements were 
present in Russia's. efforts to control export routes. 
IV. GENERAL CONCLUSION 
During the period under examination, both Ukraine and Belarus remained very much 
dependent on energy supplies from Russia. Russia's energy policies to both Ukraine and 
Belarus were characterised by three elements. First, both countries faced a substantial 
reduction in supplies and regular disruptions in deliveries from Russia. Second, Russia 
progressively increased its energy prices up to world levels. Third, despite Russia's own 
shortage of funding, its leaders decided to continue subsidising Belarus' and Ukraine's 
energy imports. What motivated such behaviour? The evidence seems to indicate that the 
increase in energy prices was not aimed at strangling the neighbouring economies, but was 
instead a reflection of Russia's own efforts to correct the unfavourable terms of trade 
inherited from the Soviet Union. Moreover, as far as Ukraine was concerned, Russia 
lacked any political incentive for reducing prices. Ukraine had adopted a negative attitude 
towards the CIS, and various issue of contention tainted relations between both countries - 
the fate of the Crimea, the division of the Black Sea fleet, the question of nuclear weapons 
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- thus eliminating any desire by Russia to provide Ukraine with special treatment. Still, 
Russian prices remained below world markets and barter payments were accepted. 
Moreover, despite the accumulation of arrears Russia never cut off supplies completely. 
Very close economic links existed between the Russian economy and the Belarussian and 
Ukrainian economies. Any major disruption in supplies would have had a negative impact 
on Russian domestic industry. Moreover, Russia was eager to avoid the total collapse of 
the already fragile neighbouring economies, given the presence of large Russian minorities, 
and the major political instabilities which such actions might have provoked. Both 
countries hosted the major transportation routes which carried Russian energy to the 
lucrative markets of the West. Such a strategic position, strongly discouraged Russia to 
behave too assertively. In addition, Belarus became a key strategic ally on Russia's 
western borders - it joined the CST, allowed for the joint protection of its western borders, 
and consented to the Russian operation of its air defence system. Ukraine instead adopted 
during most of 1992-1996 a confrontational attitude towards Russia, causing trouble along 
the pipeline route. Consequently, Belarus became all the more important for Russia, and 
this explained Russia's willingness to subsidise its energy supplies. 
The fall in energy supplies seems to have been linked above all to a fall in production, and 
not to an attempt to bring both countries under Russia's influence. In fact, Belarus' major 
efforts at reaching a political and economic union with Russia were never pursued with 
determination by Moscow. Moscow's reluctance to bring economic and political union into 
fruition indicated that its leadership was not as eager as is often assumed to create an 
'informal empire' in the former Soviet space. Although Russia seems not to have used the 
energy tool to bring both countries under its influence, it is highly likely that Russia did use 
it to obtain other military or economic concessions. On the one hand, Russia apparently put 
pressure on Ukraine so that it hand over a major part of the Black Sea 
fleet and allow the 
basing at Sevastopol, and on the other, the energy companies tried to acquire shares 
in 
coveted Belarussian and Ukrainian energy facilities. Moreover, the evidence seems 
to 
indicate that Russian leaders viewed the restoration of the former energy complex as a step 
towards further CIS economic integration. There seems to be little evidence therefore 
pointing to a Russian desire to restore an informal empire over 
Belarus and Ukraine. 
Policies seemed to have been motivated more by economic 
factors rather than by attempts 
to create systemic dependency on Russia. 
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As far as the energy-rich Caspian states are concerned, Russia's policies were rather 
assertive. The reliance of these countries on export routes crossing Russian territory gave 
Russia a very strong bargaining tool which allowed it to acquire important shares in the 
major energy exploitation deals, almost without providing further capital investment, and 
to have part of the oil carried through Russian territory. In Kazakhstan, Lukoil succeeded 
in obtaining shares in the deal involved in the exploitation of the Tengiz oil field, whereas 
Gazprom obtained shares in the exploitation of the vast Karachaganak oil and gas fields. In 
Azerbaijan, Lukoil managed to obtain a 10 percent share in the 'deal of the century' which 
involved the exploitation of the Azeri and Chirag oil fields in the Azeri sector of the 
Caspian sea, and in the CIOC consortium, which exploited the Karabagh offshore oil 
fields. Moreover, Russia was able to have the early Kazakh oil from Tengiz as well as part 
of the early Azeri oil from the Chirag, Azeri and Guneshli fields transported via the 
Russian pipeline system. The evidence available seems to indicate, however, that in their 
efforts to obtain shares in the major energy deals, Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, the 
Russian MFE, and the Russian oil and gas companies were primarily driven by the desire 
to obtain economic profits. On the other hand, other members of the Russian government, 
such as Kozyrev and Primakov, tended to view Russia's participation in the oil deals 
within a broader geopolitical framework. Although never explicitly acknowledged, Kozyrev 
and Primakov tended to view control over energy developments in the Caspian as essential 
to keep the Caspian region under Russian influence. Both Kazakhstan, and especially 
Azerbaijan, were countries that held great strategic significance for Russia. Azerbaijan was 
involved in a war with Armenia in Nagorno-Karabagh and Moscow wanted to make sure it 
remained the dominant player in the resolution of the conflict. Moreover, Azerbaijan 
bordered the sensitive areas of the Russian Northern Caucasus and this increased Russia's 
desire to keep a military and economic presence in the country. Kazakhstan had a 
substantial Russian population and was the necessary route for access to the rest of Central 
Asia. Kozyrev and Primakov tended to view the participation of other countries, such as 
Turkey, the US and Great Britain in the Caspian oil deals, as an increase of Western 
influence in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, to Russia's detriment. They therefore were 
reluctant to Western economic involvement. However, they did not manage to impose their 
views. Chernomyrdin and the MFE agreed to the participation of Gazprom and Lukoil in 
energy exploitation consortia together with foreign, primarily Western energy companies - 
an indication that non-imperialist views predominated, and that 
little could be done to 
prevent Western companies' involvement. 
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Russia also had an interest in having the oil and gas carried through its existing pipeline 
system. Control over the export routes was motivated by both economic and geopolitical 
factors. On the one hand, the pipelines represented a major source of revenue, on the other 
hand, control over the pipelines allowed Russia to hold the key to the Caspian oil 
resources, and thus keep these energy-rich countries under Russia's influence. The Russian 
government, and in particular, Primakov and the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, 
and to a lesser extent Kozyrev viewed the loss of control over the export routes as a major 
blow to Russia's strategic interests in the region, and as a surrender to Western and 
Turkish interests in the area. They interpreted the competition for control over transit 
routes and flows of energy as a new struggle for power in the area. They seemed eager not 
to have other countries replace Russia as the dominant economic power in the region. The 
sectors directly involved in the deals, however, such as the energy companies, the Fuel and 
Energy Ministry, and the Prime Minister, were mainly concerned with the profits involved. 
Although they energy lobby was eager to make profits, it was ready to partially surrender 
the control over the export of oil, so long as it still managed to obtain profits from oil deals 
and pipeline revenues. The predominance of the Energy lobby over the MFA, as well as 
Russia's weak economic position - it did not have the necessary technological and financial 
capabilities required - resulted in Russia accepting that part of the oil be transported 
through regions other than Russia. Still, Russia succeeded without much financial effort in 
making important inroads in the Caspian energy sector and of having the early oil 
transported across Russian territory, and thus allowing it to retain strong leverage over the 
region. The record of informal empire building therefore remains rather mixed. 
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Conclusions 
The current thesis intended to examine the nature of Russia's relations towards the FSS, 
and more specifically towards the CIS member states, after the USSR collapsed in 1991 
until the end of Yeltsin's first term as President of Russia in July 1996. In particular, the 
aim was to examine the commonly held hypothesis that the new Russian state, having lost 
vast amounts of land and over 25 million ethnic nationals, would prove unable to discard 
its imperial legacy and establish normal state-to-state relations with the new republics; and 
that, instead, its leaders would attempt to restore a sphere of influence or informal empire 
over Russia's former colonies, as the French did in sub-Saharan Africa after 
decolonisation. Although the current thesis has shown that there is some support for the 
`neo-imperialist' hypothesis, the evidence of such behaviour is not overwhelming. During 
the period under examination, Russia went through a transitional phase, which involved 
both handling the legacies of the Soviet era and engaging in the process of nation- and 
state-building. Consequently, Russia's policies in most fields, including relations with its 
former Soviet neighbours, did not reflect a truly consistent pattern of behaviour. It can 
therefore be argued that Russia's policies did not completely resemble France's neo- 
imperial policies in sub-Saharan Africa, which were characterised by a coherent policy 
aimed at keeping a sphere of influence in the region, through a network of military bases, 
bilateral defence agreements and preferential trade agreements; the transfer of investment 
and economic aid; the establishment of the Franc Zone; and the development of cultural 
ties. Russia's policies instead, although neo-imperial in many ways, did not follow a 
coherent strategy of informal empire building. 
The current research work demonstrates that in certain respects, during the period January 
1992 - July 1996, Russia had great difficulty in totally dismissing its imperial heritage, and 
instead, attempted in certain domains, to reassert its influence - though in an erratic and 
somehow incoherent fashion - over the former Soviet states. Russian leaders considered the 
post-Soviet space as a sphere of Russia's natural interests, and therefore believed that 
Russia had to retain a predominant position in the area. Although initially strongly anti- 
imperialist, the foreign policy discourse of Russian leaders underwent a major change after 
the Spring of 1993, and became more assertive, reflecting an increasingly neo-imperialist 
attitude as far as Russian policy towards the former Soviet states was concerned. In the 
Autumn of 1993 and Winter of 1994, Foreign Minister Kozyrev clearly talked about 
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Russia's need to keep the former Soviet states in Russia's `sphere of influence', and after 
1992, the Russian government gave growing priority to the settlement of conflicts in the 
near abroad, the protection of the rights of Russian minorities and the deepening of CIS 
military and economic integration. However, despite a more neo-imperialist rhetoric, 
Russia's neo-imperialist record remained rather mixed. Russian leaders did not pursue in 
practice a clearly defined strategy of `informal empire building', aimed at the creation of an 
area over which Russia would have a substantial capacity to influence both external and 
internal developments, over which other countries would be denied a hegemonic presence, 
and in which countries would surrender part of their sovereignty. 
The evidence provided shows that Russia's policies towards the former Soviet states in the 
military field, to a great extent, fitted the pattern of neo-imperialist behaviour, although 
legitimate state interests also played a part in Russia's decisions to act assertively. As was 
shown in Chapters 2 and 3, Russian leaders managed to retain a military presence in all 
CIS states, which the exception of Azerbaijan; to maintain control over most of the former 
Soviet air defence and early warning infrastructure located in the newly independent states; 
and to protect most of the external CIS borders with Russian troops, with the exception of 
Ukraine, Moldova and Azerbaijan. Moreover, Russian leaders signed bilateral treaties with 
most CIS states which provided for close military and military-technical co-operation 
between the Russian army and the armed forces of the states concerned. Some treaties went 
as far as envisaging the creation of joint armed forces, such as the bilateral treaty signed 
with Kazakhstan, in January 1995, or the development of the armed forces on the basis of 
common principles and a common defence policy, as the agreements signed with Belarus in 
December 1995 and May 1996. Russia also became deeply involved in the military 
conflicts that erupted in the post-Soviet space, as in Nagorno-Karabagh, Abkhazia, 
Transdniestria and Tajikistan, by mediating between the warring parties and by providing 
the main contingent of peacekeeping forces. Russian behaviour proved particularly 
assertive in the Transcaucasian region, where the Ministry of Defence, by providing 
military support to the Abkhaz, compelled the Georgian leadership to accept a long-term 
military presence in the country, in the form of three military bases and four naval ports. In 
Azerbaijan, Russian leaders pressed hard, during 1994-1996, for the re-establishment of 
military bases and for the introduction of a Russian-dominated peacekeeping force. 
Similarly, Russia managed to delay the withdrawal of the 14th Army from Transdniestria, 
thus perpetuating its military presence in Moldova. In Tajikistan, Russia's active military 
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involvement in support of the Rakhmonov regime resulted in the country becoming almost 
a Russian protectorate. 
Russia's policies in the energy sector towards the Caspian region also proved particularly 
assertive, and to a certain extent fitted the neo-imperialist pattern. Russia's control over the 
main energy transportation routes out of the Caspian sea basin allowed Russian energy 
companies to obtain participation shares in all important oil deals that Kazakhstan and 
Azerbaijan signed with Western oil companies, and to have part of the oil and gas 
transported through Russian pipelines, thus ensuring Russia's partial control over Caspian 
energy transportation routes. Moreover, the Russian Foreign Ministry, in contradiction to 
the policies of Russian Prime Minister and the Ministry of Fuel and Energy, conducted 
intensive diplomatic efforts aimed at ensuring the joint exploitation of the common 
resources of the Caspian sea by all coastal states. 
The evidence provided in the thesis, however, fails to support the neo-imperialist argument 
completely. Russia's policies in the field of economic integration might, at first sight, be 
perceived as fitting a neo-imperialist pattern. As shown in Chapter 2, Russia initiated and 
supported most of the various attempts aimed at establishing an economic union with the 
CIS states. The economic union failed to materialise, but Russia succeeded in January 
1995 in setting up a Customs Union with Belarus and Kazakhstan, later joined by 
Kyrgyzstan. Negotiations were conducted during 1993-1994 to reach a monetary union 
with Belarus and although the union failed to see the light of day, Russia and Belarus 
signed a treaty on the formation of a Community of Sovereign States in April 1996, which 
foresaw close economic co-ordination among the two countries and the introduction of a 
single currency. During early 1992-Autumn 1993, Russia held control of the ruble - the 
common CIS currency - and this allowed it to control, to a certain extent, economic 
developments in the other post-Soviet states. This was mainly the result of Russia's 
dominant economic position and the unwillingness of the FSS to introduce their own 
currencies. Moreover, Russia granted large subsidies to all post-Soviet states in order to 
preserve the existing trade links and avoid the collapse of post-Soviet economies, which led 
to a high level of indebtedness of the FSS towards Russia. This high level of indebtedness 
provided Russia with a potentially strong leverage over the other CIS economies, and 
eventually allowed Russia to obtain industrial assets particularly in the energy sector in 
some of the FSS, such as Belarus, Moldova and the Baltic states, in exchange for debt 
payments. 
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However, a clear examination of Russia's behaviour showed that Russia's policies in the 
economic sphere did not really fit the neo-imperialist pattern. Most of the integration 
projects failed to materialise because Russia proved unwilling to subsidise deep economic 
integration. Although the ruble zone was preserved for almost two years, Russia eventually 
abolished it altogether in the Autumn of 1993, thus eliminating the possibility of tying the 
economies of the former Soviet states very closely to Russia. Belarus' efforts to integrate 
its monetary system with Russia during 1994, and again in 1996, failed to gain Russia's 
support, thus attesting to a clear non-imperialist behaviour. Russia's willingness to provide 
huge subsidies to the CIS states resulted from the close inter-linkage of the FSS industrial, 
agricultural and energy complexes, and was aimed above all at avoiding the total collapse 
of FSS economies and of Russian industry. It was not aimed primarily at extracting 
military or political concessions, despite the fact that Russia eventually used the large debts 
to obtain, for example, a major share of the Black Sea Fleet, or shares in the CIS and 
Baltic states energy companies. Russia's attempts to obtain shares in the CIS and Baltic 
states' energy sector, were motivated mainly by economic factors, and not by efforts to 
restore a sphere of influence in the regions involved, especially if we consider that many of 
the facilities, such as the Odessa oil terminal, would have allowed CIS states, in this case 
Ukraine, to diversify their energy sources away from Russia, and thus reduce dependency 
on Russia. As with any profit-making company, Lukoil and Gazprom had an economic 
interest in acquiring ownership of local companies, which would have allowed them to 
control the distribution and transit of their products, especially given the debts that many of 
the countries involved had accumulated towards them. 
The evidence provided indicates that as opposed to Russia's policies in the military sphere, 
Russian behaviour in the economic field in fact, proved to be much less neo-imperialistic 
and tended primarily to follow an economic logic. Successful economic transformation, 
including macro-economic stabilisation, had become the top priority of the 
Russian 
President and of the various Russian governments after October 1991. 
Although these 
policies were certainly not conducted in a coherent fashion, and at various stages the 
objective of macro-economic stabilisation was temporarily abandoned - 
for example, by 
increasing subsidies to Russian industry and agriculture, or by providing substantial credits 
to the CIS republics - the overall goal of market transformation and 
financial stabilisation 
was preserved, and no major economic sacrifices were made 
for the sake of political and 
strategic advantages, especially after 1993 and the end of `dual power' 
in Russian politics. 
282 
This explains why efforts aimed at reaching economic integration failed to materialise. 
Although intensive negotiations on economic integration were conducted between Russia 
and the CIS states, no major results were ever reached, with the exception of the Customs 
Union, essentially because economic integration entailed great costs for Russia. The 
disparate level of economic development between Russia and most other CIS states meant 
that Russia would have had to subsidise the other countries' economies for integration to 
succeed, by financing their budget and trade deficits, and sustaining their national 
currencies. Moreover, Russia had no guarantees that the FSS would respect previously 
agreed economic engagements, nor could it impose economic decisions on the FSS that 
wanted to join the union. Therefore Russia risked paying a very high price for very 
uncertain economic advantages. Similar reasons explained the failure during 1994-1996, of 
the Russian-Belarussian economic and monetary union, and of the new-type ruble zone. 
The great importance that Russia attached to economic reforms also explains why it never 
supported efforts to set up CIS supra-national economic institutions, where it would not 
enjoy a majority of the votes, since this would have meant that the other CIS states could 
either hinder economic reforms in Russia or impose economic policies on Russia. For 
example, Russia accepted a banking union and joint control over the printing press, only on 
condition that decisions be adopted in accordance with the shares of capital invested and 
not in accordance with the number of members of the banking union, putting its own 
economic reform programme first. Economic profit also determined the desire of the 
Russian energy sector to obtain shares in the giant oil contracts that were being signed by 
Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan and the Western consortiums, as well as the intention to sell 
energy to all newly independent states at world prices. Russia's policies towards the FSS 
were therefore determined, to a great extent, by financial constraints which often forced 
leaders to abandon projects of economic and military reintegration, such as the new-type 
ruble zone, the Belarussian-Russian monetary union, and the implementation of deep 
military integration projects. However financial reasons also determined the desire of 
Russia to preserve the common CIS border as a Russian border - since it was too 
expensive to construct a new one - and to restore the existing air 
defence system. As far as 
Russian minorities are concerned, the evidence indicates that Russia's policies toward the 
Baltic states were aimed above all at integrating Russians minorities within the Estonian 
and Latvian political and civil communities. Russia seems not to have used the fate of 
Russians to preserve a military presence in the Baltic states, nor to bring these countries 
under Russia's sphere of influence. 
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The evidence provided in the thesis thus shows that Russia's active behaviour in the former 
Soviet state, even in the military field, was not always the result of `imperialistic' 
ambitions or an imperial `grand design' conceived by Russian leaders. Although, generally 
speaking, an `imperial' state of mind dominated the Russian elite, Russian leaders often, 
although not always, followed policies which would be generally regarded as legitimate 
state concerns. For example, the emergence of a belt of great instability along Russia's 
southern borders, which resulted in a massive flow of refugees, and the general indifference 
of the international community towards conflicts in the FSS, explains to a great extent 
Russia's efforts to mediate and introduce its peacekeeping forces in order to put an end to 
military conflicts in Abkhazia, Transdniestria, Nagorno-Karabagh and Tajikistan, and to 
protect the CIS external borders with Russian soldiers. The damage caused by the collapse 
of the USSR to Russia's advantageous military position, above all in Transcaucasia and 
along Russia's western borders, as well as the disruption of the common defence system, 
accounted for Russia's attempts to keep an important military presence in most of the 
newly independent states, in the form of military bases, joint border patrolling, and control 
over the early warning and air defence systems. The loss of vital economic resources and 
transportation lines explains Russia's efforts to have a stake in the profitable energy deals 
of the Caspian basin. The disruption of economic ties and the need to prevent the collapse 
of Russian and CIS industry accounted for the provision of subsidies and efforts to create a 
free trade zone. The violation of human and civic rights of Russians living beyond Russia's 
borders determined Russia's active policies, for example, in the Baltic states. However, 
these legitimate concerns often conflicted with similarly legitimate aspirations of the new 
states and consequently resulted in an infringement of the newly independent states' 
sovereignty. 
The current research work also demonstrates that although Russia did conduct an assertive 
policy towards the former Soviet states, its leaders were in many occasions reacting to - 
rather than initiating - events occurring in the post-Soviet states. 
Often, mistakes made by 
the leaders of the newly independent states created precarious or dangerous situations, 
which jeopardised Russia's national interests, and which to a certain extent compelled 
Russian leaders to get involved in the internal affairs of the former Soviet states. This 
is 
especially true when we examine, for example, the early stages of the ethnic conflicts that 
erupted in the former Soviet space, during 1991-1992. The 
leaders of the newly 
independent states attempted to use force in order to silence secessionist claims and 
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opposition groups. Azerbaijani leaders blockaded the Nagorno-Karabagh enclave and 
shelled its capital, Stepanakert, between late 1991 and early 1992; Moldovan forces 
attacked Bendery and other Transdniester cities in June 1992; Georgian President Zviad 
Gamsakhurdia abolished South Ossetia's autonomy in late 1990 and Georgian paramilitary 
forces shelled South Ossetia in late 1991 and early 1992, Georgian Defence Minister 
Kitovani stormed Sukhumi in August 1992; Tajik president Nabiev armed his own 
supporters in the Spring of 1992. These events led to an escalation of tension and an 
eruption of violence, which prompted Russia's active involvement in mediation and 
peacekeeping. Although there is substantial evidence indicating that the Russian 
government, in particular the Ministry of Defence, often provided indirect support to the 
belligerent parties in the various conflicts after violence erupted, the available evidence 
does not prove that the new Russian leadership created or instigated the ethnic conflicts, 
with possible exceptions perhaps in Transdniestria and Abkhazia. The evidence available 
seems to indicate that CIS/Russian military participated in conflicts on a voluntary basis, 
by providing weapons and equipment. However, once violence erupted, Russian leaders 
made every effort to remain the main guarantors of peace in the region. On the one hand, 
they introduced Russian-dominated peacekeeping forces in the various conflict zones, tried 
to prevent other regional players and international organisations from intervening 
militarily, and, in some cases, tried to marginalise international organisations from the 
negotiations, as in Nagorno-Karabagh. On the other hand, they tried to prolong Russia's 
military presence in the area by negotiating the establishment of Russian military bases, as 
in Georgia, or by delaying the withdrawal of forces back to Russia, as in Moldova. 
Although the Russian MFA collaborated with the UN and the OSCE in the negotiations 
aimed at reaching a settlement in Abkhazia, Tajikistan and Transdniestria, Russia tried to 
remain the dominant mediator, and attempted to displace the CSCE/OSCE in Nagorno- 
Karabagh during 1993-1994. In Abkhazia close co-operation was established between 
Russian peacekeepers and UNOMIG, but Russia's efforts to enlist the support of 
international organisations were mainly intended to provide further legitimacy to Russia's 
intervention. 
Similar conclusions, regarding Russia's reactions to events in the former Soviet space, can 
be reached when examining Russia's economic polices towards the 
former Soviet states. 
The unwillingness of most leaders of the newly independent states, with the sole exception 
of the Baltic states, to conduct serious economic reforms, to a great extent, obliged 
Russia 
to provide easy-term credits as well as subsidised energy and raw materials, 
in order to 
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avoid a total collapse of their economies. Similarly, the reluctance of Estonian and Latvian 
leaders to integrate Russian minorities into their political and civic communities, explained 
Russia's active diplomatic efforts aimed at ensuring the protection of their rights. 
The evidence also demonstrates that, especially in the early period of Russian foreign 
policy, from early 1992 until the Spring of 1993, Russian leaders lacked a clear foreign 
policy programme regarding relations with the former Soviet states, and a clear concept of 
the CIS. This was to be expected, since foreign policy experts and diplomats had been used 
to dealing with third countries and not with the post-Soviet states, and therefore had 
difficulties in establishing real state-to-state relations with countries that until so recently 
had been part of the same state, and which they still regarded as their own country. The ties 
that existed among these countries had been extremely tight, and were bound to remain so 
for a while. Consequently the Russian Foreign Ministry found it difficult to determine a 
clear policy line regarding the former Soviet states. The absence of a clearly defined 
programme regarding the near abroad became a key element in the domestic power struggle 
which ravaged Russian politics between early 1992 and September 1993, and this in turn, 
determined the incoherent and erratic fashion of Russia's policies towards the former 
Soviet states. During 1992 and 1993, an intensive power struggle between the President 
and his team on the one hand, and Parliament and the Vice-President on the other, 
characterised the domestic political scene. This struggle was above all the result of the 
contradictory and ambiguous nature of the Soviet Constitution, which Russian leaders had 
inherited from the Soviet era, and which did not set out precisely the exact powers of the 
President, the Vice-President and Parliament. 
Foreign policy became an important element, together with the conduct of economic 
reforms, of this power struggle. The slow progress of economic reform, and the lack of a 
clearly defined programme regarding Russia's policies towards the near abroad, made 
Russian leaders increasingly vulnerable to mounting pressure from representatives of state 
industry, the opposition in the Supreme Soviet, and moderate as well as more extreme 
nationalist circles who called for an assertive policy in the post-Soviet space. The Russian 
government felt compelled to abandon its policy of retreat from the near abroad and replace 
it with a more pro-active policy. The abolition of the Supreme Soviet in September 1993 
and the adoption of a new Constitution in December 1993, which granted substantial 
powers to the President, did not really improve the position of the Russian government. The 
defeat of democratic-reformist forces in the Duma elections of 1993 and 1995, the victory 
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of Vladimir Zhirinovsky, and the successes of the Communist and Agrarian parties, again 
placed the government in a weak position, and forced it to compromise on foreign policy 
issues. However, the arrival of Primakov at the Foreign Ministry in January 1996 led to 
better foreign policy co-ordination. Primakov's ability to muster the support of most forces 
in Parliament allowed for a more coherent and effective foreign policy. This was indicated 
by Primakov's renewed and temporarily successful efforts aimed at finding political 
settlements in Abkhazia and Tajikistan, as well as the new integration projects signed with 
Belarus, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. 
The lack of co-ordinated foreign policy activities was also caused by the strained relations 
which existed between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defence, a 
result mainly of the different approaches to foreign policy by Foreign Minister Kozyrev 
and Defence Minister Grachev. During 1992, the main objective of Kozyrev's policy was 
to bring Russia back into the group of developed and civilised nations. This meant, among 
other things, that Russia would conduct its relations with all countries, regardless of 
whether they belonged to the former Soviet Union or not, on the basis of the agreed norms 
of international law. This view contrasted sharply with the position of the Ministry of 
Defence, which was above all concerned with the protection of servicemen and the 
preservation of military assets in the former Soviet states, as well as with the participation 
in peacekeeping operations, regardless of whether these aims were achieved within the 
generally accepted norms of international law. Kozyrev's policy of Russian withdrawal 
from the former Soviet space, became the object of intensive criticism from political and 
academic circles, who insisted on a more active Russian presence in the region, and 
demanded Kozyrev's resignation. This forced Kozyrev to change his policies towards a 
more active Russian presence in the region by mid-1993. Although his new attitude fell 
more into line with the positions of the Ministry of Defence, he still failed to co-ordinate his 
activities with those of the Minister of Defence. As a result, Russia continued to conduct 
an uncoordinated policy in the post-Soviet space. Relations between the Foreign and 
Defence Ministries improved with the arrival of Primakov at the Foreign Ministry, 
resulting in better co-ordination and higher success. 
This research also reaches another conclusion regarding Russia's policies towards the 
CIS 
states. By the end of 1994 and early 1995, Russian leaders began to differentiate between 
certain CIS states and the rest of the former Soviet Union. Relations with Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan and Armenia started to be considered more important for 
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Russia than relations with the rest of the CIS states, and efforts were conducted to increase 
economic and military integration with them. Economic, military, geographic and ethnic 
factors determined closer relations with Kazakhstan, Belarus and Ukraine. The close ethnic 
ties that existed between Russians, Belarussian and Ukrainians, the large presence of 
Russian minorities inhabiting Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan, the geographical 
proximity of these three countries to Russia, and their geostrategic location, especially that 
of Ukraine and Belarus as transit routes to Western markets, determined Russia's efforts to 
reach closer co-operation with them. The willingness of most of these state, with the 
exception of Ukraine, to establish closer ties with Russia, also explains why Russia 
adopted a more pragmatic policy and attempted to increase co-operation with those 
countries most ready to do so. Russian leaders succeeded in establishing a customs union 
with Belarus, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan and a close economic union was set up with 
Belarus. 
The overall conclusion can therefore be drawn that Russian leaders managed to a great 
extent to discard their imperial legacy. Although they did conduct an assertive policy in the 
near abroad, such a policy often, although not always, resulted from the need to fulfil what 
are usually regarded as legitimate state interests, such as preventing the spread of 
instability and insecurity into Russia, stopping the bloodshed in neighbouring countries, 
protecting the rights of Russian minorities, or avoiding the total collapse of FSS 
economies. Moreover, in certain areas, particularly in the economic field and in policies 
towards Russian minorities, Russia's behaviour hardly resembled informal empire 
building. On the other hand, Russia did behave in a neo-imperialist fashion in the military 
field, particularly once it got involved in conflict resolution in the former Soviet states. The 
record on the `neo-imperial ist' question is therefore mixed. Russian leaders and the 
Russian population at large faced great difficulties in discarding the imperial legacy and 
coming to terms with the collapse of the Soviet state, and this largely explains why Russia 
became actively involved in the former Soviet space, often in a neo-imperialist fashion. 
However, Russia's policies towards the FSS were also influenced by what were perceived 
as legitimate state interests, such as Russia's own stability and security, as well as by the 
high inter-linkage of the republican economies, the presence of a large Russian population 
in the FSS, and the strong cultural and political ties that developed during the Soviet era. 
All these elements often argued in favour of conducting an active policy in the near abroad. 
Legitimate state interests, however, also accounted for the restraint often found in Russia's 
behaviour, especially when imperial over-extension was perceived as detrimental to 
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Russia's own interests, in particular to its domestic economic transition. Both national 
interests and imperial legacies, therefore, combined to shape Russia's behaviour in the 
former Soviet space, and this explains why policies were sometimes more restrained than is 
usually assumed. 
However, Russia's policies were also characterised by a lack of clarity, ambivalence and 
disarray a result of the weak and fragmented character of the Russian state. Highly 
dissimilar views among the various branches of the Russian government, particularly the 
MOD and the MFA, as far as relations with the FSS are concerned, conflicting agendas, 
and the struggle for power between Parliament and the President, explain the highly 
contradictory and often counter-productive policies conducted towards the CIS states and 
the Baltic countries. President Yeltsin's weak position within Russia, especially after 1993, 
and his efforts to reach broad domestic compromise, resulted in extremely incoherent 
policies, which not necessarily reflected Russia's interests. The lack of preparedness and 
the absence of a clear foreign policy project determined that policies were often reactive, 
rather than pro-active, to events in the post-Soviet space. Imperial legacy, national interest, 
and incoherence, all these three elements were always present in Russia's policies towards 
the near abroad, and this explains to a great extent the complexities of Russia's behaviour 
in the former Soviet space, as well as why Russia's policies resulted in what may be called 
restrained assertiveness'- an assertive behaviour which rarely went beyond what Russia's 
leaders considered to be the country's interests. 
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